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ABSTRACT 
Investor relations (IR) and corporate communication are functions that make the 
difference for the listed companies' communication process to the market. They are also 
the strategic corporate too] that creates visibility. interest. and liquidity. and ultimately 
attracts and motivates investment. 
The obýjectlve of this research study is to identify and extract perceptions on the IR 
function by the top management of the listed firms on the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE), the analysts and the fund managers who analyse and invest in the Greek stocks. 
The mandatory and voluntary disclosure strategies used by Greek listed companies are t: - 
also identified and their effectiveness evaluated. From the findings the author extracts. Z-1 
and synthesizes an effective IR model. 
The research, based on a grounded theory approach. identified and investigated key IR 
issues through semi-structured interviews. Interview and questionnaire data were 
collected from 164 market players. Empirical data on IR activities, programmes and 
opinions by the Greek companies, the local and global sell side analysts and the local 
and global institutional investors were collected. 
It is the first study to have been conducted in the IR area and the corporate 
communication process in Greece. and its findings could be utillsed by the listed 
companies and market players in other markets. 
In conclusion,, the study, by evaluating IR programmes and recommending a corporate 
commum cation framework and methodology, contributes towards a better 
understanding of the IR process and the IR effectiveness in a non-English speaking 
market, full of small capitalization listed firms that struggle to get attention from the 
investors. With the current research, the author also intends to contribute towards an 
enhanced interface and understanding between academic research and business practice 
in the areas of corporate communication and IR. 
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"Not things, but opi . n/ . ons about things, trouble inen " Epictems 
Investor relations (IR) have slowly but progressively become a discipline and an ail 
between a rock and a hard place. IR is a function that can make the difference to the 
listed companies' communication process to the market. With so many issues on 
corporate accountability and effectiveness, the IR function today is an issue that arises 
beyond and above the corporate governance guidelines. which are universal and 
standardised, in many national equity markets and countries, especially in the 
"economic blocks" such as the European Union, NAFTA, etc. IR is also an activity that 
puts the listed stock "on the radar screen" of the fund managers and leads to an 
investment in the listed company. 
The objective of this research study is to identify and extract the perceptions of the top 
management of the listed firrns on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), the sell side 
analysts and the fund managers. In addition, the involuntary and voluntary disclosure 
strategies used by Greek listed companies will be identified and their effectiveness 
evaluated. As a consequence, the author intends to extract an effective IR path/method 
in order to attain the IR predetermined goals, such as increasing firrn visibility and share 
price and improving the firm's liquidity through upgraded disclosure. However, 
measuring the effectiveness of the IR activities is a difficult task as well as a dilemma 
and there is no standard answer to it. As an IR practitioner. the author believes that 
ultimately the IR is measured up with some identifiable factors. These factors belong 
mostly to the voluntary disclosure pool that the IRO and the senior management can 
use. The friendly, interactive and well-informed company's web site, the increasing 
number of private meetings with investors, especially institutional investors, the 
implementation of a roadshow policy, and even the adequate and timely feedback to 
analysts are variables which the IRO can intensify or minimize well beyond the 
Corporate Governance principles and regulations of Corporate Governance. Other 
factors, such as the number of institutional investors year by year. the retaining of 
existing investors, the number of people (end users. institutional and individual 
investors) who know the company well (through constant communication and 
disclosure) and the increase of the share price of the underlying stock. are simpler and 
more obvious. Simply put. what is communicated. to whom, why and how are the main 
questions of this research. 
Viii 
Furthen-nore. the research design, based on a grounded theory approach, was to collect 
empirical data about IR programmes from the Greek companies, the local and global 
(London) sell side analysts and the local and global (London) mutual. hedge and 
pension fund managers, and to identify and investigate key issues through semi- 
structured interviews. In December 2004. there were 360 listed companies at the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). compared with 279 in Italy (Bolsa Itallana), 2 ooo in 
Spain, 2,673 in London (LSE). 861 in Deutsche Borse (Germany). 419 in the Swiss 
Stock Exchange and 1.033 in Euronext (Institutional Investor, 2005). Almost 75% of 
the 360 listed companies are considered to be i-nedium-to-small capitalization 
companies which have particular characteristics, such as newly established IR offices, 
reporting in Greek GAAP, no visibility, use only of Greek language material, etc. and 
challenges such as small market capitalisation companies, increasing analyst coverage, ' 
strategic targeting of fund managers, cities. countries for proactive roadshows, extreme 
need for IR, limited number of shareholders, liquidity issues,, more relationship 
roadshows , increasing analyst coverage. marketable press releases, etc., (this research: 
Demos, 2005c). Interview data were collected from 76 top managers of Greek listed 
companies, in addition to 44 sell side analysts and to 44 institutional investors, in total 
164. Approximately 23% (37 interviews) of the data were conducted in the English 
language while the remaining 77% (127 interviews) were conducted in Greek. All 
interviews were taped and the discussion-interview had, as a guide, the questionnaire 
format and sections-questions that had been completed previously by the interviewer. 
It is the first study to have been conducted in the IR area and the corporate 
communication process in Greece, and the author focused on collecting not only hard 
evidence from the IR practitioners but also the perceptions, misunderstanding and 
comprehension of the top managers of the listed companies on the Athens Stock 
Exchange and other market players. In terms of disclosure regulation, since the 
institution of the by-law or the better-known regulation 204, dated December 6,2000, 
by the Capital Market Committee (CMC) - the Greek SEC-, most companies tried via 
46exienial" pressure to comply with the optional but highly recommended regulation, by 
creating an in-house official "communication officer" which is not exactly an IR officer 
or IR department. 
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) also promoted the IR function by indirectly 
recommending that the listed companies establish an IR office. In 2002. the ASE's 
Research and Development department initiated a research/questionnaire, based on the 
so-called -stai- stocks'" or "star sYsienf'. It was mailed to all listed companies at the 
ix 
ASE. giving them six months to respond and comply with the issues. The obýjectlve by 
the R&D department and generally by the Administration of the ASE was to search and 
find out which listed companies were (and still are) complying with issues such as: Web 
site information. A detailed list of the roadshows that took place last year in Greece and 
abroad, Fair and steady disclosure. Having an in-house IR office or department, Board 
of Directors and Executive team, and having and operating an Internal Audit office. In 
other words, the majority of the IR "deparnnents" were established exogenously. 
basically only for corporate public mandatory disclosure. via CMC regulation 5/204, 
ASE's stock star system, law 3016, etc. ). The main issues \vhich corporate governance 
is seen as addressing in Greek fin-ris are business planning procedures, a more active 
role for the board of directors, the development of organizational and administrative 
structures, perfon-nance measurement, coordination and internal control mechanisms. 
personnel selection systems, appropriate remuneration policy and the promotion of 
business culture. The inclusion of Greece in the emerging market world as a major 
player for a long period of time partly explains the non-existence or, better, the slow 
development of the IR profession. As a Hedge Fund Manager stated during the 
interviews, 'fýreignfiunds investing in emerging inarkets have traditionalýv paid inore 
attention to the inacroecononfic characteristics qf each national inarket and its 
inonientum rather than ihefundamentals of its listed companies ". Moreover. the criteria 
of company selection have been more lax than in the developed market. By being a big 
player in those markets, Greece had secured the attention of global funds, meaning it 
was not necessary for local listed firms to spare time and money to market themselves. 
After all, the strategy of active emerging market foreign funds was to follow the top- 
down approach (macro to micro) instead of the bottom-up one (micro to macro) adopted 
by active funds investing in developed and mature markets. But the graduation of the 
Athens bourse to developed markets on May 31,2001, meant that this all had to change, 
and local firrns bad to become aggressive in marketing their strong points and in use of 
informal IR options to the global institutional investors who either did /do not know 
them or had/have a bad opinion about them. 
Chapter 1.0 Introduction 
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This chapter will try to display the framework. methodology and the objective of this 
thesis and will also display the definitions of terms, activities and market players who 
are involved in the corporate communication process and the main types of corporate 
disclosure. With reference to the title of this thesis, it is essential to define perception 
and effectiveness as they are used here. Perception, according to Webster's 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary (1988, Lexicon Publications, Inc. ), is "the ability to becorne 
aware of through the senses and to become aware of by understanding, discern" 
Respectively, effectiveness, according to the same dictionary. is defined as "the 
capability of causing a desired or decisive result". 
1.1 Defining the corporate activity of Investor Relations 
In this thesis, the tern-is "corporate communication". "corporate financial 
cornmum cation", "communication of infori-nation". "corporate disclosure", and 
"disclosure of information" as well as "investor relations" refer approximately to the 
sarne idea and meaning and are used interchangeably. The Cadbury report (1992. 
paragraph 3.2) describes corporate financial communication as "... an open approach to 
the disclosure of information (which) contributes to the efficient working of the market 
economy, prompts boards to take effective action and allows shareholders and others to 
scrutinize companies more thoroughly". A set of definitions, given by researchers. 
practitioners and authors over the years, and which try to grasp the multidisciplinary 
activity of investor relations, follows. Most people from the academic community as 
well as Investor Relations (IR) practitioners accept the well-defined descriptions of the 
Investor Relations function, given by the National (US) Investor Relations Institute 
(NIRI)l: "A strategic management responsibility using the disciplines of finance, 
communication and marketing to manage the content and flow of company information 
to financial and other constituencies to maximise relative valuation" and by the UK's 
Investor Relations Society (IRS)2: "As the means whereby listed companies maintain a 
dialogue with existing shareholders and potential investors. Its purpose is to present an 
accurate picture of corporate perfon-nance and prospects. thus allowing the investment 
I 
(jjp: //w\\\\ . niri. org) 
(J2: \V\V\\ ir-soc. on. uk) 
community, through an informed market, to deten-nme a realistic share price. As a 
result. IR can have a positive impact on a company's market value and cost of capital 
relative to the industry sector and overall economic climate". The fori-ner stresses the 
strategic element of the JR. which shows that the Americans have grasped the essence 
of the activity. The latter identifies rightly the end result of the IR activities - that of the 
share price and evaluation. During the last decade, researchers have exposed other sides 
of the JR function. In particular. Marston (1996b. p. 477) defines IR "as the 
management of the relationship between a company with pubfic]y traded securities and 
the holders or potential holders of such securities". She adds. "the IR process must 
reflect the highest standards of integrity of its practitioners if it is to retain the trust it 
requires from both corporate management and the investment communit", ". In other 
words, she stresses the human elements of the IR activity. such as management of the 
relationship, integrity of IR officers and even ethical boards of directors and the top 
executives. Brown (1995, p. 44) defines Investor Relations as a 44strategic corporate 
marketing activity, combining the disciplines of finance and communication, which 
provides present and potential investors with an accurate portrayal of a company's 
performance a nd prospects". Strategy and long range company prospects issues are 
stressed here, placing IR at the inner core of the top management of each listed 
corporation. Preis and Berbers (1990, p. 102) concluded that investor relations is "the 
mechanism by which companies communicate those facts about themselves that lead to 
a judgment, by the capital markets, on their corporate operational ability". According to 
them, the JR function is a vital communication processor or mechanism that helps to 
make right investment decisions. According to the author's experience as an JR 
practitioner, investor relations is a strategic multidisciplinary function that combines 
principles, methods and tools from sciences and arts, such as finance, accounting. 
marketing, economics, game theory, public relations, psychology and military strategy. 
Moreover, investor relations and corporate communications are activities that are 
initiated, planned and executed by skilful people in an organization at the highest level, 
since they affect the company's evaluation and future prospects. In addition, these 
personnel are incorporated into the organizational chart according to the specific needs 
of the company and the top management, and interact and communicate information 
internally and externally. The leader of the communication team has been named 
Investor Relations Officer (IRO) and since he/she is close to the upper management of 
any company and organization. is considered by market players to be a strategic 
operating officer. Therefore. the Investor Relations Officer ORO) is the executive who 
is responsible for initiating, organising. planning and implementing the IR strate(2v. as 
well as consulting and directing the top management to the most effective 
communication path. The IRO can follow either formal or infori-nal communication 
paths to convey the cornpany's message to the market participants (Demos, 2005c). The 
people internally with \N, hom the IRO continuously interacts are mainly the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors. the Members of the Board. the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and to a lesser extent the marketing director, the chief 
accountant and the Chief Operating Officer (COO). An attempt is made here to describe 
the rnam players in the Greek market place. The Chain-nan of the Board of Directors 
(BoD) is the independent and authoritative person who sets the Board agenda, ensures 
the Board obtains the highest quality infori-nation and facilitates communication both 
among Board members and between them and management. The Members of the Board' 
are the operational administrators of the firm and the independent officials who 
guarantee and authorize the decisions, strategy and efficiency of the Board. The Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) is the manager whose job is to run a major company 
successfully in an increasingly risky and hyper competitive global economy. The Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) is the manager whose job is to oversee the financial matters of 
the firm. Investor relations, in Greece. is also highly interrelated with the rules and 
principles of corporate governance. This relationship is so important that it resembles 
the father-son relationship. The fon-ner likes to control and direct and the latter tries 
hard to act independently. IROs have lost many nights of sleep over the extension of 
corporate governance and regulation (Chatzlemmanoil, 2002). This is a concern for all 
IR people across the globe 3. Every year. over the last seven years (1999-2005), in the 
4 annual global IR conference , orgamsed by the International Investor Relations 
Federation (IIRF), a large scale discussion has taken place and the main question has 
been whether regulation is counterproductive for the IROs and IR activity. But what is 
corporate governance? Corporate Governance (CG) is the set of rules and regulations 
that direct and prescribe the business conduct for accountability and performance 
(Milonas, 2002, Holland, 1995). Moreover, it tries hard to control and standardize the 
corporate dissernmation of information in order to create an environment of equivalent 
information for all market players and the instantaneous share of information by others 
with the firrn's insiders (i. e. Chain-nan of the BoD. CEO, CFO and others) (Schma, 
2004, Pikios, 2002: Welker. 1995). 
International InN estor Rclations Federation (11RF) annuai conterences" discussions, minutes and 
publications (wwwAirforg). 
-' IIRF ('on t, erencc. 2005.2004.2003.2002.2001.2000.1999. 
1.1.1 Direct wid iiidirect coiporate commuiiication iii Greece 
Historically. the IR function and industry came to existence. first in the USA. as a 
demand-driven activity and a necessity for both the top managers (as they were taking 
control away from the founder's family) and the investors (as they were becoming more 
and more institutionalized) (Marston, 1996b- Brown. 1995. Preis and Berbers. 1990). 
Later on it was dernanded in the UK and the commonwealth countries and during the 
1990s proliferated to Europe, Asia and the Rest of the World (RoW). Many researchers 
and practitioners accept that the IR function does help the infori-nation flow between the 
listed companies and their audience (Marcus and Wallace. 1998: Marston. 1996a. 
Derriman, 1969). According to the Agency Theory, in which managers run the listed 
firms, they also plan and implement the strategic and marketing plans and consequently 
control all vital company infori-nation (Healy and Palepu, 2001: Bushman, Piotroski and 
Smith, 2001; Marston. 1997a; Holland. 1997). On the other hand. all shareholders and 
stakeholders (i. e. suppliers, bankers, customers, etc. ) have little or no infon-nation on the 
company's activities and perfon-nance. Thus this information asymmetry between the 
two groups creates the need for an infori-nation. processor such as the IR function, and 
the IR adventure begins, since as infori-nation processor, the communication flows 
constantly in all directions, in and out of the company. Previous research in Greece 
found that the IR is not a simple function. It is a complex and multi -di scip] mary 
executive practice, which combines knowledge of economics, finance, accounting, 
marketing, psychology and organizational behaviour with managerial skills such as 
effectiveness, persistence, strategic inclination and other personal attributes of the 
people who implement it (Demos, 2003d: Gitzos, 2002, Aloupis, 2002). The basic aim 
of the Investor Relations (IR) department is: a) the creation and cultivation of relations 
of trust with the investors; b) the direct, correct, valid and timely disclosure of company 
activities to the market (analysts, institutional investors, brokers, bankers, etc. ), and c) 
the strategic planning and programming of IR activities, which have as their ultimate 
goal to optimize the company"s share price (Demos, 2000a). It emerges as the basic 
need of communicating the company's information to the market, and, as a platform of 
information, it can be used by the different interested parties such as analysts, brokers, 
institutional investors, bankers, etc., to their benefits. The regulators appear precisely in 
order to control and direct the communication channel to the mutual benefit of all 
market participants (Figure 1.1). Some belie\, e that the IR should operate in the 
compulsory mandatory en\, ironment and others should be left to the \, oluntary 
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mechanisms (Preis and Berbers. 1990. Marston, 1999. Holland, 1997, Nichols, 1989. 
Kopel. 1982). 
Figure I. I: Direct and indirect information to investors in Greece 
CAIC (SEC) / ASE (Mandatorv Information) 
Company I nvestors 
CEO Direct / Voluntary Informatio Institutional Investors 
CFO Private / Retail Investors 
IRO 
Information via Intermediaries 
(Analysts, Media, Brokers. Bankers, Market Makers, etc) 
Greek IR practices follow their own life cycle. For example. some expect that the IR 
department should mainly prepare and disclose the mandatory information, as set by the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Capital Market Committee (CMC) (i. e. 5/204). 
to the investors (Alexakis, 2003. Demos, 2003d). Some also believe that the IR is 
primarily a public relations activity. and the most mature practitioners like to see the 
companies regulate themselves (Avgouleas, 2003, Demos. 2000c). For their part during 
recent years, the management of the A. S. E and the Capital Market Committee (the 
Greek SEC), the local regulators, have intensified their efforts to create the necessary 
ground for establishing direct contact between the listed companies and the investors. In 
addition to helping to implement the EU-related directives, they also enforce other 
recommendations. Furthen-nore, Greek listed companies are strongly encouraged by the 
A. S. E - but also strongly motivated by their need to contact investors directly through 
group presentations or one-to-one meetings to perform roadsbows not only in Greece 
but also in Europe, Northern America and Asia (Demos, 2003b; 2002d, Kontogjams. 
2001). 
1.2 Hellenic Investor Relations 
In Greece, by September 2004, there were more than 150 IR practitioners, most of them 
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IROs. an industry association, the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute ; satisfactory 
acceptance of the IR profession by the analysts, media, the institutional investors and 
the authorities. as an important financial function for the listed companies 
(Kontogiannis. 2004a). At the end of 2004 there were 360 listed companies at the I 
c - (\vww. HIR1Jr) 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Of these, 45 are dual listed fin-ns. mainly at the ASE 
and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Some also trade at the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange. and others are listed on the ASE and the American Exchanges. name]v at the 
NYSE and the NASDAQ. Finally. there are "orphan" Greek stocks. which are Greek 
listed ones on NYSE, Oslo, etc. Therefore, there was a decade of dual listing, and US 
disclosure experience by the Greek listed companies which helped their col-poratc 
communication policies (Economist. 2004vii. 2003f. 2003k: Alexakis, 2002b. Del-nos. 
2000b). 
1.3 The research idea and objective 
The original idea for this research was to describe the IR activities in the Greek market 
and to identify the quality and sophistication of the IR practice. The plan was to extract 
the perceptions of major market players (company executives, fund managers and 
analysts) on the JR, and, furthen-nore, to identify the effectiveness of Investor Relations 
activities in Greece. The author researched the opinions about the Investor Relations 
function, of the top management, mostly the Chairmen of the BoD, CEO. the CFO and 
the IRO of a good mix of small, medium and large capitalization and global Greek 
companies (those who have operations in Greece and abroad). which are listed mainly 
on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) and on other international exchanges such as the 
LSE, NYSE, NASDAQ and others. The research objective also focused on investigating 
the major IR issues that affect the effectiveness of the IR function and consequently the 
(budgeted) costs for disclosure, the time devoted and spent by the top management, the 
liquidity of the stock, and the cost of capital for the listed company. the share price and 
others. Some of the issues are structural and others are behavioural or, rather, 
psychological, such as issues that deal with the personality of the IRO. the hidden 
agenda of the insiders, the interaction between the buyers and the sellers of the stock 
during the meetings and others. It is indeed found that the interaction between the 
organizational structure of the IR department and certain features of (the IRO's) human 
personality can bring about the best results for the listed company (Demos, 2001 a: this 
thesis). In other words, the hiring of a good, highly paid IRO should correspond with 
the maintenance of an efficient IR office/department and adequate IR budget. In order to 
achieve the IR and company goals, the IRO must establish direct contact with investors 
- both retail and institutional investors, such as Mutual Funds. Pension Funds, Hedge 
Funds. etc. He, ýshe can also convey messages and communicate points to the end users 
via intermediaries such as analysts and journalists. The research's main questions to the 
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company's managers focus on the value that the IR adds to the communication and the 
relationship of the firms with the financial community. Moreover, the research aimed to 
identify the senior executives' goals and the ultimate target of the company's disclosure 
policies: which IR strategy and tactics. as expressed with the combined use of the IR 
tools, are the most effective to reach the investors screen. shape their ,,, iews and 
influence investment decisions. For instance. if the company objective Is better 
liquidity, then the retail investors are as important as the institutional ones and therefore 
the IRO should primarily use and capitalize the media path. If the managers (the 
information insiders) target mostly sophisticated investors i. e. pension, mutual. hedge 
funds), then the IRO should use information inten-nediaries, such as sell-sde analysts. 
extensively. The research also focused on the perceptions and opinions of the local and 
London (global) sell side analysts, how they interact and utilize the IR function to' 
obtain company information, write reports and evaluate the firms, and how they are 
informed and inform end clients (fund managers) about the listed companies and give 
feedback to the companies. The research evaluated the opinions of another group of the 
major market players by examining how the local and global fund managers think and 
perceive the IR function and the effectiveness of the Greek IR policies that the IROs 
implement and follow. Assuming the inefficiency of the strong level of the financial 
markets and accepting the agency model, the current research tries to recognize the 
information relationship between the insiders and the institutional investors- 
shareholders and the role that the IR plays by using the analysts as channels of 
communication. Another objective is to find and propose ways to improve the impact of 
the IR programme, especially for small and medium capitalization companies which are 
listed in peripheral markets like the Greek one. Effectiveness of the IR is a quest and 
cannot be standardized in its application. There are common elements of the IR 
activities but, as in marketing, advertising, proactive and strategic intent, intuition, 
creativity, leadership and a superior mix of means and information media play the 
biggest role in the success of the IR. 
1.4 Rationale of the research 
As stated earlier, the primary objective of this study is to investigate the IR perceptions 
of company executives and other market players, and, most important, the effectiveness 
of the IR function for a small. somehow emerging. and non-English speaking market 
such as that of Greece. Secondly, it Nvill examine the advantages and disadvantages of 
each IR or corporate communication too] in order to identify the best way for the listed 
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companies to communicate their message and story, and bri in ormation gap and idge the in 
asymmetries between them and the investors. The research indicates some kind of 
direction for the domestic IR activities for the current and new practitioners in this 
fledgling IR industry in Greece. and it will also create the need for more research on a 
national level for local. regional and alobal interactive purposes. It Investigates the IR 
process and effectiveness that are initiated and processed by the three major components 
of the information channels: first. the infori-nation that is controlled from the market 
authorities. therefore one speaks about regulated communication. second. the 
information which is processed by the infori-nation inten-nediaries such as the analysts, 
lastly, the information that is communicated at the discretion of the top management or 
the information from insiders of company. The Greek market is a small. peripheral 
market but nevertheless a good model for similar countries in terrns of size, capital 
markets, maturity. visibility and growth level - especially countries that either are 
emerging or joining the European Union - to examine and benefit from. Consequently. 
the local experience of the IR practice can be extrapolated to surrounding countries such 
as Cyprus, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. to mention a few, that really can benefit 
from the Greek IR experience. From that perspective, the author intends to deduce the 
best possible IR tools that first combine the optimal quantity and quality of disclosure. 
and second, synthesize the management information incentives with the corporate 
governance decrees. This paradigm can be exported to non-English speaking countries 
and companies that operate in similar market settings. Therefore, the author intends to 
expose what is happening at the present time and what the people involved in IR think 
about it, and then to synthesize and create a collective body of knowledge. experience, 
imagination, perspective and sometimes unorthodox tactics that will ensure IR 
effectiveness, especially for smaller capitalization firrns with low quality of accounting 
and financial information. The study was motivated from the need and quest pinpointed 
by the Greek company insiders on how to communicate better, efficiently and reliably 
their knowledge of the company's doings as well as the ongoing international discussion 
and effort to identify which communication path should be followed (contracting, 
regulating or using intermediaries to control company information and market 
intelligence). Most of the IR research has been focused on the mature capital markets, 
especially those of the USA and UK. Recently. some EU-related reports had appeared 
and some pan-European research has been initiated by Marston (2004). including even 
the cx-communist countries. Hence the main contribution of this study is to provide 
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evidence on the IR practices and activities by the emerging economies across the globe 
by examining listed Greek companies. 
1.5 The research questions 
The basic research questions addressed by this thesis are: how the three researched 
groups Implement and use corporate communication: how they perceive the IR 
activities. how they interact and how they plan to improve the effectiveness of the 
implemented Investor Relations programme. Another question concerns the value that 
the IR adds to the Greek listed companies and how effectively it is used. Secondary 
questions are also investigated. In particular. following mainly Marston's (1993) 
research path and questions, the author tries to shed some light on organization issues 
involved in the IR. Many other IR related issues are researched, such as International' 
issues, substitution IR aspects, external substitutions, macro IR elements, etc. Greek and 
EU corporate concerns will be addressed on the effectiveness of IR activities via 
Voluntary Disclosure. These questions examine and identify the practice of the IR of 
Greek listed companies. All these questions achieve to pinpoint descriptive issues that 
correspond to the perceptions for the IR function and the parameters that provide some 
understanding of current corporate communication practices to all market players. 
especially to fund managers and analysts. Finally. the questions identify the possible 
strategic function of the IR, as well as whether the IR office can influence investors' 
awareness of corporate activity, their interest and buying behaviour. 
1.6 Methodology of research 
As Laughlin (1995) indicates, the methods of two major bodies of research are 
available: the positivistic that require less input from the researcher, and the 
phenomenological that leave more scope for researcher judgment. The IR practice 
includes some objective and "Immutable" issues that are deten-nined by the local 
psychology and culture, the local business ethics and business practices, the maturity of 
market players, the stage at which the life cycle of the local market is (i. e. emerging, 
mature, staple based, industry specific. extroverted, etc. ) that in turn makes each market 
unique (Holland, 2001, Morris, 2000, Silverman, 2000. Mason, 1996; Morgan and 
SmIrcich. 1980). The phenomenological research methodology and in particular the 
interview approach were chosen for the current research. The study relies on primary 
data collected frorn interviewing company representatives (the CFO. the CEO, the IR 
director) as Nvell as analysts and institutional iii\, estors. The semi-structured interviews 
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were based on a standardized questionnaire for each of the three groups. mailed to them 
almost two weeks before the interviews. Researchers such as Marston and Holland. who 
investigated the same subject, used similar approaches. Taped interviews are preferable 
in Greece, given the size of the country and that the ma*or*tv of the headquarters of the 
listed companies are in the Athens area. Interviews were also chosen as the research 
method owing to the author's strongly held view for the function. actl\, It,,, and 
effectiveness of IR, which in turn, along with his extensive experience in tile field. 
helped identify and ask in person solid. penetrating and motivating questions. Sorne of 
the questioning could have been biased, but an attempt was made to minimize tile bias 
through the structured format of the questionnaire and the direct answers by tile 
interviewers. If Holland (1997, p. 5) believes that "the actual observation of the 
communication process between institutional investors and management "would be 
ideal", as an IRO professional for more than 10 years who has been working in house 
for 7 listed companies and in consultation level worked for a variety of big, medium and 
small capitalization fin-ns, the author has been observing the common process of 
management to the market players and, furthermore. has been participating in that 
process. Another issue that had to be handled carefully was that "researcher's values 
inevitably affect the interpretation of the findings". as Holland (1998a, 1988b) put it. 
Indeed, it was not possible to be completely independent of the issues examined or 
researched. Even when the IR variables are assumed to be quantitatively measurable 
(such as IR effectiveness, - increase or decrease of stock price. increase of new 
shareholders, etc. ), it is difficult to establish whether or not the IR is effective and is 
subject to interpretation, perspective, even bias, etc. For example, there are cases where 
the time element plays an important role in the IR effectiveness, especially in the case 
where the IRO is effective in promoting the investment story to potential savers and 
investors, but the stock price can be observed with a time lag, because the price- 
promotion relationship is mostly time correlated. In addition, the author has been 
"engaged" intuitively and instinctively in additional data gathering methods (Schwartz 
and Nandhakumar, 2002, Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Silven-nan, 2000), such as taking 
notes during meetings and conference calls, making observations during group 
conferences and analyst presentations, holding informal discussions with fund 
managers, analysts. bankers, auditors, senior managers, et al.. and even photographing 
analysis of investors and visitors to match the intelligence on profiles. styles. even 
attitudes. In other words. from the early stages of his career (since 1994) he has been 
taking notes. tape conversations. listeninu repeatedly to and analyzing conference calls. 
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grouping communi cation styles. etc. of the different human/executive personalities 
where the concerns are to market plavers* strategy. financial and operational data and 
issues. Indeed. over many years, as Holland (2001 ) notes: "further data was collected 
from public and semi-public domain sources. These included public database or 
archives of the financial press. company reports. analyst reports, and fund manager 
marketing material for pension trustees: this data provided alternative sources of 
confirmation or contradiction of interview data. Attendance at practitioner events or 
conferences was another useful way of collecting material not non-nally available in the 
public domain". For the last five years (2000-2005), as President of the local IR society, 
the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute (HIRI). the author has been organizing several 
group presentations of clusters of Greek companies (4 or 5 listed firms) from different 
industries. with different liquidity patterns. shareholder structures, capitalization, etc. to' 
present to most financial centres such as Frankfurt. Milan. Geneva, Paris, Toronto. New 
York city, Boston, Dubai, Copenhagen, Stockholm. etc. and to the local financial 
community. These group conferences are themselves a full and wealthy pool of IR 
information and observations. 
1.7 Research progress 
At the beginning of the current research, a pilot study was implemented, in order to 
check and fine tune the questionnaire. targeting first a university professor of 
Econometrics and Statistics and second two executives who worked for dual listed 
companies at ASE and NYSE. The rationale for this was that the companies with an 
American Depositary Receipt (ADR) programme try to ensure that publicly traded 
companies in the USA provide investors with information in a timely and forthright 
manner so that investors can make informed decisions in a complex market place. 
Starting in January 2002, the questionnaire was mailed to the listed companies, the 
analysts and the fund managers. After a period of 15 to 30 days following the mailing of 
the questionnaire, the author began calling for a personal interview, and, on average, 
succeeded in arranging ten semi-structured interviews per month for the following 
months. It took two years to complete the interviews. The semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with 76 company top executives, 44 analysts and 44 fund managers 
over almost two years. The semi-structured interviews had the primary advantage of 
allowing the executives to express their opinions and feelings about the effectiveness of 
the implemented IR programme as well as other selected IR issues. As Barker (1998) 
indicates. "Relatkcly simple semi-structured questions were used to encourage 
managers to talk in detail about their private disclosure to financial institutions*'. On the 
other hand , it was necessary to face the obvious and recorded disadvantages of the 
interview method (Holland, 2001: Marston. 1996b; Barker. 1996. Langhlin. 1995: Yin. 
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1994). such as the possible subjectivity from both the interviewer and the researcher 
(i. e. difficulties in comprehending and interpreting the questions and data). the probable 
bias in the data that can arise from this specific interview technique. the availability of 
time for the interviews (indeed, the predeten-nined time requested was 45 minutes but 
almost for all interviews the duration was double that time). biological issues such as 
fear and curiosity, and social and organizational obstacles such as the approval of others 
of the executive's perception on IR, the associated anxiety of revealing price sensitive 
issues on the part of the company's insiders, and others. 
1.8 Subsequent chapters 
Table I. I: Structure of the thesis 
Chapter Objectives 
1.0 Introduction To introduce the scope. objectives and method of 
I the study 2.0 The function of Investor To describe the IR activities and to set up the IR 
Relations in Greece. framework 
3.0 Regulated Corporate To expose the relationship between Corporate 
Disclosure and IR. Governance and the IR 
4.0 Corporate Disclosure via To investigate the corporate communication 
Inten-nediaries and IR. effectiveness through information intermediaries 
5.0 Voluntary Corporate To establish the IR effectiveness that is based on 
Disclosure and JR. the voluntary mix of JR tools and means 
6.0 Literature Review. To review prior research 
7.0 Research Design and To outline the research available methods and to 
Methodology. justify the chosen research methodology 
8.0 Data Analysis and To analyse the IR practices and perceptions of the 
Findings. top management, analysts and fund managers. 
9.0 Research Selecting To integrate and refine categories as well as extract 
Coding. and elicit conclusions and recommendations. 
10.0 Recommendations: To propose practical and effective IR programmes 
Creating an Effective IR and tactics. 
model. I I 
Source: Developed. for this research 
The structure of the thesis is outlined in Table 1.1, providing the headings and 
objectives for each of the twelve chapters. In short. the first chapter sets up the 
fi-arnework of this research endeavour. The second chapter exposes the function of the 
In,,, cstor Relations and the disclosure of company's information. Chapters 3,4 and 5 
summarize the three channels of communication by the listed companies. In particular. 
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the mandatory disclosure is described as seen through the corporate governance 
principles and other regulatory bodies. The information through the intermediaries is 
described in chapter 4 and the means of discretionary disclosure is addressed in the 
subsequent chapter. Chapter 6 discusses earlier research in the same area and related 
theoretical postulations. Chapter 7 overviews the chosen and implied methodolot(l. v of 
this study. In the next chapter. chapter 8, the collected data are analyzed and some 
important findings and conclusions from the three-targeted populations, the insiders, the 
analysts and the fund managers are presented in chapter 9. Finally, in chapter 10, the 
recommendations are presented. 
1.9 Limitations 
A detailed list of limitations of this research is displayed in the later chapters which' 
suggest some directions for future research. 
1.10 Summary 
The basic intent and objectives of this present research study were displayed in this 
chapter. The definitions, the background of the Greek market, the rationale, the 
methodology and the progress of the research. and the questions were presented in order 
to outline the context and goal of the study. It is the first study in the IR area in Greece 
and the focus was placed on collecting hard evidence along with perceptions. 
misunderstandings and opinions from the top managers and the IR practitioners. 
Simultaneously. the study sets out to investigate the perceptions and opinions of a vital 
portion of the market's intermediaries: that of the analysts as infori-nation inten-nediaries 
and the fund managers as the information end users. 
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Chapter 2.0 The Function of Investor Relations in Greece 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the application of investor relations In Greece as a corporate 
activity. An overview of the Greek capital market and its current life cycle stage and its 
relationship with the IR function is provided. Then following the aforementioned 
framework, the practising IR activities such as the use of an IR programme. its 
objectives and constraints and the IR tools used by the Greek listed companies are 
described. The description will be based on the available limited research that focused 
mainly on roadshows, multiple listings and offerings (Demos, 2005a: Kasli-natis, 2004: 
Kefalas, 2002a; Kotofolos, 2004). 
2.2 IR in the Greek capital market 
An overview of the Greek capital market and the IR position in it will be described in 
this subsection. In past decades, the State and the Greek companies were trying to solicit 
foreign companies to establish factories and joint venture businesses in Greece. 
Recently, and especially during the last decade, the State along with the local capital 
market, the ASE and the listed companies and their IR departments. has been 
campaigning and drawing foreign capital to Greece from financial and strategic 
investors (Tsolis, 2004). The fact that Greece was ("and still is") an emerging rather 
than a developed market, and its inclusion in the emerging market indices as a major 
player for a long period of time, partly explains the minimal existence of the IR 
profession and activity. Foreign investors were not focusing on the fundamentals of the 
listed companies owing to their small size, their illiquidity and until recently their 
reporting according to the Greek GAAP (Monemvasiotis, 2004; Ntokas, 2003). In the 
minds of the Greek market participants, the IR activity, the IR department and the IRO 
are responsible for conveying infori-nation to all market participants as well as building 
relationships, mainly with the listed company's institutional investors (buy-side) and 
with the equity research analysts covering the stock (sell-side). These professionals 
demand prompt and accurate dissemination of relevant information and access to 
management (Demos, 2003a; Kotsis 2004; Leotsakos, 2001). An IR department tries to 
respond to those demands and requests in an open, frank and consistent way, and some 
follow a pro-active approach to building relationships with existing and potential 
institutional and retail shareholders. whilst ensuring effective use of management time 
(Gitzos, 2002. Kanelopoulos. 2002, Aloupis. 2002). Transparency and infori-nation 
disclosure practices of the listed firms have been improving continuously. However. 
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their biggest challenge was (and still is) their inabilitv to "sell themselves" to the local 
but mainly to the international institutional and retail investors. This is the job of a 
qualified and effective investor relations officer (IRO) and only a small number of the 
Greek firms have one (Demos. 2004b). The practical usefulness of the JR, along with a 
good institutional framework of corporate govemance. will not only upgrade the Greek 
Stock Market internationally, but it will also draw new investment funds to the Greek 
Stock Market (Tegopoulos, 2002). The commitment of the administration of the ASE 
and especially that of its chairman, Professor P. Alexakis. as well as the understanding 
by other institutional bodies and the efforts by the local IR society (HIRI). were and still 
are received with great satisfaction by the entire Greek market for the need of the IR as 
the "gateway" to the information on and from the listed companies. (Papadogiannis. 
2003: Koulouris. 2002a: Demos, 2003b). However. the IR was viewed differently by the' 
management of the listed companies as well as by other stock market observers (Schma. 
2004b). For example. some expected from the IR department mainly the mandatory 
information of the institutional bodies and the investors, more specifically with the 
quality criteria "instituted" by the ASE (Stergiou, 2001). What was even worse was 
that there were nurnerous people who believed and still believe that the IR is primarily a 
public relations activity (Ntokas, 2004b). A positive development for the IR profession 
was the establishment in 2002 of the local IR society (HIRI). The Hellenic Investor 
Relations Institute (HIRI) works with the management of ASE, the Capital Market 
Committee, the Association of Greek Institutional Investors (AGII), the Association of 
Certified Analysts. the two Associations of Members of the Athens Stock Exchange 
(SMEXA and SEDYKA). the related Ministries and other institutional bodies to create a 
sound and solid base of disclosure with the best communication practices in order to be 
able to attract long-term investors to Greek stocks. 
2.3 The IR plan and its phases - Greek IR Life Cycle. 
The IR industry in Greece has a life span of ten years, (the first IRO recordered in 
1996). Therefore, according to the Life Cycle hypothesis, the Greek IR is in its fledgling 
stages. The author of this study was the first in-house IRO (appointed in 1996) and had 
worked as an external IR consultant before that. It should be noted that if in 1994 
anyone had mentioned Investor Relations. even high profile market participants had no 
knowledge of what that meant (Demos, 2002e). In sharp contrast, in 2004 even the retail 
investor kncNN, what IR is. and he was familiar Nvith ma* ion. jor aspects of the IR functi 
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2.4 The IR objectives 
According to international experience (i. e. IIRF conferences) and academic research. 
the basic aims of the Investor Relations OR) department is the creation of trustworthy 
relations with the investors and the other market players. the direct and timely 
disclosure of a company's activities: and the strategic planning and programming, of the 
IR activities in order to optimize the share price (Baker, 21002a. 2002b: Brennan and 
Tannarowski, 2000, Bruce, 1999. Baxt, 1999: Braznell. 1994). The IR pi-ogramme is 
formulated to communicate and target audiences locally and globally. such as 
institutional and private money fund managers. analysts, bankers, regulators and even 
competition (Carpenter, 2004a; 2004b; Coggan, 2003). In Greece. no evidence of 
written IR communication prograrnme was recorded before. The current research 
identified only partial use of IR programmes. 
2.5 IR constraints 
In order to reach its goals and bring results, the IR office must overcome endogenous 
and exogenous obstacles and constraints. Some of these constraints are related to 
diverse variables such as the perception and support of the top management, the IR 
budget, the structure of the IR department, the IRO's personality, the company's 
financial results and its strategy, the market conditions, the perception of the 
inten-nediary markets players which play an important role in the corporate 
communication process and the IR effectiveness (Marcus and Wallace, 1998, Essman, 
1989; Ryder and Regester, 1988, - Derriman, 1969). In Greece, the operational setting of 
the IR office and the profile of the IRO affect vastly the effectiveness of the IR 
programme (Demos, 2002a; Thomadakis, 2002). According to previous research on the 
IR's position and basic IR responsibilities, the IR office incorporates the editing sub 
function (i. e. polishing news releases, memos, etc. ); the presentations section (i. e. 
preparing and producing company presentations, slides, tables, etc. ); the registry or 
metochologio section (i. e. grouping shareholders, etc. ); the administrative activity (i. e. 
organizing roadshows, coordinating meetings, updating the mailing list, email and fax 
database, etc. ); the PR sub function (setting up dinners, Christnias presents, etc. ); the 
media and legal section (dealing with financial journalists and filling documents. etc. ) 
(Demos, 2002a. Schma, 2002b). The IR department needs a regular and timek, 
information flow of input from the accounting and budgeting departments, the 
operations. the line or divisional managers, the board of directors* decisions and 
strategic direction, as well as access to competitive information and advice on legal 
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issues (e. g. SEC disclosure requirements. avoidance of for, %vard-looking statements. 
etc. ). It is also necessary and good practice that the IRO. in some companies. has regular 
contact with senior management (Chainnan of the BoD. CEO. CFO) as well as the 
middle operational managers. in order to have access to primary company .s information 
and accordingly refine the messages to be delivered to the market (Ntokas. 2004c: 
Papandropoulos, 2002. Sakelar', 2002, ). 
Figure 2.1: Basic organizational Greek IR structure 
MEDIA LEGAL EDITING 
PR 
IRO 
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In conclusion , it was recorded in Greece that the effectiveness and the performance of 
the IR department are also Influenced by the organizational setting of the IR department 
in the company's structure. It was also found that few qualified investor relations 
officers (IROs) were in the Greek market. The companies needed an IRO with solid 
training, vast experience and amiable personality. He/she must comprehend the 
analysts' company evaluation models. the fund managers' buying patterns; and the 
journalists' incentives to write a good or a bad story on the company (Vergos, 2003f: 
2002a; Papanikolaou, 2002; Demos, 2001a). 
2.6 Greek corporate communication and IR tools 
From the three major forms of disclosure (regulated, intermediary and voluntary), 
previous limited research efforts in Greece were undertaken on the voluntary tools and 
in particular on roadshows, dual listings and offerings. The findings on how these 
corporate communication tools were applied shaped and how they affected the IR 
programmes of the Greek companies, are exposed in the subsequent sections. 
2.6.1 Roadshows 
The largest Greek companies realised that in order to increase demand for the 
company .s stock they had to provide rell I investors and especially to iable information to I 
institutional m\, estors directly. By visiting them and presenting their activities. stratei! \, 
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and the prospects. the company was very "close'" to shareholders and prospective 
investors (Travlos. 2002). Their IR departments organized and Implemented roadshow 
communication policies since they managed to attain company visibility. promotion of 
the stock and meetings with institutional investors (Ntokas, 2004a: Mantikidis. 2002b. 
2000b; Kosmas, 2000). 
2.6.2 Roadshows guidelines by the Atheiis Stock Exchange (ASE) 
As mentioned earlier, during recent years but mainly within the year 2002. the ASE 
Board of Directors, as well as other institutional bodies. have intensified their efforts to 
create the conditions for direct contact between listed companies and investors 
(Georgas, 2002). Among other recommendations. Greek listed companies were actively 
encouraged by the Athens Stock Exchange to contact investors directly. through group 
presentations or one-to-one meetings, to participate in roadshows in Greece and in 
Europe, Northern America and Asia. The organization, operation and Implementation of 
the road shows were at an "Infant phase" since they were based on "fori-nality and 
amateurism". The challenge is to implement a roadshow communication policy with 
substance, efficiency and effectiveness (Koulouris, 2002b: Sakelarl. 2002). 
2.6.3 Roadshows by Greek companies 
Most of the Greek companies tried to reach and communicate with the fund managers 
by implementing roadshow communication policies during share capital, placements 
and other equity offerings (Alexakis, 2003; Antonakopoulos, 2003). According to 
previous research on roadshows by the author, a roadshow can be distinguished into 
three categories (Demos, 2001b): 
1. Relationship roadshows, which are customarily performed by all big Greek 
companies at least once a year, in order to update the investors with the latest 
developments. They visit the major shareholders, minor shareholders and all other 
holders of their stocks, and they personally inform them on the latest progress and 
results achieved by the company. 
11. Proactive roadshows, aiming to inform prospective shareholders and 
111. Offering roadshows, performed during primary and secondary equity offerings. 
The following are the basic factors and special features for effective roadshows to 
which the IROs and the IR departments must pay serious attention (Demos, 2001b): 
1. The analyst report by the analysts who cover the listed companies. This report 
provides an objective presentation, analysis and evaluation of the stock and the 
company's overall financial performance. 
2. An artistic co1porate presentation which presents the company's acti\, ities and 
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overall strategy and compares financial results. The artistic corporate 
presentation is extremely important, especially in group presentations, as the 
research showed, because it differentiates the company. 
3. The intermediary market player assigned to organize the road show (a foreign 
bank, a Greek brokerage firm, a company specialized in organizing road shows. 
etc. ). The intermediary institution undertakes the pre-marketing and the 
perception study that identifies the interested mutual funds and persuades the 
prospective foreign institutional investors to dedicate some time and money to 
the company. 
4. The company's management team assigned to present the company to investors 
may consist of the company's CEO, CFO and IRO. In most proactive 
roadsbows, the research indicated that the IRO usually represents the company's 
management. 
5. The roadshow duration i. e. two weeks, one week or just a few days. 
6. The geographic areas covered by the roadshow. Target cities may be divided 
into large groups, such as: a) London; b) Edinburgh, Dublin; c) "Continental 
European" cities, such as Frankfurt, Paris, Milan, etc.; d) Eastern USA States: 
New York, Boston, Florida,, etc.; e) Central USA States: Denver, Minneapolis, 
Kansas city, etc.; f) Western USA States: San Diego, LA, San Francisco, etc., 
7. The investment profile of the cities covered by the road show. According to the 
research, cities are divided based on their interest on equity investments, 
according to Value (e. g. San Francisco), Yield (e. g. Los Angeles), Momentum 
(e. g. Milan), Growth (e. g. Boston), High Growth (e. g. New York), etc. 
8. The number of mutual funds the company team will visit in total and also on a 
daily basis. It was indicated by the Greek managers that five or six presentations 
daily do not reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the presentation team. 
9. The type of funds targeted such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, 
venture capital, etc. 
10. The condition of the international financial markets. 
11. The stage of the Greek stock exchange in its cycle, and 
12. The industEy of the company. 
According to the research measured by the aforementioned 12 factors. every Greek 
company created its own roadshow communication strategy and targeted different cities 
to provide information to investors, analysts, banks, brokers etc. 
2.6.4 Greek roadshow effectiveness 
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Based on the aforementioned factors. the author attempted to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the roadshows by Greek listed companies and also the relationship between 
roadshows and stock performance (Demos, 2002d; 2001b). The roadshows that were 
examined were purely relationship roadshows. which were regularly performed by 
companies with a good IR function. The companies visited major and minor 
shareholders in order to inform them on the latest financial results and company 
developments. Therefore, no proactive roadshows or offering roadshows were 
examined. Conclusions were drawn by researching sixteen (16) annual road shows 
perfon-ned by eight (8) Greek companies during a two-year period (April 1999 - April 
2001). The sample contained a proportionately satisfactory number of dual listed 
companies at London or New York (LSE, NYSE and NASDAQ). It was considered a 
good sample, able to provide accurate information so as to draw somehow concrete 
conclusions, and the author has worked as an IRO for two dual listed companies in the 
sample (i. e. OTE and Antenna TV). The research focused on how the roadshows affect 
the price of the stock as well as the trading volume during the roadshows and also 
during the following seven (7) weeks after the roadshows have been completed. It was 
difficult to generalize, owing to the peculiarities of each stock; however, the research 
could generate further research attempts which would also include qualitative data such 
as the experiences and perceptions of the participants (managers and organizers), etc. 
The research showed that 27% of the sample indicated that the price of the stock was 
considerably increased (2% to 20%) after the roadshows. Similarly, 42% of the sample 
pointed out no change in the stock's price. Finally, the remaining 31% of the sample 
showed that the price of the stock suffered reduction, ranging from 1% to 23%. A 100% 
increase of the trading volume on average stocks was also observed for 63% of the 
sample. 18% of the sample showed that the trading volume was reduced by 20% on 
average, while the remaining 19% of the sample showed that the trading volume 
remained the same. The research findings were that roadshows the v sibil ty of 
the Greek companies, promote their financial performance, growth and prospects and 
lead to an increase in the interest and demand of the underlying stock. In addition, all 
companies included in the sample regularly inform their investors and the public 
through web sites, press releases and conference calls. However, 73% of these 
companies did not manage to achieve a positive effect on their stock through the 
roadshows. The research also established that the companies involved did not pay 
primary attention to numbers 3.5 and 6 factors, mentioned above, (duration, geographic 
covcrage and organizer of the road show). For instance, it was found that a common 
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mistake many Greek companies make when they make a transatlantic voyage was that 
they visit only New York and Boston, while a large number of cities in the United 
States and Canada receive no attention. Moreover. factors 8 and 9 (number and type of 
funds) are left to be decided by the organizers. while the interested companies do not 
insist on meeting certain funds. As far as factors 10 and II are concerned. (international 
market and company prospects). the sample showed that foreign institutional investors 
can be convinced and activated only by good companies xvith sound valuations and 
most important, with good management (Demos. 2002d; 2001b). 
2.7 Dual Listing and IR - The Greek experience 
As of December 2002, there were 25 Greek companies that had their shares traded on at 
least two stock exchanges. By December 2004,45 companies were dual listed on 
regulated exchange markets. The first "stop" for a company after its IPO on the Athens 
Stock Exchange is the London Stock Exchange, and the second "stop"' is one of the 
American exchanges (i. e. NYSE and NASDAQ) (Vergos, 2004, Apostolou, 2004-, 
Alexakis,, 2002b; 2002a). The last and final stage is to list on the Gen-nan Stock 
Exchanges (i. e. Frankfurt, Berlin, etc. ) given that they are driven by stock demand since 
the listing fees. in Gen-nany is minimal (Demos, 2004a: Kotofolos, 2004). Like almost 
all non-US public companies, Greek firms move towards cross border listing in order to 
expand the sources of equity capital and reduce the cost of capital (Levis, 1996). In 
addition, there are specific motives such as: 
0 Financial: increase investor base and liquidity, attract capital. dispersion of share 
ownership, cost of listing and requirements and compliance with accounting 
principles. 
0 Organizational: increase sales activities and market potential and follow 
customers. 
. 9: increase corporate image, name/brand recognition and prestige. 
Marketin iI 
0 Other: political and social factors, psychological issue, employee motivation, 
public disclosure requirements and accounting US GAAP. 
2.7.1 Greek companies listed at multiple stock markets 
As mentioned, shares of Greek companies are traded. apart from the ASE. on other 
stock markets such as the LSE, NYSE and NASDAQ. and on other European, mostly 
Gen-nan. stock markets (Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich, etc. ). Research has identified a 
series of reasons for companies heading to foreign stock markets for multiple listings 
(Bailev, Warren, Karolvi and Silva. 2000. Moe]. 1999: Huddart. Hughes and 
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Brunnermejer, 1999). The Greek companies identified the effort to increase the liquldltv 
of their shares as the most important reason for dual listing (Demos 2000b. 2000c. 
Levis, 1996). Global research for dual listing shows that the liquidity of the listed shares 
in multiple stock markets increases satisfactorily (Lang. Lins and Miller. 2003. Baker. 
Nofsinger and Weaver. 2002; Foerster and Karolyi, 2000, Karoly] 1998). It also shows 
that the shares originating from emerging markets have a noteworthy negative 
perfon-nance, while the shares frorn developed countries (Canada, Germany. France. 
etc. ) have positive performance. Also. the share price of dual listed companies in the 
American exchanges follows the local price because the investors in the USA believe 
that the local investors are better informed and consequently follow the psychology and 
purchasing behaviour of local investors (Pasha. 2002, Pagano. Roell and Zechner, 2002: 
Sofianos and Pulatkonak, 1999; Miller, 1999, Levis, 1996). 
2.7.2 American Depositag Receipts (ADRs) 
Research on the ADRs shows that the challenge for the non-US dual listed 
company is enormous since the IRO has to convey all information in fluent 
English, to check and control arbitrage opportunities, to promote the stock 
across the USA, to deal effectively with the custodian banks and to cooperate 
efficiently with the underwriting banks (Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Khanna, 
Palepu and Shrinivasan, 2003). Nevertheless, its main IR objective is to search 
for more institutional investors. Identification of US institutional investors for 
both the ADRs and its ordinary shares is therefore a primary IR job. It is 
possible to identify and target US institutional investors either on the basis of 
the filings to the SEC by the funds or via the pre-marketing by the brokers of 
the global banks such as Citibank, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Credit 
Suisse First Boston, etc., or via the proactive efforts by the IR office (Blak, 
2005; Judd, 2004b, Leuz, 2003; The bank of New York, 2002; Levis, 1996). 
All major financial institutions must disclose their holdings to the SEC in the 
USA. The frequency of SEC filings for ADRs disclosure is for US and foreign 
institutions every quarter and the latest six months. Filing is done through the 
13F Form, which must be submitted to the SEC within 45 days after the end of 
the quarter (NYSE. Listed Company Manual, 2000b). Most of the US 
institutional investors are not required by law to disclose their holdings of 
foreign ordinary shares, in contrast to ADRs whose holdings must be disclosed 
periodically. However. a substantial number of US institutions do disclose their 
holdings in foreign ordinary shares at the sarne time as they report their 
holdings in ADRs (Leuz, 2003. Levey. 2000: Andersen. 1995). When 
prospective investors for Greek stocks are identified via the pre-marketIng of major 
banks and brokerage fin-ns, the success and extent of coverage depends on the sales 
people of the banks (how many people, cities they are cover, regulation constraints. 
etc, ). Global banks cover all major cities of the markets, have stronger "personal" 
relationships but usually focus on funds that invest in the big capitalization companies 
(Demos and Papadakis, 2000). On the other hand, brokerage firrns. mainly local 
ones, have better rapport and relationship with funds that invest in small and medium 
cap companies. which match the majority of the Greek listed companies (Vergos, 2003f: 
Alexakis, 2002b, Demos,, 2000a). Finally. when targets are identified via the IR 
departments, the effort and results are more custom-made, since the IRO has access to 
the shareholder registry, which is a good starting point of identification. If for example, 
Fidelity is a major shareholder, the IR can combine tactics and strategy to target other 
Bostonian funds in order to- expose the "growth" story via the "sponsorship" of Fidelity 
as a big shareholder. In addition, the track record and standing of the IRO play an 
important role also (Baker, NoSinger and Weaver 2002; Demos, 2000b; Sofianos and 
Pulatkonak, 1499). 
2.7.3 Preliminary results ofADR listing by Greek companies 
Research results of two Greek listed companies (on the ASE and the NYSE) were 
identified by statistically correlating, examining the available data and interviewing 
participants such as top management, underwriters, lawyers and custodian banks 
(Demos, 2000b). The sample was small and the period relatively short, but nevertheless 
it was the data available by that time. It was observed that the liquidity increases while 
the volatility of the two shares was decreasing, and one reason was that the trading of 
the shares continued for many hours (approximately eight hours more), from the 
moment of ASE closing. Consequently, the ASE share prices of the two Greek listed 
companies converged with their ADR prices, because of the extended timetable of their 
trading. Also, the large number of investors and traders (since American brokers traded 
the stocks) contributed to the reduction and elimination of the bid and ask spreads and 
the trade was made. It was also observed that on average, during the period from 
October 1999 to October 2000 for which comparative data was available for the two 
shares. the closing of the price in the ASE influenced very positively the closing of the 
share price in the NYSE. The price of the OTE share in Athens led the share's price on 
the LSE by 90%. since it was dual listed for the first time on the LSE in June 1997. 
After the listing on NYSE, the price of OTE"s share on the ASE gulded the share of 
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OTE in the USA by 62%. Similarly. it was found that the price of NBG's share 
influenced very positively the price of NBG in the USA by 75%. This implies that in the 
beginning of the multiple listing. the foreign investors do not know the Greek company 
well and, believing that the Greek investors know it better. followed the movements of 
local investors. Three years later. the foreign investors had their own opinion and direct 
information frorn the company. and had become significantly information independent. 
The increase by 250% of the number of analysts covering OTE, from 15 in 1997 to 55 
in 2000, also decreased information asymmetries between Greek and foreign investors 
(Dernos, 2000b). 
2.8 Share offerings and IR 
Research indicates that share offerings encourage corporate communication and' 
increase the establishment of the IR office (Heron and Lie. 2004. Palmiter, 1999; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1997). The development of a local as well as an international flotation 
plan takes place in these three phases. As local research has found, three IR action plans 
match the three different but interrelated phases of an equity offering and its 
consequential IR activities specific to each stage may be followed. The three stages are: 
a) Pre-offering; b) During offering, c) Post offering. The responsibility of the IR office 
is to act as a rnam contact point and driving force, along the three aforementioned 
interdependent phases (Demos, 2002a, Kontogiannis, 2001). An integrated three-phase 
communication and IR strategy contains the first phase, which covers the period leading 
up to the IPO, focusing primarily on building the profile, "behind the scenes" 
preparations work and execution of the offering. the second phase that includes the 
launch, roadshow and the period immediately surrounding pricing of the offer-, and the 
third phase that continues the proactive IR activities such as the regular communication 
policies, roadshows, press releases, etc. (Lempesi, 2004; Demos, 2001 a). 
2.9 Conclusion 
The basic characteristics of the Greek IR industry were exposed in this chapter. The IR 
profession and industry are in the early stages of their life cycle and there are only a 
limited number of IR practitioners. As limited local research has found, the most 
effective way of communication for the Greek companies and the IR practitioners is the 
direct contact xvith the foreign institutional investors. The Greek companies are required 
to be proactive. The\, should coordinate a strategic corporate communication 
programme and an aggressive IR plan to reach the alobal L-Z-- - investment commumtv. 
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Offerings, roadshows and dual listings. if propefly executed. build vIsIbility and 
momentum for the company in both Europe and the U. S. Most of the Greek listed 
companies, especially the smaller ones. are challenged to promote their cases globally. 
to attract attention and have permanent visibility. The acceptance and use of the IR 
function is a major too] to accomplish these goals. 
-) r, 
Chapter 3.0 Regulated Corporate Disclosure and IR 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the relationship between Regulated Corporate Disclosure 
(RCD) and IR (Appendix X). Regulation. especially via the Corporate Governance 
(CG) rules and the US SEC, and other Securities and Exchange Commissions such as 
the European Union's directives and the UK regulations have been intensified during 
recent years. In the CG-IR context, there exist empirically two opposite 
views/argurnents. Some argue that since corporate communication is canonized by the 
CG regulation then the IR takes a secondary seat and becomes, if not obsolete, the 
passive voice of its master (Alexakis, 2003: Coffee. 1999: Brancato, 1997, Whittington, 
1993). The proponents of this view accept that the IRO simply has to implement the CG 
directives and that everything is satisfactory. Conversely. the opponents believe that the 
IR practitioners and company executives should not be restricted and the firms should 
communicate their information and news voluntarily (Dalton and Dalton, 2004, Travlos, 
2002, Milue and Chan, 1999). The question that arises from the former argument is 
what the role of the IR is if CG imposes a universal set of codes and rules even 
concerning the timing and frequency of the infori-nation disclosure. This chapter will 
examine the Corporate Governance issues and evolution in the global market, especially 
in the Greek financial market. As mentioned in the previous section, the principal means 
of regulating IR can be identified as: 
Table 3.1: Mandatory disclosure and IR tools 
a. Annual Reports 
b. Interim Reports 
C. Annual General Assembly 
d. Extraordinary General Assembly 
e. Financial Statements 
f Footnotes on financials 
g. Management discussion and analysis 
h. I Filings 
3.2 Corporate Governance (CG) 
The term Corporate Governance (CG) refers to the relationship, responsibility, power 
and information among all market participants such as shareholders. management. 
administration, employees, stakeholders, capital market authorities and government 
(Charkham. 1995). Shareholders are the retail-individual and institutional investors, 
who own stock of companies listed on a stock exchange. Management is the top 
executivcs who run the company, such as the CEO. the CFO, et al. The people who 
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comprise the senior management team are also the "Insiders"' of the company s 
information. Administration refers mainly to the board of directors. whose job is to 
approve the management plans. Employees represent the majority of the people working 
in a company. from upper management to the lowest level. Traditionally. this group 
forms some of the stakeholders. but it is mentioned separately, because some. if not 
most of them, are the infori-nation insiders and therefore play a maýjor role in the 
disclosure process. Stakeholders are those directly affected by the operation of the 
company, these include suppliers, customers, banks. local community and employees. 
Capital market authorities are the governing bodies of the capital market. such as SEC. 
in Greece Capital Market Committee, stock exchange authorities. etc. Government is 
the law setter in any land (Hoepner, 2002: Chark-ham, 1995; Keasey and Wright, 1993). 
Theoretically, the separation of ownership and control of the companies, and the 
inability to clarify and define concrete contracts between owners and managers. have 
created the agency problem and consequently a number if not the majority of corporate 
governance issues come into existence. These issues have existed in the corporate world 
for many years, especially in the Anglo Saxon business setting, and in the UK three 
codes of business practice have been initiated to define and balance governance, 
accountability , and enterprise. The Cadbury Committee in 1991, the Greenbury 
Committee in 1995 and the Hampel Committee in 1998 were set up in order to improve 
governance. The Cadbury report, as Stiles and Bernard (1993, p. 61) state. "was 
published explicitly in order to put pressure in British boards to change their behaviour 
and to adopt new practices in corporate governance". Along the same lines, Short, 
Keasey, Wright and Hull (1999, p. 337) found that "'the overriding emphasis of the 
Hampel Report is the need for good corporate governance to be based on principles 
rather than prescription" and they add (p. 338): "this shift in emphasis, from a focus on 
accountability to the need for governance systems to provide structures and incentives 
to allow business enterprise and prosperity to flourish. is clearly embodied in the 
Hampel Report". As a result, Corporate Governance is a system of checks and balances 
that directs and controls the corporate power. Therefore, a CG system or code is a 
power system which is given to all corporate entities and is taken away from 
wrongdoing business concerns. This transfer of power requires a workable business 
environment and a free framework of effective accountability. Indeed this power 
struggle and/or transfer have been recorded for a long time. As the Economist reports: 
"More than 60 years after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first 
contemplated democratizing the election of company directors in America. the 
bureaucrats in Washington. DC. ha%, e mustered the courage to take a first, bold step on 
the path to reform. Yet boardroom fears of this revolution seem a tad overblown. 
Prompted by the thought that shareholder participation might encourage a greater sense 
of responsibility among owners and accountability among directors, the SEC has 
proposed a limited form of enfranchisement" (Economist, 2003u). The financial and 
information inten-nediaries play their own part in the CG environment. Thus, the parties 
auditing the company. e. g. chartered auditors, those analyzing its performance. i. e.. 
analysts, rating agencies and the mass media, and finally the investment banking 
institutions and brokerage fin-ns. also participate in Corporate Governance, in various 
ways. It must be stressed that this research study refers mainly to companies listed in 
stock exchange markets. But CG also applies to other companies, e. g. public 
corporations, non-listed companies, private companies etc. (Hil, 2002a, - 2002b; Bogler. ' 
2000; Tashjian, 2000). 
3.2.1 Purpose aiid motives of Corporate Goveriiance 
The initial purpose of CG was the protection of the shareholders' rights in a listed 
company (Demirag, 1998. Whittington, 1993, Stiles and Bernard, 1993). The first 
pressure came frorn the international institutional investors who invest more and more 
in the listed companies and consequently expect not only transparency of information 
but also participation in the corporate decisions and actions. Even up to the present day, 
"institutional investors have been taking their role far more seriously than before, at 
least for now. It is encouraging that on both sides of the Atlantic shareholders have been 
taking a tough line with corporate boards that reward the boss munificently while the 
company flounders. In Britain, investors have kicked up a fuss over pay at Reuters, 
SheD and EMI, a big music group that has now decided to back down. In America, 
those under attack include General Electric and Hewlett-Packard. One of the main 
problems with establishing good corporate governance is that ownership is dispersed. 
But institutional investors own a bigger share of American equities than ever before: 
49%, four times as much as 40 years ago. As the institutions' share of equities rises') so 
the option to sell declines and the case for raising a stink gets stronger. If institutions 
behave like owners, companies will be well governed. Regulators must remove all 
obstacles that discourage them from doing so. Then it will be clear whether bad 
governance springs from market failure or investor apathy" (Economist, 2003K). The 
trend towards more responsible and efficient forms of corporate organization and 
administration has been affected by recent events (Kroen. 2005: Judd, 2004a). In fact, 
the rush of mergers. acquisitions and takeovers on a global scale. the emergence of non 
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US multinationals. the mini (country specific) financial collapses such as those in 
Thailand, Russia. Japan. Brazil, etc.. the hedge fund turbulence (i. e. LTC). the collapse 
of communism and the subsequent prevalence of the market economy, the accelerating 
globalization. the privatizations, the increasing role of stock markets in relation to bank 
borrowing in financing of companies. the increasing role of institutional investors and 
the strengthening of stock options and the recent global stock market bubble. all have 
increased even more the importance of Corporate Governance (Economist. 200311; 
Croft, 2001; Plender, 2000b). As a result, shareholder activism is on the rise globally. 
As the Economist reports: "Disney is but the most prominent of a number of cases 
where shareholders are asserting their rights over -their companies I managers in a newly 
aggressive way. And it is not just in America that their muscle is being flexed. In Britain 
this week the chairman of Royal/Dutch/Sbell, Sir Philip Watts, resigned after 
shareholder pressure following his belated and over-relaxed presentation of the 
downgrading of Shell's oil reserves. Increased shareholder activism and tougher. more 
independent boardrooms have "the potential to remedy the situation". The imperfections 
in the market for chief executives are considerable and it is up to shareholders and their 
representatives in the boardroom to improve the functioning of that market. Even if a 
talented,, and honest, chief executive is at the helm, shareholders need to know what lie 
is doing and why" (Economist, 20044). Indeed, the governance issues have been 
intensified with financial scandals such as the developments in Enron, Arthur Andersen, 
WorldCom, Xerox, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Martha Stewart and in other large 
US companies, and more recently in some giant European companies also such as in the 
French Vivendi, the Swiss-Swedish ABB, etc. Common issues on the aforementioned 
financial crises include the deception of the investors by the senior executives, the non- 
existent or inefficient internal auditing mechanisms, the incompetent external auditors, 
the obscure relations between listed companies, analysts. investment bankers and 
brokers and the indifference or insufficiency of the regulatory bodies to control the 
"irrational exuberance" (Hill, 2002b; Frederick, 1999). Therefore, it is clear today that 
CG, which started as a protection movement mainly of individual but also institutional 
shareholders who do not have the inside story and information of the companies they 
invest in, has in fact been called to help re-establish the confidence of investors and the 
public faith in the capital market setting, through transparency. auditing and the 
appropriate role of the board of directors (Sax, 2003). 
3.2.2 Global CG and regulated corporate disclosure 
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The corporate governance framework, as proposed by Keasey and Wright (1993, p. 12). 
suggests that effective governance includes "a multi-faceted set of activities involving 
institutional investors, insider and outsider board membership, executives with 
appropriate incentive-based remuneration, board committees, auditing, the market for 
corporate control, etc. ". International organizations and academic institutions have 
joined forces to research and propose CG principles. Along these lines, the OECD 
issued the "OECD Principles of Corporate Governance" in 1999. They cover five areas: 
(1) shareholders' rights, (n) equal treatment of shareholders, (116) role of stakeholders, 
(iv) the dissemination of information and the transparency and (v) the role of the Board 
of Directors. Each one of the five areas also contained concrete propositions (Corporate 
Governance, 1998). Other international bodies, such as the World Bank, the 
Commonwealth Association on CG, the International CG Network, etc., have also 
focused on and published similar reports (Avgouleas, 2004; Nikoletopoulos, 2003; 
Corporate Governance, 1999, Thomson, 1994). In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was 
passed and became law in the USA. Its main features are obligating the CEOs and the 
CFOs of listed companies to certify personally the financial results of the companies, 
prohibiting loans to members of the Board of Directors and managing officers, 
providing penalties of imprisonment for those implicated in corporate frauds, setting a 
two - day notice of the announcement of trading of shares, etc. Some CG regulations, ) 
such as the King Report in South Africa, the code of the Toronto Stock Exchange, etc., 
have been produced by the -stock markets of the respective countries, especially the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, because of their shareholder-centred culture (Economist, 
2004viii). There are also private sector initiatives such as that of the GM's Board of 
Directors in 1994 with the title "General Motor's Board Guidelines on Significant 
Corporate Governance Issues. " Also, in January 2002, the CG European Institute was 
founded in Brussels. Across the European Union a similar fever and focus on CG issues 
have been observed. In Germany a strenuous effort has tried to combine proper CG with 
the applicable model of the German consensus capitalism, an evaluation of the CG in 
the listed German Companies has been attempted, and a scorecard for Gen-nan 
Corporate Governance has been published. CG "fever" has been observed in Italy, in 
Sweden and other EU member states. In 2001 the European Code for takeovers was 
voted on and agreed, and in 2002 the propositions for a European CG system were 
submitted in the hope that they would become the rule and a European Union directive 
by 2004 (Economist. 2004c, 2004k, 20040, Avgouleas, 2004. Atkins, 1998). Efforts by 
the institutions in Japan also and as far away as Mexico have also been made in order to 
establish an appropriate corporate governance framework and to make family controlled 
listed companies more transparent. All the aforementioned initiatives concerning the 
above entitles have been imposed by the need to maintain an atmosphere of faith in the 
market so that the investors may be attracted and protected, also giving, perhaps, a 
premium to companies with proper CG (Economist, 2004c. 2004d, Judd, 2002b). 
3.3 The Corporate Governance framework in Greece 
The Corporate Governance framework in Greece, as in many other countries , is 
based 
on the relations among the different agents or market participants that affect the 
governance of the firm as well as on the effect and impact that these relations have on 
the firm's accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and perfon-nance. As already 
mentioned, most of the issues concerning these relations arise from the agency 
problems, which are associated with the separation of ownership and control that has 
taken place only during the last decade in Greece (Demos, 2003d; Chatziernmanouil, 
2002, Kefalas. 2002a, Mertzanis and Avlonitis,, 2002; Thomadakis, 2002). On the 
application of CG principles there were three significant difficulties: (a) the strong 
decline of the ASE since 1999, (b) the relatively small size and the family structure of 
quite a large number of the listed companies and (c) the disagreement concerning to 
what extent the related regulations had to be voluntary, or enforced by law (Augouleas, 
2004; Alexakis, 2003, Drakos, 2002). The acceptance and the importance of CG for the 
Greek companies and their top management have become clear and vital particularly 
now that the Greek companies are operating in the highly competitive environment of 
the European Union. Until 1998/1999, Greece had considerably delayed adjusting to the 
contemporary trends of CG. However, from 1999 onwards, most of the institutional 
bodies such as the Capital Market Committee, the ASE, the National Economy 
Ministry, and other business organizations have been CG activated at high speed. In 
particular, during the late 1990s, an attempt by the ASE to "gather" all recent 
developments on CG was a welcome initiative. Consequently, another similar CG 
initiative by the CMC led to the production of the so-called "white paper" on CG in 
1999, following the "OECD Principles of CG", as mentioned before. This publication 
has made propositions (non obligatory for the listed companies), following the OECD 
model. in the following areas: Rights and obligations of shareholders; Equal treatment 
of shareholders, Role of the company's business associates and of the agencies with 
legitimate interests in the company, Transparent disclosure of infori-nation and audit, 
The Board of Directors. The non - Executive Members of the Board of Directors, and 
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The Executive Management (Vergos. 2003a. Nikoletopoulos. 2003). Towards the end 
of 2000, the CMC proposed and passed two resolutions. (1/195/19-7-2000 and 
5/204/14-11-2000), which dealt with the special and significant subject of transparency. 
They obliged the companies to disclose information on takeovers and buvouts. 
expansion plans, inside information. trading by the top management, trading by 
auditors, internal auditing departments and shareholder registry. On 17 May 2002 the 
first Greek law (N. 3016) for the CG was published. It deals with subjects such as the 
composition and obligations of the Board of Directors, the Internal audit. the inside 
information and the terrns of increase of the share capital. On 27 June 2002 the ASE 
Board of Directors announced that, for the next year. only 21 out of the 355 companies 
listed in the ASE had achieved full compliance with the four qualitative criteria 
proposed by the ASE. The four main criteria referred to the existence of an updated. 
informative and "friendly user" company website, the number of group and/or 
individual presentations and meetings, the adoption and implementation of corporate 
governance issues (structure of the BoD, non-executive members. etc. ), and the liquidity 
of the stock and bid-ask spread patterns (Alexakis, 2003; Xanthakis, 2003, Vergos, 
2003c). In July 2002, a draft law was submitted for the "Constitution of a 
Standardization Accounting and Audit Committee and other related Provisions", and 
the law 2992 / 2002 was passed and voted by the Greek parliament for the 
implementation of the IAS regulation. Recently, the application of three EU directives, 
already approved by the European Parliament,, was promoted. Their main subjects were 
the avoidance of market abuse, the content and the procedure of approval of the 
Prospectus on the listing and marketing of securities in the stock exchange, the review 
of the framework of investment services provision, and the implementation of the 
International Accounting Standards in the EU land. Greece has planned to make these 
directives law and regulation in the land by early 2005. With some delay, it became law 
in summer 2005 (Economist, 2004iii; 20031; Economicos, 2002). Listed fin-ns, mostly 
of small capitalization, were - and some still are - in a race against time to meet the 
deadlines for the application of the rules of corporate governance. Even worse, the 
associated costs in ten-ns of money, time and know-how drive the small capitalization 
firrns to speculate even de-listing scenarios. Most of the listed fin-ns, however, schedule 
extraordinary general meetings (EGM) to comply with and approve changes that will 
bring them in line with requirements. Some, however. are failing to do so and they are 
subject to fines (Dimitriou, 2004, Ntokas, 2002d). Overall. firms seem to be split into 
two "speeds. " Large-capitalization companies, mainly those comprising the FTSE ASE- 
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20 and 40 indices, carry out the required changes on time and some go and have gone 
beyond what the law stipulates. Some, however. struggle to comply and Indeed still 
have much to do in essence. particularly concerning the entry of non-executive. 
independent members onto the board of directors and the introduction of mechanisms 
for coordination and internal control and elections of new boards. "The provisions of the 
law are no different to those in other countries, " says research economist Lucas Spanos. 
of Athens University. who stresses that "the chief weakness of most Greek listed firrns 
lies in the organization and functioning of their boards of directors, due to the 
predominance of family members and the lack of internal control". The issue is timely 
not jI ust because of the special laws, but also mainly "because it direct y concerns the 
modernization of Greek enterprises and economy, " Spanos adds. The main issues which 
corporate governance is seen as addressing in Greek firms are business planning' 
procedures, a more active role for the board of directors, the development of 
organizational and administrative structures, performance measurement, coordination 
and internal control mechanisms, personnel selection systems, appropriate remuneration 
policy and the promotion of business culture (Ntokas, 2004a; Vergos, 2003d; Gounarl 
and Kalamara, 2002). A recent research study has shown that Greek listed firrns that 
apply accountable practices of corporate governance enjoy lower capital raising costs 
and higher valuations. as a result of a "credibility premium" that may be as high as 25 
percent (Vergos, 2003b). Some Athens bourse-listed firms complain that corporate 
governance entails higher operating costs in lean times. But Spanos is categorical: "It is 
an investment with a high return. The foreign markets want it, the Greek fund managers 
want it and firrns give a better picture of themselves. " He adds that it is necessary for 
firms to make more changes, such as introducing web pages with infon-nation for 
investors in Greek as well as English, regularly publicizing corporate events and 
applying the rules of corporate social responsibility beyond charities and sponsorship of 
social events, as major Greek corporations are accustomed to implement. "Corporate 
governance practices are proven to do away with many obstacles to business, but it is 
imperative that firms are encouraged to apply them on a voluntary basis" (Ntokas, 
2004a. Kefalas, 2002b). 
3.4 Channels of Greek Corporate Governance 
In the following sections the three main channels of Greek corporate governance such as local 
incorporation law. secUnties law and stock exchange fisfing requirements will be described, 
3.4.1 Main emisiderations 
The Greek corporate framework is based on the law 2190/20, which has constituted the 
legal guide for Greek companies for almost 80 years. In addition. this law had some 
critical subsequent modifications, especially by the Presidential Decrees 350/1985 and 
512/1992 as well as a series of Ministerial Decisions, such as article 55 of the law 
2396/1996, and the ]aw 2733/1999, which tried to settle different corporate issues. 
These steps have been taken in order to increase the level of transparency and 
accountability of listed companies. Indeed, the Presidential Decree 512/1992 was 
amended so as to provide more information on the changes in corporate ownership of the 
main shareholders of listed companies (Milonas, 2002; Kiriakopoulos, 2002). The most 
important amendments were incorporated in the Law 2733/1999. They state that changes in 
votmg rights that equal or exceed the 5% limit must be disclosed both to the supervisory 
authority and the company within the first day following the transaction (the previous 
penod was 5 days). Changes in the voting rights of a shareholder who owns more than 10% 
of the total voting rights as well as any change in the voting rights that exceeds 3%, must also 
be disclosed. In addition, changes in the voting rights of the members of the company's board 
of directors and senior management must be disclosed. Brokerage ffl-ms must disclose to the 
Capital Market Commission all executed transactions on shares being under special 
surveillance or under special status, as is defined by the competent authorities. and their value 
exceeds 5% of all daily transactions executed on each share (Nikoletopoulos, 2003; 
Kiriakopoulos, 2002). In October 1997, a committee was established in Greece, and in 
November 1999 it issued a, set of recommendations on corporate governance on best 
practice in the country. These recommendations followed generally the spirit of the OECD 
principles on corporate governance, but they also took into consideration the Greek corporate 
pracfices. This Committee on Corporate Governance put these recommendations into the 
"blue book" and took into account not only the particularities and peculiarities of the 
Greek corporate structure but also the prevailing practices of the leading European 
Union member states (such as the U. K., France, Germany) as well as the existing 
framework and recommendations of the OECD, (contained in the OECD Principles on 
Corporate Governance). The main element of the Greek CG is the functioning of the 
Board of Directors. Its central role is recognized not only for monitoring the efficiency 
of the executive management and the accountability of managers and the board to the 
shareholders and stakeholders, but also for ensuring the establishment of the best 
perfon-nance conditions and the strategic leadership of the corporation. For instance, the 
"Blue Book", in a very light. prescriptive mode. mentioned the conflict that arises when 
the CEO holds simultaneously the position of the Chairman of the board. Similarly. the 
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blue book on CG recommended the maximum number of the Board of Directors to be 
no more than 13. possibly to satisfy at this point the control element in the joint stock 
companies in Greece (Nikoletopoulos, 2003, Mpitros, 2002). In Greece, as in many other 
European countries. corporate governance practices are established through three main channels: (a) 
incorporation law. mostly the law 2190/1920 and its amendments, (b) securities law and (c) stock 
exchange listing requirements as well as guidance and benchmarks. 
3.4.2 Meorporation law 
Generally, incorporation law in Greece deals quite satisfactorily with corporate governance issues, 
such as corporate boards, voting rights, corporate remuneration policies, stock ownersNp, etc. 
However, there are areas in which improvements have been made over the past few years and 
some other areas where the incorporation law could be amended. Some clauses have priority over 
corporate governance and securities law and affect corporation practices. For instance, incorporation 
law and corporate governance can be complementary. reflecting new needs and practices, such as: 
0 The issuance of only one class of common shares, with a voting right, that in turn 
strengthens n-unonty shareholder rights. Moreover, the voting rights of minority 
shareholders should be strengthened to encourage the efficiency of the oversight by 
shareholders of corporate management and to ensure its transparent operations, and 
that comes with the corporate governance rules. Furthen-nore, the overall condition 
for exercising minority shareholders' rights should be reduced from the present 5% to 
lie in the range of I% through 3% of outstanding shares. 
The existence of registered shares (and the complete abolition of bearer shares) that 
uniquely reports the end owner of the underlying share(s) and helps basic activities 
such proxy voting and electronic voting in the AGMs. In addition, the 
dematerialization of the Athenian shares eliminates risks of fraud, theft, etc., and 
clanfies issues such as control and voting. 
The establishment of new voting procedures that include possibilities of postal 
or electronic ballot. Thus, the voting reflects better and more the opinions of 
minority shareholders in the annual or extraordinary general assembly. Furthen-nore, 
changes in the procedures of the board of directors meetings should be established to 
allow directors to attend the meeting not only in person but also through teleconference 
procedures. 
The strengthening of the supervisory efficiency and effectiveness of the board of directors 
and providing a proper balance between accountability and enterprise. This came about 
through the establishment of non-executive (outside) and independent members in the 
board, a sub-coi-nniatee system for the board. efficient auditing procedures that promote 
proper infori-nation disclosure practices. and of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (or the International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
9 The empowen-nent of "controlling" shareholders. who exercise powers to influence 
and control managerial decision procedures and bear the corresponding legal 
responsibilities for their participation in management decisions. In this respect- the 
company's relation with its creditors is particularly important. 
The strengthening of the responsibility of the board directors, particular with 
regard to recording in detail the board meeting views of directors who opposed certain 
agenda and the reasons for the opposition. Also shareholders might be allowed to read 
and copy the details. 
0 The establishment of practical procedures governing takeover. acquisition and 
merger activity and securing the accountability of management to the board of directors 
and ultimately to the general shareholder meeting. 
The majority of these issues is also dealt with by the securities legislation, as shown below, and 
affects vastly the corporate communication practices and the investor relations programme. For 
example, should the IRO spend time to inform minority shareholders (retail investors and 
individuals) and how much? Is the IRO legally protected if he/she participates in the board of 
directors meetings as a non-voting member? Moreover, how is he/she protected when an insider 
and official spokesperson for the company detects wrongdoings by the controlling shareholder" 
What is his/her responsibility. since no legal action against IROs has been witnessed, but CEOs 
and CFOs have been sent to prison for their corporate actions and misleading infon-nation 
(Economist, 20031; Vergos, 2003a; Nikoletopoulos, 2003; Plantzos, 2002b; Ntokas, 2002e). 
3.4.3 SecurXes legWadon 
Securities legislation has been the most important channel for the improvement of corporate 
governance practices in Greece. The appropriate legislation includes state laws, rules and 
regulations introduced by the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (CMC), rules and 
regulations introduced by the Ministry of National Economy in Greece, as well as self- 
regulation practices (Antonakopoulos, 2003; Nikoletopoulos, 2003, Thomadakis, 2002). First, 
law 3016/2002 became effective in June 2002, and its main objective is to protect the 
shareholders of the listed companies. By pursuing this objective the law focuses on two main 
issues: (a) the structure and workings of the Board of Directors and (b) the role of the Audit 
Committees as well as the Internal Control committees. In particular, the law promotes the 
nomination of truly independent directors (at least one third (1 /3) of the total number of the 
board(s). In addition, it pursues the establishment and the strengthening of the audit 
committees. Second. law 2836/2000 became effective in July 2000. enhancing the 
supervising powers of the CMC. These powers involved (a) the expansion of the CMC's 
authority to introduce extended rules and regulations regarding tradmg conditions and the 
general level of transparency and the quality of infon-nation disclosure by companies listed in the 
ASE, (b) the more effective control of the process duration and the minimum requirements for 
the licensing of brokerage fin-ns and the approval of changes in the capital structure of listed 
companies, (c) the introduction of 'fit and proper' criteria for the conduct of business by listed 
companies, capital market agents and personnel and (d) the safeguarding of the CMC 
legislative and auditing actions against civil liability. Third, in 2000, the Ministry of National 
Economy introduced new rules regarding the general operating conditions of the capital 
market. The rules (a) raised the minimum level of the initial share capital required for the 
listing of a company's shares in the main market of the ASE to 11.7 million Euro and for the 
listing in the parallel market to 2.9 million Euro, (b) raised the amount of compensation' 
provided by the Compensation Guarantee Fund from 20,000 Euros to 30,000 Euros, (c) 
changed the method of calculation of the daily closing price of individual stocks and the general 
mdex in the ASE (the latest method calculates the daily closing price as a weighted average 
of the prices recorded during the last 30 mýinutes of trading) (Baskozos, 2002; Klavdianos, 
2002). Fourth, the following rules and regulations by the CMC enhanced market integrity and 
the level of accountability in the market. These rules strengthened the market's safety by 
specifying conditions for the imposition of trading halts on transactions in the Athens 
Derivatives Exchange (ADEX); specified the amount and quality of information required for 
setting derivatives contracts; specified the ten-ns and conditions for engaging in derivatives 
transactions by collective investment institutions (CIS); raised the daily price fluctuation lirmits 
of individual stocks traded in the ASE from initially ±8% to ± 10% and then to ± 12%; introduced 
a set of rules regulating the conduct of a tender offer in the capital market; set the conditions for 
engaging in repurchase agreements by CIS; set the terms and conditions for engaging m short 
sales activities; amended the process of the clearing and settlement of transactions in the ASE, 
thus securing the efficiency of the dematerialization process, raised the minimum level of the 
initial share capital required for obtaining a licence to set a mutual fund management fin-n 
from 293,500 Euros to 1.2 billion Euros; and properly readjusted the level of contributions as 
a result of the Compensation Guarantee Fund (Kapemarakou, 2002; Anastasiou, 2002). Fifth, 
the CMC introduced rules regardirig the operation of the newly instituted New Market, m which 
innovative and dynamic companies are encouraged to seek investment capital. These rules set 
the terms and conditions for participation, share ownership and its distribution, the conduct 
of business, market-making activity and underwriting obligations. Sixth. the capital market 
framework was improved through the introduction of rules by the board of directors of the 
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ASE, which set more transparent procedures for the approval of companies applications 
wishing to list their shares in the exchange, introduced stricter provisions for the approval of 
these companies' prospectuses and set stricter time limits on underwriters for meetig their 
obligations; set the ten-ns and conditions for the listing and trading of shares in the New Market, 
amended the terrns and conditions for the subjection of individual stocks under special 
surveillance and liquidity status; dealt with certain technical issues concerning the operation of 
the ASE electronic trading system (Kavouropoulos, 2001). Simýilarly. the securities legislation 
affects the investor relations practices since it deals with specific corni-nunication issues such as 
the trading of the stocks, the available mfori-nation in the prospectus during an offering, analysts' 
and broker conduct, depth and characteristics of the company's registry, liquidity and tradirig of 
the stocks, transparency procedures, etc. (Xanthakis. 2003, Drakos, 2002; Katrannadou, 2002a. 
Milonas, 2002). 
3.4.4 flie A thens Stock Evc1wpge fisting requirenwiz 
Following the establishment of outside directors in basic corporation law, the regulation for 
listed corporations has been amended, in the forrn of changes in the Athens Stock Exchange's 
listing requirements, to require the board of directors to include outside directors of sufficient 
number and quality. The issue of independence is therefore emphasized, and the ten-ns 
and conditions for independence are strengthened by preventing the appointment of persons 
who have had either some relationship with the corporation in the recent past or difficulty in 
perforn-iing their duty. The ASE moved beyond fori-nal regulation by introducMg the so-called 
4(stock star system". It recommended that the executives of the listed fin-ris take a careful look 
into the group of "qualitative criteria", for the listed firi-ris, that the international investment 
community takes into considerafion duiing the decision-making process of buying stocks or not. 
In fact, the management of the ASE correctly diagnosed that Greece, as a peripheral and small 
market, needs to do something "extra", more proactive to get ahead of the other stock exchanges, 
which with the application of the global standard of corporate governance pracfices are going in 
the same direcfion. In addifion, on October 10,2002, the Board of Directors of the ASE decided 
to implement a series of measures aiming at boosting liquidity and increasing transparency 'in 
listed companies (Alexakis, 2002a). Analytically. the BoD of the ASE announced a number of 
measures that will be proposed airýg at increasirig market liquidity and improving the 
transparency of listed companies' financial statements. In short, the measures miclude 
modification of the legal fi-amework for derivative products and short sellMg, thorough 
exan-unation of the financial statements of the listed companies; abandonment of the securities 
transactions tax for market makers; tax audit for the companies pending for listing; possible 
changes in the \N'ay low liquidity stocks are traded (introduction of auctions). The ASE 
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administration recommended additional guidelines in order to enhance shareholder 
communication and investor relations. to foster shareholder participation in the general annual 
assembly and other extraordinary meetings in person or by means of proxy voting, and to re- 
examine relations between analysts and corporate finance bankers as well as auditors and 
consultants (Bougatsou, 2004. Katrarnadou, 2002b). 
3.5 Main players in the Greek Capital Market 
In this section, the local capital market's basic players. such as the capital market 
committee. the ASE, the institutional investors. the analysts, and other industry related 
professional associations, will be described. We will start with the Greek capital market. 
3.5.1 The Greek Ca ital Market P 
During the 1990s, share ownership broadened considerably, giving a boost to' 
government plans for partial privatization of state-controlled corporations. Rising 
confidence in the government's deten-nination to .. Jng join the Euro sent Greek stocks flyi _ 
in 1999, making it the world's best-perfon-ning stock market, with a rise in the Athens 
general index of 102%. The sharp decline of interest rates that accompanied the 
government's austerity programme drew capital away from government bonds - for 
long the haven for Greek family savings - and into the equity market. In particular, this 
new class of small investor piled heavily into small -capitalization stocks, generating a 
speculative momentum that pushed some shares up by as much as 500% (Vergos, 
2000b). The ASE was upgraded on May 31,2001 to the group of "mature" stock 
exchanges, and it was withdrawn from the emerging markets group. Greek stocks also 
felt pressure from the shift in the country's status from an emerging market to a 
developed one. Greece was traditionally one of the biggest fish in the emerging-markets 
pond, guaranteeing it a large slice of investment portfolios focused on the developing 
world. With its inclusion in the euro "club", however, Greece became part of much 
bigger pan-European portfolios. At the same time, following this upgrade, it was 
observed that some foreign investors. who were specialists in emerging markets, started 
to sell holdings of Greek stocks and bonds, owing to the nature of their investment 
policy. In the short terrn, this shift deprived Greek equities of a great deal of liquidity, as 
investors gradually re-rated Greek companies. This effect began slowly and 
progressively to ease, as pan-European portfolio managers added Greek stocks to their 
holdings. thus feeding some liquidity back into the Athens market. Despite some 
progress in attracting foreign funds, mainly directed at a handful of large-capitalization Ir 
companies included in the MSCI-Greece index. most listed firms have little to show on 
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that front years after the Greek stock market was upgraded to the developed markets 
league by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). Central to their failure has 
been the inability by the top management to grasp the importance and necessity of 
investor relations. Indicatively, the term and concept of "investor relations". so often 
called in Greece "investment relations". is still confused with public relations (Dernos, 
2003d; Kontogiannis, 2002c). On average, however. the International Institutions 
account on average, for an estimated 35 per cent of trading in the ASE: annually. 
domestic investors drive the market. (Monemvasiotis. 2004, Papadogiannis. 2003). 
Official figures from the ASE's departments showed foreigners holding a greater 
proportion of large Greek companies, comprising the blue-chip FTSE/ASE-20 stock 
mdex,, than they did prior to the market's upgrade. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that 
the observed increase in foreign ownership of some Greek companies is as a result of 
both the rebalancing of the Morgan Stanley Composite Indices (MSCI) used by foreign 
institutional investors as benchmarks, and the resulting increase in the Athens bourse's 
weight in the same stock indices as well as the trimming of underweight positions, 
established initially by developed market passive funds upon the local bourse's entry 
into the developed market league in 2001 (Schina, 2004a; Gelantali, 2004a: Kokorls. 
2002). This conclusion is substantiated by observed investment patterns and the claims 
of high-level company officials in promising bigh-growtb mid-capitalization firrns. such 
as the Maillis packaging group, who say foreign funds now account for a much lower 
proportion of their stockholders' base than they did on May 31,2001. In contrast, 
others, such as the Technical Olympic group of companies, another medium 
capitalization firm, confirms that foreign funds now account for a much higher 
proportion of their stockholders' base than they did on May 31,2001. Similarly, a small 
capitalization company, the Fourlis company, during the last two years (2003-2004) has 
evidence that 30% of the stock belongs to foreign institutions (Joannou, 2004; 
Koulouris,, 2002a; Kollias, 2000). Under norrnal circumstances, active foreign funds 
should be more interested than passive funds in smaller companies, with little or no 
weight in the MSCI-Greece index or the HSBC small and medium European 
capitalization index. Active funds try to beat the benchmark stock index through 
superior stock selection and market timing, whereas passive funds simply try to 
replicate the returns of the benchmark indices. Along with the active funds. some 
emerging Investment houses have been investing in Greece (Sakkas. 2004e; 2003). The 
justification for this is that since the most dynamic Greek companies operate 
successfully in south east Europe (Balkans and ex communist Europe) and a big portion 
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of their sales and profits are generated in these markets. which are considered as 
emerging markets. the Greek listed companies can be characterized as "semi emerging". 
Their base (Greece) is classified as a mature market. operating in Euroland, using the 
Euro as a medium. and important portions of their operations are based in economies 
that are classified as emerging (Financial Times, 2003). 
3.5.2 The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
In February 2002, the Research and Development department of the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) promoted a research/questionnaire. on the so-called "star stocks" or 
11 star system". It was mailed to all listed companies at the ASE, giving them six months 
to respond and to comply with the issues. The objective by the R&D department and 
generally by the Administration of the ASE was to search and find out which listed 
companies were and still are complying with the following issues: web site information; 
a detailed list of the roadshows that had taken place in the previous year in Greece and 
abroad; fair and steady disclosure; having an in-house IR office or department; Board of 
Directors and Executive team; and having and operating an Internal Audit office. 
Following the announcements of the Athens Stock Exchange regarding the continuous 
submission and evaluation of the listed firrns based on the aforementioned qualitative 
criteria, the Athens Stock Exchange released and presented a table with those 
companies which fulfil these criteria. The Athens Stock Exchange indicated clearly that 
the above table was not intended as a solicitation, suggestion or proposal for any kind of 
investment in securities of listed firrns included in this table now or in the future, and 
also constituted no categorization of securities of any kind. The financial results of the 
examined companies were not taken into consideration. The deadline for the star system 
questionnaire was the last day of February 2002 (28/2/2002). After collecting the first 
questionnaire, the ASE's R&D department sent and emailed a second wave of 
questions, mostly to clarify the "answers" by the listed companies, and to remind those 
who had not answered the first time that they might be not included in the research and 
publication of the Greek star stocks. Moreover, the second patch of the questions asked 
the listed companies to identify fully and in detail the listed IR practitioners, the IR 
personnel, a detailed description of the actual roadshows in 2001 and the planned 
roadshows during 2002. A negative aspect of all this is that the ASE R&D department is 
geared towards roadshows which had taken place in the different cities in Greece. That 
means it focuses mostly on communicating to individual /retail investors rather than the 
institutional ones (Vergos, 2004. Nikolopoulos, 2002). t7 
3.5.3 The Capitallfarket Committee (the Greek SEC) 
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The Capital Market Commission (CMC) is an independent decision-making body in the 
form of a Public Law Legal Entity operating under the supen, ision of the MinistrIv, of 
National Economy. It is in fact the Greek SEC. Its main objecti\, e is to promote the 
establishment of sound conditions for the operation of the capital market and to enhance 
public confidence both in the quality of supervision and market behaviour. In order to 
achieve this objective, the Commission sets the general terms and conditions f2oveming 
the organization and operation of the capital market. and issues instructions on 
compliance procedures. It also introduces the measures that are useful for ensuring the 
proper functioning of the market (Kavaropoulos, 2001, Vergos, 2000a). The legislative 
framework of the Greek capital market is fully. han-nonized with the guidelines and 
directives of the European Union. The capital market entities supervised by the CMC 
are the brokerage firms, the firms providing investment services, the mutual fund 
management firms, the portfolio investment companies and the firrns for the reception 
and transmission of stock exchange orders. Entities and organizations, such as the 
Athens Stock Exchange, the Athens Derivatives Exchange, the Athens Derivatives 
Transactions Clearing House and the Central Depository of Securities are also subject to 
supervision by the Commission. The members of the boards of directors and executive 
managers of the above mentioned entities have to comply with the rules and regulations 
set by the Commission. A central means for exercising prudential supervision by the 
Capital Market Commission is the licence authorization function and the imposition of 
proper European Union (EU) standards for the approval of operation of capital market 
entities. More specifically, licences for the provision of investment services are granted 
on terms that secure their use as a 'European passport' in the EU temtory. The granting 
of licences to the Mutual Fund Management Firrns and the portfolio investment 
companies, as well as the granting of licences for the conduct of initial public offerings, 
is another important means of exercising prudential supervision (Sakelari, 2004; 
Plantzos, 2002a). The monitoring of the capital adequacy of the brokerage firrns and the 
fin-ns providing investment services, the approval of public offers by listed companies 
and of the changes in the composition of the board of directors and senior management 
of the supervised companies, the granting of licences for obtaining the qualification of 
the 'broker representative' and for the establishment of subsidiaries by financial 
intermediaries all constitute fundamental means for the exercise of prudential 
supervision of the capital market entities. With respect to the Mutual Fund Management 
Firms and the portfolio investment companies, the prudential supervision involves the 
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monitoring of the portfolio composition and compliance with transparency rules and 
regulations (Thomadakis, 2001). 
3.5.4 Mutual Funds in Greece 
In Greece the mutual fund institution was introduced in 1973 with the almost parallel 
establishment of the Commercial Bank and National Bank Mutual funds. i. e. Hermes 
and Dilos respectively. By the end of the 1980s, the market image remained much the 
same with two mutual funds, the total assets of which were only some millions of 
Euros. The landmark year for capital market and mutual funds was 1990. when the 
group of Trust Bank was also introduced to the area, whereas in 1989 a third mutual 
fund, from an insurance company, was also launched. so that a wave of new mutual 
funds followed thern, the number of which exceeded 120, a number that was to alter 
every day. The institutional frame within which the first mutual funds started was Law 
608 of 1970,, which was finally replaced by Law 1969 of 1991, which renewed the 
already existing legal framework by taking into account the corresponding instruction of 
the European Union (Milonas, 2002). From 1972 until almost 1989 the mutual funds 
institution worked with no disruption within a very limited capital market with a daily 
trade volurne, which with difficulty exceeded 100 million drachmas. Up to 1990, the 
average investor's maturity concerning capital market and mutual funds in particular. 
was very low, therefore an investor, influenced as he was by past difficulties (i. e. 
political disturbance, old-fashioned economy) went on investing in real estate, precious 
metals and mainly foreign currencies (Papadimitriou, 2004; Papadokostopoulos, 2004). 
From the beginning of 1990, the situation began to be reversed with rapid pace. Despite 
the crisis that the capital market has suffered so far, public interest in investing in 
mutual funds is being drastically raised, for the total assets of Greek mutual funds have 
reached the GRD 1.3 trillion compared with GRD 20.1 billion as at the end of 1989 
(Sakkas, 2004b; Stergiou, 2002). The year 1992 can also be characterized as a 
significant year for the development of the mutual funds in Greece for three main 
reasons: 1) the law of 1969/1991 was applied, which constituted the basis for the modem 
function of mutual fund institution. specifying in detail the obligations of the mutual 
funds. The main objective is the investor's protection from misinformation and 
consequently from wrong investment choice; n) the highest yields of 1990 are already 
past, a fact that obliged investors to start pushing mutual funds for information and 
advice as Nvell as for alternative investment solutions and in) the presence of "Income 
funds" increased spectacularly, that is those which invest mainly or exclusively in bills. 
bonds, etc. These kinds of mutual funds offer a shelter to investors who saw their 
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principal invested in balanced funds shrinking following the Stock Exchange bearish 
trend during 1991. The first "International funds" appeared which Imested Investor's 
Greek drachmas in securities (stocks, bonds, deposits) abroad. Subsequently. the growth 
and importance of the Mutual Funds Industry closely followed the development of the 
securities and financial market (Ntokas. 20041; 2002a). The institution of mutual funds 
continued in a phase of immense and quick development. In recent years in particular 
the pace of this growth has increased spectacularly. The main reasons are: the 
progressive growth of the Greek Money Market and Capital Market within the 
framework of the Greek Economy liberation: the search by money investors for 
alternative chances of placernent apart from the old-fashioned bank deposits. the 
expectancy of tax-free profit from the investment in relation to the undertaking risk 
(Risk/Reward Trade off), the direct approach and liquidity at times of need, and tax 
exemptions; and the accession of mutual funds in the offered services of banks and 
insurance companies, with the result the improvement of these services (service 
quality). For the Greek investor, a mutual fund means the capability to invest in 
drachmas and lately in Euros, through the mutual fund he has chosen, in foreign 
securities which are traded on the biggest and most known Stock Exchanges in the 
world and which offer, depending on the choices made already, protection against 
potential devaluation or a small and/or big fall in the drachma (Ntokas, 2002c). 
a Types of Yiiulualfunds 
In Greece the mutual funds. follow mainly the classical distinctions, which are the 
following: the income funds, the investment orientation of which is towards securities 
of fixed income which, accordingly. are either strictly self-confined to such bonds, or, 
based on the regulations, can deviate by investing a small percentage of their capital in 
equity; the growth funds, which, either exclusively or not, invest the total of their 
available funds in shares, leaving a small percentage of their capital to be invested in 
income securities; and the international mutual funds, which, as their title itself 
indicates, invest in foreign stock or income securities (Kitsios, 2004, Klousis, 1999). 
The distinction of mutual funds in pure and mixed ones covers two different 
expediencies. The pure ones aim to be comparable with some stock exchange indices 
and therefore to offer a comparative measure of positive and negative performance 
against these indices to investors. On the other hand, the mixed ones are indifferent to 
this comparative measure and pursue flexibility. so that. when the space area in which 
they are active suffers a fall for reasons of coincidence. i. e. a stock value fall, they can 
transfer their capital to more safe and secure ground, i. e. to fixed income securities 
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which do not suffer from fluctuations as intensP, cly as do equity shares. Assuming that 
they are well managed. international mutual funds can, assuming that they are well 
managed apart from the other things. exploit the differences that various capital markets 
present In Stock Exchanges all over the world, and transfer their investments from the 
US to Japan and from the Far East to Europe and so on. Greek people can invest their 
money in foreign mutual funds with no restrictions. This important development in the 
rapidly changing field of mutual funds was the result of the application of the 85/611 
directive of the EU. combined with the partial liberation of capital movement. More 
specifically, the EU directive 85/611 allows a mutual fund, whose management 
company is in a country member, to dispose its shares to the rest of the countries of the 
Community, since it has previously submitted all the necessary docurnents, based on the 
Directive, to the official Capital Market Board. The application of the EU directive in' 
Greece was completed with the presidential decree 433 of October 1993 (Kasimatis, 
2004,2002, Kitsios. 2004-, agn site). Therefore in 1993. the first foreign mutual funds. 
seated mainly in Luxemburg, were presented in Greece. and in a very short time 
attracted significant capital: 50 billion dracbmas. It is characteristic that since 1992 two 
new kinds of mutual funds have been growing - Liquid Reserves funds and International 
funds - while simultaneously the share of Income funds has been continuously 
increasing, all at the expense of the share of Growth or Balanced funds. In 1992 the 
market share of the Liquid Reserves funds was raised to 30.4% instead of the 6.4% of 
the previous year, while at the beginning of 1994 this reached 40.7%. Correspondingly, 
the market share of Liquid Reserves funds and International funds increased 
impressively (Mantikidis, 2004: Konstantinidis. 2003). Moreover, the investor's 
knowledge about these specific products improved significantly, a fact that allowed the 
creation of different types of mutual funds. The existing regulation concerning the 
mutual funds function in Greece is compiled in the Government Law 1969/1991 entitled 
"Investment Trusts, Mutual Funds and other provisions for the modernization and 
improvement of the capital market", and it regulates their operation. The mutual fund 
industry and the fund managers as well as the buy side analysts influence the investor 
relations activities and programme. It is a fertile training ground for the IRO and his/her 
team before the promotion becomes European and global. by targeting global fund 
managers. It also affects the liquidity. trading and positioning of the underlying stock. It 
is common that global funds feel more comfortable about investing in a Greek stock 
where Greek funds have invested in (Schina. 2003b). As mentioned earlier. the fund 
managers are the ultimate target for the IROs and therefore exact analysis of the local 
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fund managers' investment behaviour, patterns, profile and characteristics is critical to 
the investor relations strategy and tactics. 
b Association of Greek inutualfunds (A G11) - (EOE) 
The "Association of Greek Institutional InvestorS6- is a non-profit organization. 
founded in 1985. Its members. as of December 2004, include 33 Portfolio Invcstnient 
Companies and 29 Mutual Fund Management Companies. One of the main goals of the 
"Association of Greek Institutional Investors" is the promotion of the concept of 
professional investment management as well as the proposal of ways of Its 
improvement, the enhancement of sound competition and the application of ethical 
principles in the profession. Moreover, it makes efforts to strengthen tile relations 
among its members and establish relationships between its members and other Greek 
and foreign organizations. Additionally, the association informs its members of the 
news, difficulties and prospects of the profession, and tries to improve the training and 
perfon-nance of its members' personnel through seminars and other similar events. 
Lastly, it undertakes the responsibility of solving issues which are of importance to its 
members, participates in the preparatory operations of the implementation of laws, 
examines the results of the application of these laws and interprets the laws which 
govern its members' operations (Sakka, 2004f). 
3.5.5 Association of Greek brokeragefirms - (SMEXA) 
The association aims at establishing cooperative relationships among its members (93 in 
2003). In addition, it systematically undertakes research concerning the various 
problems each business sector in Greece faces and initiates improvements as far as the 
function of the Stock Exchange and the Capital Market are concerned. Its members 
operate mainly in Athens (Sakelariou, 2004). 
3.5.6 SED YKA 
It is a body of stock brokers with some specific characteristics. They operate in every 
major city in Greece and therefore target mainly the retail market. By law, their job is to 
execute orders and they can not be financial and investment advisors. The IRO channels 
company information through this body and its members in order to inform individual 
shareholders across the country. In 2003, there were 250 active members. 
3.5.7 Associations of Greek listed companies 
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Two associations of the listed companies exist and operate on the ASE; EEEXA and 
SEISET. 
aEEEX4 
EEEXA was established by SEV and represents mostIv the largest capitalization listed 
firms. SEV, the "Federation of Greek Industries". was founded in 1907 and is an 
independent non-profit association for employers, enterprises and organizations 
sustained by memberships and sponsorships only from members. It is the representative 
of the business sector in Greece and its main goal is the improvement of the economic 
and business environment. It is also concerned with the development and growth of 
Greek enterprises as well as their increased resence internationally, especially within p 
the European Union. The association promotes the adoption of corporate governance 
guidelines and respect for the natural environment. Also, it greatly supports' 
entrepreneur activity in Greece. creating the conditions that must exist in order to 
enhance it. 
b SEISET 
SEISET represents mostly the medium and small capitalization listed companies. It is 
an association that tries to promote its members along with the promotion of the Greek 
Stock Exchange, because, via the promotion of the ASE, the smaller companies become 
visible. Moreover, it is more active than EEEXA and informs its members regularly on 
issues related to the economy, the Greek and international Stock Markets, the new 
regulations from the ASE and the CMC. It represents the listed companies to the Greek 
capital market bodies and the Capital Market Commission. It makes suggestions as far 
as the function of the Greek Stock Exchange is concerned, and sits on committees 
responsible for the development and implementation of laws concerning the capital 
market activities and the protection of the investors. It also takes part in conferences and 
presentations in Greece and abroad. Moreover, they cooperate with the European capital 
market authorities and similar associations which have the same goals. 
3.5.8 SED 
It is a non-profit association that its members use and by which they communicate 
freely through the internet. It has become influential over the years in the retail market 
across Greece 7. It has two principal goals: the improvement of the training of Greek 
investors regarding investments, and the protection of their rights. More specifically, it 
airns at informing the investors on matters regarding the Greek and international capital 
market so that they can invest more efficienfly. Moreo\-er. it employs whatever legal 
sed . Lr 
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means are needed in order to defend the rights of the Investors and proposes solutions to 
problems that are faced by the investors to the authorities. It is a good source of 
information for individual investors, especially for the annual (ordinary) general 
assemblies and the extraordinary ones (Vergos, 2003e). 
3.5.9 Associations of'A nalysts 
There two analysts' associations in the Greek market place. One group Includes the 
certified analysts from the local CMC and the other consists of the analysts who hold 
the well-known CFA certificate. 
a Certified by CMC Association ofA nalj7sts 
This association has 29 members (2004). All of them work as analysts in the brokerage 
business as sell side analysts. They get their title and licence after passing the 
examinations set out by the Capital Market Committee (CMC). 
b CIA Association ofAnalysis 
This society has only 35 members (2004). The majority of them (62%) work as buy side 
analysts8 in the Greek fund management industry and the rest work in the brokerage 
business. "The society is an association of local investment professionals. Consisting of 
portfolio managers, security analysts, investment advisors and other financial 
professionals, it promotes ethical and professional standards within the investment 
industry, encourages professional developments through the CFA programme and 
continuing education, facilitates information and opinions among people within the 
local investment community and beyond, and works to further the public's 
understanding of the CFA designation and investment industry". 
3.5.10 Hellenic Investor Relations Institute (HIRI) 
On June 3,2002, the Hellenic, Institute for Relations with Investors 9 (HIRI) was 
established as a non-profit organization, representing mostly the IR practitioners and 
filling the gap of IR representatives in the Greek market. The purpose of HIRI is, in 
general, the promotion and improvement of the relations between the companies whose 
shares are traded publicly and the investors, private and institutional, the mass media 
and the competent supervising authorities of securities trading and the agencies 
involved. To accomplish this objective, the HIRI aims to promote the best 
communication and its techniques among the listed companies and the abovementioned 
parties: to promote the transparency and unhindered dissemination of information on the 
financial results, strategy. perspective and operations of the listed companies, to 
www. cfagreece. corn (CFA president interview. October, 12.2004). 
xNvw. 1iJrJ. gr 
48 
encourage the improvement of practice. and the existing theories governing the domain 
of Investor Relations as well. on the basis of the international and national experience. 
and of the investors' needs being created: to promote the professional level and 
professional ethics on its members. to provide to its members with a means of 
exchanging views and experiences for the purpose of optimizing relations with the 
investors, to promote the research on topics of relations with investors: to organize 
social events, further training seminars and to promote further training and informative 
material on the relations with the investors, to represent and support its aims before the 
supervising authorities and agencies involved. in Greece and abroad; to represent and 
support its aims in similar foreign agencies, to promote the cooperation between the 
practitioners of Investor Relations and the competent supervising authorities in subjects 
relating to legislation and the operational framework of the sector; and to provide' 
information for the Investor Relations practices to interested listed companies so they 
may be able to turn to good account these practices to obtain a more accurate valuation 
for them and for better communication with investors (Demos, 2002f). In order to attain 
the aforementioned, aims the institute has organized joint conferences, including: Joint 
conference: Financial Analysts and IROs, January 2003, "Communication and 
disclosure issues", Joint conference. * Institutional Investors and IROs, April 2003, 
"Communication and disclosure issues"; Joint conference: IROs and the Media, May 
2003,, "Corporate communication and the media"; Joint coq/erence: Local and Global 
IROs, June 2003. "Conference on perceptions of ASE listed firms: A global view". 
Joint conference: Thessalonica Stock Exchange and HIRI, March 2004. ) "Efficient 
corporate communication"; Joint conference: IROs and listed companies, April 2004, 
"Corporate social responsibility"; Joint conference: HIRI and STANDARD and 
POORS, December 2004. HIRI also has organized roadshows or, better, local group 
presentations mostly to the retail investors in different cities in Greece. HIRI, along with 
officials from the ASE, invited a group of three listed companies to update their 
shareholders in regions around the country on updated infori-nation and data. With the 
exception of the IROs, the senior managers participated, and that showed the company's 
commitment to inform their shareholders and potential local investors directly. 
Therefore, group presentations were organized in: Thessalonica, March 2003, 
Companies: Technical Olympic. Frigoglass. Alumil: Larissa, April 2003, Companies: 
Technical Olympic. Forthnet, laso, Thessaloniki. November 2003. Conipani . es. - 
Hatzioannou. laso. Hellenic Fabrics, Ioannina. February 2004, Companies: 
Hatzioannou. Spider. Neochimiki; Thessaloniki. March 2004, Con7panies. - Hatzioannou. 
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Neochimiki. Sprider. Thessaloniki Port Authority. In addition. HIRI has organized 
group roadshows abroad, in order to create visibility of the Greek stocks abroad. The 
targeted global financial cities were selected after pre-marketing, and usually accepted a 
group of Greek listed firms for the first time. For instance, group presentations took 
place in: Frankfurt, January 2004, Coinpanies. - Hatzioannou, Motor Oil. Elbisco. 
Neochimiki, Thessaloniki Port Authority, Geneva. Zurich, May 2004. Colnpanles. - 
Hatzloannou, Neochimiki, FG Europe, Gek Tema, Themellodomi, London. June 
2004, Companies. - Hatzioannou, Cosmote, Neochimiki. Plaisio, Hellenic Exchanges: 
Toronto, Canada, July 2004, Conipanies. - Hatzioannou, Petzetakis, Themeliodomi. 
Paris, December 2004, Con7panies: Ballis, Neochimiki, Nikas, Plaisio, Forthnet; and 
Montreal and Toronto, Canada, January 2005, Companies. - Neochimiki, Themellodomi, 
FG Europe, Hellenic Exchanges. 
3.6 Other Corporate Governance issues 
Corporate social responsibility has become very important for the listed companies and 
many local and global institutional investors, especially the largest global funds, 
associate their buying decisions with the existence or not of corporate social 
responsibility policies, implementations and community sensitiveness. 
3.61 Corporate Social Responsibdify widEIRISIFTSE 4 GOOD 
Slowly but progressively the corporate social responsibility as well as the existing 
global indices such as FTSE 4GOOD motivate the larger capitalization Greek listed 
companies to fill out the respective questionnaires and try to act responsibly by 
introducing every year socially sensitive activities such as scholarships, hospital 
donations, etc. (Galam, 2004; Damoulianou, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2002). 
3.6 2 Corporate A ccouitting Practice OFRS v& Greek GAAP) and IR 
The information gap that different (national) accounting systems (i. e. the Greek 
Accounting Principles, the British Accounting Principles, etc. ) convey, create 
confusion in the investors' minds and a major task for the Investor Relations 
Officer is to clarify, explain and justify the company's accounts to investors and 
analysts with different accounting practices, perceptions. training and 
understanding. The standardization efforts to create similar accounting practices in 
the major economic blocks (i. e. European Union, NAFTA, etc) are a blessing also 
to the corporate communication practice and of considerable help to the IROs. In 
particular, the Greek IROs spends 35% of their time. during a private meeting, in 
order to explain the similarities and differences between Greek GAAP and US 
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GAAP. British GAAP and so on (Chrisikopoulos. 2004. Konstas. 2002: Lamprou. 
2002). The application and implementation of the IFRS across Europe will increase 
financial understanding. eliminate transaction costs and boost investment even to 
obscure listed companies (Michos, 2004: Gelantali. 2002). Similar results were 
shown in a research study by KPMG, on the differences between ]AS and Greek GAAP. 
which indicated the challenges, not only for the Greek listed companies but also for the 
communication effort by the IROs. to explain the accounts of the company in terms of 
]AS. It is very important that the CFOs and the IROs always emphasize the important 
role that accounting plays in the communication and IR process. Furthen-nore, 
accounting communication as an interactive process consumes a great deal of time for 
the IROs; therefore the trade off is immense (Petalas, 2004, Sakelari, 2004b, - Kirjakou, 
2003). Historically, Greek accounting requirements are based mainly on Corporate' 
Law 2190/1920, and consequently the Greek accounting standards issued by the 
Ministry of National Economy, the interpretations issued by the National 
Accounting Standards Board and the Greek General Chart of Accounts approved 
by Presidential Decree 1123/80. This research focuses on the International Financial 
Reporting System (IFRS) or, previously, International Accounting Standards (1AS) 
versus Greek GAAP, not only because it affects the communication process and the 
message but also because the accounting information (I P&L, B/S, intangibles, etc. ) in 
practice are a handicap for most Greek listed companies and consequently for their IR 
departments when communicating with the different market players (Sakkas, 2002; 
Alexakis, 2002c). It is worth noting that the Fund Manager of an American Pension 
Fund, in August 2000 during a roadshow, raised his hands and said apologetically to the 
presenting (Greek company) executive team, "Sorry, but I do not understand your 
accounting principles and logic". The central goal of EFRS is to make results and balance 
sheets more comparable. In general, EFRS focuses on elimýinatlon of the most common 
practices used to manage results. The impact of IFRS rules on different sectors will vary 
greatly (Vassis, 2004). For instance, the financial sector will have to deal with the most 
dramatic changes. Secondly, those sectors that relied heavily on mergers and acquisitions and 
the usual restructuring provisions that go with the consolidation phase will be impacted. Also, 
sectors with heavy balance sheets like construction and real estate will see some changes in 
their accounting. Sectors, like staffing services, with relatively simple balance sheets, will be 
impacted the least (Sakelari, 2004c). The IFRS accounting rules by law had to be 
implemented in 2005 by all EU listed companies. The BoD of the ASE recommended 
proactivcly that the listed companies at the ASE implement the rules in 2003. The limited 
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number of local qualified accountants to convert the accounts frorn Greek to IFRS 
accounting was the main reason for the failure of this effort. The ASE was forced to 
extend its recommendation and follow the European dates of implementing the rules by 
2005. Dual listed companies on a US exchange that disclose and report in US GAAP 
could postpone complying with the IFRS "regulation" until 2007. Sectors. such as the 
banking and insurance sectors, tried to obtain a postponement, as the rules have a beavy 
impact on their accounting (Sakellariou, 2002). In conclusion, the application and 
impernentation of the IFRS by all Greek listed companies will help greatly the IROs since the 
standardization, comprehension and expanation will be easier for all European fund managers 
and analysts and comperatevely easier for the American institutional investors, since they 
have to deal with US GAAP and IFRS accounting systems (Economist, 2004d, Gelantali, 
2002; Alexakis, 2002c). The MRS implementation will enlarge the mandatory 
communication set of the companies and will also give more time to the IROs for voluntary 
information disclosure (Demos, 20004c). 
3.7 Summary 
In this phase of the development of the Greek capital market, the question of disclosure 
is very important. Between the main forms of information disclosure - "the mandatory 
disclosure" and "the voluntary disclosure" - the Greek companies restrain themselves 
mainly to follow primarily the mandatory disclosure elements, especially and 
specifically when infori-nation is conducted in the Greek language. When the companies 
have the incentive and aspire to look for global investors. ) then they use the English 
language as a tool, and therefore they are motivated to implement voluntary IR policies 
and programmes in order to achieve visibility, investor confidence and stock buying. On 
the other hand, the regulations and the corporate governance directives de-motivate the 
Greek companies to act proactively by inducing only a passive attitude on the corporate 
communication and investor relations activities (Kefalas, 2002a; Ntokas, 2002c; 
Plantzos, 2002b). In ten-ns of this procedure, the Greek IR departments conduct 
mandatory disclosure policies, by way of: dispatching quarterly, semi annual and annual 
results and their analysis; informing investors on important developments in the 
company; informing on subjects likely to influence the demand and offer of the share 
(for example change of management, of members of the Board, and executive 
management, dividend yield. etc. ); and setting procedures and proxy voting for annual 
and extraordinary AGMs. 
Chapter 4.0 Corporate Disclosure via Intermediaries and IR 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters. it was mentioned that the IR function can be measured by its 
programme and activities towards its goal, that of matching the listed company's share 
price as accurately and closely to the company's relative value of historical 
performance, current operations and expected future cash flows. In achieving this goal. 
the company"s IRO can use outsiders who may offer support. These supporters are the 
analysts, the brokers. the financial journalists and generally the media people, the 
auditors, the specialists and other professionals, as indicated below. 
Table 4.1: Disclosure via intermediary professionals. 
A. Financial Intermediaries B. Information Intermediaries 
1. Investment Banks 1. Sell-side Analysts 
ii. Corporate Banks ]I. Buy-side Analysts 
M Venture Capital Funds U] Independent Research Analysts 
IV. Insurance Companies IV. Industry (Experts) Analysts 
V. Country Analysts 
vi. Financial Press 
vil. Other Media People 
Vill. Auditors 
Ix. Custodians 
X. Specialists 
X1. Brokers 
X11. Rating Agencies 
X111. Lobbyists 
Prior research (as outlined in chapter 6) has been focusing mainly upon the analysts' 
role in the communication of company's information. Moreover, an extensive review of 
the current literature on disclosure has been given by Healy and Palepu (2001) and Core 
(2001). This chapter describes and analyzes the role of the analysts and the press as 
major information intermediaries (Appendix XI). The focus is on the function of the 
analysts and its facets, and how it interdependently with the IR activity bridges the 
infonnation gap. 
4.2 The role of the intermediaries 
For disclosure issues, two groups of the aforementioned professionals, - the analysts and 
the financial journalists, - have gathered much attention. In fact, the analysts have 
gained most of the research focus, as a result of the vital role that they play in the 
commun i cation process. The lack of research on the role of the other major group - that 
of the media people on the disclosure process - is a challenge for future research efforts. 
Recently Miller (2004) approached the US press association to ask for lnfon-nation 
about the listed companies but this area is still a blank box. In contrast. issues such as 
disclosure, voluntary IR activities and analyst coverage have been investigated and 
documented by many researchers on both sides of the Atlantic (and in the Em-111sh 
language), such as Bhushan (1989). Bhushan and O'Brien (1990). Marston (1994. 
1996). Holland (1997), Lang and Lundholm (1996). Their findings are mostly 
complementary and converge to similar if not the same results. The research is focused 
mainly on two areas: research on the determinants of analyst following and research on 
the determinants of analyst forecast accuracy and analysis consensus or dispersion. 
Also, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 418) found that there is at least partial evidence that 
4-4shows that disclosures made by financial analysts, the business press, and bond-rating 
agencies affect stock prices". In particular, they (2001, p. 416) state that "overall. 
evidence indicates that financial analysts add value in the capital market". Similarly, 
Core (2001, p. 446) argues that the notion that "analysts and institutions produce 
information and reduce information asymmetry". Furtherrnore, they put down questions 
implied by "their" disclosure framework such as: "How effective are financial analysts 
as infori-nation intermediaries? What factors influence their effectiveness? How does 
corporate disclosure affect analyst coverage of firms? " (2001, p. 411, Table 1). But 
what are the incentives and influence for these inten-nediaries - and especially the sell- 
side analysts - upon variables such as company visibility, investment case credibility, 
reduction of information knowledge, cost of equity capital. and share price? 
Additionally, how do some IR activities and results. like the increase in the number of 
analysts reports written, the increase in the number of analysts covering the stock, 
obtaining coverage by analysts of the major global banks, achieving better consensus of 
analysts forecasts, and range of earnings forecasts, the increase in the number of sell 
side analysts presentations, help the company's insiders to get their "message" across to 
the investors, and how is this "message" or "Information package" refined, checked, 
rephrased by analysts? ". For the American analysts, the Economist reports that indeed 
'&a study by two business school academics concludes that equity research analysts in 
America do a half-decent job-better than their counterparts in other markets" 
(Economist 2003n; Healy and Palepu, 2001). In conclusion the analysts are the major 
information inten-nediaries that affect the corporate communication process as well as 
the IR attitudes. activities and effectiveness (Holland, 1998b. Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991). In Greece, equally important is the media group especially that of the financial 
Journalists who can create noise and disturb. modify, even "infect the communication" 
of company information. In this study, the former group is researched and the latter 
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should be a research target since the media group is a limited or light regulated 
information group, it is also very large and requires more space and specific attention to 
the so called "media relations" as part of the corporate communication mechanism 
(Georgladis, 2004, Baker. 2003: Vergos. 2003f). 
4.3 Defining intermediaries 
This section will describe most of the intermediary market participants, such as the sell- 
side, buy-side and independent analysts, the financial journalists, the brokers. the 
auditors, the custodians, the specialists and the rating agencies. 
4.3.1 A iialysts 
In this subsection an effort to define what the analysts are. who they represent and what 
they do is made. Marston (2004b, p. 12) defines analysts as "persons involved in' 
evaluating investments, irrespective of their employing institution. They are sometimes 
known as financial analysts or investment analysts". Financial analysts, according to 
Rao and Sivakumar (1999, p. 32) are "Independent professionals who serve current and 
potential investors by scrutinizing the performance of corporate managers". Schreiner 
(1994, p. 28) characterizes the financial analysts as a professional "as intrusive as a 
reporter, as uncontrollable as a car without brakes, and as short-term oriented as a 
woman in labor". More aggressively, Luhmann (1979) calls financial analysts 
"watchdogs" who serve the shareholders and are "proof' of the lack of confidence and 
even distrust of company's insiders by the investors. According to the author the main 
task of the financial analysts is to: Gather information from public and private domain 
sources; Build models to assess and evaluate managers' and company performance; 
Combine quantitative and qualitative data into forecasts of future earnings; Reflect upon 
and interact with IROs, CEOs and CFOs as well as institutional investors; Elicit 
intelligence from middle managers and stakeholders, such as suppliers, customers and 
bankers; Cooperate with financial journalists in the acquisition and interpretation of 
primary and secondary data; and Recommend buying, holding or selling a stock 
(Demos, 2003a). Analysts can be separated into three major groups (Weiss, 2003; Jasen, 
2000, Chang, Khanna and Palepou, 2000): The sell-side analysts who work for banks or 
brokerage houses, their product (company reports, industry analysis, country profiles, 
monthly reviews, prospective and daily's ones) is distributed to all market participants 
and becornes a free item on the public domain information set. The buy-side analysts 
who work exclusively for institutional investors i. e. managers in mutual funds, pension 
funds. hedge funds. insurance money and banks) and their analysis is used on]y 
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internally and is the responsible recommendation to the fund managers. In other "vords. 
one can argue that the buy-side analysts belong more to "information end users" along 
with the fund managers, or one can label them as "light or soft intermediaries". The 
independent research analysts who are qualified analysts that cover stocks and 
industries based on a specific contractual assignment and agreement. In other words, 
they are paid by the listed companies to evaluate and write a report on their investment 
case,, sometimes without any recommendation and target price attached. This group has 
been growing in number in every country, especially after the period of the recent stock 
market collapse (Lowengard, 2004). Standard and Poors research reports cover only US 
listed companies and partially fill the gap of non-coverage. As the Chairman of the CFA 
Institute,, Mr. Barlett, said in the IIRF conference in Rome (IIRF Conference. 2004), "in 
the US, one half of the listed companies have no coverage at all". 
4.3.2 Other imerniediaries 
Financial Journalists are the media specialists who search, unravel and report in print, 
on radio or on TV the activities and whereabouts of the listed companies and their 
founders and/or top executives (Miller, 2004; Economist, 2003v; Townsend, 1993). 
Brokers are the stock market inten-nediaries who make the trades possible. These stock 
brokers, eitber. tbrougb the analysts or through the execution, have access to advanced 
company infon-nation before it is made public. This puts a heavy burden on the brokers 
since they are knowledgeable of prematurely sensitive company information 
(Economist, 2002s; Bryant, 2000b). Auditors are the accountants who know first the 
operational as well as the accounting results of the companies and check for the 
reliability and validity of the figures (Economist, 2004s, 2002r, Patel, 2003; Hodge, 
2003). Custodians are the intermediary share depositors in local as well as in cross 
border transactions and share buying and selling. They somehow control the share 
registry and "know" who owns what (Economist, 2004s, 2004x). Specialists are the 
professionals who buy and sell on behalf their clients on the American stock exchanges. 
They are important for the Greek corporate communication, not only because they are 
dually listed on NYSE or NASDAQ, but also because they are trend setters for the other 
Greek companies. As the Economist reports, "they are not supposed to buy shares for 
themselves knowing that they can resell them to clients at a profit, a practice known as 
"front running" (Economist, 2003p). If buyers are bidding more than sellers are asking, 
specialists are not allowed to trade for themselves and pocket the spread. They should 
nierely bring buyer and seller together and then stand aside. meeting. in the ugly 
language of the NYSE. their "negative obligations". It has never been entirely clear how 
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the specialists make their money. They are obliged to provide an orderly market. At 
times. they may therefore have to build an inventory of shares that are in demand. or 
otherwise intervene between buyers and sellers. To do that. however. they have to move 
before their customers, putting them in danger, at least of front-running or breaking the 
negative-obligations rule. "Specialists make money based on proprietary knowledge of 
investor order flow". says Benn Steil, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 
"This is not a by-product: it is what the exchange does". Increased transparency at the 
exchange has already had the unintended effect of making specialists' clients - mainly 
financial institutions - disgruntled. Transparency is vital for what is, in effect. a quasi- 
public institution, says Charles Elson, a professor at the University of Delaware. Recent 
turmoil over the NYSE"s directors has made a mockery of the exchange's claims to be 
the first line of investor protection. The fashion in corporate governance circles is to, 
frown on such reciprocal relationships". Rating Agencies such as the Moody's. 
Standard and Poor's and Fitch agencies evaluate the companies and estimate their credit 
risk premium based on the current market yield structure (Economist, 2004p, 2003a). 
4.4 Information intermediaries and regulation 
As Dwyer P., McNamee M., Thornton E., and Byrnes N. explicitly report, in the US at 
least, (. 4regulators hope to restore the integrity of research by forcing structural reforms 
on the Terrible Ten. The pact also aims to boost the sophistication of individual 
investors by requiring the firms to provide free copies of independently produced 
analysis and to support an investor-education fund" (Business Week, 2003c). 
Furthermore 
, it 
hopes to make research more transparent by requiring fin-ns to publish 
their analysts' stock picking track records. How effective will these changes be? Greater 
transparency, smarter investors, and more honest analysis are welcome reforms. Despite 
plenty of evidence that senior managers knew that retail customers were losing money 
because of tainted research, none was charged in the settlement. The fin-ns have agreed 
to rebuild the Chinese walls of years past, but research and investment banking will not 
be completely separated. The most glaring source of conflict , in 
fact, remains: because 
research produces no revenues, it will need to be indirectly subsidized, most notably by 
investment banking. which accounts for about 25% of the fin-ris' revenues. "The budgets 
of research di\,, isions are going to be dependent on xN, hether investment bankers see 
anything in it for them" says Columbia University law professor John C. Coffee Jr. 
Winning back investor confidence may mean complying \\, ith the letter of the pact, 
Nvh1ch requires deep structural reforms (Economist, 2003n). Analysts and investment 
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bankers must now report to different supervisors and they must be physically separated. 
Specifically: A- Improve research Independence. The agreement requires 10 brokerage 
firms to spend $432.5 million over five years to provide retail customers with research 
from at least three independent sources alongside their own recommendations. 
However. it is unlikely that research from the best analysts will be available in a tirne]Y 
manner to small Investors,, and small companies could lose coverage. B- Increase 
transparency. Investors will obtain more honest infori-nation on how analvsts' stock 
picks perform and how ratings work. Web sites must explain analysts" ratings. price 
targets, and ERS forecasts. If coverage ends, firms must give reasons for that 
happening. But regulators will rely on outside groups to compare one analyst with 
another. C- Reduce conflicts on Wall Street. Brokerage firrns must locate research and 
investment banking in different offices and create separate reporting lines, budgets and 
legal staff, but analysts will still feel pressure to boost ratings to keep corporate clients 
happy and they can still advise investment bankers. D- Hold management responsible. 
Ex-Citigroup analyst Grubman and fon-ner Merrill Lynch analyst Blodget have been 
barred from the securities business. However, no action has been taken against their 
bosses or top managers at other firms, although regulators say they are pursuing "failure 
to supervise" cases against a few" (Business Week, 2003c, The Wall Street Journal 
Europe, 2002). 
4.5 Information Intermediaries and Voluntary Disclosure 
Lang and Lundholm (1996, p. 490) state that "investor relations is consistently a 
significant determinant of analyst behavior" and "direct contact with the company is a 
primary source of infon-nation for analysts". The IROs motivate, persuade and attract 
more sell-side coverage. They manage that by transferring "inside" information to the 
analysts; simplifying the company's model; minimising analyst time on providing 
timely and reliable infon-nation and promoting the investment story to fund managers, 
who in turn ask for more analysts' reports (Byard and Shaw, 2004; Francis, Hanna and 
Philbrick, 1997). Increased analyst following improves disclosure, reduces infon-nation 
asymmetry and estimation risk, which in turn increases investor (especially institutional 
investor) buying and consequently reduces firrn's cost of capital (Weiss, 2003; Irvine, 
1001, Bhushan and O'Brien, 1990). Similarly, the IROs, by helping analysts to forecast 
more accurately. mitigate dispersion of forecasts and support building a consistent 
consensus (Stem. Stewart, Bennett and Chew. 2002, Shoeshine. 1999. ). In addition. 
improvement of accuracy eliminates negative - and even positive - surprises of the 
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market, which in turn leads to more stock liquidity (Der Hovanesian. 2002a; Forbes and 
Skernatt, 1992, - Walmsley. Yadar and Rees, 1992: Bouwman and Frishkoff. 1987: 
Belkaoui, Kahl and Peyrand, 1977). As research indicates (as outlined in detail in the 
next chapter), basic deten-ninants of analyst following are specific firm characteristics 
and implemented disclosure policy. Indeed. analyst following is correlated with firm 
size. institutional ownership, return variability, share price. stock splits and even top 
management (CEO and CFO) presentations. Analytically, analyst following is 
correlated with the decrease of a firm's return volatility before analyst following 
increases, stringent disclosure requirements increase. number of firms increases 
(Economist, 2003v; Der Hovanesian, 2002b; Stewart, 2000; Abarbanell, Lanen and 
Verrecchia, 2001, Bhushan and O'Brien, 1990, Bushan, 1989). Since information is the 
lifeblood of efficient, effective and fair capital markets, the corporate communication' 
and access and the proactive IR programme increase analyst coverage; then the listed 
firm's beta increases which means its liquidity improves (Garten, 2003-, Bertoneche and 
Knight, 2001, Irvine, 2001). 
4.6 IR activity processvia intermediaries in Greece 
The traditional Greek IR model focuses mostly on corporate public mandatory 
disclosure (i. e. quarterly and yearly accounts, press releases, etc. ) according to by-laws 
and regulation, and on any "Impulsive action" internally by the people from the registry 
(metochologio) department. In addition, it can be observed that the media people 
occasionally substitute the internal people who process the information and also affect, 
to a great extent, the message given to the market directly through the newspapers or via 
the dailies of the sell side analysts. Moreover, it has been observed that the reports of 
the country analysts who work for the global banks affect substantially the trading 
patterns and the price of the Athenian listed entities (Georgiadis, 2004; Papadogjannis, 
2003; Gitzos, 2002). The investors must understand the company's strategy well. The 
Greek experience, at least, shows that the main reason for which the foreign investors 
dispose of a certain share is because they do not understand "what the company want to 
do" (Dernos, 2002c). Furthermore, the company, and more specifically the IR, is the 
most serious, reliable and direct source of infon-nation for them. For this purpose, the 
reliable analyst coverage by Greek and foreign analysts xvill help and it is the first step. 
and the most important one for a listed Greek company. because this disseminates 
information about the company everywhere. There, the IR must help and offer guidance 
pro,,,, iding feedback on analyst reports. In the Greek market there are 10-15 very good 
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analysts who can be compared very easily with the respectj%, e foreign analysts of 
London. Those Greek analysts perform a "national" task when "selling" shares from 
Athens listed of Greek companies to the foreign institutional investors (Kotsis. 2004: 
Philipas and Karantzlkos. 2004: Aloupis. 2002). Finally. analysts who deal with top 
executives and listed companies from one side and infori-nation end users frorn the other 
side are well qualified to judge the disclosure and IR policies of the firrns every day 
(Bolland, 2002). 
4.7 Media and IR 
This subsection highlights the media as an infori-nation inten-nediary since it plays an 
important role in the corporate communication process (Lempes], 2004, Georgas. 2002: 
Katramadou, 2002b). The excess number of financial journalists as well as financial 
newspapers and magazines, the accessibility to the top management that media people 
enjoy and the absence of strong regulation on their conduct create corporate information 
noise and many times replace the IROs as the official company "voice" (Alexakis, 
2004, Vergos, 2003a, Vrachnis, 2002; Demos, 2002e). Over the years, it has been found 
that in Greece,, there is a positive correlation between media and analyst coverage 
(Alexakis, 2004; Georgladis, 2004; Vergos, 2004). When media coverage (MC) 
increases then analyst coverage (AC) increases by almost the same rate. However, 
media coverage captures mostly the impact of exogenous events, i. e. market and 
industry trends, government policies, etc., and expands these into companies' news and 
developments. Moreover, the recent regulatory and disclosure requirements impose 
disclosure, not through the media but officially through the Stock Exchange (Mertzanis 
and Avlonitis, 2002; Kavouropoulos, 2001). The IRO's task is to manage the global 
press by managing the international media across the complete spectrum of print, radio 
and TV. He/she must identify key media audiences in the UK, continental Europe and 
North America, and determine how best to target them through broadcast, internet, print 
and wire communications. In other words, he/she should raise the company's profile by 
identifying key media personnel at Editorial and Senior level (in the home country and 
across all relevant countries), and through a series of meetings and lunches, with 
company's management, to keep them informed of the company's strategy, vision and 
long-term goals. This would involve a day spent with local communicators focusing on 
all aspects and characteristics of the local media. Moreover. the IRO should deal 
comfortably with any given situation. whether it was a hostile TV crew confronting the 
management of the company as part of a crisis management situation. or at a packed 
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press conference as part of a planned media programme (Bbojraj. Blaccomere and 
Souza, 2004; Demos. 2002e: Townsend, 1993). The IR team would be the first point of 
contact for all media enquiries throughout. and would be on call 24 hours a day. 
Paramount to the success of mastering the media would be the identification of key 
issues and messages by the IR office. which would communicate these through all 
media contact lists either in person or with a conference call. Targeting the correct 
media followers and furnishing them with the necessary information are important steps 
to forming positive relationships with the financial media (Mercer, 2004: Economist, 
20040,2003a, Pearlman, 2002; Pae, 2002). 
4.8 Conclusion 
Disclosure via inten-nediaries is vital as well as "obligatory" for the IR function of the 
Greek listed companies. Intermediaries such as the analysts, the media and the bankers 
can multiple and verify the corporate information to end users and market players. 
However. the corporate disclosure inten-nediary process has been changed considerably 
during the last five years. Research reports reveal that half of the US listed companies 
have no coverage at all and only 12% of all Greek listed companies have continuous 
coverage (Vergos, 2005, Chang, Khanna and Palepou, 2000; Bhushan and O'Brien, 
1990). This trend is detrimental mostly to smaller companies that bave no belp from 
inten-nediaries. especially analysts, to become visible. Macroeconomics and regulation 
have affected the analyst's conduct, perfon-nance, and even career. For instance, sell- 
side analyst positions were reduced while buy-side analysts work opportunities were 
increased (Boland, 2002, Demos, 2002e). These changes have stimulated a number of 
questions, such as: what is the future of research analysis? Which buying models will 
survive? Has the quality of research improved during recent years? Has the 
independence of research improved? Can there be a genuine market for independent 
research? Will sell-side research diminish continuously and be dead in the near future? 
(IIRF Conference, 2005,2004; Maitland, 2002; Pikios, 2002). 
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Chapter 5.0 Voluntary Corporate Disclosure and IR 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the tools that the IR office can use on a voluntary basis. and the 
parameters that can help the company obtain visibility. stock liquidity. analyst coverage. 
capital attraction and stock price increase. In addition, the current practice and the 
transformation of the Greek companies' IR activities from being compulsory to 
discretionary are described. As mentioned in chapter 2. the discretionary arsenal that the 
senior management and the IR office of a listed company have consists of many tools. 
the most important ones are listed below: 
Table 5.1: Discretionary IR tools. 
a. Group Presentations 
b. Participation in Conferences 
C. (Private) Meetings or One-to-One meetings 
d. On-site visits 
e. Analysts' Presentations 
f Management Forecasts 
g. Feedback on Analysts Reports and Coverage 
h. Press Releases 
1. Other Corporate Reports 
J. Mailing Information 
k. Telephone Answering queries 
1. Emailing Information 
M. Web Sites 
n. Web Casting 
0. Conference Calls 
P. Dual Listing 
q. _ Roadshows 
r. Targeting Institutional Investors 
Source: Demos, 2003b 
5.2 Transition from the mandatory to voluntary corporate disclosure in Greece 
Corporate disclosure in Greece followed and follows its life cycle path as outlined in 
Appendix XIV. Most of the terminology used to label the phases in this appendix is 
from Holland's work. 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic view 
During the second half of the previous century the Greek state was trying to solicit 
foreign companies in order to invest and establish business entities and factories in 
Greece as direct investments. Currently, the IR departments. along with the Greek 
Government, the Athens Stock Exchange, and the companies. are campaigning and 
trying to attract foreign capital to Greece directly or through the capital market, in order 
that the Greek entrepreneurs can utilize capital and know hoxv and expand their fin-ris 
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(Mantikidis. 2002c; Hope, 2000, Demos. 2001a). Until 2001. Greece was considered an 
emerging market financially. and the major stock market and bank indices were quoting 
the Athens Stock exchange as an emerging market. By this definition and 
categorization, the majority of the global investors were from the emerging mutual 
funds and pension funds that Invest in emerging economies and markets. and private 
money that invest in markets with higher risk. These foreign funds Investing in 
emerging markets have traditionally paid more attention to the macroeconomic 
characteristics of each national market and its momentum. rather than the fundamentals 
of its listed companies (Heron and Lie, 2004. Hall and Brummer, 2003, Levis, 1996). 
Moreover, the criteria of company selection by the emerging markets fund managers 
have been more lax than amongst those who invest in the developed markets. The 
strategy of active emerging market foreign funds was to follow the top-down approach' 
(macro to micro) instead of the bottom-up one (micro to macro) adopted by active funds 
investing in developed and mature markets (Patton and Makhija, 2004, Fathilatul, 
Harnid, Salleh and Yusof. 2003. Hesse] and Non-nan, 1992). Greece's inclusion in the 
emerging market world as a major player for a long period of time partly justifies and 
explains the small steps of the IR profession, especially during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Lempes], 2004; Kontogiannis, 2001, Demos, 2000a). By being a big player in those 
markets, Greece had secured the attention of global funds, meaning it was not necessary 
for local listed firms to devote time and money to market them. However, the 
graduation of Athens bourse to developed markets on May 31,2001, (owing mostly to 
Greece's inclusion into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism and the introduction to 
the Euro as the official currency) meant that this all had to change, and local listed firrns 
had to become aggressive in marketing their investment case, strategy and strong points 
to the global institutional investors who either did /do not know them or had/have a 
neutral or bad opinion about them (Monemvasiotis, 2004; Slafakas, 2002; Vergos, 
2002a). Simultaneously, the local capital, especially the institutional money (i. e. Greek 
mutual funds, pension funds, private money, etc. ) started to invest only in those 20-30 
biggest capitalization firms which have the adequate liquidity (Gelantall, 2004b-, 
Apostolou, 2004). Furthermore, owing to the consolidation of the market, the local 
banks, owning the mutual funds, were directing their investments towards their listed 
subsidiaries (i. e. banks. insurance stocks, real estate. etc. ) and leaving no available 
capital to "support" the remaining 300 small and medium capitalization fin-ns. As a 
consequence. the individual investors progressively moved away from these stocks as 
well. and the majority shareholders. in order to support the share price of their stock in 
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the downward market of 2000-2004, started to buy back portions of the shares 
(Katramadou. 2002b, Kollias. 2000). This process led to the result whereby today each 
of the majority of the medium and small capitalization listed fin-ns is owned 
substantially by a major shareholder. who, in most cases, is the founder of the entity 
(Philipas and Karantzikos, 2004. Sakkas, 2002). A number of additional factors deterred 
active foreign funds also from investing in Athens. The small size of tile local stock 
market, its minimal visibility, its lack of depth and liquidity. the fact that most local 
firms reported in Greek GAAP (up to Summer 2005 when they started to report in 
IFRS-IAS by law), the non availability of comparisons with European and global 
stocks, owing to non coverage and the introversion of the local stocks all created a wall 
that separated local stocks from the global funds (Tsolls, 2004, Kontogiannis, 2002a. 
Alexakis, 2002c). On their part, the stock exchange authorities not only supported the 
companies' IR efforts to achieve international visibility in order to attract capital to their 
stock but also proposed practices and measures that motivated them to do so (Georgas, 
2002; Hope, 1998). For instance. the ASE's qualitative criteria for the listed companies, 
its official, friendly user and infon-native (on all listed firrns) web s1te'0 and the constant 
and laborious participation at almost all group global conferences and roadshows by its 
Chain-nan, Professor P. Alexakis , indicated the tenacity, commitment and support in that 
direction. However, the new ASE administration has, since September 2004, focused on 
promoting the bigger capitalization stocks. Towards this direction, it proposed, in 
summer 2005, to change the- existing indices (FTSE 20,40 and 80) in order to create 
two major indices: the "big cap" or global index -which will include the stocks with 100 
million Euros capitalization plus and another index - which will include the remaining 
250 (approximately) listed companies (Kokoris, 2005; Kokoris and Papadimitriou, 
2004; Korfiatis, 2004b; Ntokas, 2004d). Holland (1996) indicates that a good 
institutional framework of corporate governance helps and goes along with the practical 
usefulness of the IR (Mulligan, 2001; Lindsay, 1998; Chew, 1997). A set of rules and 
corporate governance principles which help the companies to be accountable and 
profitable would not only upgrade the Greek Capital Market conditions to international 
standards but would also attract new investment capital to the Greek Stock Market. 
Transparency, accountability and practice of good corporate governance directives will 
take away some obstacles. thus allowing funds to invest in this market (Alexakis. 2003: 
Kiriakopoulos, 2002, Kefalas, 2002b). In order to attract foreign capital. the local 
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society of IROs (HIRI). as the official voice of the IR practitioners. works with the 
management of ASE, the Capital Market Committee (Greek SEC), the Association of 
Greek Institutional Investors (AGII), the Association of Members of the Athens Stock 
Exchange- brokers (SMEXA), the analysts' associations, the related Ministries and 
other institutional bodies, in order to educate and help IROs by creating better practice 
communication platforms and effective discretionary IR tools (Kontogiannis, 2002c: 
Karafotakis, 2002; Alexakis, 2001). 
5.2.2 Microecoiiomic vieu, 
Globalisation trends, outward looking, transparency and corporate disclosure practices 
by the Greek listed firms have been improved considerably during the last ten years 
(Ntokas, 2003b, Travlos, 2002, Rokkas. 2001). That makes the task of the fund 
managers easier and at the same time intensifies the competition among listed' 
companies to attract the available capital. On the other hand, every private or 
institutional investor is investing for a solid dividend yield and a capital gain, which in 
turn means that the Greek listed companies should be profitable. Without solid and 
profitable companies, neither the IR nor the CG rules and directives can perform 
miracles (Lefanowicz and McLelland, 2001, Miller, 2002; Falkenstein, 1996). The 
biggest problem facing Greek firms is their inability to "get attention from" and "sell 
themselves to" the (active) international investors (Ntokas, 2004f, Demos, 2005c). To 
overcome this problem, one solution is to act proactively. However, it is necessary, if 
not imperative, for Greek firms to go out, market themselves and attract foreign funds 
by implementing proactive IR strategies. In the past, a few executives seemed to have 
taken notice of these problems and had tried to rectify them and to act accordingly 
(Kontogiannis 2004a; Demos, 2000a). But in the highly competitive world of developed 
stock markets, failure to do so may mean the company's shares will under-perform in 
the wider market or the sector in which it belongs, even though economic fundamentals 
warrant a better perfon-nance (Simmons and Simmons, 2004; Waterstone, 1999). The 
great majority of the Greek listed firms fail to act accordingly and then it is expected 
that the broader market suffers, by disappointing local and global investors even if 
global market conditions become brighter and the equity markets are booming (Demos, 
2004b; Kontoglannis, 2001, Vergos. 2000b). The small capitalization companies from a 
small country like Greece should conceive and implement a proactive communication 
plan. This is mostly the responsibility and the job of the investor relations officer (IRO). 
but most Greek firms do not employ a qualified one. The IR profession/industry is at the 
early stages of its life cycle and there is on1v a limited number of effective IR 
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practitioners. Non-qualified IROs fail to advise, educate. consult, motivate and lead the 
top management and the BoD of the listed companies in the right direction in order to 
minimise information noise, to create direct rapport with the investors, to educate the 
analysts and the media. and to increase visibility. The medium and small size Greek 
listed companies especially face a major challenge: that of the lack of visibility at the 
major financial centers of the world. Decreased visibility justifies the illiquidity of many 
stocks. Visibility is a major concern for IR practitioners and is partially documented in a 
number of ad hoc perception studies' I that have been carried out. mostly by IR 
consultants since 1998, for particular Greek companies. These studies were conducted 
via interviews of European and US investors, active in the Greek stock market. who 
invest in the ASE or dual listed stocks (Aloupis, 2002; Demos, 2002a). Some indicative 
views are provided below: 
Pre-Olyiiipic Era (up to 2004) 
Global investors have traditionally macro concerns in Greece and still most funds 
follow a top-down approach in their investment decisions, since macroeconomics and 
government policy, in this small market, play a major role and affect largely the equity 
markets (Kontogiannis, 2004b). An exact description of the transition from the macro 
approach to the micro one was reported by D. Ball: "The sharp decline of interest rates 
that accompanied the government's austerity program drew capital away from 
government bonds, long the haven for Greek family savings, and into the equity market. 
In particular, this new class, of small investor piled heavily into smal ]-capitalization 
stocks, generating a speculative momentum that pushed some shares up by as much as 
500%". He continued: "Greek stocks also are feeling pressure from the shift in the 
country's status from an emerging market to a developed one. Greece was traditionally 
one of the biggest fish in the emerging-markets pond, guaranteeing it a nice slice of 
investment portfolios focused on the developing world. With its inclusion in the euro 
club, however, Greece will become part of much bigger pan-European portfolios. In the 
longer terrn, this shift also will force Greek companies to compete with German and 
French peers for investment flows. Given the comparatively small size of even the top 
Greek companies only the biggest names will gain the notice of major international 
funds, leaving most stocks hostage to the sentiment of domestic retail investors" (The 
Wall Street Journal, 2001). 
po, 51 Otjwipic era (2004forward) 
'' Devve Rogerson ( 1999), Shandwick International (200 1 ). Citigate (2002). Capital Link (2003). 
Buchanan Communications (2004), 
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Visibility still remains the biggest challenge. Investors" opinions on disclosure, financial 
reporting and IR activities are not satisfactory. although the regulatory framework is 
generally satisfactory and it has been improved in recent years (Katofolou, 2003. 
Brenman and Tamarowski. 2000: Preis and Berbers, 1990: Hart, 1987). Furthermore. 
macro-economically, still "the post-Olympic glow fades amid a new budget squabble" 
which signals the elasticity of the markets to the management of the whole economy 
(Economist, 2004in). Another challenge is the duality characteristics of the Greek 
equity stories. Greece. as market, from being a top star and a safe heaven among 
emerging economies, has suddenly become the small fish in a large pond among 
developed countries and financial markets. But since most of the Greek listed 
companies have invested massively in the Balkan region and the greater south Eastern 
(ex-communist) Europe, many global investors consider them as "emerging" stories and' 
Greek stocks still attract many emerging fund managers (Kontogjannis, 2004c; Vergos, 
2003f). Therefore, a case-by-case analysis is followed by the institutional investors. 
Foreign investors believe that there are excellent investment stories and selective 
opportunities (Demos, 2005b; Ntokas, 2004g). There is more and more focus on the 
individual company's strategy and fundamentals rather than on macro factors. It has 
been easier lately with the Euro and the implementation of pan-European rules and 
directives to compare on an IFRS, P/E, EPS, etc. basis, and every quarter to judge if a 
stock is overvalued or undervalued. There is also cyclical interest and focus on sectors, 
following the international trends (Kotsis, 2004; Koulouris, 2002a). Large capitalization 
stocks have adequate visibility, are liquid and attractive, especially to index funds. 
Medium capitalization stocks have minimal visibility, are less liquid but more attractive 
to mutual funds, while small caps have no visibility, are almost illiquid and selectively 
attractive to venture capital and hedge funds. The local business culture and attitude 
affect investment decisions also. Some global investors agree with the following phrase 
of an Edinburgh fund manager: "Greeks appear massively when things are ok but 
disappear and withdraw when things go bad" (Ntokas, 2004c; Demos, 2002d). In terms 
of specific sector importance, shipping is considered to be the best industry. As the 
Economist reports: "Greece, a country of some IIm people, controls by far the biggest 
share - nearly 20% - of the world's merchant fleet by tonnage, even if many Greek 
ships fly flags of convenience. The past few years have also seen the emergence of the 
publicly traded Greek shipping company. an idea that would have been anathema to the 
likes of Onassis and Niarchos. who had little time for the transparency or accountabilltv 
involved in being public. For instance. Tsakos Energy Navigation (TEN) a subsidiary of 
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the second largest Greek ship-owning firrn is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Argonaftis, the first shipping firin to float on the Athens Stock Exchange, announced in 
February that it would also get a New York listing. TEN. for instance. signed aS 170m 
contract to buy a liquefied natural gas carrier (LNG) in early June, a sector that Greeks 
have historically steered clear of. but which is now starting to boom. As well as 
becoming more diversified, risks are also being managed by making the Greek fleet 
younger" (Economist, 2004v). 
5.2.3 Concluding remarksfrom the Greek IR experience 
Investors who decide to invest in the Greek equity market apply a top-down approach 
along with other evaluation criteria (Ntokas, 2004b). Corporate governance (CG) 
principles and corporate disclosure applications are also very important, since they 
decrease the risk undertaken. On the other hand. the local management of the listed 
companies remains inactive and it waits for other market participants to discover them. 
Some executives expect that the IR department has to comply with only the mandatory 
infori-nation to the institutional bodies and investors. Some others believe that the IR is 
primarily a public relations activity (Ntokas, 2004b; Demos, 2002c; Kontogiannis, 
2002b). The practising Greek IR "model", by the majority of the listed companies. 
focuses mostly on corporate public mandatory disclosure (i. e. quarterly and yearly 
accounts, press releases, etc. ) according to by-laws and regulations, and on "impulsive 
action" by the people from the registry (metochologio) department (Gitzos, 2002; 
Kanelopoulos, 2002). In addition, Demos observed that inten-nediaries - especially the 
media people - not only substitute the internal people who process the infonnation but 
also affect on a large scale the message given to the market, either directly (newspapers, 
TV,, etc. ) or indirectly via the sell side analysts' dailies (Demos, 2003a). In conclusion, 
the "Greek IR model" is practiced because of the immaturity level of the market, its 
stage on the life cycle line, the existence of few trained and qualified IR professionals, 
the particularities and business Greek culture, the low visibility of the Greek market as a 
whole and - in particular - the medium and small size listed companies, the low IR 
budgets owing to the declining economic cycle and the misunderstanding of the IR 
function by the top executives. The challenge is to identify corporate communication 
programmes and IR strategies that will help the Greek companies to promote their 
investment case successfully, both locally and globally. 
, 5.3 Main prerequisites for a proactive Greek IR policy 
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Some main prerequisites for the Greek IR to act on and Implement successful IR 
policies can be identified as: internal IR set up and organization; company visibility. 
Investor confidence building: and stock liquidity and dual listings, (Demos, 2002a). 
5.3.1 Interiial IR set up and orgaiihation 
Historically, as mentioned previously. the position and organisation of the IR office are 
attached to the CFO's office, and in some cases it operates under the PR department. 
The IR department is also responsible for informing the management about the profile 
of the visitors, such as number of shares, trading behaviour, analyst and fund manager 
photos, disposition and attitude towards the stock, known characteristics and biases, 
allocation, history. The IR department has to undertake and submit to the top 
management the following memos in frequent time intervals for internal use as well as 
for specific occasions: a weekly memo which must include the stock's movernents, the' 
trading activity and where it comes from, what is happening in the international and 
European telecommunications market, new IPOs, etc., and a quarterly memo for the 
Board of directors and the managers only, which should include important financial 
evidence, a comparison of stock behaviour. etc. It also submits a memo, in frequent time 
intervals for internal use, to all the managers and sub-managers to show the importance 
of "not talking more than we should", the inside trading and SEC obligation as well as 
other disclosure issues. Moreover, the IR department needs to inforrn the middle 
managers and other departments (i. e. accounting, international, etc. ) periodically in 
order to motivate them as well as to collect infori-nation easily from them before he/she 
processes it to the analysts and the investors (screening raw data) (Aloupis, 2002; 
Demos, 2002a, Tegopoulos, 2002). It continuously undertakes the grouping of the 
existing and potential investors, since many institutional investors buy from different 
types of funds or financial centres. For example, fund managers from Templeton and 
Fidelity, located in London, NYC, Florida, California, Paris, Hong Kong, etc. invest in 
Greek stocks, and the IRO has to know how much in total Templeton and Fidelity owns. 
He/she also creates a complete profile of the portfolio managers. The IR department 
watches the trading in the major stock exchanges, such as the Athens Stock Exchange, 
the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, as well as the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. where the stock is listed and traded, in order to check 
possible arbitrage moves and inform the management on a daily and weekly basis. The 
IRO is the official spokesperson for the equity and bond transactions. and has direct 
communication with the Chairman of the Board of Directors, the CEO and the CFO for 
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the setting of the involuntary and voluntary communication and information 
(Kanelopoulos, 2002; Tegopoulos. 2002, Demos and Papadakis. 2000). 
5.3.2 Company visibifitjl 
As noted, the basic aim of the Greek Investor Relations (IR) departments is to increase 
the company's visibility, and to motivate investors - especialtY institutional invcslors - 
to invest in the company's stock. In order to do that it is necessary to implement some 
basic steps, including for example: 
a) The "diagnosis" of the listed company. in order to bring about its needs. 
particularities and implementation of the appropriate IR strategy and tactics. so as to 
match it with the potential investors (Schina, 2002b, Demos, 2000b). 
b) The strategic planning and programming of the IR activities which ultimately lead to 
the optimization or rather the maximization of the company Is share price. The creation 
of an effective action plan and perfon-ning budget of the IR activity helps the IR 
department to design a proactive strategic programme for the needs of the share and not 
simply to play the role of a firefighter. A tenacious IR plan could make sure that the 
company will be on the radar screen of many fund managers (Alexakis, 2000c, Vergos, 
2000a). 
c) The direct, authoritative and timely disclosure of the company's activities, strategy. 
results and perspectives to all market participants (analysts, institutional investors, 
brokers, bankers, etc. ). The steady increase of the company's visibility across various 
types of investment houses (value, growth, dividend, investors etc. ) as well as across 
different geographic financial centers (i. e. Nordic, Canada, Japan, etc. ) and the 
increased visibility in more US cities, even in periphery ones, such as Kansas City, 
Minneapolis, etc., can be accomplished by the implementation of a consistent and 
aggressive roadsbow policy. This is a necessity when there is no coverage for a stock 
and therefore the company has to search and tell its investment merits directly to the end 
users (Baker, 2002a; Demos, 2002d). 
d) Furthermore, the creation and culture of relations of trust with the investors and 
inten-nediaries. The good relations are established by infori-nal and one-to-one meetings 
which for the listed companies is imperative because the foreign institutional investors 
and analysts especially are bombarded on a daily basis by many investment offers from 
companies of other countries. So,, the idea not only of the reliable information but 
mostly the visits to their offices and the briefing on the history and perspective of a 
company is the best sale of that company's share (Theiss. 2004: Ryder and Regester. 
1988). 
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5.3.3 Stock liquidiýy and multiple listings 
As mentioned earlier, one reason for the non visibility of the Greek stocks is inherently 
attached to the liquidity characteristics of these stocks (Konstantinidis, 2003: Kokorls. 
2002; Demos, 2000c). The need to increase liquidity and trading activity is important. 
and one proactive solution is the dual listing of the stock in more liquid exchanges than 
the ASE (Doidge, Karoly] and Stuiz, 2001, Levey. 2000; Levis, 1996). It is easier and 
cheaper for a German investor to buy a stock in a local exchange (Alexander. Gordon. 
Cheol and Janakiramanan, 1988). Cross-border transaction costs are avoided. company 
information could be available more quickly in German, local brokers can analyze and 
prornote the stock more effectively and efficiently to the institutional and local 
investors, and the clearing of any transaction is easier (Judd, 2004b). The liquidity of a 
stock is influenced by the demand and supply of the underlying shares, the availability' 
of capital (private and institutional) in each financial market, and the attraction of 
foreign capital, among other things (Bailey, Warren, Karolyi and Silva, 2000: Levis, 
1996). Multiple or dual listings for companies that trade their shares in small periphery 
stock exchanges are another way to create local investor confidence and a consequent 
increase of bids for the stock (Harley, 2000; Moel, 1999; Levis, 1996). Again, an 
investor from Calgary in Canada has a high propensity to invest in a Greek listed stock 
when it is traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange JSX) (Demos, 2000b). Technically, 
the liquidity of a share is influenced by three basic factors, that is, the bid and ask 
spreads, the volume of transactions and finally the depth of the share (Stulz, 1999: 
Levis, 1996; Demos and Papadakis, 2000). Respectively, either for single or multiple 
listings, the bid and ask price spreads depend on the shares price level, the volume of 
transactions, the stock volatility. etc. The increase of volatility increases the bid and 
asks spreads and consequently transactions are not being made. For the multiple listings 
in particular, the volume of transactions depends on the number of stock markets where 
a share is traded, and also on the profit or loss opportunities because of arbitrage, which 
may be caused by foreign exchange differences and a different price of trading in the 
various stock markets. It has been calculated that the transaction cost of a cross border 
share transaction, on average, covers the 1.5% of the price of purchase or sale (Blak, 
2005). So, if the difference is of the order of 3.5% of the share and there is not 
significani foreign exchange modification, then the purchase of the share is 
advantageous. Consequently. the increase of the transactions volume lessens or even 
reduces the bid and asks spreads, and consequently. one obtains the transaction, which 
increases the share"s liquidity. Finally. the depth of a share influences directly its 
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liquidity by the conduct of the transactions. Usually. the shares with high marketabilltv 
and capitalization have also the required depth for many transactions and also when a 
share has many shareholders or a large investor base (Blak. 2005; Leong. 2002: Demos. 
2000c). 
Figure 5.5: Stock Liquidity, Multiple Listings and IR activities. 
a) IR Programme & Activities 
b) Local Listing 
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Source: Demos, 2000b; Levis 1996. 
5.3.4 Investor confidence building 
While the main objective of the IR programme and activities is the creation and 
"cultivation" of reliable relationships between the Greek listed company's management 
with the investors, analysts, bankers and the other market makers, the most important 
element in this process of building confidence and strong relationships is the timely, on 
line, "correct" communication of the company's strategy and operations to the 
investment community. "Building confidence is the essence of the IR job" (Gitzos, 
2002; Kanelopoulos, 2002; Aloupis, 2002; Demos, 2001a). The foreign institutional 
investors, analysts and other market players have formed a perception of Greece and the 
Greek stock market. Historically, their bias is entrenched in the associated uncertainty, 
lack of confidence, poor information, inconsistency etc. In particular, with reference to 
smaller capitalization firms, they perceive it as "strongly illiquid". Furthermore, since 
65% of ASE's trading is initiated by the foreign investorsq most of the trading takes 
place at the top 20 to 30 companies, either as index or large capitalization investors 
(Volls, Karathanasis and Diamandis, 2004. Kontogiannis. 2002c: Demos. 2000a). 
Therefore, in order for the majority of the Greek companies to provoke and attract the 
attention, to disclose and clarify more infori-nation. to dissolve any uncertainty and to 
build investor confidence. they should apply voluntary disclosure policies, and then- IR 
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departments should implement a proactive and aggressive IR plan. The concept of 
"disclosing bluntly and timely the real (not only the proper) infori-nation" but also that 
of visiting the investors' off-ices in order to inform and brief them personally on the 
company's history. finances and perspective is the best way to market any company's 
share (Ntokas, 20041; Kontogiannis, 2002a; Demos, 2000a). A prerequisite to "cement" 
the investors' confidence is to target and visit, flexibly and frequently, institutional 
investors in any location, investment type and form. This activity indicates the 
company's commitment to enlarge the investors' base geographically and among 
mutual, pension, hedge and other funds, and the appetite to know new companies and be 
exposed to new investment ideas and models is constantly there. The interest expressed 
for Greek stocks, by investors from various "regional" American and Canadian cities 
such as Des Moines, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Toronto, Montreal, etc., was' 
surprising 12. When the big global bank s-underwri ters plan a roadshow for a Greek 
stock, they cannot visit all financial centres and cities across the world, where certain 
mutual and pension funds (long-ten-n investors) are based. because of the lack of time 
and salespeople. It is the responsibility of the IR departments of the Greek companies to 
identify, plan, target, match and implement an aggressive informative and promotional 
campaign in order to sell shares (Demos, 2004a; 2001b). 
5.6 Summary 
In conclusion, the basic attributes for the effectiveness of the IR activity are the 
appropriate diagnosis of the specific firm's needs as well as the layout of creative 
strategic communication planning by the IR department. In this process, the personal 
attributes and characteristics of the IRO trigger the effectiveness of the communication 
plan and the visibility of the company's investment case across financial centres. In 
addition, the establishment of an efficient IR department, the freedom to act creatively 
and with discretion, and a dual or multiple listing of the share on other major stock 
exchanges, intensify the fin-n's visibility and its stock liquidity which in turn increase 
trading and build solid and lasting investor confidence (Demos, 2004a; Thomas, 2004; 
Williams, 2003). 
'2 The author"s roadshox\ participations amount to more 200 European and North American one-to-one 
meetings. In addition. there were more than 70 1group roadshows and 
another 30 company group 
presentations in Greece. Furthermore. more than half of the private and group presentations were 
initiated. oi-ganized and implemented by the author. I 
Chapter 6.0 Literature Review 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters 2 to 5 provided a detailed description of IR In general and In the context of IR 
in Greece. This chapter provides a literature overview on the subject of corporate 
communication and investor relations. It describes the theoretical foundations that may 
be applied to corporate disclosure and investor relations. such as the agencY theor-y and 
the efficient market hypothesis model. Later, it exposes the research findings in the area 
of corporate communications according to corporate governance (CG). disclosure via 
intermediaries and in discretionary mode. By doing so, it gives an overview of the 
theoretical and empirical development of the corporate disclosure and investor relations 
research. Corporate communication, investor relations and corporate disclosure are 
used interchangeably, since it is accepted here that they are in essence similar in 
functioning and activity. 
6.2 Theoretical foundations 
The information process is defined by the acquisition., interpretation and use of 
infori-nation (Figure 6.2). When information delivery fails then infori-nation asymmetry 
issues arise that seriously affect decision making. Decision making is also affected by 
the proliferation and excessiveness of information and therefore the existence of noise. 
Information asymmetry and noise are problems in the corporate communication process 
and affect investment decisions. The major shareholders or owners of a listed company, 
but mostly the top executives who run it and can evaluate better the business entity, are 
the infori-nation insiders (agents) who select the type and time of delivery of information 
and the disclosure pattern (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003, Hong and Huang, 2003; Del 
Guercio, 1999; Hilton, 1993). Consequently, there might be an infori-nation gap between 
the acceptance and interpretation of the company's infon-nation, and its proper use and 
implementation by the market players (agency information paradigm). The investor 
relations literature is based mostly on the agency economic theory and selected themes 
from accounting, finance and marketing. In other words, there are several academic 
disciplines involved in the study of investor relations (Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller, 
2003, Hong and Huang, 2003; Brennan and Tamarowski. 2000). Verrechia (2001, pp. 
98-99) states that "disclosure literature could be probably characterized as an eclectic 
commingling of highly idiosyncratic (and highly stylized). economics-based models". 
and. furthermore, suggests that "eclecticism is exacerbated by the fact that disclosure, as 
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a topic. spans three literatures. accounting. finance. and economics, and thus inevltabiy 
takes on features of those literatures". 
Fip, ure 6.2: Information Process and Asymmetry. 
COMPANY INSIDERS 
(of Information) 
INVESTOR RELATIONS 
ACQUISITION 
of Information from internal departments and top management 
DELIVERY of Infori-nation 
(Means to transfer and convey information) 
ACCEPTANCE of Information 
(Reliable information to get attention and persuade) 
t 
INTERPRETATION of Infori-nation 
(Using inten-nediaries) 
IMPLEMENTATION of Information 
By information users 
(Buying or retaining stock by Investors) 
Source: Demos, 2001 a; Dixon, 1976. 
Marston (2004, p. 7) argues that "there is no specific theory that can explain IR practised 
by companies". She evaluates IR as part of the financial reporting process but also 
suggests that IR can be viewed from different angles, not merely as an information 
providing function. She also stated (1996) that the purpose of IR is to provide 
information to the financial community, such as analysts, media, institutional and retail 
investors and public investors, in order to evaluate a listed company optimally. Since 
the recent stock market bubble in 2000, the subsequent collapse of investors' confidence 
and the proliferation of mandatory rules and corporate governance regulations by the 
US and other SECs, formal corporate communication has become synonymous with 
regulated disclosure (Witt, 2004; Stilponos, 2004, Mulligan, 2001). In other words, all 
formal channels of company information could be regulated and controlled by the 
security authorities. The annual, semi-annual and quarterly reports, the official press 
releases, the agenda and minutes of the general assembly. the financial statements and 
the footnotes. and the fillings were and are part of the formal or regulated corporate 
communication. Corporate disclosure and IR activity were examined either as formal or 
as infornial corporate communication functions (Holland. 1998b: Marston. 1999). 
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Informal corporate communications and activities can be classified as public and private 
(Brennan and Kelly 2000, Marston. 1999, Holland, 1998a). Public disclosure includes 
press releases, web site and web casting communication of information. Private 
communications consist of mailing infon-nation to market participants. answering 
queries, providing feedback on analysts' reports. email infori-nation. group and/or one- 
to-one meetings, etc. Disclosure is a finn's voluntary and discretionary delivery of 
information to the investors and the market, and disclosure effectiveness refers to the 
use of information, so savers/investors are able to make informed investment 
Judgments, as figure 6.2 indicates (Pae, 2002, Palmiter, 1999: Holland. 1998a). As 
mentioned in Greece. there has been no previous research on corporate communication 
and investor relations, with the exception of some case studies on roadshows and dual 
listings. 
6.2.1 Agency theory foundations 
Investor relations have been examined from an agency theory perspective. The 
traditional agency theory was introduced by Coase (1937), and later expanded by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), and Fama (1980) observed that the role of financial infon-nation 
was to supervise the behaviour of top management in order to reduce the agency cost. 
Dye (2001, p. . 184) suggested that "there is a theory of voluntary disclosure and (this 
theory) is a special case of game theory with the following central premise: any entity 
contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favourable to the 
entity, and will not disclose information unfavourable to the entity". Investor Relations 
and voluntary disclosure decisions "involve balancing conflicting incentives associated 
with different audiences (Chen, Conover and Kensinger, 2005, p. 1). Investor relations 
(IR) play a vital role in the " information process and information asymmetries" 
(Yoshikawa and Linton, 2000, p. 3). They are accepted by top management (company 
information insiders) as an information filter, official company communication voice 
and even a buffer and protection zone for the executives. As Rao and Sivakumar report, 
"top managers found it rational to hire personnel to buffer themselves from external 
scrutiny" (1999, p. 30). They are also accepted by the analysts (infori-nation 
inten-nediaries) and the investors (company infori-nation users) as a reliable source of 
company information (Holland, 1997, Marston, 1997a). IR relate directly to two major 
agents in the corporate setting: the top executives and the owners. "Managers must 
provide owners with accurate, timely, and complete disclosure of the company's 
positions", and systems. codes and governance have been developing in order to resolve 
-conflicts of interest between owners who lack the specific infon-nation (or the 
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background knowledge to utilize it) and the managers who act as their agents (Chen. 
Conover and Kensinger, 2005. abstract). " Lev (1992. p. 17) pointed out that "economic 
theory has recognized that without active disclosure the truth never comes out and 
consequently a permanent infori-nation gap generally exists between insiders and 
outsiders". Gelb (2002) argued that the separation of ownership and control leads to 
agency problems and the diffusion of ownership leads to governance problems. The 
economic theory of the agency paradigm also addresses the information asymmetry and 
communication gap between management and shareholders. Research by Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985), Lang and Lundholrn (1996,1993), Welker (1995) and others in this 
field indicated that corporate disclosure is positively related to infori-nation asymmetry 
between investors and managers. Agency theory and investor relations are also closely 
related through the relationship and/or distinction between existing shareholders and' 
prospective investors. As Miller Lee Richard (1988, p. 128) noted, "in most companies. 
the Investor Relations function devotes a very large proportion of its efforts to the 
outsiders (prospective investors - if and when some of them purchase the securities of 
the firm), and only a limited part to the shareholders (the actual investors). This is 
probably because the Public Relations function has traditionally been the "parent" of the 
Investor Relations". Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that the companies should 
increase discretionary disclosure in order to minimize pressure from government and 
stakeholders' and unnecessary compulsory regulation. In conclusion, a large portion of 
the academic research and literature on disclosure and investor relations draw heavily 
from the agency theory. 
6.2.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) foundations 
Investor relations have been examined from an efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
perspective. The market is efficient if information is included in the market price. IR 
also plays a vital role in the timing of the corporate disclosure and infori-nation 
efficiency (Holland, 1998b). As Rogers (2002, p. 22) reports, "companies derive 
significant benefits from voluntary reporting, including using vehicles like the CEO 
presentation which allows management some interpretive licence". To handle such, IR 
must be integrated at the topmost levels of the firm. The use of the means that convey 
the company's information (i. e. letters, telephones, press releases, web sites, email, 
meetings. etc. ) to the investment community and the equal access to this information by 
the information users and other market players (analysts. media. regulators, authorities. 
institutional. individual investors, etc. ) are major concerns in the IR function. and as 
such. investor relations have been examined from an efficient market hypothesis 
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perspective. Deller. Stubenrath and Weber (1999). found that by disclosing more to 
interested parties and to the market. a company could influence the market participants. 
Marston (1997a, p. 266) argues: "In practice there will always be Information 
asymmetry". It is not possible to convey to the market all the information about a 
company. If this were possible the market Nvould exhibit strong form efficiency. which 
has been reported on by Keane (1983. p. 10) as follows "The market is efficient In the 
strong sense if share prices fully reflect not only published information but all relevant 
information including data not yet publicly available. If the markets were strongly 
efficient,, therefore, even an insider would not be able to profit from his privileged 
position". Bromwich (1980, p. 68) connects information asymmetry with insiders and, 
most important, financial analysts with inside infori-nation, and suggests that the holders 
of esoteric company intelligence partially help the market efficiency. In particular, lie 
argues that, "given the relatively small numbers of individuals who have access to such 
non-public information". these individuals first of all may contribute to economic 
efficiency, since they have access to superior company knowledge, as they claim, and, 
secondly, they exercise a kind of monopolistic information power and,, therefore, "will 
not provide the information to all those willing to pay the incremental cost of their 
demands". In conclusion,, since investor relations play an important role in the 
information process, information asymmetry and information efficiency, they can be 
analysed from the efficient market hypothesis framework. 
6.3 Empirical and theoretical IR literature 
There has been research into the specific area of disclosure that is covered by the 
investor relations in the English-speaking countries (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ, 
etc. ) but there has been little academic research into IR issues in the rest of the world, 
for example in Europe and Asia (Marston, 2004; IIRF Conference, 2004, Investor 
Relations Society 2000b; Jacobs, 1998; Pincus, 1989). Minimal research in general has 
been focusing on other markets. And if research initiated focuses mostly on the 
regulated disclosure (Tiron, 2005). Yoshikawa and Linton examined variables that 
affect the practices and models of the Japanese companies' investor relations. They 
found that "'corporate governance and investor relations theory from North America 
may be appropriate for Japanese companies" (2000, p. 20). Marston and Straker (2001). 
in a survey of 80 large non-UK European companies. enquiring about their investor 
relations activities. found that "investor relations was becoming an increasingly 
important function. and almost 90% of the respondent companies employed a full-time 
im, cstor Relations Officer". In addition. their research indicated "the practice of 
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investor relations in Europe has varied and still varies considerably between nations. for 
a variety of reasons". They conclude "there has been growth in investor relations in all 
European countries. perhaps as a result of increases in international investment and the 
spread of Anglo-Saxon business practices". Godfrey (2001, p. 4) evaluated the investor 
relations in New Zealand by researching "how effective ... corporate IR programmes 
and strategies [are] in communicating with the financial community in New Zealand. " 
Hoepner (2002) Investigated the application of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in 
Germany. Du (2002) examined the corporate governance consequences on Chinese 
corporations and investors. Solomon, Solomon and Chang-Young (2002) conducted 
research into how corporate governance applications affect the investment community 
in South Korea and the feedback and influence on the local mandatory mechanisms by 
the institutional investors. Marston and Empson (2004c) have also documented the level' 
of the IR industry in Eastern European countries. Patton and Makhija (2004) evaluated 
the voluntary disclosure policies via their annual reports of Czech listed companies. 
Hamid, Salleh and Yusof "Investigated the usage of Internet by Malaysian public listed 
companies as a medium for IR" and the companies that use web communication to the 
investment community enjoy the investors' confidence (2004, p. 21). Much of what is 
happening in the European countries, as well as in others like Japan, Korea, etc., can be 
found in the IR Magazine (Bingham. 2004). Aside from the academic contribution to 
the study of IR phenomena, the industry of corporate communication and IR draws 
much from the IR practitioners, who plan and implement the IR programme, consult 
and advise the company's insiders and owners based on the synthesis of market 
perceptions, opinions and strategies. The practitioners convey their experiences, 
observations, and knowledge to the IR magazine and to different ad hoc research 
conducted by intermediaries and consultants. This collection of findings contains a good 
source of information on IR issues. In addition, knowledge about the IR status in many 
markets comes from informal discussions and formal presentations in the International 
Investor Relations Federation annual conferences (IIRF Conference, 2004). Academic 
researchers could look into the considerable event-related material in the investor 
relations area which is encountered in publications and magazines, mainly in the United 
States and the UK (Investor Relations Society 1998). All IR practitioners and interested 
parties accept the UK's IR Magazine and its sister web periodical IR on the Net as the 
-official magazine" in the industry. Across the Atlantic. the USA's National Investor 
Relations Institute's Investor Relations Quarterly and Investor Relations Update are also 
considered to be good sources of information about IR practices. case studies and tl 
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results. In addition, NIRI and the UK's Investor Relations Society publishes ad hoe. 
insightful empirical IR research studies that cover many IR-related issues. such as IR 
constraints. tools. effectiveness, relation to the corporate governance rules and 
directives, and intermediary information disclosure (National Investor Relations 
Institute, 2000). Such ad hoc surveys ernerge in other regions as well. News Directions" 
(1999) survey in ten European countries and Intercapital Communications' IR survey in 
Australia (1998) are good examples. In conclusion, investor relations issues have been 
examined to some extent , if not satisfactorily in the USA and the UK markets. but 
minimal research has been conducted in other markets. Different IR practices and 
empirical examinations can be surveyed in the specialty IR magazines and the 
practitioners' conferences, but little academic research can be found across other 
markets, at least in English. 
6.4 Regulated corporate disclosure and IR literature 
Following the cycles model or interpretation in the political arena the financial markets 
and specifically the securities industry. corporate disclosure "rides on its own cycles" 
(Batra, 1987; Schlesinger, 1986). After the stock market collapse in 2000. the need and 
demand for more control and regulation of the equity markets initiated control and 
check points in the corporate disclosure activities. Investor relations as a strategic 
intelligence function are viewed as an activity in the Corporate Governance framework 
(Rogers, 2002). Academic research identifies and examines investor relations as an 
element of Corporate Governance in the fon-n of a mandatory public infori-nation 
mechanism that, according to a standardized and universal set of rules and regulations, 
enhances infon-nation symmetry and efficient markets (Brown, Finn and Hillegeist, 
2001; Holland, 1998a). Walmsley, Yadav and Rees (1992), in their event study of the 
market effect of presentations to the UK investor society, concluded that company 
infori-nation is impounded into the share price. They consider that private information 
given during presentations is potentially unfair and could be illegal. Short, Keasey, 
Wright and Hull (1999), Coffee (1999), Brennam and Kelly (2000), Adman and 
Pfleiderer (2001), Bushman and Smith (2001), Franco (2002). Fishman and Hagerty 
(2003), and Avgouleas (2004) have all researched the dimension and the role of 
regulation, and especially corporate governance on the disclosure process, the quality of 
corporate governance and corporate communication. the usefulness of regulation. and 
stress the uniformity of the IR activities across companies. markets and countries. In 
addition, there are studies or surveys that examine legal or regulatory issues concerning 
the role, constraints. tools and effectiveness of IR. In the UK. Gaved (1997) investigated 
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the role of institutional investors in the governance of the listed companies of which 
they are shareholders or in which they intend to invest. In the US. Thompson (2002. 
2003ý 2004) has been investigating the impact of corporate governance rules and 
especially of the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) and the Sarbanes-Oxley act on 
the investor relations and therefore on the asymmetry. investors' confidence. share 
price. volatility, trading, analysts' models, etc. relating to the infori-nation. In particular. 
the Reg. FD rules that enforce the companies to disclose simultaneously any 
information to all market participants, via the web site. web-casting, press release. etc.. 
probably created more informal and discretionary communication issues, at least in the 
non USA markets. In Gen-nany, Witt (2004) researched the particularities and 
application of corporate governance rules in the Gen-nan context. In the EU, Carpenter 
(2002, p. 27) concluded that "disclosure practices have been forced to improve for 
several companies from smaller markets ... while ... 
disclosure practice among Europe's 
blue chips is driven by similar international standards". A global survey by Citigate 
Financial Intelligence (2003, pp. 3-6) reported that "... while shareholder identification 
is regarded as the building block of Investor Relations ... the impetus 
legislation is not 
generally provided by the agendas of the corporate or the buy-side communities: the 
original motive for transparency was the protection of the small shareholder and it 
remains the legislator's primary concern, joined by other motives for greater 
transparency such as the desire to prevent money laundering or insider dealing". 
Another global report by Simmons and Simmons (2004, p. 8) concludes that putting 
"aside Russia, which has no formal disclosure obligation (of share ownership), 
... companies in continental 
Europe and Canada, Scandinavia, and the UK and 
commonwealth ... rely on the enforcement powers of the national regulators where the 
information provided is not sufficient". In addition, almost every year major global 
institutions such as the NASDAQ produce a well-defined booklet on investor relations, 
which describes adequately and practically the three modes of disclosure (regulated, 
intermediary and voluntary). On the other hand, Marston and Empson (2004a, p. 7) 
argue: "hard-copy disclosures and investor relations disclosures may require a different 
theoretical approach" and Dye (200 1, p. 184) posits that "there is no received theory on 
mandatory disclosures". The last five years have seen progress into an era of mandatory 
and strong regulatory imposed regulations and practices in the securities industry and in 
the cornmuni cation of the infori-nation in the corporate world. Regulatory bodies. stock 
exchanges. academic research and specialty periodicals focus, examine and justify the 
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incorporation of corporate communication and investor relations in the ereater 
framework of regulated corporate information. 
6.5 Corporate disclosure via intermediaries and IR literature 
A large group of researchers have tried to evaluate the role of the information 
intermediaries in the company's disclosure activity. They examine basic parameters 
such as analyst coverage, accuracy of analysts' forecasts of earnings. earnings 
projections, earnings guidance, wires intermission. media intermediation. etc. Arnold, 
Molzer and Noreen (1984), Hirst (1988), Gmewosz (1990), Lang and Lundholm (1996). 
Francis, Hanna and Philbrick (1997), Marston (1997a. 1997b), Clement, Rees and 
Swanson (2000), Irvine (2001), Byard and Shaw (2004) have all attempted to identify 
the role of analysts in the infon-nation continuum, mostly in the English speaking 
financial markets. The majority of them have employed the survey, questionnaire and 
interview research approach, and their findings assert and support the dynamics of 
different facets of the disclosure via intermediaries. Bhushan (1989) developed a ]-node] 
of analyst following and proposed a number of parameters that affect analyst coverage. 
The size of the firm, the business lines, the shareholder structure, the company's 
founder and major shareholder's role, share liquidity and stock return are some of these 
variables. Additionally, O'Brien and Bhushan (1990, p. 17) found that "analyst 
following increases more in firms with small prior analyst following and in firms whose 
return volatility has declined and that analyst following increases more in industries 
with regulated disclosure and with an increasing number of firrns. Institutional 
ownership increases with firm size and with increased market risk". In a later paper, 
they (1996, p. 490) concluded that "firms with more forthcoming disclosures in their 
industry have a greater analyst following, more consensus among analysts' earnings 
forecasts, more accurate forecasts and less variable forecasts revisions" and, more 
important, "investor relations is consistently a significant deten-ninant of analyst 
behaviour... since ... direct contact with the company 
is a primary source of infori-nation 
for analysts". Bromwich (1985) argued that some analysts have access to private 
company information and could be considered as insiders (of company information) 
themselves and therefore are part of the agency problem. Lee and Tweedie in 1981 (p. 
104) reported that during a company and site visits "any infori-nation obtained (during a 
visit to a company) may well be unique in the sense that it may not be shared by other 
inx-cstors (both existing and potential), whereas published sources provide knowledge 
for all users. Consequently. company visits would seem at first sight to be an extremely 
USCft1l means of obtaining information in advance of other investors". Marston (1997a. 
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p. 267) stated: "it is clear that informal contacts between analysts and companies have 
long been the norm. The literature clearly indicates that such meetings were viewed 
with approval as an essential part of a company's financial public relations exercise' 
Hirst (1988, p. 20) evaluated the close relationship between top management and 
analysts and concluded that "an open management xvill tend to reduce information 
disparities. It may, however, reflect more than different management styles. Companies 
in financial difficulty are likely to be subject to considerable information disparities, and 
their managements will be unable to speak freely. In either case, the evidence seems to 
support the view that an open relationship between management and analysts supports 
marketability". Lang and Lundholm (1996) recognized the value that IR adds to the 
disclosure practices over time and show that more infon-native disclosure policies, and 
through the analysts, reduce infon-nation asymmetry. In an earlier study, they (1993, p., 
246) provided evidence that "the analysts' ratings are increasing in firm size and in firrn 
perfon-nance... and ... decreasing in the correlation between earnings and returns, and 
higher for firms issuing securities in the current or future period". In other words, the 
mandatory disclosure secures only a small portion of company's information, and the 
biggest part of the information is left to the discretionary mode of the companies or 
better to the incentives of the top managers to disclose more infon-nation. Another area 
of research that is associated with the corporate disclosure through the information 
intermediaries is the management of managers I earnings. The relationship between 
information asymmetry and earnings management was examined by Biggs (1984), Lang 
and Lundholm (1993), Dye (2001), Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2003) and others. The 
opportunistic disclosures of company's earnings by the insiders were also researched by 
these researchers,, who posit the interdependence and positive relationship of 
information asymmetry and management of earnings. Farragher, Kleinman and Bazaz 
(1994) found a positive correlation between investor relations activity and the consensus 
of analysts' forecasts, especially in terms of earnings per share. Francis, Hanna and 
Philbrick (1997) similarly found a positive correlation between analyst presentations 
and analyst coverage. Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) found a positive correlation 
between analyst coverage and liquidity of the underlying stock. Specifically, Lang and 
Lundholm (1996,1993), Welker (1995), Sengupta (1998), Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
(1999) have documented a negative relationship between corporate disclosure and 
earnings management. Healy and Palepu (2001) as well as Core (2001) have reviewed 
the recent empirical disclosure research through the infon-nation intermediaries. Healy 
and Palepu (200 1. p. 418) concluded that there is enough evidence that "shows that at 
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least some of the disclosures made by financial analysts, the business press. and bond- 
rating agencies affect stock prices". Nonetheless. they summarize that "there remain 
important gaps in our knowledge about the incentives of auditors and intermediaries. 
and the impact on their credibility". Academic attention has been focused mostlv on 
analysts and their role in corporate disclosure. but the role of other information 
intermediaries such as the media, the auditors, the brokers and others is vital. and 
regulatory bodies such as the US SEC have been pushing hard over recent years to 
control the role of intermediaries and their access to privileged company information by 
exhorting companies to disclose more information directly to investors (Byard and 
Shaw, 2004, Chang, Khanna and Palepou, 2000). 
6.6 Voluntary corporate disclosure and IR literature 
Academic research focuses and also examines the discretionary corporate 
communication process. Discretionary public and private corporate communication, 
through group and private meetings, telephone calls, conference calls and even web 
sites, enhances information symmetry and efficient allocation of resources and money. 
As a consequence, a solid body of the IR and related literature treats investor relations 
as a form of voluntary disclosure. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argued that the top 
management of the listed companies should focus and increase their discretionary 
disclosure in order to bridge the information gap voluntarily between themselves and 
the market, and to pre-empt the regulatory institutions strategically to enforce patterns 
of disclosure. If minimum disclosure requirements exist in a capital market, then the 
flexibility of the management to exercise discretion in its corporate disclosure and the 
communication of the company's infori-nation is maximized. Along the same lines, 
Verrecchia (2001) argued that the top management could accept the cost associated with 
a possible voluntary increase of the corporate disclosure in order to value their company 
and its underlying stock by the market correctly. Similarly, Barry and Brown (1985), 
Merton (1987) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) provided evidence of negative 
correlation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetries between 
management and sharebolders-investors, and, furthen-nore. of the positive relationship 
between discretionary disclosure, stock liquidity and share price. Lev (1992) argued for 
a more proactive and consistent communication policy by the public companies, and 
researched their communication policies with the investors' confidence. information 
surprises to the market and the share price. In addition, he concluded that "'economic 
theory has recognized that without active disclosure the truth wffl never come out -a 
pen-nanent information gap generally exists between insiders and outsiders" (1992. p. 
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42). Healy. Hutton and Palepu (1999) also documented the importance of "private 
information" that stimulates analysts to cover the stock. and that it also motivates fund 
managers to buy the stock and therefore boost liquidity and stock price. Eccles and 
Mavrinac (1995) found that voluntary disclosure policies by the listed companies 
surpass the mandatory requirements and play an important role in the corporate 
communication. Marston (2004,1994). in the last decade, systematically researched the 
investor relations activities, by using mainly questionnaire methodology, examining 
consistently the development and functioning of the investor relations industry. She 
based her analysis on the assumption of IR as voluntary disclosure and examined IR 
organizational issues, execution of private meetings, effectiveness of group meetings 
and telephone conversations. among others. Likewise, Holland (1998b, p. 267) reported: 
"private disclosure activity was recognized as a significant part of a larger corporate' 
decision concerning public versus private voluntary disclosure". By interviewing top 
executives,, he tried to shed light upon and "offer little guidance on how infon-ned 
traders become informed, or how private or public disclosure will affect other 
institutional and market states such as trust, confidence and support" (1998a, p. 65). 
Barker (1996,1998), also using the grounded research approach (structured interviews), 
interviewed finance directors, analysts and fund managers, and concluded (1998, p. 27) 
that "for analysts, direct contact with the company provides timely, focused, forward- 
looking information that is perceived to offer a competitive advantage over rival 
analysts" and similarly, "for fund managers, formal meetings offer an opportunity to 
access the company's strategy and the ability of management ... and to offer a 
competitive advantage in terms of investment perfon-nance relative to rival funds". 
Along the same lines, Marston (1999), Weetman and Beattie (1999), Beattie (1999), and 
later Roberts, Sanderson, Hendry and Barker (2004) justified the importance of investor 
relations meetings and in particular the private meetings, in closing the infon-nation gap 
and accessing directly the top management and therefore primary company information. 
Similarly, Walmsley, Yadav and Rees (1992) reported the importance of private 
meetings in the disclosure of corporate infori-nation. Larran and Rees (2003), using the 
questionnaire and interview methodology, also concluded that the meetings - both group 
and one-to-one meetings - were very important for the most important players, such as 
company executives. analysts and fund managers. Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller 
(2003). Tasker (1998) and Frankel, Johnson and Skinner (1999). researching a specific 
IR too]. that of the use of conference calls to convey information to market participants, 
concluded that this voluntary too] is not only decreasing information asymmetries but 
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also affects positively trading volume and volatility of the shares. Surveys and case 
studies on conference calls can also be found in industry magazines (Carpenter. 2004a. 
Gower, 2003a; Investor-Relations-Business 1999a. Investor-Relations-Business 1999b. 
and Investor-Relations-Business 1999c). Since the last decade. with the advances of 
internet technology and the use of ernail as a fast. frequent, on time. inexpensivc and 
formal disclosure instrument, much attention has been directed on the extensive use of 
internet financial reporting (Lyle, 2004; Boros, 2001; Croft. 2001, Fisher. Laswad and 
Oyelere, 2000; Clemons and Row. 2000; Ashbaugh. Johnstone and Warfield, 1999: 
Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman, 1999, Bury. 1999, Baxt, 1999). Deller. 
Stubenrath and Weber (1999) found a positive correlation between the content of the 
web sites and the level of disclosure. especially in the annual reports. Gelb (2002. p. 
169), researching internet technology disclosure, concluded that "'disclosures 
represented by the investor relations category are less formal and rigid and are not an 
effective signal of the fin-n's intentions to disclose more in the future". Geerings, Bollen 
and Hassink (2003), Oyelere, Laswad and Fisher (2003), Xlao, Jones and Lymer, 
(2002); Lymer, Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (1999); Deller, Stubenrath and Weber 
(2000,1999); and Brennam and Kelly (2000) have researched internet-related topics in 
different country settings such as the EU, New Zealand, the US, the UK, Germany. 
Malaysia, Sweden, Ireland and Japan. Topics covered by these research efforts are 
mainly the existence of interactive web sites by cross-sectional listed companies, 
financial reporting via the web, the nature and depth of the company's information, the 
continuous flow of updated data, the friendly user content, among others. Another 
survey focused on firnns' web casting: that reported in the IR Magazine (July 2002) 
shows that the best web casts -could be found not only in the large capitalization 
companies but in smaller dynamic firms. Even a decade earlier, Weisul (1996) found 
that small dynamic companies were using the internet to promote their investment 
cases. Research has been conducted in some specific markets. Baker (2001), in an 
empirical work, found that personal contacts and personal relationships are the 
communication tools most widely accepted and used by the French institutional 
investors, especially with the companies in which they have holdings. In Scandinavia, 
Tuornmen (1997) reported and documented that the Nordic corporate communication 
people favour personal and proactive IR policies extensivelv. In conclusion, research 
has been extensive on voluntary corporate communication. by examining how 
companies disclose through meetings, telephones. conferences. web sites and emalls. 
and the conclusion is that discretionary disclosure enhances infon-nation symmetry. 
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6.7 Other investor relations research and literature 
Event studies in the investor relations area examine a particular effect such as the cost 
of capital, investors' confidence, abnormal returns, liquidity issues, etc. that the investor 
relations activities have. during a certain period of time. As Armitage (1995. p. 25) 
notes, "much of the (event) research involving abnormal returns consists of tests of the 
efficient market hypothesis that share prices reflect all available infori-nation. " Along 
these lines, Fishman and Hagerty (1989) showed that IR activities lower the cost for the 
market players such as the traders, which leads to the efficiency and liquidity of the 
company's stock price. Byrd, Johnson and Johnson (1993) concluded that IR lowers the 
equity cost of capital, increases stock attractiveness and decreases information 
asymmetries between management and potential investors. Some researchers focus on 
the relationship between IR and visibility, especially for the smaller companies. Bushee. 
and Miller (2005, p. 3) focused on the IR and corporate communication policies of 
small and medium capitalization listed firms which face visibility challenges. They 
conclude that "IR activities play a significant role in helping small and mid-cap 
companies overcome their low visibility due to their firrn characteristics to attract a 
wider following by investors and information inten-nediaries and improve their market 
valuation. " There is also research that shows that the IR influence or impact on the 
capital market is limited and inconclusive. Peasnell, Tallb and Young (2005, p. 29) 
found that "low confidence in accounting credibility in the market also may have 
damaged the confidence investors placed in IR. Hence. contrary to existing anecdotal 
evidence suggesting a positive role of IR during a market crisis, our study found that IR 
failed to insulate awarded for their IR firms from the negative market shocks causing 
these firms to be penallsed more. " In contrast, almost ten years ago, in the pre-Enron 
era and before the recent market crash,, Mavrinac (1997, p. 13) argued that IR is a 
fundamental determinant of the companies' share value. In her Canadian survey of three 
groups (managers, institutional investors and analysts), "the evidence in support of IR is 
almost overwhelming. If this evidence is to be taken seriously, investment in IR and the 
development of a truly strategic IR capability is not only warranted but strongly 
recommended. " 
6.8 Conclusion 
The review of the literature indicates that voluntary corporate disclosure and the 
investor relations tools that companies employ in order to be more effective and 
efficient have been examined. On the other hand. manv investor relations issues. tools. 
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implementation and effectiveness are \vorthy of further detailed in\'estwatlon. The 
existing research concentrates on the aspects of the three expressions of corporate 
disclosure (regulated, via intermediaries and voluntary). During the last decade in 
particular, many changes in the legal and regulatory disclosure framework were 
witnessed which consequently affected the companies ability. flexibility and 
willingness to inform the markets and the market players. There has been inadequate 
research on all of these (three) fronts of corporate disclosure. especial]'\ 7 for the non 
English speaking markets. The next chapter sets out the research design and 
methodology for the current research effort. 
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Chapter 7.0 Research Design and Methodology 
7.1 introduction 
This chapter outlines the chosen research methodology. the available research methods. 
the rationale and the way the research was carried out using the chosen methods. The 
airns of the research and the research problem are outlined. A short description of the 
limitations of the research is also given at the end of the chapter. Research methodology 
is followed either by using a theoretical framework or by extracting and formulating a 
theory from the analysis of gathered empirical data. Then. based on the theory. 
interpretations, extrapolations, and forecasts for the future and recommendations are 
composed. In the present research methodology. one qualitative tool was used: that of 
interviews. The taped interviews were based on a pre-completed semi-structured 
questionnaire, which provided quantitative but mostly qualitative data that allowed the 
researcli objectives to be attained. 
7.2 Research Methods / Paradigms 
A short review of the main classifications of social research options is necessary for 
comparing the theoretical and empirical implications of investor relations research. In 
the greater picture, there exist two main groups of researching issues in disclosure: 
infori-nation asymmetry and in particular IR. On the one extreme side of the research 
continuum lies the positivistic (or quantitative) model and on the other extreme side lies 
the phenomenological (interpretative or qualitative) paradigm (Table 7.1). Perry and 
Coote (1994, p. 103) noted some key differences between these two polar paradigms 
(the interpretative and positivist research paradigms). In particular, interpretative 
research models, compared with positivistic ones, consider words rather than numbers 
in data terms, tend to be inductive rather than deductive, also tend to use data rather than 
from experiments for instance, and include subjective data rather than seeking only 
objective data. Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 50) pointed out that these extremes are 
non-native forins and may be relatively rare in practice. They identified types (1997, pp. 
59-60) of positivistic methodologies, such as cross-sectional studies, experimental 
studies, longitudinal studies and surveys. They also singled out forins of 
phenomenological methods. such as action research, case studies, ethnography, feminist 
perspective. grounded theory, hermeneutics and participative enquiry. They cautioned, 
however. that the two extreme paradigms are at the edge of the continuum and 
suLl(_, csted that "each methodology can be moved some \\'ay along the continuum 
according to the researcher's assumptions" (1997. p. 59). 
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Table 7.1: Extreme Research Paradigms / Methodology. 
PARADIGMATIC POSITIVISTIC PARADIGM PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
ASSUMPTIONS METHODOLOGY PARADIGM 
(Empiricism) METHODOLOGY 
Nature of reality An apprehensible reality exists Reality is seen as subjective 
(Ontological which is driven by immutable (No real xN, orld exists outside the 
Assumption) natural laws and mechanisms consciousness of the obsci-ver) 
Role of the observer e The reality is independent of Researcher's values inevitably 
and uninfluenced by the affect the interpretation of the 
(Epistemological observer (only that which is findings 
Assumption) observable and measurable is 
regarded as valid knowledge) 
e Interpretation by the 
researcher is replaced by 
explanatory prediction and 
analytical rigor 
Process of the research 
(Methodological 
Assumption) Data 
collection and Analysis 
Types of research Quantitative methodologies Qualitative methodologies 
* Cross-sectional studies Involve interpretation and 
e Experimental studies interaction between 
e Longitudinal studies the researcher and the subject 
e Surveys (generally such as interviews: 
quantitative and scientific e Action research 
methodologies where testable 9 Case studies 
hypothesis relating to 0 Ethnography 
relationships between * Feminist perspective 
measuring variables) 0 Grounded theory 
9 Market based studies 9 Hermeneutics 
0 Participative enquire 
Source: Laughlin (1995) 
A continuum of ontological assumptions has been identified by Morgan and Smircich 
(1980, p. 492). That makes it possible to draw a typology table with the aforementioned 
research models. Some research methodologies are exposed to varying degrees in the 
paradigms noted above. Moreover, the methodology chosen should reflect, as far as 
possible, the implicit paradigm assumptions of the research. It should be noted, 
moreover, that the positivistic research methods require less input from the researcher, 
while the phenomenological ones leave more room for researcher judgment and added 
value. In conclusion, there are two extreme research methodologies: on the one side, the 
positivistic (or quantitative) model and on the other. the phenomenological 
(interpretative or qualitative) model. Both have their own characteristics and should be 
used appropriately. Along the research continuum there exists a synthesis of extreme 
and diverse research methods. The contemporaneous use of combined or mixed research 
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paradigms can be applied for different research problems. One of them is the so-called 
triangulation method. which makes use of multiple methods to investigate and to cross- 
examine a problem in question. As Jick argues (1979, p. 602) the triangulation methods 
LL examine the sarne phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also enrich our 
understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge". Gronstedt (1996. 
p. 30) believes that the "triangulation of research method helps the validity and 
reliability of a research study". In a broader social science, Morgan and Burrell (1979) 
contributed broad research avenues for empirical research. They identified a continuum 
of alternative research options from "subjective" to "objective" which are characterized 
approaches, such as the position on being (ontology). the role of the researcher (human 
nature), the social perceptions (nature of society), the perceptions on understanding 
(epistemology) and methods to investigate (methodology). Tom-kins and Groves (1983)' 
suggested that researchers avoid scientific /positivistic methods and follow alternative 
research frameworks in order to investigate social phenomena and in particular 
accounting and finance issues. Laughlin (1995, pp. 68-70) identifies research paradigms 
according to three levels of dimensions: "(1) level of prior theorization; (2) level of 
theoretical nature of the research methods; and (3) level of emphasis given to critique of 
status quo and need for change (high/ medium/low)". In order to avoid problems 
inherent in the positivist methodologies, while researching capital markets issues,, 
research paradigms should unravel the market players' real experiences, perceptions and 
ideas (Parker and Rolley, 1997). Healy and Palepu, (2001), and Core, (2001) provided a 
synopsis of the empirical research endeavour and literature on disclosure, and in 
particular on voluntary disclosure and infon-nation asymmetry that involve and affect 
the IR function and programme. Voluntary disclosure and therefore IR decisions and 
choices affect and are associated with major workings of the capital markets, such as the 
levels of information asymmetry, quality and credibility of information, agency issues, 
stock and capital markets transactions, stock ownership, stock option plans and 
management compensation, stock liquidity and perfon-nance, litigation problems, 
market abuse and free rider issues, equity cost of capital, financial and infon-nation 
intermediaries role and effects and level of regulation, to name a few. In a general 
financial context, "information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation 
of resources in a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions created to 
facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in 
mitigating these problems" (Healy and Palepu, 2001. p. 407). 
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7.3 Research frarneiv, ork and design 
Research methodology affects to a very great extent the way data is collected and 
analysed during a research inquiry. Qualitative research methods may shed light on 
issues of corporate communication. and in particular IR understanding. that incorporates 
social. corporate and capital market interpersonal and interdependent decisions and 
actions. The social researcher attempts to use a sample of data in order to illustrate and 
su port p more general. theoretical arguments. Also, as Vogt argues tý (1993, p. 196). the 
research design must ensure "consistency and rigor throughout the research process in 
order to provide the most valid findings". In other words, the collect] II ion and ana ysis of 
data also mould the research method. Strauss and Corbin (1998. p. 3) state that 
methodology is "a way of thinking about and studying social reality". Furthermore. 
methods are "a set of procedures and techniques for gathering and analyzing data". 
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 54) defined methodology as "the overall approach to the 
research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of 
data". They also (1997, p. 140) defined paradigms as offering "a framework comprising 
an accepted set of theories, methods and ways of defining data'". Investor relations, 
similar to accounting and marketing, are not a positive science and practice like physics. 
They belong to social phenomena and practice that combine many theories, and are 
interdependent of many disciplines. The research framework used in order to investigate 
IR-related phenomena and how to balance public and private voluntary disclosure 
should focus on the inner feelings and perceived opinions of the insiders or the sellers 
and the buyers of the stocks, as well as any major market players such as the analysts 
and the media people. The theoretical framework of a research can influence 
interactively the research methodology. Either the research framework can be 
theoretical or an empirical framework can also be developed. As Laughlin (1995, pp 63- 
64) notes, (6'the developments of financial economics and particularly the generation of 
the efficient market hypothesis and the opening up of agency theory created demands as 
well as openings for accounting (and corporate communication) academics sympathetic 
to the thinking of empirical research". Moreover, since "there are no comprehensible 
approaches to understanding the empirical world" (Laughlin, 1995. p. 77), it is the 
author's intention to learn from the research methodology that Marston (1994), Holland 
1997) and Barker (1998) have used in order to understand empirically, and to explain 
theoretically the practical use and value of the IR practitioners and other market players 
to better comprehend the IR practice and profession and its effectiveness. 
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7.4 The chosen research methodology 
The research methodology that was chosen and used. as well as the rationale for this 
choice. will be described in the following sections. 
7.4.1 Grounded research lheoiýy 
Grounded theory research methodology is appropriate for use in data collection. 
analysis of data, development of concepts and relationships. generation of explanatory 
theoretical framework and an outcome theory. Strauss and Glaser (1967, pp. 22-23) 
observed that "grounded theory research aims to organize many ideas which have 
ernerged from analysis of the data, through systematic analysis of documents, Interview 
notes, or field notes by continually coding and comparing data to produce a well 
constructed theory". And "the theory will often be complex, formulated through 
iterative analysis of data, and through the development of core concepts whose' 
relationships are investigated in order to generate an explanatory theoretical framework 
which emerges from the data collected" (Strauss, 1987, p. 54). "Data collection, 
analysis and the resulting theory have a reciprocal relationship" or, in other words, 
"theory and the data in which that theory is grounded are intrinsically interrelated" 
(Parker and Rolley, 1997, p. 214). Grounded theory research is primarily hen-neneutic 
and interpretive in sharp contrast with the positivist economic, accounting and finance 
research, and, as interpretive research, is based on minimal levels of prior theorizing. 
Thus, with its emphasis on emergence of theory rather than a priori preconception 
(Glaser, 1992), the theoretical assumptions underpinning grounded theory research 
should be located in Laughlin's (1995, p. 70) "low/low" quadrant, along with 
pragmatism, symbolic interactionism and ethno methodology. Holland (2001, p. 3) 
stated that "developing grounded theory involves an iterative reciprocal relationship 
between data collection, theory and analysis" and emphasizes that "the researcher 
begins with an area of study, rather than a prior theory" and "the theory arises from the 
data by employing systematic methods of analysis". And "the researcher begins with an 
area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
p. 12). Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 12) also stated: "a researcher does not begin a 
project with a preconceived theory in mind". The current research started using as basis 
questionnaires from previous research such as Marston's but the open ended qualitative 
discussions and information during the interviews and the additional data collected were 
massivc were enough to yield a grounded theory. As Holland (2005. p. 265) notes "the 
grounded theory provides a key context for other disclosure research studies and ... 
especially for continuous corporate disclosure" as exactly the IR function does. 
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Laughlin indicated (1995. p. 65) that "there is a certain advantage and importancc of 
making deliberate choices on these matters prior to undertaking any study"". The 
methodology allows the researcher to develop a theoretical interpretation of a disclosure 
or corporate communication activity (phenomenon). while simultaneously grounding 
such interpretations in empirical data. From the identification by Hussey and Hussey 
(1997, p. 140) of the main data collection methods. such as "critical incident technique, 
diaries; focus groups, interviews; observation, protocol analysis: and questionnaires". 
the one that is more personal and gives the opportunity to be fully explanatory was 
chosen for this research. In the research, there are some given and fixed issues and 
practices that are determined by the local psychology. culture, business ethics and 
practices, the maturity of market players, the stage of the market (i. e. emerging. mature. 
staple based, industry specific, extroverted, etc. ). It was preferable therefore to use a 
qualitative research procedure, or better, a "norimathernatical process of interpretation, 
carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and 
then organizing these into a theoretical explanatory scheme" (Strauss and Corbin. 1998, 
p. 11). The original structured quantitative data were supplemented by an enon-nous 
amount of complicated and overlapping collected interview data that "eventually, (the 
underlying researcher) realized that certain concepts can be grouped under a more 
abstract higher order concept, based on its ability to explain what is going on" (Strauss 
and Corbin,, 1998, p. 113). The open coding was done by analysing sentences and 
paragraphs as well as the entire interview "document" for similarities and differences. 
Proceeding to axial coding by analysing the interviewed data, "the researcher cannot 
help but notice how concepts relate to each other. In explicating these relationships, the 
researcher begins to line categories with their subcategories, that is, to notice that these 
seem to be conditions -these actions/interactions, these consequences" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 135). Finally, moving to selective coding as "the process of integrating 
and refining categoriesl' the current research followed Strauss and Corbin's 
recommendation to "be more creative, so to provide our own names for what is going 
on and then describe our conceptual izati ons in terms of the particular properties and 
dimension that were evident in our own data" (1998, p. 155). 
in summary, all research approaches have strengths and weaknesses but the use of 
grounded theory is particularly appropriate in developing the theoretical IR framework. 
This approach motivated the researcher to focus systematically on the detailed 
description and the properties of the interview data collected before attempting to 
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develop a general theoretical framework. Using grounded theory methodology, this 
study seeks to offer a theoretical interpretation of the development of strategic IR ideas. 
7.4.2 The interview., v 
The research approach adopted in this research is based on grounded theory 
methodology (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998,1990), which has 
been widely used in corporate disclosure research (Holland, 1997). The semi-structured 
interview fon-nat was used by other researchers in similar research projects (Marston. 
1999, Holland. 1998. Barker. 1998). Such interviews with open-ended questions not 
only allow the interviewees to express themselves fully and be completely 
comprehensible, but also free them to be talkative in a framework of issues, themes and 
questions. Indeed, as Marston states (1999, p. 12), semi-structured interviews "afford 
respondents the freedom to answer questions without restricting their responses, while' 
the use of an interview framework or agenda. may prevent excessive deviation from the 
research questions and issues". The two qualitative gathering methods were evaluated 
by researchers such as First (1990) and Weetman (1994), who identified three 
advantages of interviews, compared with questionnaires: specific and detailed answers 
by the interviewees, clarity of answers and participation of the interviewer in the soft 
"cross-examination" process to unravel truthful information and insights. No research 
has so far been undertaken in Greece in the areas of investor relations and corporate 
communications. Apart from some event examinations (that were published in the 
newspapers and presented in conferences) the current project is the first in-depth IR 
study in the region. An aim of this research study is to examine and evaluate the IR 
strategies, and their effectiveness, which are employed by the Greek listed companies 
on the ASE and on other exchanges. In order to evaluate the local IR and corporate 
communication competence, the research tried to gauge and judge the opinions and 
perceptions of the different players involved in the Greek financial markets. These 
perceptions could only be rightly extracted from the Greek executives as well as the 
analysts and institutional investors during a face-to-face Q&A session based on a set of 
predeten-nined questions written in a questionnaire. At the end, the formulated theory on 
the IR phenomena was validated by comparing it to raw data and by presenting it to 
interviewees and respondents for their reactions. Therefore, it was followed the 
recommended by Strauss and Corbin that "a theory that is grounded in data should be 
recognizable to participants" and in this case it fitted every aspect of their cases (1998, 
p. 161). As in many smaller economies, in Greece most of the listed companies are 
medium and small capitalization firms where the founder or biggest shareholder is an 
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active top executive such as CEO and BoD chain-nan, and as a controlling insider 
prefers and follows discretionary disclosure policies and financial. operational and 
strategic reporting (Demos, 2003c). The informal corporate communication choice b", 
the insiders directs this research to the use of "qualitative methods that... obtain the 
intricate details about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes. and emotions that 
are difficult to extract or learn about through more conventional research methods" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 11). Similarly. as Godfrey (2001. p. 106) concluded. "as a 
result of these factors, a quantitative survey was likely to have a poor. unrepresentative 
and unenlightening response. A positivistic approach, then. would not be appropriate 
for this kind of study" and therefore "the objectives of the research study and its 
research problem, then, lent itself to a more qualitative aspect of research 
methodology". Consequently, taped interviews are preferable in Greece, given the size 
of the country and that the majority of the headquarters of the listed companies are in 
the Athens area. In particular, 300 fin-ns out of 360 listed on the ASE have headquarters 
offices in the greater Athens area, while most of the remaining operate out of 
Thessalonica , in Northern Greece,, and a small number are scattered all over the country. 
Additionally, interviews seem necessary, because in Greece many people do not 
respond to questionnaires and therefore, to have access to quality responses, personal 
interviews were the ideal too]. Although they might be time-consuming elsewhere, in 
Greece they are preferable and effective. During the pilot study. emphasis was given to 
the questionnaire and limited time was given to semi-structured interviews, but during 
the main research study interviews were the main research too]. At the beginning, the 
research design was to collect empirical data from the three targeted groups, (the senior 
managers of the listed companies on the ASE, the analysts and the institutional 
investors-owners, ) about their preferences and choices on disclosure issues and investor 
relations tools and effectiveness, through a combination of interviews and mailed 
questionnaires. The collected data from the pilot study as well as the first interviews and 
questionnaires were not comparable. The data from the interviews were richer in 
content, rigour, style and explanations, while the infori-nation gathered from the 
questionnaires was shorter, non-explanatory, monolectic (i. e. yes. no) and inferior to the 
same question from the interviews. It was observed that in the questionnaires, people do 
not reveal "actively and passionately" their thoughts, inner feelings and perspectives. In 
addition, the elernent of local culture to feel comfortable and reveal true beliefs and 
perceptions in a personalized setting (discussion, loose interview) justified this switch. 
Finally. the researcher's experience from participating in and observing extensively the 
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communication efforts of many listed companies was fundamental and helpful when 
asking and identifying issues during the interviews, as supported by Holland. who 
mentions that "the actual observation of the communication process between 
institutional investors and management would be ideal" (1997. p. 5). Another issue 
faced was that "researcher's values inevitably affect the interpretation of the findings". 
as Holland (1998) put it. In the current research. in order to avoid or to minimize bias. 
all interviews were taped and carefully listened to at least three times during the 
decoding 13 process in order to comprehend fully and display objectively the 
interviewees' perspectives. Questions such as what factors influence and determine IR 
effectiveness, should IR be regulated and if yes what kind of IR activities, how effective 
are analysts as information intermediaries, what is the value of IR. helped to extract 
diverse and emotional answers and viewpoints, because answers are mostly qualitative' 
since they include different peoples' experiences, behaviours, feelings, emotions. 
perspectives, philosophies, and cultures. The interview approach has its limitations but 
has great advantages, especially for samples that overcome time and space constraints. 
face cultural homogeneity and idiosyncrasies and acknowledge and involve targeted 
population and individuals who perceive and act toward their environment based on the 
quality and strength of motives, needs, attitudes and emotions. Interviews can extricate 
more easily the views and perceptions of senior managers. They could also allow 
clarification and simplification of questions and answers through availability of 
participants and duality of the infori-nation process (Marston, 1999, - Weetman, 1994). In 
addition, during interviews "the interviewer does have the opportunity to identify non- 
verbal clues which are present, for example, in the inflexion of the voice, facial 
expressions or the clothes that the interviewee is wearing, and these can be used to 
develop secondary questions" (Easterby- Smith, 1991, p. 173). On the other hand, 
interviews have some flaws and disadvantages. Time is the most important, since time 
is the most expensive "Item" in the financial markets and probably in life. The 
interviewer's time to go to the headquarters for the interview. to collect, decode, (in this 
case) translate and rewrite the data makes this research method the most time- 
consuming. A secondary but very important handicap is the related possible bias 
involved, especially when the interviewer. like the author. is a practitioner. Similarly, 
the interviewer's subjectivity and interpretation of the data during and especially after 
the interview could affect findings and conclusions. There exist some ways to overcome 
13 Decoding is the process of trving to "read between the lines- and extract and expose the real meanim, tý - t7 
ofthc intcrvicwers' sayings and quotes / rcsponscs. 
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these drawbacks: for example, "the adoption of structured interviews and/or the use of 
an interview agenda" (Marston, 1999) and the use of tape recorders and other "objecoVe 
mechanical tools". In addition, Patton (2002), Huberrnan and Miles (1994) as well as 
Canning and Gwilliam (1999), proposed "grouping together answers from the different 
interview transcripts per the interview guide and allowing the guide to %vork as a 
descriptive framework for analysis". In summary, interviews were chosen as the 
research method, which helped the researcher, as an experienced IR practitioner. to 
identify and ask solid, penetrating and motivating questions during the interviews. To 
minimize bias in the interview questions, a structured fonnat of the questionnaire was 
also used, and direct and clear answers by the interviewees were pursued. It is 
acknowledged, however, that the researcher could not be completely independent of the 
issues examined or researched. For quantitatively measurable IR variables (such as IR 
effectiveness , increase or decrease of stock price, increase of new shareholders. etc. ), it 
was difficult to establish whether IR are or are not effective, and the question was 
occasionally subject to interpretation, perspective. even bias,, etc. For example, there 
were cases in which the time element plays an important role in IR effectiveness, 
especially in the case where the IRO does a good job promoting the company 
investment story to potential investors, but the effect on the stock price can be observed 
with a time lag, owing to the time correlation weight of share price-stock promotion 
relationship. 
7.4.3 Previous IR research methodology 
The choice of methodology can be viewed in relation to prior research. Verrecchia 
(2001), Dye (2001) and Lambert (2001) developed taxonomy of the theoretical research 
approach to disclosure. Marston (1996a) analyzed the significance of the methodology 
in research essays. She believed that the line that clearly separates and exactly 
distinguishes the positivist and phenomenological approaches is non-existent, and 
argued that social science studies draw on both methodologies. Originally, she even 
used the positivist methodology for her research efforts in the IR area, since she 
believed (1996a, p. 60) it to be "feasible and appropriate to collect data relating to facts 
and opinions about IR meetings in an objective manner". She evaluated (1996a) the 
relative merits of qualitative research methods such as postal and telephone 
questionnaires, interviews, and observations. The postal questionnaire was selected as 
her research method for more of her subsequent IR focused research undertakings. The 
same research method was also employed by Eccles and Mavrinac (1995), Beattie 
(1999) and by IR institutions such as the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI) in 
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the USA and the Investor Relations Society (IRS) in the UK to research similar IR and 
disclosure phenomena. Some researchers have utilized the in I iew approach 
inquiring into IR issues. Weetman (1994) and Holland (1995) used interviews to draNA' 
out the perceptions and opinions of analysts and institutional investors about disclosure 
policies. Weetman (1994) also used structured interviews and documented major 
advantages for the use of interviews, such as the specificity, the clarity and the 
insightful and conversation elements of the interview approach. Holland (1995, p. 4) 
used semi-structured interviews to "allow the participants to interpret and describe the 
phenomena in their own unique way". In a subsequent essay, he (1998, p. 34) again 
used semi-structured interviews in which "the participants were asked to talked freely 
about the questions and to discuss them from their own experiences". Later, Weetman 
and Beattie (1999) also employed the interview approach in order to obtain insightful' 
views and opinions from market participants on IR issues. Similarly, Marston (1999, p. 
3) adopted the interview approach "because this enabled a richer and more complex 
picture to emerge", although it "cannot capture the real complexity of the situation". In 
conclusion, the interview approach was used for the current research because of 
academic, cultural, psychological and country- speci fi c criteria. 
7.4.4 Additional data 
Additional data gathering methods, as described in (Schwartz and Nandhakumar, 2002; 
Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Nandhakumar and Jones. 1997, Silven-nan, 1997), were also 
gathered as part of the research. Data such as notes taken during meetings and 
conference calls, observations from group conferences and analyst presentations, 
infori-nal discussions with fund managers, analysts, bankers, auditors, senior managers, 
and even photographs of fund mangers and analysts were collected to deepen 
intelligence and analysis on the profiles, styles, and attitudes of investors. Since 1994, 
taking notes, taping conversations, re-listening and analyzing conference calls and 
grouping communication styles of the different executive personalities have helped the 
understanding of better corporate disclosure and identification of parameters for an 
effective corporate communication process. This technique has been used by Holland, 
who notes: "further data was collected from public and semi-public domain sources. 
These included public databases or archives of the financial press, company reports, 
analyst reports, and fund manager marketing material for pension trustees.... This data 
provided alternative sources of confirmation or contradiction of interview data. 
Attendance at practitioner events or conferences was another useful way of collecting 
material not nornially available in public domain" (2001, p. 12). The group 
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fe presentations of Greek listed companies (from different industries. with df rent 
II ion. etc. ) to financial centres such as liquidity patterns, shareholder structures. capitalizati I 
Frankfurt, Milan,, Geneva, Paris. Toronto. New York city, Boston. etc. that were 
organized by the researcher. provided a wealthy pool of IR information and 
observations. information and observations of the Greek corporate cornmuni cation 
behaviour were also collected through the market cycle from the "exuberant" years of 
1999-2000 to the following capital market collapse. 
7.5 The thesis research questions 
The basic research question of this thesis addresses two intertwined and interrelated 
issues: that of the Investor Relations perception and the effectiveness of the 
implemented IR programme by the major local market players - by senior executives of 
the listed companies at the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), by sell side analysts and by 
fund managers. As Holland (1998b, p. 36) states: "understanding how companies and 
institutions resolve the infori-nation asymmetry is important for the efficient allocation 
of equity capital by fund managers to companies", and he continues: "the answer to 
these questloný will help us understand the effectiveness and the relative importance of 
the markets for financial reporting and financial analysis and will thereby enable us to 
address the question whether and bow, fund managers' investment decision can be fully 
infon-ned". Therefore, extending Marston's (1996b, p. 479) research. the author's quest 
44seeks to establish the causes, nature and effect of company communications" via 
regulated guideposts, inforrnation intermediaries and direct private disclosure. The 
current study therefore relies on primary data collected from interviewing company 
representatives (the CFO, the CEO, the IR director) as well as analysts and institutional 
investors. The semi-structured interviews were based on a standardized questionnaire 
for each of the three groups, and these were mailed to them almost two weeks before the 
interviews. The questionnaire was directed to the cbainnan of the board of directors 
and, after a telephone follow up and explanation, it was established who from the 
hierarchy would give the interview. The telephone call was then made to the appropriate 
executive-potential interviewee and the time and the place of the interview were 
arranged. At the same time, the chain-nan was informing him. /her about the interview 
and the existence of the questionnaire as the basis of the subject. The questionnaire 
consisted of 15 sections (13 for the analysts and institutional investors) and a total of 
150 questions (108 for the analyst and the fund managers). The questions covered issues 
from the three maýlor communication channels (regulated, inten-nediary and voluntarv 
disclosure) and tried to identify and determine the effectiveness of each company"s 
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corporate communication programme and the investor relations objectives. Moreover, 
the questions focused on the value that IR add to the communication and the 
relationship of the firms with the financial community. Similar if not the same questions 
were posed to the fund managers and analysts in order to establish the added value of IR 
to the valuation chain, their decision making. recommendation and the share purchase. 
In particular, the sections in the questionnaire had the following titles: Section 1: 
Organization of the investor relations function; Section 2: International IR aspects and 
consultation; Section 3: Substitution effects for the IR function; Section 4: Macro 
aspects of the IR function, Section 5: Executing of the investor relations programme: 
Section 6: Company meetings with analysts and fund managers; Section 7: Telephone 
conversations with analysts and fund managers, Section 8: Company feedback on sell- 
side analysts' reports. Section 9: Mailing infori-nation to analysts and fund managers-, 
Section 10: Proactive roadshows (visiting the fund managers) and increasing analyst 
coverage, Section 11: Email database management and distribution of information, 
Section 12: Conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium; Section 13: Disclosure 
via Internet sites; Section 14: Controlled infori-nation; and Section 15: Opinion on your 
company's relationship with FAs. The focus of the present research is also to examine, 
describe and prescribe possible discretionary disclosure policies that listed companies 
use and can utilize in order to obtain their communication and IR goals. The semi- 
structured interview methodology helped to identify and clarify disclosure and IR issues 
along with the perceptions and opinions of the market participants. The aforementioned 
questionnaire sections could be grouped according to the research framework, such as: 
Group A: IR prerequisites and constraints (Organisation of the IR function). Group B: 
IR tools (Executing of the IR programme). Group C: Regulated Corporate Disclosure 
(Macro aspects of the IR function). Group D: Corporate Disclosure via Intermediaries 
(International IR aspects and consultation; Substitution effects for the IR function; 
Company feedback on sell-side Analysts' reports; Opinions on company's relationship 
with Analysts). Group E: Voluntary Corporate Disclosure (Company meetings with 
Analysts and Fund Managers, Telephone conversation with Analysts and Fund 
Managers; Mailing infori-nation to Analysts and Fund Managers. Proactive roadshows 
and increasing Analyst coverage, Email data base management and distribution of 
information, Conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium: Disclosure via internet 
sites, Controlled infon-nation). 
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7.6 Process of the research 
The research procedures for each targeted group of data collection. listed companies, 
analysts and fund managers are described in this section. 
7.6.1 Data collection 
Primary data were collected using semi-structured interviexvs xvith three targeted 
"information process 11 participants, over, a period of two years (January 2002-December 
2004). Before and after the interviews, intelligence and data, such as interviews in the 
newspapers and magazines, corporate and marketing materials. websites content. 
conferences, group and company presentations. official fillings, and infori-nal 
discussions, analysts reports and forecasts, Bloomberg and Reuters content and TV 
commercial and interviews, were also collected from material in the public information 
domain for the participating listed companies, analysts and fund managers. All 
interviews were tape-recorded along with detailed notes of explanations and body 
language movements and executive attributes. Subsequently, they were carefully 
transcribed and translated from Greek into English in such a way as not to distort 
meanings, quotes and sayings. Each interview had a time limitation of 45 minutes but in 
reality was caftled out in an hour and half, simply because the interactive element of the 
interview motivated both the interviewer and the interviewee to deepen and examine 
subtly the investor relations and information policies. As mentioned, each interviewee 
had received the mailed questionnaire at least two weeks before the actual interview and 
had prepared himself/herselffor the issues tackled. Moreover. the structured element of 
the interviews and the proper preparation by the interviewer made the interview 
efficient and effective. All the questions were answered during the interviews. 
Consistent effort, flexibility and tenacity were meticulously followed in order to obtain 
comparable data. When a "distortion" was discovered during the interview (although 
this happened mostly during the author's reflection, translation and decoding of the 
data), an explanatory telephone conversation or a conference took place with the 
respective interviewee to shed light on the ambiguous point. In addition, the objective 
was to combine and implement the vital prerequisites for a grounded researcher, as set 
by Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 7), "to step back and critically analyze situations, to 
recognize the tendency toward bias, to think abstractly. to be flexible and open to 
helpful criticism, to be sensitive to words and actions of respondents and be absorbed 
and fully devoted to the work process at hand". 
7.6.2 Justification and selection of the interviewees 
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The research sample or target was determined so as to be very representative. across 
sectors, industries and multiple listing entities. The goal was to cover the major market 
players as information providers, movers and users. The top managers of the listed 
companies were selected as information insiders, the analysts as information 
intermediaries and the fund managers as information users. The largest quoted Greek 
companies (250) were selected as targets, out of a total number of 360 listed companies. 
The prime target was the large capitalization firms, where the need for specialized IR 
services is important and demand driven, and also the dynamic small and medium 
capitalization firms, which either have global operations or strive to attract foreign 
institutional investors. In particular, the target was to interview top executives from the 
companies that belong to one of the three FTSE/ASE indices: the FTSE-ASE 20 which 
consists of the 20 largest capitalization stocks, the FTSE-ASE 40 which consists of 40' 
medium size capitalization stocks. and the FTSE-ASE 80 which consists of 80 small 
size capitalization stocks. There are two more important indices: the oldest one, the 
ASE General Index, which consists of 80 stocks. and the MSCI Greece with 20 stocks. 
All five include the most important companies as a result of overlapping. In terms of top 
management, the research extracted the opinions of 14 Boards of Directors Chain-nen, 
II CEOs, 15 CFOs and 36 IROs on the importance of their company's information, the 
dynamics of their communication process, the responsibility of the investor relations 
function and minor issues such the methods of communication and presentation, the 
depth of information. the frequency and the incentives of disclosure, the multiple 
listings, etc. Barker had researched executives in the UK and noted that "CEOs are 
themselves taking responsibility for an investor relations process that aims to ensure that 
the city understands the company and that it has the infori-nation with which to make a 
reasoned assessment of market values" (1998, p. 39) and concluded that "financial 
reporting is primarily concerned with the communication of infon-nation relevant to the 
valuation of shares" (1998, p. 6). All major analysts were targeted and 45 were selected 
who analyse and publish research on Greek stocks and work for either the local brokers 
or the global banks out of London. Two local analysts were independent researchers. 
All, except one. were interviewed, and they revealed their perceptions and evaluated the 
capability of their companies' investor relations programme. Marston (I 996b, 1994) has 
also researched the disclosure of information via the analysts. She examined "the 
superior access to company personnel that analysts appear to enjoy". She added: "all 
users have access to published infori-nation such as the annual report. Analysts, 
howe\, cr. maintain informal contacts with companies, which may serve as a route for 
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additional information disclosure". Semi-structured interviews were conducted xv, th 44 
domestic and international fund managers, who invest or have invested in Greece. The 
targeted population was 60 fund managers, but 14 local and 2 global FMs were not 
available for the interview. however. they offered to complete the questionnaire and 
mail it back. For the sake of homogeneity of the collected data. these questionnaires 
were excluded from the research. Consequently, the application of a soft "interrogation 
process" through interviews to a sizeable sample endorsed the extraction of perceptions, 
communication policies and effectiveness of investor relations tools and programmes. 
a Senior management of listed companies 
Analytically, the top management of 250 listed Greek companies were targeted, 
representing the majority (69%) of the population of the Athenian quoted firms. The 
preconception was that the ultimate target sample was the 140 firrns that belong to the 
three main international FTSE/ASE indices. Indeed, there are small capitalization fin-ns 
(less than 50 million Euros). that appreciate and implement IR policies proactively, and 
they have much to say on these issues. Nevertheless, as Godfrey Andrew (2001, p. 60) 
states, for Australia and New Zealand, the Greek listings also "comprise a small number 
of large companies and a much larger number of smaller companies". The stratification 
approach followed was consistent with the research method employed by Marston 
(1999) and Holland (1997) in their IR studies for the UK market. Therefore, the target 
was to interview executives from companies that appreciated the need for specialized IR 
services. First the large capitalization firms were chosen. since research has indicated 
that the propensity to disclose information voluntarily is positively related to fin-n size 
(Marston, 1997). The top executives from the companies that belong to one of the three 
FTSE/ASE indices, (FTSE/ASE 20-40-80, or in total FTSE/ASE 140) were 
interviewed. The indices FTSE/ASE 20-40-80 were established in 1988 and were the 
result of cooperation between the LSE and the ASE. In addition, an appropriate industry 
representation was also obtained. Therefore, companies from industries such as 
retailing, tourism, infori-nation technology, manufacturing, financial services, transport, 
utilities, fast moving consumer goods, property and primary resources were targeted and 
included in the sample. As a result, the research method applied in the current study was 
closer to that of Marston (1997a, 1997b) than that of Holland (1997). Generally, the 
market capitalization characteristics of the Greek stock market in 2003 are summarized 
below. It is worth noting that 88.1 percent of the companies represented only 9.5 
percent of the market capitalization. Conversely, 90.5 percent of the market 
capitalization was represented by 11.9 percent of the cornpanies. A selection of 
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companies based on market capitalization would present a Nveak picture of the IR 
I ies. activities. as Holland (1997) noted, of the majority of Greek listed compan' 
However. a selection based on the number of listed companies would inadequately 
reflect the much higher level of the significant IR activity of the larger companies. The 
obýjectlve of the study was to provide an exploratory and balanced view of IR activitv in 
Greece. 
Table 7.2: Greek Market Capitalization. (2003). 
Market Capitalization Number of Companies 
(% of Total) 
Percentage of Total 
Market Capitalization 
Less than I 00m 277 (76.9%) 4.3% 
1 00m to 200m 40 (11.2%) 5.2% 
200m to I bn 31 (8.6%) 29.1% 
Over I bn 12 (3.3%) 61.4% 
Totals 360 (100%) 100% 
Consequently, an approach similar to that of Marston (1999) was adopted. Data was 
collected from 76 Athenian listed companies. stratified by market capitalization. It was 
felt that this number and the method of selection would provide the valid data on an 
exploratory basis for the theoretical sampling and generalisability required of a 
qualitative approach, as identified in the introduction of this section (Silverman, 2000; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997, Yin, 1994). Theoretical sampling means CLselecting groups or 
categories to study on the basis of their relevance to your research questions, your 
theoretical position ... and most importantly the explanation or account which you are 
developing. Theoretical sampling is concerned with constructing a sample ... which 
is 
meaningful theoretically, because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which 
belp to develop and test your tbeory and explanation" (Mason, 1996, pp. 93-94). A letter 
by the president of the Athens Stock Exchange (see appendix), an explanatory letter and 
the questionnaire were mailed to the companies as well as the analysts and the fund 
managers. The introductory letter by Professor Alexakis, the president of the ASE, gave 
the research an authoritative image and sponsorship leverage in order to attract attention 
and motivate participation by the highest and appropriate level of the management team. 
The letter was addressed to the chairman of the BoD in each company and then directed 
to the appropriate person qualified to deal and discuss IR-related issues. The existing 
good and personal relationships among market players in this small 
financial market and 
community (everybody knows everyone) were disregarded and avoided since the 
objective was to focus professionally on the interviews and their content. 
For instance, 
during each interview. the first thing to do was to put a watch in front of the interviewer 
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and the interviewee(s) in order to indicate to them the seriousness of the process and the 
goal and effort desired to extract qualitative and homogeneous research data. 
b Information intermediaries: A iiatysts 
The second targeted group that of the analysts as information intermediaries. N\'as easier 
to deal with because of the limited number of analysts and their willineyness to 
participate in the research. Marston (1999) interviewed company executl\, es to obtain 
the perspective of the insiders, and balanced her research with interviews from the 
financial community. in particular brokers' analysts and institutional investors. She 
believed, like Godfrey (2001) and Weetman (1994), that the matching of the participant 
was an important part of the research design. In addition, Mozier and Arnold (1984) and 
Weetman (1994) proposed the "examination" of these two important market players 
(analysts and fund managers) in order to extract sufficient data and responses for 
comparison, confin-nation, explanation and repetition of collected infori-nation and data. 
The current research focused again on interviewing 45 financial analysts. who supplied 
broad insights and evaluated the existing IR programmes and practice of small and big 
corporations; they also identified and suggested their strong expectations of the IROs 
and consequen tly their companies. To have a rounded view of the companies' IR 
practices and disclosure policies, all analysts knew the Greek market well and wrote 
annual, semi-annual and quarterly coverage reports and comments on their daily 
bulletins. Out of the targeted 35 local analysts, 7 held the CFA certification and the 
remaining 28 have been certified by the CMC as analysts. The CFA certification is well 
known internationally, while the local certification by the Greek SEC was initiated in 
2001. Four (4) analysts held a PhD while 24 held Masters Degrees (MBA and MA), 
mostly from English speaking universities and specifically from UK institutions of 
higher learning. Ten (10) global analysts based in London were also targeted. The 
selection criterion was their relationship with the Greek market and its listed firms. 
Since they have covered Greek stocks, their knowledge of the local capital market was 
at least satisfactory. Furthen-nore, these analysts, along with the respective investment 
banking departments from their bank, have been participating in all major global 
offerings of the Athenian equities and the dual listings on the LSE and on the American 
exchanges. Many researchers recognize and identify other important market 
intermediary players. such as the media, the financial journalists, the auditors, the 
investment consultants. the financial advisers, the brokers and others. None of these 
igoups was targeted in this report. but a brief identification and their importance in the 
communication process are crn, en. The media people. especially the financial journalists L_ 
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in Greece, play a strategic and tactical role in the communication of information by 
creating disclosure problems. caused mainly by the infori-nation "noise" they generate in 
the market (loannou. 2004. Konstantinidis, 2003). They also increase information 
transaction costs (companies spend more time and money to explain again and again 
what they rneant in the first place) not only for the listed companies but also for the 
regulatory authorities (who take the time to ask and comprehend why vital company 
information is not supplied, why it appears only on the newspapers, or why misleading 
information exists). Media people are not regulated or even slightly controlled (no 
credentials and fon-nal education are required for a journalist) and actually no regulatory 
body is responsible for what they write and say (Demos, 2003d; Stergiou, 2002a). 
Future research will be ideal in this area since this group heavily influences the 
implementation of the IR programme and creates a lot of '*'Information crisis" to the' 
listed fin-ns. Further research is also required for the auditors, who continuously play a 
bigger role in corporate disclosure, since from 2004 and 2005 the listed companies are 
obliged to report their accounts according to Greek GAAP and IFRS (IAS). The 
investment consultants or advisers comprise a group that is highly regulated in Greece, 
but in recent years their association has had fewer and fewer members (Economicosl 
2002). Similarly. the brokers (local and global) comprise an inten-nediary body that 
heavily affects the corporate information process, and their influence should be 
researched extensively. 
c End Users: Institutional Investors 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 44 domestic and international fund 
managers, who invest or have invested in Greece. The targeted population was 60 fund 
managers and 73% of these were interviewed. Because of their proximity to and 
knowledge of the firms, the local institutional investors are the main institutional buyers 
of the smaller capitalization companies, those for which the foreign and global fund 
managers, because of the costs associated with small investment and limited share 
liquidity, among other factors, do not take the time even to analyze. Therefore, 40 local 
fund managers were targeted in order to capture their opinion of not only the big listed 
corporations but also the smaller ones. Similarly, 20 globally based fund managers who 
knew the Greek market, either as an emerging or mature market, and have put money in 
the ASE stocks were targeted. In conclusion, by examining the aforementioned three 
groups. a balanced view of the overall market perception of the IR activities was 
obtained along the lines of the findings of Marston (1999) and Holland (1997). 
7.6.3 The Interview process 
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Before the interview, participants had completed the questionnaire and had aN cry good 
idea about the issues covered. A period of at least two weeks was allowed between 
sending the questionnaire and the interview date. All interviews were completed over 
almost a one year period. 57% of the interviews were completed and conducted with 
one participant, and the remainder was joint interviews, mostly with two participants 
with the listed companies. Similarly, '39% of the interviews with the information 
inten-nediaries were completed and conducted with one analyst. and the majority of the 
interviews were conducted with the director of research and an industry or countrv 
analyst. Lastly, 43% of the interviews with the end users were conducted with one fund 
manager and the rest were completed with two institutional investors. Other practical 
issues in terms of the interviews were dealt with satisfactorily. For instance, ethical 
concerns,, such as those suggested by Hussey and Hussey (1999, pp. 37-38), including 
confidentiality, anonymity, inside information, informed consent, objectivity. 
impartiality, and unbiased conclusions, were covered partly from the good reputation of 
the researcher in the Greek capital market setting and partly from the promise that was 
given to the interviewees in the cover letter. Before the interview, the following had to 
be done: (Mail the questionnaire; Call to locate the interviewee; Call to secure and 
confirm the appointment). At the beginning of the interview, the following proce s had 
to be undertaken: (Thank the participants for their time and commitment; Explain the 
goals of the research; Promise confidentiality and anonymity, Promise secure storage of 
gathered (soft) data; Promise generalization of published data and findings; Promise 
defined time span of the interview (I hour); Promise to send to them a summary of the 
findings; Ask pen-nission to tape the interviews; Ask pen-nission to interrupt and 
discuss, clarify issues; Ask pen-nission to trouble them later if needed via email or fixed 
line or cell phone; Avoid spill over to non related and not targeted issues. After the 
interview, the following had to be done: (Listen, try to comprehend fully and decode the 
taped interview; Compare the data from the tapes with the notes taken; Send a 'thank 
you' letter to the interviewees). 
7.6.4 Data analysis 
Following the collection of data,, the subsequent effort was to organize, classify, code 
and recode, and then analyze the gathered data. The open coding process proposed by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 101-121) was adopted in the analysis of the translated 
(into English) mass of data collected from 164 interviews. Accordingly. concepts, ideas 
and notes were identified based on properties, dimensions and characteristics. They 
were then organized into categories and subcategories that helped to classify and 
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conceptually order the IR issues and phenomena. This process of data collection. 
coding, analysis and conceptual ordering, was iterative (Holland. 2001, p. 7). The 
iteration among all aforementioned variables ended when a satisfactory and perhaps 
explanatory number of subcategories and categories were determined (Schwarz and 
Nanhakumar, 2002). Questions like those posited by the author in his research study 
C4 should also be posed during the data collection and reflection stages to ensure that data 
collection, analysis and concept fori-ning activities are reciprocal and iterative rather 
than sequential" (Holland, 2001, p. 10). In fact. as stated by Strauss and Corbin (1998, 
p. 20) "conceptual ordering as a type of analysis is a precursor to theorizing". Therefore 
having primary data frorn three groups can provide an in-depth view, but a lot of time is 
required to analyze it. Indeed, listening. translating. converting voice to writing out the 
notes taken during the respective interview provided a large amount of interview data. 
Trying to implement the iterative seven-stage approach proposed by Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe, (1991 ), and Holland. (2001), that is case familiarization, reflection 
on the contents. conceptual izati on, cataloguing of concepts, recoding, linking and re- 
evaluation, was a Herculean task, especially for the first time. Nevertheless, satisfactory 
help was gained by the partial or full understanding of similar data analysis approaches, 
such as the matching data approach proposed by Yin (1994), as well as the three-step 
approach adopted by Boulton and Hammersley (1996) - identify significant data, 
categorise or code it, compare and contrast the data of each category- and the grouping 
of categories of gathered data employed by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998). Similarly, 
as Godfrey Andrew (2001) states, establishing the categories could be deductive or 
inductive. Indeed, Huberman and Miles (1994, p. 431) argue that "qualitative studies 
ultimately aim to describe and explain a pattern of relationships, which can be done 
only with a set of conceptually specified analytical categories. Starting with them 
(deductively) or getting to them gradually (deductively) are both legitimate and useful 
paths". 
7.7 Assumptions and interview limitations 
As mentioned earlier, during each interview, objectivity was a major concern owing to 
the author's experience, IR practice and knowledge of many companies and executives 
(because of the size of the market and lengthy involvement). Going to the interviews 
without any predetermined notions and results on issues, situations and people was 
constantly a challenge. A further challenge was that the interviewees were asked and 
encouraged to express themselves freely on the subjects of the company disclosure, the 
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value of the JR, the need for regulation, the Implementation of corporate governance 
principles and the role of the founder and the top management. 
7.8 Limitations of the scope of the research study 
By accepting IR as a strategic function of the company and employing the merits and 
methodology of the grounded research, the direct "observation" to identify and decode 
the market participants' perceptions and opinions of the value of the IR activities were 
the aims in this research. In the financial and capital markets setting. corporate 
disclosure can take multiple and diverse forrns. If investor relations operate in a non- 
regulated information environment then it could be left to the discretionary power and 
action of the top managers. In other words, it is the responsibility of the insiders to 
disclose and use one or the other IR too] to communicate the company's information to 
the interested parties and to the whole market. Mostly, these voluntary - especially the 
informal IR tools were examined in this research endeavour. The companies' 
communication through intermediary analysts, as a discretionary mode. was also 
analyzed. But there exists a fertile research ground in terrns of the other inten-nediaries, 
such as the fin, ancial journalists, the investment advisers, the brokers. the auditors, the 
bankers, the rating agencies that need to be addressed and examined. In the underlying 
research - and especially for the Greek market - the media people and the financial 
journalists play a major role in the communication of corporate information. However, 
they were excluded owing to the large number of journalists and sometimes their 
ignorance of the investor relations functions and activities. Finally, a reference was 
made to the regulated corporate disclosure, which has been increasing lately. But IR is 
an interdisciplinary profession and practice that cannot be "controlled" by corporate 
governance principles and directives. In sharp contrast, many IR practitioners ask if 
regulation has crossed the line and become unproductive (Stone, 2005). Nevertheless, 
this research study tries to synthesize the observations and opinions of the interviewees 
in order to build an IR practical model that measures IR strategy fon-nulation and 
implementation effectiveness. 
7.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the methodology and research design of the study. It has 
also justified the research framework and interview method as well as the targeted 
groups. Data Nvas collected via semi-structured interviews from top executives, financial 
analysts and fund managers in order to gauge their perceptions of the IR issues. The 
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research began studying the IR area and allowed the theory to emerge from the 
interview collected data. The following three chapters will present and analyze the data. 
Chapter 8.0 Data Analysis and Findings 
8.1 Introduction 
The following chapter contains an analysis of the data collected. The chapter contains a 
description of the views of the three major targeted groups of this research: the top 
executives, the analysts and the fund managers. in tern-is of their companies' corporate 
communication and investor relations activities. An attempt will be made to make 
known the interviewees' representative opinions and perceptions, while taking care that 
the average representation does not eliminate diversity and sound perceptions. 
In the subsequent chapters (9 and 10), an attempt will be made to synthesize the 
opinions presented in the data analysis chapter. 
Table 8.1: Response rates to the Interviews: Top Management. 
RESPONSE RATES TO THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS and QUESTIONNAIRES 
Response Initial mailing Int erviews Success Rate FTSE/ASE Index Listed 
% of % of % of % of % of Index No of % 
No. total No. total Initial No. total Initial Listed Firms Firms ofFTSE 
Top Management 
_Chairman 
of the BoD 14 8.5% FTSE/ASE 20 16 80% 
CEO 11 6.8% FTSEASE 40 25 1 63 '/c 
CFO 15 9.2% FTSE/ASE 80 35 440% 
IRO 36 21.9% Other 0 0 
Subtotal 250 70.5% 76 46.4% 30.4% 76 46.4% 30.4% Subtotal 76 54.3% 
Research Total L55 , 100% 164 100% 164 100% 46.2% 1 
As the table 8.1 indicates, the top managers of the larger, more aggressive and saleable 
Greek listed fin-ns that comprise the FTSE/ASE 140 Index 14 were interviewed. This 
index is the one upon which most, if not all, of the market players focus, analyze and 
trade. Nevertheless, the larger companies responded faster and in detail and those that 
declined to participate in this research were, at that time, organizing their IR 
department. As mentioned, the interviewer asked the questions in the order set in the 
questionnaire; they were answered, while an effort was made to be concise, specific and 
indicative since the material gathered was vast. 
Table 8.2: Response rates to the Interviews: Analysts 
RESPONSE RATES TO THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS and QUESTIONNAIRES 
Response Initial mailing In terviews Success Rate FTSE/ASE index Listed 
% of % of % of % of % of Index No of % 
No. total No. total Initial NO. I total Initial Listed Firms Firms ofFTSE 
Analysts 
Locals 35 9.8% 34 20.7% 97.1% 
London based 10 2.8% 1 10 1 6.1% 1 100% 
Subtotal [R 45 12.6% 14 1 26.8%1 --97.8% 44 26.8% 97.8% 
esearch Total __2 
55 100% L6 41 100%1 1 L64 1 100% 46.2% 
The analysis of the data collected continues with the opinions and perceptions of the 
inici-mediate market players. Specifically, th] II is chapter will also reveal the views of the 
" it consists oftlic firms in the FTSE'ASE 20.40. and 80. 
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interviewed analysts in terms of the corporate communication and investor relations 
in total activities of the Greek listed companies. As the table 8.2 indicates, 44 analysts i 
ing were interviewed. 34 of thern were based in Athens and the remaining 10 were work' 
out of London. The research also focused on the perceptions and opinions of the 
institutional Investors. who are the infor-i-nation end users as well as the ultimate targets 
of the IR programme and activities. As the table 8.3 below indicates, 26 Greek fund 
managers and 18 London-based ones were interviewed and in total an equal sample (44 
interviews) was used with the analysts. 
Table 8.3: Response rates to the Interviews: Fund Managers 
RESPONSE RATES TO THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS and QUESTIONNAIRES 
Response Initial mailing Int erviews Success Rate FTSE/ASE Index Listed 
% of %of % of % of % of Index No of % 
No. total No. total Initial No. total Initial Listed Firms Firms bfFTSE 
Fund Managers 
Locals 40 11.3% 26 15.9% 65% 
London based 20 5.6%1 18 1 10.9% 1 90% 
Subtotal 60 
_ 
16.9% 1 44 1 26.8%1 73.3%] 14 1 26.8%1 73.3% lResearch 
Total 355 100% 1 L64 1 100% 11 
. 
164 1 100% 1 46.2% 
In summary, this chapter proceeds with the comparative analysis by comparing similar 
na for similarities IR issues, events, suýjects, actions and interactions and look] 
differences, opposites and extremes to bring about significant IR properties and classify 
thern. It synthesizes the collection of the perceptions and opinions of three major groups 
on the communication of information: the listed companies' executives, the analysts and 
the fund managers. In the following subsections: a) refers to the questions and answers 
by the listed companies' top management; b) refers to the questions and answers by the 
analysts; and c) refers to the questions and answers by the fund managers. 
uestion 8.1.0 - Oroanization of the IR function 
The following subsections (questions and answers) describe first how the top executives 
interviewed have organized the IR function, how this activity is perceived by them and 
how important they consider it to be. The following subsections also describe how the 
interviewed analysts communicate with the listed companies and especially their IR 
departments, and how the IR activity is perceived by them in terrns of importance, 
efficiency and effectiveness of communicating the company's infon-nation. Finally, the 
subsections (questions and answers) describe how the local and global fund managers 
zat on and operation of the IR departments in the Greek interviewed vlexv the orgam II 
listcd companies. 
1.1 Number of professionals 
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a) Top Management: Please state the number of directors (including the chairman) 
in your company. 
All companies participating in the research had a Chain-nan of the Board of Directors, a 
CEO, a CFO and an IRO. Additionally. most of the interviewees indicated that their 
companies had more than ten top executives and non-executive directors. 
Please indicate the number of staff working for the investor relations / financial 
public relations officer (including clerical and secretarial assistants). 
The bigger companies have bigger budgets and use more people (2-5 on average) for 
their IR needs. Similarly, the number of dedicated IR people diminishes as the 
companies become smaller: (1-3) for medium size firms and (1-2) for the smaller 
stocks. 
Is these staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do 
they perform other duties? 
Not all of the aforementioned people are dedicated to the IR office work exclusively for 
the IR programme and objectives. In the large capitalization fin-ns. 75% of the IR 
personnel are fully dedicated to the IR activities and only one out of four persons on 
average is involved in other activities, whereas almost half (48%) of the people at the 
medium size companies occupy themselves with non-IR jobs. Finally 60% of the 
smaller fin-ns do something more than IR related jobs, which means that even the 
designated IRO is involved in activities other than IR (i. e. work for the marketing 
department, auditing, etc). - 
b) Analysts: Please state the number of analysts in your company. 
It emerges that the Greek analysts and the London-based ones who cover the Greek 
stocks are keen to know about and highly interested in the disclosure procedures that 
their "clients" apply and implement on the communication front. After the "exuberant 
years" of 1999 and 2000, the industry of analysts in Greece and partly in London has 
shrunk to half its size (Vergos, 2004; Demos, 2003a). Therefore, the average number of 
analysts locally is very small. In terms of their official qualification, some are qualified 
by the Greek SEC (CMC) and some hold the CFA diploma (Vergos, 2004, Kotsis, 
2004). In addition, each research department has the support of 3 people. The London 
analysts interviewed were either country specific analysts or industry analysts. 
Please indicate the number of staff working for the investor relations. 
When the interviewees were asked if they could indicate on average how many people 
work in the IR departments, the local analysts estimated that one person (6%). two 
persons (6%). three people (219%). more than 3 persons (35%), and 24% of the analysts 
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could not estimate this at all. The global analysts answered that two persons do the IR 
job (10%), three people (30%). more than 3 persons (50%) and 10% do not know. 
Table 8.4: Analysts' opinion on the average working people at the IR office 
Average IR people Local CFAs /o London CFAs 
_One 
person 6 10 
_Two 
people 6 30 
Three people 29 50 
_More 
than 3 people 35 10 
_Not 
known 24 - 
_Other - Is these staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do 
they perform other duties? 
Moreover, 70% of the local sell side analysts as well as of the London-based ones 
I indicated that they consider and believe that "the people, out of the IR depailments, - 
work full time for the IR function and are fulýv dedicated to the activ107 of corporate 
iqfonnatlon ", as one director of research put it. 
c) Fund Managers: Please state the number of executives in your (fund 
management) company 
On average, every office of local fund managers has II employees, while the average 
number in the London-based investment houses rises to 95 professional staff. 
Please indicate the number of staff working for the investor relations. 
31% and 16% of the FMs respectively indicated one person working at the IR office, 
54% and 67% said two people, 8% and 16% answered 3 people and only 8% of the 
local FMs indicated that more than 3 persons work at the IR office. Moreover, "It 
depends on the siZe of the company, " one fund manager concluded. 
Is these staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do 
they perform other duties? 
In addition, 69% and 83% respectively indicated that the people in the IR office are 
fully dedicated to the IR function and they do not perform other activities in the 
company. 
1.2 Involvement / Communication with the IR 
a) Top Management: Please specify how man), of the directors are involved to 
some extent in managing and / or executing the investor relations function. 
The vast majority of the top executives interviewed indicated that they are involved 
with the IR function. even if only marginally. Specifically, 68%, 72% and 85% (11/16, 
18/25 and 30/35) of the top management in the large. medium and small capitalization 
firms respect iv c ly do participate in the corporate communication process and the IR 
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activities. In particular, in the small capitalization category. the managers. who are 
simultaneously the owners. or who have a direct relationship xvith the founders and 
major shareholders, are extremely interested in the corporate communications process. 
Most of the companies assign a leading communication role to the CFO. since 
historically communication referred to the disclosure of the financial results. The 
following comment by a CEO defines the practice: "The CFO is partial4l, executing JR, 
graduallv relinquishing it to the IR office which was set up Iasi September. " 
To what extent are the members of your company's directorate involved in 
managing and/or executing the investor relations function? 
The BoD Chain-nan, the CEO and the CFO of aRthree interviewed groups are involved 
with the IR function. The top managers of the smaller capitalization companies (71%. 
100% and 100% respectively) that have simpler organizational structures indicated 
more commitment and time devoted to the IR issues. The need for more visibility and 
refinement of owners' image motivate managers to "take care" of this sensitive 
function. One Chairman and major shareholder mentioned: "One of the executive 
directors is in charge of the Investor Relations Unit and he is heavily involved with it". 
The top managers of the bigger capitalization companies that have better organized IR 
departments (with more people) spend less management time on this activity. The large 
capitalization managers in particular reach 38%, 63% and 88% involvement 
respectively by the BoD Chain-nan, the CEO and the CFO. 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of working days in a year that the 
Directors devote to JR? 
FTSE 20 managers (Chairman of the BoD, CEO and CFO) devote less than a month per 
year to IR, FTSE 40 executives just more than a month, while FTSE 80 managers more 
than 2 months. Specifically, the BoD Chain-nan, the CEO and the CFO of the lager 
capitalization firms devote 20,25 and 35 days per year respectively. The BoD 
Chairman, the CEO and the CFO of the medium capitalization firrns devote 40,40 and 
55 days per year respectively, and the BoD Chairman, the CEO and the CFO of the 
small capitalization fin-ns devote 70,65 and 60 days per year respectively. The smaller 
the company, the more involvement of the top executives takes place. 
b) Analysts: Please specify if you communicate with the top management of the 
listed companies. 
The interviews with the analysts show that the analysts had a direct line of 
communication with the top management. The following comments illustrate this point: 
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"Yes we do. IT'e irv to coniact the top management of listed companies as often as 
possible. We consider it iwalfor our work- and "Yes, on a monthli, basis at least. 
With whom of the top management you have frequent contact? 
Table 8.5: Analysts' communication with the top management 
Local C FAs (%) London CFAs (f, ýoj 
1* 2* 3* 4* 1* 2* 3* 4* 
BoD 
Chairman 
6 9 44 
I 
44 - - 30 70 
_CEO 
3 53 44 - - - loo 
_CFO - 
27 73 - - 100 
_IRO 
6 94 - - - 1 00 
IR analyst 29 71 - - 10 90 
1) Not at all, 2) Minor Extent, 3) Moderate Extent, 4) High Extent 
The absolute majority of the local analysts indicated that they have frequent contact 
with the Chairman of the BoD, CEO, CFO, IRO. even the IR analyst (where he/she 
exists), 88%, 97%, 100%, 100% and 100% respectively. and the same applies to the 
London-based analysts who cover Greek companies. who speak to the hierarchy of the 
companies at a mode of 100% (Table 8.5). Even so "culturalli, and even habitually the 
top management of the Greek companies have its doors continuously open to us ", one 
analyst said. 
Please specify if you know the IRO in person. 
For the analysts, the IRO is the official company spokesperson and the person who 
always willing to help and inform. All analysts are in touch continuously and they know 
him/her personally. 
Please specify the issues you discuss with the IRO? 
Table 8.6: Analysts' discussions with the IROs on Strategy and Finance 
Local CFAs (%) London CFAs (%) 
1* 2* 3* 4* 1* 2* 3* 1 4* 
Strategy 9 9 29 53 - - - loo 
Finance 3 6 9 85 - - - 
* 1) Not at all, 2) Minor Extent, 3) Moderate Extent, 4) High Extent 
The IRO analyses to the local analysts the issues related to the strategy of the company 
very well (53%), with a satisfactory level (29%) and not so well or even lower than 
expected (18%). In sharp contrast, London-based CFAs are highly satisfied with the 
Ih the answers strategic analysis by the IROs, but the local analysts are better satisfied wit 
given by the IROs in terms of explaining the finances of their companies, some are 
ing to other sources simply satisfied (9%) and another 9% are looki or people for 
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explanations. In terms of finances. the global analysts again declare complete 
satisfaction (100%) with the services of the IROs. 
now many days per year do you or your associates talk with the IR office of the 
targeted listed firms? 
In terms of time spent with the companies, or, better. the IR officer of the listed 
companies, the local analysts said thatý they devote 50 days annually (41%). 30 days 
(53%) and 10 days (6%). while the global analysts indicated that they spend 30 days per 
year (40%) and 10 days (60%). 
What kind of (communication) relationship exists? 
When identifying the communication pattem that, exists between the IROs and analysts, 
it was observed that the majority talk in person (82% for local analysts) and (80% for 
the global ones). Similarly, 88% of locals and 90% of global CFAs use the telephone, 
94% and 100% respectively use the e-mail and 53% and 70% choose the traditional 
mail. 
Do you communicate with other company departments (i. e. the shareholder 
registry, accounting, etc. )? 
I 
Analysts (both local and global) also indicated that they communicate with other 
departments in, the companies, such as shareholder registry, accounting, etc.: 47% and 
10% respectively. The IROs introduce the analysts to the registry in order to obtain 
information on behalf of their clients. They do the same for the accounting department 
in order for the analysts to obtain detailed information and explanations about 
accounting policies. However, this accessibility creates problems, since most of the 
CFOs discourage or prohibit the IROs from opening the doors to the accountants. 
c) Fund Managers: Please specify if you communicate with the top management of 
the listed companies. 
85% of the local fund managers (LFMs) and 100% of the global ones (GFMs) do 
communicate directly with the top management of the listed companies. A typical 
comment was as follows: "Periodically but not systematically. We communicate for 
questions or explanations concerning specific developments in the company. " 
With whom among the top management do you have frequent contact? 
Table 8.7: Fund managers' communication with the top management 
Company Executives Local FMs London FMs 
BoD Chaimian 50 33 
CEO 77 44 
CF 88 44 
_ IRO 100 44 
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As table 8.7 shows. the Athens-based money managers communicate frequently: 50% 
with the Chain-nan of the BoD. 77% with the CEO. 88% with the CFO and 100% with 
the IRO. The London-based institutional money managers speak to the Chain-nan, CEO. 
CFO and IRO (33%, 44%, 44% and 44%) respectively. 
Please speciýN 7 if you know the IRO in person. 
69% of the local and 100% of the global FMs said that they know and speak to the IRO 
personally. 
Please speciýv the issues you discuss with the IRO? 
Conceming the issues they discuss with the IRO, 88% of the local FMs and 39% of the 
global ones discuss strategic issues. while 92% and 44% respectively talk about 
financial issues. 
How manA 7 days per year do you or your associates talk with the IR office of the 
targeted listed firms. 
31% of the local FMs declared that they talk to the IR office of the targeted listed 
company 50 days per year. 46% and 33% of the local and global FMs talk to the 
companies 30 days per year on average. and 23% and 67% respectively talk around 10 
days per year. "It depends on the company. Usualli, I to 5 finies, " a local FM stated. 
Another said: "It de ends on the IR depai-iment. We communicate with a good IR p 
department I to 3 times a week". 
What kind of relationship exists between IROs and FMs? 
When establishing the type of relationship that exists between IROs and FMs, 46% of 
the local and 78% of the global managers interviewed said that they do have a personal 
relationship with the IROs of the listed companies they invest in, while 69% and 100% 
respectively have frequent telephone contact. 77% and 100% do communicate with the 
IROs via e-mail. Finally, 92% and 100% communicate with the companies via postal 
mail. 
Table 8.8: Fund managers' communication patterns with the companies 
Communication Pattem Local FMs Global FMs 
Personal 46 78 
Telephone 69 100 
Email loo loo 
Mail 92 loo 
_ Other - 
Do you communicate Nvith other company departments (i. e. the shareholder 
registry. accounting, etc. )? 
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Only 38% and I I% of the local and global FMs indicated that they do communicate 
with other departments of the companies (i. e. registry. accounting. etc. ) in addition to 
the IR. 
1.3 Position of the IR 
a) Top Management: Does your company have a designated investor relations 
financial PR officer 
12 of the big capitalization companies interviewed (out of 16) have an IRO (75%). 
while 17 (out of 25) medium capitalization firms (68%) and 22 (out of 35) smaller ones 
(63%) have chosen and can afford to have a designated IR person. While more than 
60% of the Greek listed entities use an IRO, many executives raised the issues of the 
quality of the IRO. The following comment by a CEO was often pointed out: "The 
question exists. - are there enough qualified IR professionals to servicelserve the market 
Or, as they say, to match the demand". 
Please state the job title if the answer to the above question was 'Yes'; to whom 
does the designated investor relations officer report? 
Of the FTSE 20 companies, 25% of the IRO report to the Chairman of the BoD, 75% 
report to the CFO and nobody to the CEO. As a CEO indicated: "We consider the IR 
function as a strategic one, and as such we chose the IRO to report to our chairman ". 
At the FTSE 40 level, conversely 48% report to the CEO, while 20% speak to the CFO 
and approximately 32% report to the Chain-nan of the BoD. As noted before, in Greece 
the position of the Chain-nan of the Board and the CEO coincide in 9 out of 20 
companies (large cap, FTSE-20), 35 in the 40 companies of FTSE-40, and 62 in the 
FTSE- 80 (Demos, 2003c). Finally, for the small cap listed, again a heterogeneous 
pattern is observed, where 43% report to the Chairman, 14% to the CEO and 43% to the 
CFO. As mentioned, since in 8 out of 10 small companies the CEO and the Chairman of 
the BoD is the same person, this reality might distort the analysis. As mentioned by an 
IRO: "The founder of the business still keeps the CEO position, because he does not 
trust his offspring". Another IRO: "Our company has a problem of succession when 
our Chairman and CEO faces the dilemma of transferring power to someone else fi-om 
outside, since he has no kids and heavily distrusts his nephew ". 
Please indicate the position of the investor function within your organization. 
With reference to the organizational structure and location of the IR department, it was 
found that more than half of the large and medium size companies have a separate IR 
department (63% and 52% respectively), while only 26% of the small capitalization 
firms use a separate IR off-ice. Similarly, 13%, 28% and 23% of the IR people (of FTSE 
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20,40 and 80 companies respectively) operate out of the CFO's office. while 6%, 12% 
and 40% of the IR activity is done through the "registry,, (metochologio in Greek) 
office. "Most of the inne, one individual serves both, functions (the IR and registiý-- 
metochologio) ", a CFO indicated. Lastly. in 19% of large caps the IR function is carried 
out by peoplewith no central unit or department. The percentages for medium and small 
caps are similar: only 8% of the interviewed people. 
Please indicate if your company has a separate IR department that is not the 
same as the Office for Shareholders (Registry or Metochologio), and how they 
cooperate. 
When it comes to the issue of IR vs. the registry office (metochologio), all participants 
(100%) from the FTSE 20 companies answered that their companies operate separate IR 
and registry departments, while half of the FTSE 40 (52%) companies do the same and' 
only 31% out of the 80 small cap companies have separated the two functions. It is a 
confusing issue in the Greek capital market, since the local SEC (CMC) officially 
recommended that the person responsible for the voluntary disclosure be the "corporate 
communication officer" without mentioning the Investor Relations Officer (Dimitriou, 
2004). As an IRO pinpointed, this confusion is pointless since: "The Office for 
Shareholders has to do ivith logistical procedures regarding the shareholders (i. e. 
transfer of shares, death of shareholders, etc. ). The JR department is concerned with the 
information flow, newspapers, Internet and information to institutional mone-v 
managers. 
Does the office for the (retail) shareholders (Metochologio) complement the IR 
function? 
The majority of the interviewees (100%, 80% and 86% of the FTSE 20,40 and 80 
respectively) clearly indicated the complementary essence of the two functions (IR and 
metochologio). 
b) Analysts: Does the office for the retail shareholders (Metochologio) complement 
the IR function? 
In addition, 79% of local interviewees and 90% of the global ones declared that they do 
not find the registry (metochologio) complementary to the IR function. "Indeed not, 
given that the JR0 has a wide knowledge of the listed companýv in terms of strategy and 
development ", a local analyst declared. The main objective of the registry is to infon-n 
the top management about the changes in the shareholder holdings and to help 
shareholders to receive dividends, invitations to general assemblies. and to help transfer 
ownership in case of death. etc. That is why the analysts have no interest in this office. 
121 
Many of the analysts Interviewed believe that "The two depart7nenis are difftrent. I also 
think that they are somehow complenientar-v ", one global analyst commented. 
c) Fund Managers: Does the office for the retail shareholders (, '\Ietochologio) 
complement the IR function? 
When asked if they feel and believe that there exists a cornplementary relationship 
between the IR and the shareholder registry office. 62% and 72% respectively of the 
institutional investors were negative. One person declared: "The IR deparnnent is inuch 
more infornied and rýfers to institutional investors ". Only the 23% and 16% see some 
correlation between the two offices. "The departinents are coniplementary and the IR 
department has strategic responsibilities ", one fund manager confirmed. 
1.4 Effectiveness of the IR 
a) Top Management: Does your company have a formal policy or written 
description stating the objectives and responsibilities of the investor relations 
function? 
Finally, a small number of firms (31%, 16% and 14%) across the companies 
investigated indicated that they have- formal and written IR programmes with objectives 
I 
and a timetable. The majority of the respondents gave vague or negative answers. 
b) Analysts: Does the IR office serve you well? 
56% of the local CFAs answered that they are highly satisfied and 29% said that they 
are served well by the IROs. Similarly, 70% of the global CFAs replied that they are 
served well by the IROs -and 20% are moderately satisfied. -JR0s reflect the 
management's attitude towards analysts and this is very satisfacton, ", a global analyst 
confin-ned. In addition, IR departments, without IROs, serve the local analysts well 
(50%) and moderately (15%). "The IR department serves me well in only 50% of the 
companies Ifollow", one analyst said. In contrast, the majority (90%) of the global 
analysts refers to or talks to the IR offices, and when there is no IRO, they tend to talk 
to the CFO or the CEO. The remaining 10% are satisfied with the IR departments. 
How quickly does the IR respond to your inquiries? 
With reference to the speed of IRO replying, the local analysts receive answers within 
24 hours (35%), 3 days (29%), a week (21%) and faster than this (15%), while the 
global analysts receive the requested infori-nation within a day (60%), 3 days (20%) and 
a week (20%) from the IR departments. 
What constitutes a good and effective IR office? 
Some of the analysts stated that an effective IR department should "provide accurate, 
credible, systematic and in depth company information". as one global CFA stated. 
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"The IRO Is the critical person in the communication process as another global analyst 
said, and "if the IRO is not capable and qualified to supply timely, transparent and 
detailed information then the IR office is not a good one". another analyst added. To 
summarise. the analysts believe that the IRO is the official company spokesperson and 
the main Information processor. but they are not satisfied with the quality, depth and 
strategic information they receive. so they turn to other executives for the information 
required. 
c) Fund Managers: Does the IR office serve vou well? 
When the fund managers were asked if they were satisfied with the services (time. 
content, and speed, etc. ) offered by the IR department, 62% of the local and 89% of the 
global fund managers replied emphatically yes (especially for the IROs), while 23% 
and II% respectively answered positively and most were referring to the IR office. 
H ow quickly does the IR respondto ý70ur inquiries? 
62% and 89% replied within 3 days, 31% and I I% said within a week and 8% of the 
local fund managers answered that it takes more than a week to get an answer. 
What constitutes a good and effective IR office? 
Some of the fund managers stated that, predominantly, the knowledge that the IRO 
should have should include the following: "Knowledge of the issues of the company, 
frequent communication, fast response", "Knowledge of the company, willingness to 
help, knowledge of the market and the sector", "Good knowledge of strategic matters 
and financial figures", "Access, honesty and knowledge of the object". Another group 
of the institutional investors interviewed focused on the communication of the 
information distributed to the market. Some salient comments were: "To provide 
ormation distribution" "Direct and valid information credible, fast and systematic inf 
accuracy, equal treatment"; "Information distribution, transparency and effectiveness"; 
"Business scenario, timing and equal distribution of infori-nation". To summarise, the 
local and global fund managers indicated that the IR of the Greek listed companies is 
well orgamsed but can improve its efficiency and operations. 
1.5 Motivation of the IR 
a) Top Management: Please can you pro, % 7ide an estimate of the annual gross salary 
bill for the investor relations officer and his/her staff. 
With reference to the compensation and simultaneously the motivation of the IR team, 
the research shows that, given the size of the Greek market and the level of wages and 
salaries. some lROs are paid well: more than 150.000 Euros annually in 2 out of 16 big 
companies interv I ewed, 4 out of 25 medium ones and 7 out of 35 small ones. For the 
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other IR people. 38%. 68% and 60% of the three categories of the investigated fin-ns are 
paid according to the salary level in Greece. 
Please can you give an approximate indication of the annual budget allocation for 
the investor relations function (excluding the salary bill and also excluding the cost 
of production and distribution of annual report)? 
In terms of the IR annual budget, 38%. 48% and 23% of the big. medium and small 
fin-ns indicated that they spend more thanC]00,000 annually. while 38%. 32% and 20% 
spend C200,000 per year and 25%, 12% and 12% respectively spend more than 
IE300,000. To summarise, IR is well established in the Greek listed companies and is 
better organised and functioned in the larger listed firms. The Chain-nan of the Board of 
Directors, the CEO and the CFO value the IR function and are involved in the IR 
activities. Most of the companies have created an IR office but the IR people, in some 
companies, are not fully involved with their communication and IR activities. 
Question 8.2.0 - International IR aspects and consultants 
This section exposes the Greek listed companies that have experience in dual listing 
processes and, have worked with global IR consultants, specialists. etc. As mentioned 
earlier, dual listing can help the corporate communication and IR services of the 
companies and sets high standards for the IR people. In order to target and enlarge the 
pool of prospective investors, Greek companies dual list or multiple list their shares. 
The dual listed companies' communication patterns and the IR departments' efforts 
should be global and of high standards. When a listed company expands operationally 
beyond the Greek borders, - and many Greek companies do operate extensively in south 
Eastern Europe, - it has been observed that this attracts more attention by the analysts 
and the global institutional investors (Levis, 1998; Demos, 2004b). This visibility 
intensifies the need for more and better investor relations services and more experienced 
IROs. If, for instance, a company proceeds for a dual or multiple listing, its 
communication and relationship with the investment community and the intermediaries 
have to be polished and become organized. Many companies look for advice elsewhere 
and sometimes they hire IR consultants from London or New York. From the IRO's 
perspective, a dual listing opens the door for a rich experience, on both the mandatory 
and voluntary company communication. The following questions try to estimate the 
analysts' opinion about the disclosure policies during this transformation, from a local 
to an international listed company. This section also reveals the fund managers' 
124 
perceptions and experience with the communication of dual listed companies and their 
cooperation with global IR consultants, specialists, et a]. 
2.1 External IR consultants 
a) Top Management: Does your company currently employ the services of an 
external investor relations or financial public relations consultant? 
All London based major IR consultants/spec] all sts can offer their expertise and services 
to Greek listed companies. As the research indicated, London based IR consultants such 
as Dewe Rogerston, Cit1gate. Buchanan and others, have worked at least once with a 
Greek client during the last seven years. In addition, there are some local IR consultant 
companies that offer different types of IR services to Athens listed firms. They are 
Capital Link, Metaholdings, Xrima. Novus Finance, V+O, and others that usually offer 
specific IR activities. such as group presentations around major cities in Greece. web-' 
site consultations, press release distribution, etc. The current research did not focus on 
distinguishing between London based and local IR consultants, but it investigated 
whether the IR departments were receiving help, experience and expertise from 
outsourcing. Most of the interviewees replied that they do not use external help. In fact, 
63% of the big firms answered negatively; similarly, 68% of the small caps said no and 
even more, 84% of the medium companies, never used outside help. The outside help is 
welcome when the IR department is new and receives a lot of help from experienced IR 
practitioners. As an IRO from a medium size company mentioned: "At the beginning, 
the site specialists added soine value but after that nothing". It also logical to expect 
that newly established IR offices need support with the use of English language; another 
IRO said: "Even the experienced London consultants could try to help us more, rather 
than onýv by editing our press releases ". 
Does your company currently employ the services of other agencies related to the 
IR professionals, such as Financial Information Services (Carson group, 
Technimetrics, etc. ), Web site specialists, Annual report distribution agencies, etc.? 
The majority of the interviewees declared that they do not use complementary services 
from IR professionals, such as annual report specialists. editors, targeting FMs 
specialists. Indeed. 75% of the FTSE 20,64% of the FTSE 40 and 57% of the FTSE 80 
companies denied the use of such services. Most of the interviewees in the small 
capitalization finris indicated that they would like to use such services. 
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Can you provide an approximate indication of the cost incurred by your company 
in the past twelve months in retaining the services of an external investor relations 
or financial public relations consultant? 
When investigating the cost that the companies have to carry for the use of an external 
IR service, it was found that the larger caps pay more than the smaller ones. Indeed. 
37%ý 48% and 49% of the three teams investigated pay more than 30.000 Euros 
annually. In addition. the cost of more than 90,000 Euros per year was paid by 13%, 
24% and only 8% of big. medium and small caps. Finally. 13%, 8% and 3% of the 
targeted group of firms pay more than 150,000 Euros. 
If you were able to answer the above questioný please can you provide an estimate 
of the percentage of the consultant's charges that relate to communications with 
analysts (both sell - side and buy- side) and fund managers as opposed to 
communications with other groups? 
No answers were obtained here. 
b) Analysts: Do you know if your targeted companies currently employ the 
services of an external investor relations or financial public relations consultant? 
Only 24% of the local CFAs declare that the companies they follow and analyse use the 
services of an IR consultant,, and only 20% of the London-based CFAs said they know 
about such outsourcing IR relationships and activities. 
Does any company currently employ the services of related to the IR 
professionals? 
Exactly the same number (24% and 20%) of the local and global analysts mentioned 
that they know of some IR external consultancy activity in their company s universe. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you know if your targeted companies currently employ the 
services of an external investor relations or financial public relations consultant? 
When asked if they know listed companies that employ the services of an external IR 
consultant, only 15% of the local FMs answered positively, while most of the global 
FNls denied any knowledge. 
Does any listed company currently employ the services of related IR professionals? 
The same number - 15% - of the local institutional professionals indicated that in some 
forrn the listed companies use an external advisor on IR-related issues and activities 
such as annual reports, sites, etc. The London-based fund managers, however, had no 
knowledge of such an activity. 
2.2 Dual listing and IR 
a) Top Management: Is your company dual listed? 
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Dual listing implies extra regulation and may affect the IR function. In Greece, 44% of 
the interviewed big companies reported dual listed, while only 16% of the medium and 
I I% of the small ones interviewed were traded on more than one exchanges. 
And on what exchanges? 
Of the big firms, 3 are listed on the ASE and the NYSE. 8 on the LSE, 2 on the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Deutsche Bourse-DB) and 2 on others. From the medium 
size companies, 4 reported that they are listed and on the LSE, 7 on the DB and I on 
some other exchange. Finally, from the small group, 2 are dual listed on the LSE and 4 
on the DB. As the research indicates, the Greek companies. across the board, prefer the 
EU alternative exchanges in addition to the local one, since Germany and the UK are 
the biggest Greek trading partners and many listed companies have operations in these 
and other European countries. They tend therefore to list in LSE and DB, since they' 
gain enlarged visibility to more global fund managers and are more easily promoted to 
the London and Frankfurt institutional money. This trend, especially for Germany, did 
not diminish, even after the Euro currency was accepted by Greece and other European 
countries and the foreign exchange and trading transaction costs were minimized. The 
comfortable level that the German fund managers feel for their local markets increases 
the propensity to buy a Greek stock when it is listed or traded on the DB. A CFO 
commented , "German investors prq/erred to trade our stock on the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange, so we did list on the DB ". With reference to the UK market, the LSE, beyond 
the point of becoming a major Stock Exchange for Greek companies operating in the 
English market, is favoured by the majority of bankers and banks that operate out of 
London, and they continuously promote and advise Greek companies to list and trade on 
the LSE. An IRO stated, "Our banker proposed the dual listing on the LSE and our 
management accepted". Another IRO remarked: "The LSE listing has helped us to 
improve disclosure, which in turn proved beneficial to the liquidity of our stock". The 
other EU Exchanges are Milan and Amsterdam because these companies again either 
have operations there or are somehow related to companies that have a base there. 
How has the dual listing of your stock influenced the IR function and its activities? 
25%, 20% and 6% respectively of the companies interviewed replied that the dual 
listing has influenced the IR function only moderately, and 38% of the FTSE 20 firms 
declared that they have gained from the dual listing. IR standards and techniques as well 
as visibility and liquidity are the benefits mentioned by the interviewees. An IRO from a 
large listed firrn declared: "The RNS distribution systein at the LSE has helped us to get 
viSibility by the smaller UK. /und inanagers ". 
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Does the IR have direct connection with the following depositarý 7 banks? 
In total, 9 of the companies interviewed indicated that they use the Bank of New York 
(BONY) while 4 declared that they have a relationship with the Citibank depositary 
branch. The BONY has helped the Greek listed firms to trade American Depositary 
Receipts on the US exchanges but has not helped in the marketing of their stock. 
"BONY iqforins us nionthýv but it is not helping us in inarketing our stock", an I RO 
mentioned. 
Is it the IRO or an external consultant (IR company or Law office) that does the 
riling? 
The IRO 
, in cooperation with the American lawyers, does the official filing and at least 
is responsible for doing so (63%, 24%, and 6% for FTSE 20,40 and 80 respectively). 
The American lawyers review the final documents and press releases, especially when 
they are filed with the SEC and the American Exchanges. "The American lalivers have 
the upper hand in the press releases and leave no roomfior marketing", an IRO 
declared. Other market makers such as the specialists at the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) do not help the Greek dual listed stocks satisfactorily. "Our specialist is good 
we bother him an IR director said. 
b) Analysts: Do you target (cover) dual listed companies? 
Only 18% of the local and 60% of the global analysts indicated that the targeted 
companies are dually listed (ASE plus some other exchanges). "Yes and no. We cover 
top 15 stocks; dual and multiple listing is not a consideration Qf our coverage, 
however", one local analyst declared. 
On what exchanges? 
All interviewees declined to answer and gave no comments to this question. 
How has the dual listing of the stock influenced the IR function and its activities? 
18% of the local analysts believe that the IR function does not change after the fin-n is 
dual listed, while 53% of the analysts believe that the IR activities, perception and 
implementation is affected by the new setup, (i. e. when the company is listed on the 
NYSE), and finally 29% of the analysts believe that "the IR office of a listed changes a 
lot when the compan_1, starts trading in another exchange such as NASDAQ, DB, LSE, 
etc. ". The observations by 50% of the global analysts are similar when they say that 
they observe the IR function to improve slightly, and those of 40% that they improve 
dramatically when a firm is dual listed. "Dual lishngInCreases the need. for an ef)ective 
IR department since it needs to satisli, the requests of more analysts and inore 
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presentations "a London based analyst explamed. "To a great degree as it requires a 
wide knowledge qfinvitutional, legal and accouniingfi-aineworks ", another one said. 
Do you observe any difference between listed on the ASE and dual listed 
companies? 
Both analyst groups mentioned differences between ASE-only listed, and dual listed 
companies. Indeed, 6% of the locals answered that they see none, 53% see moderate 
differences and 41% huge differences in functioning. mentality. proactive action. 
perception. etc. Similarly, 20% and 80% of the global analysts observe moderate and 
big differences in terms of IR efficiency and effectiveness and disclosure policies. "The 
IR departments qf dual listed companies are inore organized and larger ", one analyst 
asserted. To summarize, most of the local and global analysts detect differences In the 
communication patterns between the ASE-only listed and dual listed Greek companies. ' 
As indicated by the analysts interviewed. dual listing motivates and drives the IR 
departments to be more effective in ten-ns of the quality and quantity of their company's 
information. 
c) Fund Managers: Are your targeted companies dual listed? 
23% and 33% of local and global FMs respectively answered positively, while 38% and 
67% said no. In particular. the London-based fund mangers said clearly that they do not 
care if the company's stocks are traded on other exchanges, and someone stated: "The 
great majority qf the companies wefiolloii, are only listed in the ASE 
On what excha"ges? 
23% of the local FMs indicated that some companies are also listed on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ and the LSE, while 15% said that some companies are traded on the German 
(DB) exchange. It was surprising to learn that the global fund managers show no 
interest in the multiple listings of the Greek listed companies. 
How has the dual listing of the stock influenced the IR function and its activities? 
The perceptions and experience of the local and global FMs on the performance of the 
IROs when their companies are listed additionally on another exchange are 
unanimously positive, and 77% and 100% respectively believe that the IR function is 
affected highly by the dual listing. The remaining 23% of the local FMs also believe 
that it is influenced moderately. This is possibly explained by the fact that the IROs 
have to deal with demanding legal issues,, accounting practices and policies, filings and 
mandatory disclosure policies in a foreign language. etc.. which makes them more alert, 
more flexible, effective and efficient. and quicker to act and plan. One commented: 
IN 
"Greater demand offinancialfigures according to the US GAAP requires greater IR 
responsibility. " 
Do you observe any difference between companies listed at the ASE and dual listed 
companies? 
When asked if they distinguish any differences between the listed companies on the 
ASE and other dual listed firrns, 31% and 100% of local and global FMs observe 
sizeable differences while 69% of the local FMs see moderate differences. Sorne of the 
following comments indicate characteristically some of the fund managers* perceptions: 
"In the dual listed companies there is better IR organization and professionalism ", 
"Yes, they are much more careful in ii, hat they say and hoiv they say it "Yes, the dual 
listed companies'IR departments are inore compeient andprqfessional In conclusion, 
the opinions of the fund managers who invest in Greek stocks are that multiple listings 
of their stocks do influence positively the companies' disclosure policies and practice. 
They also indicated that the dual listed companies' communication patterns and the IR 
departments' efforts are of high quality. 
To summarize, the big capitalization Greek companies dual list their shares mostly on 
I 
American or London exchanges in order to attract more capital and have a better mix of 
global shareholders, and that creates the need for high standards in corporate 
communication and IR activities and programmes. To reach this level, many firms hire 
London based external IR consultants and other professionals from the global market. 
Ouestion 8.3.0 - Substitution effects of the IR function 
The in-house IR people could be replaced or substituted by external IR consultants 
and/or other professionals such as the analysts and the financial journalists. In smaller 
economies and in markets with a limited number of qualified IROs, the positions are 
filled by the aforementioned professionals. As mentioned, the probability of replacing 
or duplicating the IR function by the inten-nediaries such as brokers, media people, et 
al. , is 
high, especially in the absence of a non-qualified IRO, a well organized IR office, 
an IR programme and action plan and a company's official spokesperson. In this 
section, the opinions of the analysts on the subject are estimated, in order to compare 
them with those of the companies' executives and the fund managers. As mentioned 
also previously, substitution of the official corporate communication process can take 
place either through the brokers' activities on the sell side or the Jourrialjstsý reports on 
companies. Both create communication confusion. misleading information and noise, 
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and as a consequence the information end users (the fund managers) decline to pa"', 
attention and to invest in a company with unclear infori-native policy and tactics. 
3.1 IR substitution by Analysts / Brokers 
a) Top Management: How have the analysts and the traders or sales people of the 
domestic securities firms replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of Your 
company? 
Most of the executives believe that the domestic sell side (analysts, traders and sales 
people) operate in a complementary mode with the IR people. Specifically, 88% of the 
FTSE 20 managers interviewed spoke of the complementary relationship between IR 
and the domestic sell side. Similarly. 64% of the medium cap executives stressed the 
same. while only 29% of the small cap managers suggested that this was their policy. It 
is worthwhile noting the dispersion of opinions and perceptions among the different size' 
companies. Many top executives of the small companies feel that the different players 
of the sell side process "substitute" their companies communication to the markets, at 
least sometimes. Why does that happen? "The non-existence of a trained, professional 
IR person is the reason ", a CEO explained. Similarly, "the operation of the IR activities 
bY the CFO or even the CEO makes thein i, ulnerable to the brokers and others ", another 
CEO added. Indeed,, the existence of a large brokerage community-industry (95 
brokerage houses) in the small Greek market leads many brokers and salespersons to 
offer "extra" services to listed companies in order to "hook" them as clients. 
Furthermore, since "when the companies do not have an IR department their role is 
replaced by the brokerage people ", 34% of the small cap firms believe that their "voice 
is getting out of the broker's mouth". The problem is smaller for the medium size fin-ns 
where only 16% indicate that the IR profession is replaced or duplicated by the sell side. 
"The IR job is substituted with vei-v little effect ", a CFO mentioned and "Over the past 
years there was an overlap which tends to be eliminated", another CFO claimed. 
Does the big domestic brokers' "daily market watch" or "daily market news", 
which is distributed to their global database every morning, create disclosure 
problems for your company? 
In sharp contrast, the majority of the executives from all three groups believe that the 
"dailies" issued by the sell side do not create any disclosure problems for their 
companies. In fact, only a quarter (26%) of the small fin-ns believes some problems are 
created from the dailies, and, as an IRO mentioned, "there is a continuous flow of 
I. naccurate intbrinaiionfior a number of lisied. firms ". However. fewer managers from 
the bigger companies. (120/o and 6% for medium and large caps respectively) indicate 
131 
disclosure problems from the dailies, one IRO said: "if the press releases are complete, 
accurate, short and clear there is no problem In contrast, 88%, 72% and 49% for the 
big, medium and small firms beheve that the dailies help them. 
How do the sell-side analysts out of London of the big international investment 
banks and their sales people rill or duplicate the IR job for your company? 
When the research is taken on the global level and the same questions are asked about 
replacement, substitution and duplication of the IR job by the London-based bankers 
and/or salespeople, the result is unanimously negative and the vast majority of the 
Greek firms indicate the absence of threat by the global players. 94%. 80% and 80% 
respectively and clearly stated the need for cooperation between their companies and the 
bankers, who are based mainly in London. One CFO stated: -The_1, do not substitute it. 
In contrast, they make it easier when there is cooperation and the. 1, disseminate 
infOrmation received ky the IR department to theirclients that IR has no access 
Is there any cost and benefit for it, if that happens? 
No comment. 
Do your auditors play an important role and most often influence your company's, 
I 
corporate disc losure policies? 
More than half. of the interviewees indicated that the auditors do not play any role on the 
company's disclosure policies. In fact, 63%, 68% and 54% declared no auditor 
influence whatsoever. 
b) Analysts: How have the analysts and the traders or sales people of the domestic 
securities firms replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of targeted companies? 
When analysts were asked if they replace and duplicate the IR job or the IR people, they 
looked a little surprised; 29% , are completely negative, 65% see some moderate 
overlapping and 6% believe that some duplication might exist. Similarly, 30% of the 
global analysts believe there is no chance whatsoever for replacement, 60% accept that 
some duplication might exist and only 10% believe that they replace the IR activities, 
especially when IRO does not exist in the companies. "To some extent andfrom some 
anah, sts this may have happened. However, the roles are complementai-Y. Analysts and 
securities firms are the link between listed companies and investors", a bank analyst 
declared. "Not at all. Thesefunctions are complementarjý, ", another said. Similarly, one 
London-based analyst explained that "Analysts'work helps 1ROs to idento, some of the I 
dýficiencies relating to their presentah . on content ". And lastly. an opposite perception 
such as "Analists have not replaced the IR nction - dýf A ferent roles 'n the market ", was 
recorded. 
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Does the "daily market watch" or "daily market news" of the big domestic 
brokers, which is distributed to their global database every morning, create 
disclosure problems for the listed companies? 
Most of the brokerage or bank analyst departments search for news to add to their daily 
report. in Greek but mostly in English. which they publish in the early morning and 
email to global fund managers, analysts, bankers, et a]. Historically in Greece. the major 
source for the listed companies, their management. their finances, etc. was the relative 
reporting stories in the newspapers. magazines. etc. However. few of these stories are 
official (distributed by the companies) and have been a product of noise, third opinions. 
biased information, etc. These "distorted" news items are translated to English from 
Greek and more distortion takes place. as a result of translation and interpretation 
(Demos, 2004b). When a Canadian fund manager, for instance, reads a story by a Greek' 
brokerage house in a daily, without being informed directly and officially by the 
company or at least having that story being confirmed by the IRO as real news, then 
confusion exists and the stock price might feel the pressure as a consequence. The 
company, in particular the reliability of the IROs, also suffers. 
But what do the analysts believe about this issue? Approximately 23% of the local 
analysts replied negatively, 65% answered positively and 12% agree that they might 
create disclosure problems. "We do not believe that ive create disclosure problems, 
since our sources are the companýv along with the press. We rarely transfer/reprint 
invalid data since we use their knowledge of the company to validate what we publish to 
investors. Some occasional phenomena o invalid disclosure might have been !f 
recorded", an analyst explained. 
Similarly, 20% of the global sell side analysts were completely negative and 80% 
accepted the creation of some minor disclosure problems. "A problem should not be 
created, since inany tinies we base our reports on official press releases and 
announceinents h. v the companies. There is, though, subjectivity as far as the 
interpretation is concerned", another analyst said. 
Do you read / follow regularly the "dailies" by other brokerage houses? 
When asked if they read the daily reports of the "competition" (i. e. other sell-side 
analysts), 3% of the locals replied not at all, 70% just take a glimpse and 26% firmly 
believe that they should know what the others focus upon and write about. "Yes, I read 
soine, not ci, eri, day though " was a common comment by many analysts. On the other 
hand, . 10% of the globals 
deny any reading, 70% accept that they read slightly the other 
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analysts' dailies and only 10% read the competition's reports carefully. "Daily, bulfiroln 
the reports of specýfic conipanies " one admitted. 
How do the sell-side analý7StS out of London of the big international investment 
banks and their sales people fill or duplicate the IR job for the listed company? 
Everybody was negative in response to this question and only 6% of the local analysts 
gave a signal of doubt and indicated that sometimes it might. "Definuelv, the. i. do not 
duplicate the IR job. Instead, they support it, bY spreading the iiffibrination confingfi-oin 
the IRO ", a local analyst declared. 
Is there any cost and benefit for it, if that happens? 
No comment. 
Do you read the formal "investor releases" released by the IR offices? 
All analysts read the official IR press releases carefully. 
c) Fund Managers: flow have the analysts and the traders or sales people of the 
domestic securities firms replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of companies 
in which you invest? 
When the fund managers asked if the analysts and/or salespeople of the domestic 
brokerage firms duplicate or replace IR activities, 19% and 44% of local and global 
FMs replied negatively. A local FM declared: "The analysts are not in place to 
substitute the JR0s. Theirfunction is complenientary to the JR0s ". Another one based 
in London added: "Our local analyst needs the IR to provide inore efficient research 
about the listed company". But the majority of the FMs, 81% and 55% respectively, 
accepted moderate overlapping (does that mean that the IR job is untouchable? ). One 
stated: "Unfortunately, the IRO position is considered to be a luxurv due to the size of 
the Greek companies, therefore it usually happens to the sinaller conipani . es The 
majority of the fund managers accept the duplication of the communication, especially 
for the smaller capitalization companies, and the IR departments should find ways to be 
more authoritative and reliable. 
Does the brokers' "daily market watch" or "daily market news", which is 
distributed to their global database every morning, create disclosure problems for 
the listed companies? 
The majority of the FMs (77% and 100% respectively) believe that these dailies do not 
create disclosure problems or even corporate governance issues to the listed firms, as 
the following statement indicates: "As long as the. 1- adapt to the requireinents of the 
legal systeni ihey do not create probleins ". Only 23% of the local FMs were negative 
and said that the dailies might create some problems. "The phenoinenon of invalid 
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iqtbrinanon is usual4i - observed and the possibiho, Qf wrong perception of some event is 
eminent ". 
Do you regularly read / follow the dailies by the brokerage houses? 
69% and 100% of locals and global fund managers do carefully read the daily research 
memos that come out of the analysis departments. while 31% of the local FMs just 
glance at the dailies of the brokerage houses. "I have a regular update, usualývfiroin n7Y 
colleagues, " one stated. 
How do the sell-side analysts out of London of the big international investment 
banks and their sales people rill or duplicate the IR job for the listed company? 
8% of the local FMs and 100% of the London based institutional investors see no 
duplication of the IR job by the work of the London covering Greek stocks. In contrast. 
8% of the local FMs see a minor fill-in substitution. The following comment reflects' 
that: "They do not substitute them. The IRO shouldJust provide information, present the 
company and answer the questions. The analysis evaluate the company and their 
analysis is taken into consideration bv the market plavers 
Are there any costs and benefits for it, if that happens? 
A London-based manager explained: "The cost is the existence of many ig res -K, ith _fu 
important differences. The benqfit is greater transparency concerning the progress of 
the listed companies ". Another added: "It can build the wrong opinion about the listed 
company. Local analysis have a good approach to the local listed companies. " In 
summary, the fund managers observe no important substitution between the infon-nation 
intermediaries and the IR offices. 
Do you read the formal "investor releases" released by the IR offices? 
All fund managers do read the official and formal investor releases or "press releases" 
or newsletters by the IR departments, either after the quarter results or any other 
important material or management change in the company activities. 
3.2 IR substitution by media 
a) Top Management: Similarly, do the reports in the Greek newspapers (daily or 
weekly) substitute the official announcements for your company? 
From an investigation into whether the daily reports by the media people, especially in 
the newspapers, create many disclosure problems or, better, substitute the official 
announcements by the company, the results were found to be mixed. The big players 
agree unanimouslv that they do not perceive any substitution issue, while the opinion of 
the medium firms is split into almost half (32% answered yes and 48% said no)-, the 
same applies, more cleafly. to the small companies Nvith an exact and just 43% equal 
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split between 'yes' and 'no'. Therefore it may be observed that, xvith the exception of 
the large listed fin-ns, - the remaining majority of the Greek listed firms are suspicious 
and afraid of the substitution effects of the communication process by the media. 
Therefore, for the majority of the executives, an "indirect communication process " 
exists, which is not the official process and distorts the company's information. It also 
creates "noise" which in turn affects perceptions. decisions. share pr ces. liquidity and 
other fundamental indicators. "This indicates a major challenge. for thefirins, especialýy 
for the CEO and the Chairman (who inight be a major shareholder), who give in and 
talk to constant "questioning " ýv, the journalist ", an IRO suggested. Another added: 
11 the media people are gelling access to the original information on the companv's 
results, strategy, operations, management change, etc., and they publish it in order to 
be thefirst to inform the market ". 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the CMC and the Stock Exchange authorities 
have tried to control this "indirect communication process" through mandatory and 
voluntary directives and recommendations. For instance, they placed an obligation on 
the listed firms to report to the authorities, within 24 hours of the article being published 
in the news , if the published information 
is correct and why it was not fon-nally filed to 
the authorities and concurrently disclosed to the investors. This obligation has created 
more disclosure problems and side effects for the companies (i. e. wasted time, 
confusion, misleading information, wrong interpretation, etc. ), especially "when our 
announcements are not stated correctly and there are too manyfinancial newspapers ", 
as an IRO stated. Or "problems are created when only pieces of our announcements are 
used", a CFO mentioned. The big companies, however. try to avoid this confusion by 
assigning specialized persons to, talk to the media; one IRO mentioned: "they do not 
substitute the official announcements. Usually they do not create problems because we 
have an official spokesperson and a very severe policY with press releases and other 
announcements and we have a thorough follow up of all reports ". Another IRO added: 
"Rarely, since we control theflow of information to the press. " 
Have you designated an Official Spokesperson to the newspapers, media, etc.? 
81 % of the big players declare that they have a designated official spokesperson to the 
media. while 56% and only 31% of the medium and small companies respectively act 
similarly. It is worth noting that 51% of the small firms indicated that they have no 
person designated for the media whatsoever. This somehow explains the noise and the 
indirect information process, especially for those smaller companies which have neither 
a rnedia person nor an IRO. 
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If yes. Is this person the IRO? 
If the designated person to the media coincides with the IRO. 56%, 44% and 31 % of the 
companies (big-medium-small) answered positively while 44%. 32% and 51% replied 
negatively. There is a dichotomy of opinions. perceptions. and, most important, of 
practice towards this issue in the Greek market. Generally speaking, when the IRO has a 
background of working with / for the media" then he is highly qualified to deal 
effectively with his/her former associates. 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship with media people. 
100% of the FTSE 20,40 and 80 believe that the meetings with the media people and 
especially the financial journalists are of high and moderate importance respectively. 
and also the telephone conversations are of the highest importance (100%). In contrast. ' 
all big, medium and small caps totally (100%) disregard any inactivity in terrns of 
meetings, telephone talks and guidance. In addition, 100% of big, medium and small 
companies believe that the sell side tries hard to evaluate objectively their companies 
without focusing either on the short term profitability or on the long terrn prospects, 
therefore losing sight of the current value of the companies. 
b) Analysts: Similarly, are the reports in the Greek newspapers (daily or weekly) 
substitutes for the official announcements for the listed companies? 
In terms of the potential substitution of the company's (IR) official announcements , in 
particular the newspaper reports, by the media people, 41 % of the local analysts refused 
and 59% accepted that this could take place. Similarly, 40% of the global analysts were 
negative, while 60% accepted that a slight substitution might exist but they indicated 
that usually these kinds of phenomena exist when the IR office is weak or non-existent. 
Do you prefer to talk directly and/or officially with the listed firms? 
Similarly, all analysts declare positively that they prefer and try to talk directly to the 
management of the listed firm and have open communication with the IR departments. 
Do you prefer that the firm has a designated Official Spokesperson to the 
investors, analysts, newspapers, media, et al.? If yes, is this person the IRO? 
Again, all analysts prefer that the listed companies have a designated IRO as the main 
"processor" of information to the market and to the company as feedback. 
c) Fund Managers: Similarly, do the reports in the Greek newspapers (dailý 
7 or 
weekly) substitute the official announcements for the listed companies? 
73% and 89% of the end users disagreed totafly with, and 27% and I I% accepted 
partially, anv substitution of the official announcements by the listed companies from 
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the reports in the Greek newspapers. The following statements are representative of 
these views: "Somelitnes and especialýv when theýv are based on runiours " and -Theýv 
can create many problems when thev express personal opinions and are polilically 
I. qfluenced". But things have improved over time since "In the past problems lvere 
created to a greater degree than nowadqvs ". 
Do you prefer to talk directly and/or officially with the listed firms? 
All fund managers prefer to talk directly with the companies in which they own stocks 
Do you prefer that your targeted firms have a designated Official Spokesperson to 
the investors, analysts, newspapers, media, etc? If yes, is this person the IRO? 
All fund managers prefer to see that the listed firms have a permanent "processor" in 
place, in other words a designated official spokesperson. 88% and 100% of tile local and 
global FMs do believe that this person should be the IRO. 
To summarise, the majority of the interviewed big firms indicated that no other market 
players like the analysts or the journalists substitute the IROs, but many executives of 
the medium size companies and the majority of interviewees of the smaller firrns accept 
the existence of the analyst and the media substitution. They also indicated the existence 
of "indirect c ommunication process" and "noise" that affects the communication 
process and the IR activities. Most of the analysts interviewed also indicated that there 
might exist a duplication and a replacement of the IRO's communication efforts by the 
analysts' daily reports and especially the journalists' articles, and they accepted the 
existence of the analyst and the media substitution as well as indicating the existence of 
"indirect communication process" and "noise" that affect the communication process as 
well as the IR activities. In summary, the majority of the fund managers interviewed 
accepted possible duplication of the corporate communication, especially for the smaller 
capitalization companies, with the analysts' reports but observed no substitution with 
the articles of the financial journalists. They indicated that the existence of the "indirect 
communication process" and "noise" that affects the communication process as well as 
the IR activities should be overcome when the IR departments could be more 
authoritative and reliable. 
lacro aspects of the IR function 
In this subsection the relationship among corporate governance , industry structure and 
IR in Greece, as well as the influence by the EU regulations are researched. The macro 
aspects or variables that affect the IR function are the corporate governance principles, 
rules and practices. The relationship between investor relations and corporate 
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govemance is fundamentally and philosophically the cornerstone indicator for IR 
practitioners, the listed companies and the regulatory authorities. Moreover. the 
distinction between compulsory and voluntary communication and investor relations 
policies are based on the aforementioned intertwined and interdependent relationship of 
CG and IR. This research asked the analysts' perspective on exactly this relationship. as 
in the previous chapter the listed companies executives were asked, and in the 
following chapter the institutional investors' opinion is given. The relationship between 
the corporate governance framework (macro dimension) and the investor relations 
activities plays an important role, since for many IR practitioners, market players and 
researchers it is the fundamental starting point of investor relations activities and the 
choice between mandatory and voluntary corporate communication. 
4.1 IR and Corporate Governance 
a) Top Management: Is there any interdependence and relationship between the 
IR policies and Corporate Governance in Greece? 
In response to the question of interdependence between IR and CG (Corporate 
Governance), almost all interviewees indicated the strong relationship between the two 
(100%, 76% and 83%). An IRO explained: "The IR mission is to follow as much as 
possible the Corporaie Governance guidelines and there is a close relationship between 
the IR policies and the Corporate Governance 
Can you see any influence from or mandatory convergence to the European 
Corporate Governance? 
The extreme majority of the interviewees (100%, 92% and 91%) declared the speedy 
and necessary convergence of the local and EU Corporate Governance platform in 
theory and in practical terms. 
Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or 
forecasting policies? 
The vast majority of interviewees pinpointed the different set up that exists in Greece in 
terms of industry culture and structure that definitely affects the application of the 
voluntary disclosure policies. For instance, the small size, the family element, and in 
most cases control and manipulation, the strategic orientation and outlook are only some 
of the factors that affect the companies' communication policies. Indeed, 88% of the 
large caps. and 32"/, o and 49% of the medium and small size companies. agree on the 
particularities of the Greek market structure. The small percentages from the smaller 
companies' executives simply indicate that the "family" structured companies take more 
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time to digest, accept and initiate changes towards better disclosure. corporate social 
responsibility, professional ing communication and I management, auditing, enhanci 
reporting and finally facilitating shareholder value creation. 
b) Analysts: Is there any interdependence and relationship between the IR policies 
and the Corporate Governance in Greece? 
All analysts agree that interdependence and relationship do exist between IR policies 
and Corporate Governance (CG) principles. In particular, 41% and 40% of local and 
global analysts respectively believe that there is a strong relationship, while the 
remaining 59% and 60% respectively agree that there is a weak interdependence. "I 
think the IR enhances the role of Corporate Governance and the CG is usual4l' 
supportive to the IR ", one local analyst commented. "There is a strong relationship, 
although I believe that the interdependence will be n7ore obvious when the Coiporate 
Governance fi-ainework is promoted on a inore objective basis ", another analyst said. 
Can you see any influence or mandatory convergence to the European Corporate 
Governance? 
All analysts (100%) believe strongly in the convergence European Union Corporate 
I Governance guiding principles for all European markets and their role in the Greek 
pid convergence, especialýv h. 1 he blue chip s ocks ", one market place.. " Verv ra ýII 
mentioned, and another noted: "Yes, but it will take some time even though progress is 
already visible ". 
Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or 
forecasting policies? 
The absolute majority of analysts (100%) believe in the particularities of the Greek 
market, especially the formation of the industry structure, the small family size of the 
listed and general companies, the profile of major shareholders, even the "immaturity" 
level of the top management that resembles more closely the entrepreneurial style rather 
than the conglomerate/global enterprise running top management. "I think that we 
already observe limited disclosure due to the structure of the Greek economic 
environment", a global analyst claimed. Also, a local analyst noted, "Yes, due to the 
conservative attitude of major shareholders ". 
c) Fund Managers: Is there any interdependence and relationship between the IR 
policies and the Corporate Governance in Greece? 
58'. 1o and 100% of the local and global FMs do find a strong relationship and even 
interdependence between the IR policies and the Corporate Governance in Greece. The 
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remaining 42% of the locals also believe in the existence of a moderate relationship. 
"Yes, but we believe that we are at an earli, stage as. far as the overall implementation 
of Corporate Governance is concerned, " one stated. 
Can you see any influence or mandator), convergence to the European Corporate 
Governance? 
All interviewees mentioned that it is only a time issue for the full convergence across 
Europe. They accepted and believed that there is strong influence and convergence 
between the Greek and European Union (EU) corporate governance practices and 
principles. Some comments are representative: "Convergence will take place due to EU 
regulations. I believe it will happen in the inediun? or long run ". "It alreaýv happens 
unof , 
Ticialýv 
Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece' 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or 
forecasting policies? 
Both the local and global fund managers accept the particularities of the Greek market 
which in turn affects the implementation of the mandatory and voluntary 
communication policies. They indicated that these characteristics and particularities of 
the Greek "industrial" or market structure and consequently its market dynamics 
influences the implementation and application of some if not all of CG principles, such 
as accounting issues, forecasting policies, and even voluntary disclosure practices. 
Someone mentioned: "I believe that this is a requi . rement J. rrespective of the time of 
implementation ". 
4.2 IR learning curve 
a) Top Management: Is there any learning IR experience (curve) exist in Greece? 
The percentage of responses to the question of IR learning experience (curve) in Greece 
is satisfactory; but, as the researcher found, many interviewees doubt that there exists a 
collective knowledge of country-market specific practices, owing to the recent 
appearance of the IR phenomenon, in the country. Only 63%, 64% and 54% of the 
companies respectively believe that they can learn something from internal-Greek 
sources. In fact, there is extremely limited research on the IR field but there are some 
experienced IROs. The question remains whether these experienced IROs are willing to 
move to the "teaching- or "training" level-status. so they can pass knowledge. expertise 
and experience to others because they are probably afraid of "their jobs", given the 
small size of the Greek market, the limited number of good saleable listed companies, 
cvcn the informal oligopolistic structure of "crood" IROs that protect this rigidity of the tý 
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profession and their careers. A pessimistic view offered by a small company executiVe 
even suggested that "A learning experience in Greece exists onýi-fior a, few large cap 
companies. " 
Is there a need for a National Investor Relations Association that will reduce the 
learning path and time for other Greek companies? 
This question was answered positively, and the local IR society is accepted as an able 
institution to transfer knowledge, know-how and experience and also offer instruction. 
especially to smaller companies. 94%, 96% and 100% of the big, medium and small 
capitalization fin-ns answered that they believe that they will learn from HIRL 
b) Analysts: Is there any learning IR experience (curve) in Greece? 
All (100%) agree on the learning experience dimension and the path of the Greek IR 
industry and the value that HIRI could provide to the local IROs. "Yes, HIRI could help, 
though within the current structural limitations ", a local analyst said. 
Do you believe that the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute will shorten the 
learning path and time for the listed Greek companies? 
Most analysts believe the local IR society could benefit other related industries as we]L 
"HIRI is useful to the investment community as a whole, besides the IR ", a global 
analyst indicated. 
c) Fund Managers: Is there any learning IR experience (curve) in Greece? 
All interviewees believed that over the last decade IR experience has been accumulated, 
especially in the larger I] sted companies. 
Do you believe that the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute will shorten the 
learning path and time for the listed Greek companies? 
All believed in the learning path for the IROs and the important role that HIRI can play. 
One respondent commented: "HIRI would help not only the JR0s but also the CEOs 
and the CFOs ". 
To summarise, the Greek companies are implementing the EU corporate governance 
regulations but Greek practice and local business culture affect their implementations. 
In the corporate communication and IR area, only the large capitalization listed firrns 
are experienced while the smaller companies have limited or no experience. The 
analysts interviewed accepted the interdependence between IR and Corporate 
Governance as well as the full implementation of the EU corporate governance 
regulations, but Greek practice and local business culture affect their implementations. 
They also accepted the IR satisfactory experience and learning that has been 
accumulated during the last decade. The fund managers interviewed also referred to the 
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high corporate governance level in Greece but also accepted the Greek particularities 
and the local business culture which affect the Implementations of regulations. 
xecutinp, the IR propramme 
The following section describes how Greek companies describe and rate their disclosure 
practices, IR policies and corporate communication tools. The analysts' opinions on the 
IR tools, especially concerning which communication tools to use. are the most 
effective and have great value. The analysts are the most important intermediary body 
of the communication of the company's information that not only passes and distributes 
the information but, most important, evaluates the company, based on that information, 
and promotes its shares to the investors. In other words, the analysts are a 
communication too] themselves. Therefore, the opinion of these analysts, as both 
processors and users of company's information, is extremely valuable. In this' 
subsection also, the fund managers' perceptions and preferences are given on the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of the communication tools that the IROs employ. 
5.1 IR communication tools 
a) Top Management: Please can you indicate the means by which your company 
communicates with analysts (sell - side and buy - side) and fund managers and the 
importance of the different means of communications? 
Group presentations 
38% of the large fin-ns indicated that they consider group presentations to be of minor 
and moderate importance, while the remaining 44% value these presentations very 
highly. For the medium size companies, group presentations are important (52%) while 
for 32% they are of high importance. Furthermore, the small caps all assigned higher 
value to this type of presentation, with 40% valuing them highly and 60% as important 
(Table 8.9). This is explained probably because most of the Greek and "especially 
globalfund managers having prerequisites and limitations and don't agree to see small 
and medium caps privately (in one-to-one meetings-presentations) ", an IRO from a 
small company declared. Therefore the companies find some way out of this deadlock 
by participating in group presentations in Greece or abroad. That, additionally, saves 
them money (splitting the cost with other listed firrns), and they learn from other 
presenters' methods of presenting, styles, tactics, annual report ways, etc., and therefore 
improve their own performance in their disclosure. Many companies, regardless of size, 
are like to participate in "industry" group conferences in which global firms also 
participate. The leaming curve is very steep and highly beneficial for companies from 
"ci-nerging" markets such as Greece. As mentioned, the Hellenic Investor Relations 
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Institute (HIRI) and the author have organized many group presentations for Greek 
companies in important global financial centres such as Frankfurt, Geneva, Zurich, 
Milan, Paris, Boston, Toronto, etc. during the last five years, and these were extremely 
beneficial for the Greek companies, as their trading patterns and liquidity improved. 
Table 8.9: Companies' corporate communication tools. 
F TSE/ASE 20 (%) FTSE/ASE 40 (%) FTSE/ASE 80 (no 
1* 1 2* 1 3* 4* 1* 1 2* F3* 1 4*_ 2* FT* 1 4* 
By group presentations 19 19 19 44 16 20 32 32 20 40 40 
By private meetings (one-on-oný) - - 12 88 - - 8 92_ - 6 94 _ By telephone queries - - 6 94 - 4 20 76 9 91 
By the sell-side analysts' reports 
feedback 
- - 12 88 - - - 100 3 - 6 91 
By mailing information - - 6 94 - - 8 92 3 8 3 86 
By visiting the companies - - - 100 - - 4 96 - 6 14 80 
By increasing analysts coverage - - 100 4 - 8 88 1 6 - 17 77 
By email - - - 100 - - - 100 - - 6 94 
By holding conference calls 19 12 25 44 20 - 24 36 20 14 54 26 6 
Via the intemet - - 6 94 - - 8 92 - - 6 94 
Web casting 31 50 - 19 8 52 1 28 12 6 51 34 
* 1) Not at all, 2) Minor Importance, 3) Moderate Importance, 4) High Importance 
Private meetings 
Private meetings are the "high-end tools for the IRO and the most challenging for the 
company ", an executive asserted. All big companies positively showed their extreme 
preference for this kind of communication (88% assigned the highest mark) and the 
remaining two interviewed companies (12%) said it is moderately important, but that 
was because these two companies never participated in private meetings. The same 
applies to the medium caps, where 92% value them highly and 8% moderately. It can be 
inferred from the interviews that the "no participation" issues for some executives did 
not create uneasiness and misevaluation. of the private meetings. Finally, the small 
companies valued these meetings with the highest mark (94%) and transcended their 
(. 4 agony" for more proactive individual meetings since they do not have the same 
opportunity as do the large caps to participate in private meetings because of 
shareholder structure, small free float, minimal visibility, etc. 
Telepho ie use 
With reference to the use of the telephone, all companies use this cost- and time-saving 
tool effectively in order to convey infori-nation, to answer questions and to promote their 
story. Indeed, more than 94% of the large caps value the telephone extremely highly. 
The same applies for the small caps (more than 91%); while more than 76% of the 
medium caps rate the use of telephone with a high importance mark. Every company, 
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big or small. uses the telephone and believes that it is "an effective tool of the 
communication qf inf6rination, especialýv nowadays with the use qf cell phones " as a 
CEO stated. "A decade ago, while roadshowing across Europe or even worse across 
the USA, we could not be online, cominum . cate ei . ther w'th the home of . 
fice or the 
roadshow organizer, and that alone crewed, to say the least, inefficiencies and a lot qf 
misundersiandings ", another CEO remarked. Today, even "in the inidst of a private 
roadshow meenng, I can call up the chiqfaccountantfor an explanatoi-y clarification if 
needed", a CFO said. 
Sell side analysts reports feedback 
This IR tool is of extreme value. "The (analysts) reports put us on the map" a CFO 
declared. The research indicated that 88%, 100% and 91 % of the large, medium and 
small Greek companies respectively put the highest mark on this communication tool. ' 
The smaller companies, as indicated, face analyst coverage problems: "We are begging 
the analysts to cover us ", one IRO said. "Everi, Fund Manager we meet, thefirst thing 
that ihey ask us is who covers us ", another IRO said. The report drafts are distributed to 
other managers as well for comments and that in turn helps the motivation and focus of 
the company. One CEO declared: "The reports helped 177.1, company to evaluate even 
internal procedures and departments 
Mail 
The use of mail for the communication of information is considered classic and 
traditional and, as the current research finds, it remains strong. Indeed, mailing 
infori-nation is much appreciated in the Greek market and it conforms to the local 
cultural and business habits. The web and electronic use and Internet penetration in the 
country is one of the lowest in the EU (Sakkas, 2004c; Schina, 2002b). Therefore, 
Greeks like to send and receive hard copies of annual reports, marketing tools, press and 
quarterly releases, etc. The research found that 94% of the large firms, 92% of the 
medium ones and 86% of the smaller companies send information and materials via 
traditional mailing methods. 
Visiting companies 
Visiting companies mostly refer to on-site visits and/or visits to the headquarters. 
"Walking on the ground", as a BoD Chain-nan called it is a prerequisite, before 
buYing (the stock), ýv the. fund inanagers ". In particular, a major and regular part of the 
Association of the Greek Fund Managers' annual activity is the implementation of "site 
visits" to the headquarters, plants and operations of the listed companies. As the current 
study indicates. 100%. 96% and 80% of the large. medium and small replied that they 
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consider the companies' visit extremely important and one of the best "I'nforination 
tools, that avoids wrong interpretations and misjudgment ". Also, a CFO said that "the 
visits also give the opportuniýv to ineet with some important operati . on managers, in the 
headquarters, or the fiacton"', and have dual positive effect. In addition, some 
executives mentioned that "the visilors (FMs or FAs) are deepening their 
understanding and touch on more qualitative data when thev speak with these line 
managers" and furthen-nore "the managers are being inotivated inore when 1he. l. realize 
the effort by the top management and they receive thefieedback (insights, perspective, 
etc. ) fi-om the different market players who visit them 
Analysts' coverage 
Analyst coverage is considered by the listed companies to be of similarly high 
importance, (100%, 88% and 77%). Simply, the larger the cap, the bigger value of the 
sell side coverage, owing to the global trading access that these companies have. The 
medium caps value the coverage somewhat less, and there are some firms that are 
unable to measure this too] because they do not target global institutional money. It is 
worth noting that the majority of Greek analysts write reports in both languages: Greek 
and English. The same is so for the small cap category, although this is coupled with the 
limitation by the local (or even London-based) analyst community, owing to staff. 
budget and policy constraints. 
E-mail 
The use of email is the absolute leader of the means of communication with the highest 
mark (100%, 100% and 94%) by the three groups of companies. Naturally, it is the most 
cost-effective too] of communication, especially when it serves the sophisticated market 
players (i. e. FMs, FAs, Bankers, etc. ) and some large individual investors. 
Conference calls 
The utilization of conference calls has not been established in Greece and it is 
appreciated as an effective and efficient means of communication. It is probably owing 
to "the business culture and mentality of the Greeks who mostly prqfer the "personal 
. 
Tairs ", as a CEO said. In other words, "bodj- language plays a ve big touch in their af ry 
and important role in the day-to-day business conduct, on a local and on a global 
setting '' another CEO added. 19%, 20% and 14% of the large, medium and small caps 
interviewed answered that they do not use conference calls at all. Conversely, 44% of 
large. 20% of medium and only 6% of the small companies value these highly and use 
teleconferencing extensively. The reasons given for doing so are 1. the cost and time 
sýjvin, (, ),, fi-equent rapport ini, estor across the globe, quarterýv results iqforinalion and 
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analysis and others ", according to an IRO of a big corporation. Finally, 25%, 36% and 1 
26% of the respective three categories indicated that they value the conference calls 
moderately. 
Internet 
The use of the internet. in sharp contrast. is valued and used widely and vastly by the 
Greek companies. The voluntary proposals- regulations by the CMC and the ASE in 
recent years have played a major role in motivating the companies towards this practice, 
but the demand by the local and global players alike is also a "compulsory" incentive to 
do so. 94%, 92% and 94% of the companies use the Internet as an information source, 
for shareholders and stakeholders alike. 
Web casting 
Finally, web casting is at its "primitive" stages in Greece, where 31%, 8% and 6% of 
the companies have never used casting and 50%, 80% and 85% do not use web casting 
but they see value in it. and only 19%, 12% and 9% have used the service at least once 
in the past. 
To summarize, the majority of the three targeted groups of listed companies describe as 
moderately and highly important most of the IR tools such as private meetings, email, 
telephone disclosure and communication via the analysts. The research indicated that 
the use of conference calls and web casting is not extensive as a means of corporate 
communication, especially by the smaller Greek companies. Analyst coverage plays a 
major role but many executives assign it to the mentality and communication local 
culture. In the following subsections, a detailed analysis of the different means of 
communication is given. 
b) Analysts: Please can you indicate the means by which you communicate with the 
listed targeted firms and the importance of the different means of 
communications? 
When asked to disclose and evaluate the different means of communications with the 
listed entities. ) three infon-nation tools excel, according to the opinion of 
both local and 
global analysts, the one-to-one meetings, (100%), e-mail (94% and 100%) and the 
telephone (88% and 100% respectively). This unanimous acceptance and agreement of 
the importance of the three aforementioned tools of communication have indeed 
motivated the author to venture more deeply into the research on this section. He 
interviewed 20 CFAs (September-December 2004) about the information sources and 
the results were extremely similar to those of this research (Demos, 2005c). The 
remaining communication tools are in second place and again are valued similarly by 
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the two groups of sell-side analysts (Table 8.10). The group presentations are given a 
high mark (24% and 10%) by the local and global CFAs and a moderate mark (64% and 
90%) respectively. The analyst coverage or the promotions through the analysts' reports 
are recognized by the analysts themselves as a moderate processor of information (71 % 
and 100%) respectively. Similarly. 88% and 100% of analysts accept that information is 
transmitted with a moderate mode by increasing analysts' coverage of the listed 
companies. The same acceptance is observed for the use of mail from 97% and 100% by 
the local and global analysts. "Walking on the ground" by visiting the companies' 
headquarters, facilities, factories, distribution centres, etc., is considered to be of a 
moderate (71% and 30%) to high value (29% and 70%) source of information. It is 
striking that the conference calls are valued with a high importance (32% and 100% of 
local and global analysts) and with a moderate importance (68%) by the local analysts. 
Finally, the web, i. e. the companies' website in particular, is extremely highly valued 
(24% and 80%) and highly valued (77% and 20%) by both groups of analysts asked. To 
summarise, the analysts interviewed described as highly important the private meetings, 
email and telephone communication. The research indicated that the use of other IR 
tools such as conference calls, web casting, mail and others are valued as important 
communication tools. In the following subsections, a detailed analysis of the analysts' 
opinions on different means of communication is revealed. 
Table 8.10: Analysts' communication with the listed companies 
Local CFAs London CFAs (Lo) 
1* 1 2* 1 3* 4* 1* 1 2* F3* 4* 
By group presentations 12 29 35 24 - 30 60 10 
By private meetin s (one-on-one) - - - loo - - - loo 
By telephone queries - - 12 88 - - - loo 
By the sell-side analysts' reports 29 53 18 - - 80 20 
By mailing information - 41 56 3 - 80 20 
By Visiting the companies - 6 65 29 - - 30 70 
By increasing analysts coverage - 35 53 12 - 20 80 
By email - - 6 94 - - - 100 
ing conference calls - 12 56 32 - - - loo 
Via the intemet - 23 53 24 - 2 8 
Other 
* 1) Not at all, 2) Minor Importance, 3) Moderate Importance, 4) High Importance 
c) Fund Managers: Please can you indicate the means by which you communicate 
with the listed targeted firms and the importance of the different means of 
communication? 
When the interviewees were asked how they communicate and obtain Information from 
the listed companies. it was observed that 77% of the local FMs and 100% of the global 
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ones use the group presentations (either mandatory or voluntary) to a great extent and 
the remaining 23% of the locals use them discreetly. On the contrary, all FMs (100%) 
prefer the private (one-to-one) meetings (Table 8.11). It is not unusual that during 
roadshows, for the institutional investors, especially those in the mature financial 
centres such as London. Boston, and NYC. direct communication with the companies is 
extremely important and many t1mes they "1hrow out,, the interniediai-v people (i. e. 
salespeople, consultants, bankers, et a/. " and "keep in the room only the company's 
executives ", one FM indicated. 
Table 8.11: Fund Managers' use of communication and IR tools 
Loca l FMs London FMs 
1 2* 3* 4* 1* 2* 3* 4* 
By group presentations - 23 77 - - - loo 
By private meetings (one-on-one) - loo - loo 
By telephone queries (%) - 15 85 - 11 89 
By the sell-side analysts' reports 8 69 23 - loo 
By mailing information (%) - 46 54 16 _84 By visiting the companies (%) - 100 - loo 
By increasing analysts coverage 31 69 100 
By email (%) - 100 loo 
By holding conference calls 46 54 12 14 
Via the intemet (%) 38 62 16 84 
Other (%) - - - - 
1) Not at all, 2) Minor Imporiance, 3) Moderate Importance, 4) High Importance 
Similarly, the FMs very much like to visit the companies and to communicate 
constantly with them via e-mail. The telephone is used extensively as a vital infonnation 
too] by 85% and 89% respectively and moderately by 15% and 11%. The same applies 
to the use of the traditional mail,, where 54% and 84% do use it extensively and 46% 
and 16% occasionally. With regard to the use of the sell side analysts' reports by the 
fund managers, a diversion and dispersal of opinions and perceptions are observed. 
While it may be seen that the global FMS believe very much and value highly the 
reports, and the continuous and increasing (every quarter from annual coverage and 
covering more and more companies) coverage, the local FMs value the reports with 
minor (8%) moderate (69%) and high (23%) importance; only 69% of them believe that 
I investment decisions. Similarly, while the increasing coverage will help them In their 
global money managers do accept that conference calls add the highest value in 
informing themselves on the current perfon-nance of the listed companies (probably 
because of the distance element, the weekly rapport as local managers do, etc. ) only half 
(54%) of the local FMs believe highly in the value of the conference calls and the other 
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half (46%) moderately so. Finally. 62% and 84% of local and global FMs accept the 
high importance of the Internet (i. e. websites. etc. ) as an information too] which. 
moreover, covers the "equivalent information" principle and belongs to the public 
, 
domain infon-nation set which satisfies many CG guiding principles. 38% and 16% 
respectively accept the Internet moderately as a medium of communication or. better. 
said that as a medium it helps them decide and invest better. 
To summarize, the majority of the fund managers interviewed describe as highly 
important most of the IR tools. such as Private meetings, group presentations. site visits. 
email, conference calls and telephone disclosure. They also describe as effective 
communication tools the communication via the analysts. the web casting, and other IR 
tools. In the following subsections, a detailed analysis of the different means of 
communication is given. 
Question 8.6.0- Company meetings with FAs and FMs 
The general and special meetings with analysts and fund managers are analyzed by the 
top management in this section. The group and private company meetings are evaluated 
by the analysts as well as the meetings with the listed companies and the analysts are 
analyzed by the fund managers. General meetings are defined here as meetings for a 
group of delegates from a number of different employing organizations. Special 
meetings are defined as meetings for individuals or small groups from one organization. 
6.1 Organization of meetings 
a) Top Management: Does your company hold meetings with any of the following: 
sell - side analysts, buy-side analysts and fund managers? 
All companies, none excluded, hold meetings with at least the sell side and buy side. 
Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these meetings? 
Table 8.12: Presenting the company. 
Presenter Bi 10) gA Med' Jum Small J! /O) 
Chain-nan of BoD 12 52 60 
CEO 38 60 48 
CFO loo 76 57 
IRO 88 76 69 
Marketing Director 6 8 - 
_Chief 
Accountant 6 8 9 
Extemal IR adviser 12 4 
Who presents the company (companies) in these meetings, for the large, medium and 
small companies the responses are shown in the following table. The existence of the 
duality phenomenon is worth noting. i. e. the positions of Chain-nan of the BoD and that 
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of CEO are concentrated in the same person. According to a recent survey. in 78% of 
the listed companies the Chairman and the CEO hold the same position (Demos, 
2003c). 
Does the company keep a record of the proceedings of these meetings? 
100% of the large caps keep a record of the proceedings of both group and one-to-one 
meetings, while 72% of the medium ones make notes of the group and 84% of the 
private meetings. Even the small caps keep notes: write down questions, answers. 
feedback comments, names of the participants, requests, etc., from around 63% of 
general (group) and 69% of one-to-one (individual) meetings. 
How many of these meetings did your company hold in the past twelve months? 
On average per year the big firms held 10 group meetings and 45 private meetings. the 
medium size companies held 6 group and 23 one-on-ones and the small companies' 
similarly held 6 group and 24 individual meetings in Greece and abroad. As mentioned 
in chapter 1, the ASE qualitative criteria "require" 5 presentations for the listed 
companies. Therefore, most of the fin-ns try to fulfill this minimum requirement at least, 
with presentations that take place in major cities around Greece. Given that the vast 
majority of local institutional money managers and other market players (such as 
analysts, brokers, bankers, et a]. ) work out of Athens, the companies presenting in other 
cities are mostly looking to inform individual (retail) investors. Group company 
presentations are also organized in the biggest Greek cities such as Thessalonica, Patra, 
Larissa and Heraklion. By presenting to these cities. the companies do not cover the 
whole of the Greek individual investor base, especially during the summer months when 
most Greeks visit the islands and stay in their summer houses. 
Approximately how many analysts are there on your company's database of 
people who may be invited to these meetings? 
The large caps have better databases and invite more people. They invite 100 sell side 
analysts and on average 200 professionals from the buy side. The targeted invitation list 
for the medium reaches 80 analysts and 300 fund managers, and the smaller companies 
include 200 sell side analysts and 320 respective buy side analysts or fund managers. 
"The smaller the compan. i, the more extensive and inclusive the invitation list becomes ", 
a CFO of a FTSE-80 company declared. The research also indicated that the FTSE-40 
and especially FTSE-80 companies invite analysts from smaller funds, which the big 
corporations are unwilling to deal with. 
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Can you provide an estimate of the number of individual analysts who have 
attended at least one of your meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
The success rate on average annually, which means how many invited people actually 
attend the presentations. reaches 30%, 25% and 25% of sell side analysts attending the 
meetings of the big. medium and small capitalization firrns respectively. and 350//o. 70/,, o 
and 6% of the buy side analysts and - fund managers attend the special or general 
meetings organized by the big, medium and small capitalization firms respectively. 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of stock-broking firms and institutions 
which sent representatives to your meetings (special or general) in the past 12 
months? 
The big, medium and small capitalization firms respectively replied that from their 
invitation list 30 brokers, (members of the associations of Greek brokers, SMEXA and 
SEDYKA) [30%] attend their meetings. In reference to the invitation list to the banks, 
20 professionals from the banks (10% of the invitation list) attend the larger firrns' 
meetings, 30 bankers (38%) go to meetings in the medium size firms. and 15 (5%) 
bankers participate in the smaller caps' meetings. As mentioned earlier, in 2004 there 
were 37 banks in Greece; SMEXA had 97 members and SEDYKA 250 members but all 
interviewed companies indicated that their invitation list is selective and specifically 
they invite to the meetings bankers with whom they have banking relationships. 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of institutional investor organizations 
which sent representatives to your meetings (one-to-one or general) in the past 12 
months? 
40%, 44% and 44% respectively of the big, medium and small capitalization firms 
indicated that the buy side analysts and the institutional investors attend their 
presentations. 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of individuals who have attended at 
least one of the group meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
3 company executives attended the group meetings with the local analysts and 2 the 
private ones. 2 executives attended the group meetings with the global analysts and just 
I the private ones. 
b) Analysts: Do you participate in group presentations? 
94% and 100% of local and global analysts replied that they attend group presentations 
by the listed companies either in Greece or abroad. 
Do you participate to one-on-one meetings-presentations? 
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Similarly. the absolute majority (100%) of analysts participate in the private (one-to- 
one) meetings. 
Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these meetings? 
On average, 53% and 40% of the meetings, 74% and 10% of Directors of Research 
participate for local and global analysts respectively: the industry research analyst takes 
part. and 18% and 30% of teams of analysts go to these meetings. 
Do you keep records of the proceedings of these meetings? 
All analysts keep records of every meeting. It is a common phenomenon to see the 
analysts working continuously on their thick notebooks, writing quantitative and 
qualitative information and data that affect their perception, perspective, evaluation and 
appreciation. It is also intriguing to investigate whether the analysts "believe" what they 
write for others. One way to gauge and to judge such a matter is to read their notebooks 
carefully where they "note and ivrite down evaluations, even the bo4j, language of a 
CFO qfter a tough question ", as a CFO remarked. 
Who from the analysis department go to these private meetings? 
77% and 80% of local and global Directors of Research participate in these important 
private meetings, and the industry analyst is there, while 44% and 40% -a combined 
team of analysts - are present at these meetings. 
Do you go to group presentations, organized by the listed companies themselves? 
Similarly, 77% and 80% respectively always go, and 65% and 90% often go. 
How man), of these meetings did your (analysis) department attend in the past 
twelve months? 
On average, the local analysts participate in 80 group presentations (including those that 
the Association of Greek Fund Managers (AGII) and the Greek Brokers Association 
(SMEXA) organize every week, that is 50+50=100 annual official group presentations 
in addition to the companies' voluntary and own conferences) and 120 private ones, 
while the London based analysts who cover Greek stocks take part in 45 group and 85 
one-to-one annual presentations on average. 
Approximately how many company officials are invited to these meetings? 
At the group and private meetings with the local analysts, 5 top company executives 
participate while 3 top managers take part with the global analysts. 
Do you go to group presentations organized by other brokerage firms or banks? 
When analysts were asked if they P-o to the group company presentations that are 
organized by the other brokers or other brokerage research departments. they replied 
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that 77% and 80% of local and global analysts respectively always go, and 651/o and 
90% often go. 
Do you set up the meetings or the listed company? 
In answer to the question of who is the originator of these meetings. it emerges that the 
research department itself is responsible (41% for the local and 40% for the global 
analysts). For 29% and 20% respectively, the initiators of these meetings are the listed 
company's top management and the interviewed analysts (53% of the local analysts and 
60% of the global analysts) acknowledged the IROs as the initiators of the meetings. 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of individuals who have attended at 
least one of group meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
On average 3 people attended these meetings. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you participate in group presentations? 
77% and 100% of local and global FNIs participate in group presentations by the Greek 
listed companies. 
Do you participate in one-to-one meetings-presentations? 
In 100% of both targeted groups (local and global) FNIs participate in the private (one- 
to-one) meetings. 
Who represents the fund at some or all of these meetings? 
46% and 61% of those interviewed said that the top fund managers themselves 
participate in these group meetings. In addition, 69% and 94% stated that the industry 
fund managers take part. while 96% and 84% responded that the analysts participate. 
and finally 46% and 84% said that a team of people go to these group presentations. 
Do you keep a record of the proceedings of these meetings? 
All the FMs keep records of the proceedings during the group and the one-to-one 
meetings 
Who represents the fund at some or all of these private meetings? 
69% and 78% of top fund managers, 92% and 100% of the industry fund managers, 
100% and 100% of the buy side analysts and finally 69% and 78% a team of people do 
take part in the private meetings. 
Do you go to group presentations organized by the brokerage firms? 
77% and 94% of local and global FMs replied that they always participate in meetings 
organized by the brokerage firms, while 38% and 6% respectively attend occasionally. 
Do you go to group presentations organized by the listed companies themselves? 
77o and 94% of local and global FMs replied that they always participate in meetings 
organized by the brokerage fin-ns, while 38% and 6'ý'o of the local and global fund 
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managers respectively indicated that they participate occasionally in meetings organised 
by the listed companies. 
In how many of these meetings did your fund management company participate in 
the past twelve months? 
On average, the local FMs participated in 120 general meetings while the global FMs 
went to 170 group presentations. In addition. the local FMs said that they had 
participated in 200 private meetings and the global managers took part in 500 one-to- 
one meetings annually on average. 
Approximately how many officials from your fund are invited to these meetings? 
Also, on average, 3 local and 5 global managers go to group presentations and 3 local 
and 3 global managers participate in one-to-one meetings. 
Do you initiate and set up the meetings or the listed company initiates the 
meetings? 
Table 8.13: Group and/or private meetings initiation 
Local FMs London FMs 
Fund 15 6 
IRO 54 33 
Top management 46 11 
Brokerage house 54 1 39 
When asked if they know who is organizing either the group or the private meetings, 
15% of the local and 6% of the global FMs said that they themselves request these 
meetings; 54% and 33% replied that the IROs initiate the meetings; 46% and I I% 
believe that the top management want these meetings; and 54% and 39% respectively 
answered that brokerage houses plan and execute these meetings (Table 8.13). 
Can you provide an estimate of the number of individuals who have attended at 
least one of group meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
On average, the local FMs interviewed estimate that 3 people participate in group 
meetings and 5 officials take part in one-to-one meetings. The global FMs interviewed 
replied that, on average, 2 people participate in the group presentations and 4 in the 
private ones. 
6.2 Disclosure in the meetings 
a) Top Management: Please indicate the types of information that your companý 
provides to delegates (sell- side analysts and / or buy - side analysts and / or fund 
managers) at these meetings (special or general). In respect of those types of 
information that there are provided please can you indicate their relative 
importance? 
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By analyzing the value and type of infori-nation that is provided in these meetings it is 
observed that the "explanation of recent results" is valued high]\, by all companies 
(94%, 96% and 100%). The "explanation of accounting policies" is important and 
emphasized by 56%. 72% and 60%. The "additional breakdown of data by line of 
business and by geography". the "performance of recent acquisitions' ,. the "research and 
development projects" and the "Industry structure" are valued similarly. Of extreme 
importance for 100%. 92% and 86% respectively is the "explanation of strategy and 
structure". Concerning information on the future and projections. three groups of 
information are identified as being of great value. The first refers to the announcement 
and "explanation of major new projects and developments" by the companies that are 
valued highly (100%, 84% and 80%) by the three groups of companies (large-medium- 
small). The second includes information on "new products", "new contracts", ýIorders- 
and "R&D" issues, and it is valued moderately. Finally. the third is recognized as the 
most important for the buy and sell side professionals, and includes "prospects or 
forward statements" and "feelings on profits strategy as a whole and in parts", 
"acquisitions and investment plans", "cash flows" and "dividends" and "general 
outlook". 
b) Analysts: Please indicate the types of information that the listed companies 
provide to delegates at these meetings (special or general). In respect of those types 
of information that are provided, please can you indicate their relative 
importance? 
When they were also asked to evaluate the type of information disclosed in either group 
or private meetings, it was found that for both analyst groups (local and global), 
explanation of results and accounting policies were valued moderately: 94% and 80% 
and highly 6% and 20%, respectively (Table 8.14). Breakdown of figures by line of 
business and geography was marked highly: 47% and 40% and modestly 53% and 60% 
respectively. Perfon-nance of acquisitions and R&D projects was valued important at 
76% and 100% and 88% and 80% respectively, and analysis of the B/S was extremely 
important, by 88% and 90% accordingly. In terms of future projections. four clusters of 
information valuation were identified by the local and global analysts. The first not-so- 
important element of information, referring to new projects, products, contracts and 
order book that affect sales, was valued as important at 80% and 90% on average 
respectively. The R&D efforts and immediate results of old R&D projects were valued 
slightly more highly for future cash flows at 90% and 100%. Sales and profits, cash 
flow and di\, idend estimation and budget were valued with the highest mark. 100%, by 
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both groups. Finally. for short and long term strategic initiatives, orientation was 
marked with a very high value: 90% and 100% from both. 
Table 8.14: Analysts' evaluation of types of company's information 
Local CFAs London CFAs 
P 2* 3* 4* V 
ý 
2* 3* 4* 
1. Explanation of recent results in the context of the general 
economic environment 
51 41 6 40 40 20 
11. Explanation of accounting policies (%) 53 41 6 40 40 20 
III. Additional breakdown of published figures by line of business - 53 
1 47 - 60 40 
IN'. Additional breakdown of published figures by geographical area - 53 47 - - 60 40 
N Performance of recent acquisitions 23 53 24 - 80 20 - 
V1. Outcome of completed research and development projects (%) 44 44 12 20 60 20 - 
Vii. Explanation of structure of balance sheet and gearing 12 88 - - 10 90 
VIII, Other (%) - - - - - - 
Ix. First announcement of major new proj . ects and developments 77 23 -1 60 40 
X. Further explanation of major new projects and developments that 
have already been announced (%) 
53 47 - 20 50 30 
X). First announcement of new products 71 29 60 40 - 
x1j. Further explanation of new products that have already been 
announced (%) 
94 6 80 20 - 
X111. First announcement of new contracts N 94 6 80 20 - 
XJV. Further explanation of new contracts that have already been 
announced N 
94 6 80 20 - 
XV. Current state of order book (%) 47 53 50 20 30 
xv]. Prospects of current research and development projects 65 23 12 50 50 - 
XVII. First announcement of new research and development projects 65 23 12 50 50 - 
XVIII. Further explanation of new research and development projects that 
have already been announced (%) 
65 23 12 50 50 - 
xIx. First announcement of profits forecast 100 - - - 100 
xX. Further explanation of profits forecast that has already been made 100 - - - 100 
xxi. Company strategy in the short term ('/o) 18 82 - 100 
_ 
XXII. Company strategy in the long term (%) 18 82 100 
Xxiii. Company strategy for particular segments of the business 12 88 100 
XXIN'. Company strategy on future acquisitions 12 88 100 
1) Not at all, 2) Minor Importance, 3) Moderate Importance, 4) Hip ., 
h Importance 
c) Fund Managers: Please indicate the types of information that the listed 
companies provide to your delegates at these meetings (special or general). 
On average 76% of local and more than 80% of global FMs indicated that information 
on the general economic environment, accounting policies, recent acquisitions and 
progress on R&D projects is of minimal value, and only 20% on average from both 
groups find this information of good value (Table 8.15). The historic breakdown of 
figures by line of business and by geography is considered to be of higher value, and the 
explanation of the Balance Sheet accounts is perceived as useful information for their 
evaluation models. Information on new R&D projects, products and contracts were 
considered to be of moderate value. while information on strategy and its 
implernentation is of high value. Finall-y. sales prQ)ections, profitability and cash flow 
157 
forecasts, and dividend policy were considered to be very high value Information whIch 
the top management discloses in group and private meetings. 
Table 8.15: Fund managers' evaluation of types of company's information 
Local FNI, London Pý1ý 
1* 4* 1* 
1. Explanation of recent results In the context Of the general 
economic environment 
8 118 11 
II. Explanation of accounting policies 0/0 - 
iii. Additional breakdown of published figures by line of business 62 21 50 22 
Additional breakdown of published figures by geographical area 
N 
- 31 1ý 11 44 44 
Performance of recent acquisitions - 38 38 21, 44 44 11 
V1. Outcome of completed research and development prQjects - 38 38 23 67 
vil. Explanation of structure of balance sheet and gearing 4 96 100 
Vill'. Other N - - 
Ix. First announcement of maýjor new projects and developments 38 39 39 
X. Further explanation of major new projects and developments that 
have already been announced 
35 38 27 39 39 
xi. First announcement of new products (%) 23 46 31 50 2ý 2-) 
x1l. FurtheTexplanation of new products that have already been 
announced N 
2" 38 38 67 
XIII. First announcement of new contracts 31 31 23 15 56 44 
Xl\. Further explanation of new contracts that have already been 
announced N 
31 31 23 15 56 44 
X\. Current state of order book 35 46 19 - - 100 
xv). Prospects of current research and development projects 38 38 23 56 44 - 
MI. First announcement of new research and development projects 38 38 23 1 56 44 
xviii . Further explanation of new research and development projects that have aircady been announced (%) 
35 46 19 - 56 44 
xiN. First announcement of profits forecast 100 - - 100 
xx. Further explanation of profits forecast that has already been made - 100 - 100 
xxi. Company strategy in the short term (%) 38 46 16 84 
xxii. Company strategy in the long term (%) 15 85 - 100 
xxiii. Company strategy for pa5icular segments of the business (%) 38 62 16 84 
xxiv. Company strategy on future acquisitions 
1 31 31 38 78 22 
Xxv. Company strategy on future disposals of segments_of the business 31 . 
31 38 72 28 
* 1) Not at all, 2) Minor Extent, 3) Moderate Extent, 4) Hipb Extent 
To summarize, the general (group) and special (one on one) meetings are highly value 
by the interviewed listed companies and their top executives do participate in these 
meetings. The number of meetings, however, is not satisfactory and most of the big, 
medium and small companies indicated that they like to have more group and private 
meetings. In addition, they are not satisfied with the participation rate of the analysts, 
fund managers, brokers, and bankers to the meetings, in reference to the number of the 
invitees. Finally, the majority of companies valued the information given during these 
meetings as highly important. The group and one-on-one meetings are highly valued by 
the interviewed analysts who participate in these meetings and request a range of 
company infori-nation such as projections, strategy, breakdown, etc. The majority also of 
the fund managers Interviewed prefer to participate in group and private meetings with 
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the listed companies. since they have the chance to meet the top executives, extract 
information directly and confirm and evaluate the company personally. 
Question 8.7.0-Telephone conversations with FAs and FMs 
In this subsection. the communication of company's information via telephone is 
evaluated by the interviewees. The use of telephone by the analysts In the 
communication of company's information from and towards the investment community 
is a preferred means of communication since it is direct, cost and time efficient and 
guarantees fast accessibility, especially by the use of mobile telephony. Analysts use the 
fixed and mobile phone extensively to ask, define, report, give feedback, participate in 
the conference calls and even "retaliate" to an investment story they cover and to the 
company's top managers. In this section, the use and the reliability of the telephone 
(land and mobile) are evaluated also by the infori-nation end users and investors. 
7.1 Telephone communication 
a) Top Management: Does your companv engage in telephone conversations with 
analysts? 
All companies use the telephone extensively to convey information, especially when the 
mobile telephone is available. 
Please indicate the company personnel who answer telephone enquiries from 
analysts (sell side and / buy side) and / or fund managers. 
The Chain-nan of the BoD of the large caps uses this means of communication only 12% 
of the time. The CEO of the big players spend more time on the telephone, up to 38%, 
while the CFO reaches 75%, and lastly all (100%) IROs of the large caps continuously 
use receivers and cell phones. For the medium capitalization companies, telephone use 
by the Chairman reaches 36%, that by the CEO 48%, by the CFO 72%, by the IRO 
68%, by the Chief accountant 24% and 28% by the registry "metochologio" department. 
It is interesting to note that the IRO's telephone-participation is less than that of the 
CFO, and that is because of the "nature of the IR profession in the medium and small 
companies", where the IRO or IR professional is not actually qualified to communicate 
and answer requests. questions, etc., and therefore this job is done by the CFOs (the 
CFO is acting as IRO as well, in essence). The smaller the company the more telephone 
active is the Chairman of the BoD (43%). The same goes for the CEOs, who participate 
with 49%, again indicating that the "top executives in smaller companies are heavily 
and personally involved with the market players, even via the phone", an IRO stated. 
on the contrary, the IRO's usage of phone (fixed lines and cell phones) is on a reverse 
course: "the smaller the company the less IR Involvement-, the same IRO added, (63%), 
159 
indicating that "IROs at small caps have to improve themselves and stand up to the 
difficult and demanding questions and requests". as a majority owner and CEO of a 
FTSE-80 company indicated. The use of the telephone by the CFO is similar across the 
companies (75%. to 72% to 74% respectively). Lastly. other executives. such as the 
Chief Accountant and the metochologio people. answer calls. from the medium (24% 
and 28%) and the small (28% and 44%) -fin-ns. whereas this does not happen in the large 
caps. 
Do you keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
Of the large caps, 13% record telephone conversations on tape and 25% write down 
notes, while a large percentage (62%) do nothing. From the medium caps, 8% use tapes, 
40% write notes and 52% do nothing. Finally, of the small caps, 12% use tape 
recorders, 34% use notebooks and 54% make no effort to record. 
b) Analysts: Do the analysts from your research department engage in telephone 
conversation with targeted listed companies? 
All analysts fully exploit the use of the telephone (fixed and mobile). 
Please indicate who from the department's personnel answers telephone enquiries. 
As table 8.16 shows, the local analysts prefer to talk to the Chairman of the BoD (24%) 
and approximately the same applies to the global analysts (20%). It is found that 77% of 
the locals and 60% of the globals talk to the CEOs, and a large proportion of the 
interviewed analysts, 94% and 90% respectively, call the CFOs. Similarly, 97% and 
100% call and talk to the IROs. Some, 29% and 20% respectively, even call the Chief 
Accountant (especially at the companies with no CFOs), 24% and 10% talk to the 
Marketing Directors and lastly 12% of the local analysts speak to the PR people. 
Table 8.16: Analysts' telephone communication with the top management 
Local Analysts_C/o) Global Analys! s Yo 
_Chain-nan 
of the BoD 24 20 
CEO 77 60 
CFO 94 90 
IRO 97 100 
Chief Accountant 29 20 
Marketing Director 24 10 
Head of PR 12 - 
Do you keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
68% and 100% respectively keep detailed notes during a telephone conversation, 
xvhereas 21 % of the local analysts replied that they keep no notes. 12% of the local 
analysts do tape at least important telephone conversations. 
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c) Fund Managers: Does your fund management company engage in telephone 
conversations with targeted listed companies? 
All FMs use the telephone extensively. 
Please indicate with whom you talk from the listed company or who answers the 
telephone enquiries from the listed companies? 
3 8% and 94% of local and global FMs talk to the Chairman of the BoD; 77% and 100% 
respectively speak to the CEOs; 92% and 100% talk to the CFOs. 92% and 100% talk to 
the IROs; and 23%, 8% and 4% of the local FMs speak occasionally to the Chief 
Accountant, Marketing Director and Public Relations Director. 
Do you keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
8% of the local FMs use a tape recorder for important telephone conversations with the 
top management. 100% of the locals and 100% of the globals make notes during the' 
telephone conversations. and 31% of the locals do not use anything. 
7.2 Disclosure via telephone 
a) Top Management: Do you believe that the information provided (bý 7 using the 
phone) is useful and added value to your evaluation of the listed firms? 
88%, 92% and 100% of the big, medium and small interviewed companies believed that 
the information communication over the phone is of high value. And "usually telephone 
conversations are explanations on h7forniation published" a CFO mentioned. 
b) Analysts: Do you believe that the information provided (by using the telephone) 
by the companies is useful and value added to your evaluation of the listed firms? 
In terms of the value of the information coming from telephone conversations, 74% and 
80% of the analysts respectively (local and global) believe that they add good value to 
their evaluation of the targeted firms, their management, and underlying stocks, and 
only 26% and 20% indicated that the telephone conversations are partially useful. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you believe that the information provided (by using the 
phone) by the companies is useful and adds value to the evaluation of the listed 
firms? 
When asked if the infori-nation provided over the phone (fixed line or cell) is useful and 
value added for the FMs in their evaluation of the targeted listed firms, 58% and 89% of 
local and global FMs respectively replied that it is very useful, while 38% and I I% 
respectively replied that the infori-nation is partially useful. 
In summary. the research indicated that the top executives (the BoD Chairman. the CEO 
and the CFO) across the interviewed companies are mostly involved with telephone 
communication xvith the market players. In contrast, it was found that other important 
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managers such as the chief accountant, the marketing director. et a]. do not participate in 
the telephone communication of infori-nation. A large majority of all companies do not 
keep any records of their telephone conversations. The research indicated that the local 
and global analysts rate the telephone as important and use it often to communicate with 
the top executives of the listed firms. The research finally indicated that the fund 
managers are constantly involved with telephone communication with the top 
executives of the listed companies, the analysts and other market players. The majority 
of the fund managers do keep some kind of records of their telephone conversations. 
Question 8.8.0 - Company feedback on sell-side analysts' repOrts 
Information disclosure via inten-nediaries and especially via the sell side analysts, as 
mentioned, is very important not only in terms of promoting but also in terms of 
evaluating the listed companies. The companies' feedback on the reports written by the 
sell side analysts is a major too] that creates reliability on the management and the 
information by them. It also increases visibility and justifies evaluations to all market 
players and especially to financial and strategic investors. In this subsection, the 
feedback on the analysts' reports is evaluated by the analysts themselves. The concerns 
of accessibility to the insiders and credibility to the information given to them are 
somehow eliminated by the existence of the IROs. A London-based analyst said in an 
HIRI conference: "I do not trust the chairman of the board - and major shareholder - 
and the information he gives me but I do trust that the JR0 will supply me with real 
story, since helshe is professional and expects the market to believe him/her". The 
concerns and the insecurity by the analysts not to be far from the market opinion on the 
targeted company, drives the analysts to communicate and consult with other market 
players such as brokers, traders, corporate finance people, bankers, et al. In turn, this 
creates the need for these market players to be well informed as well and, if possible, 
concurrently by the IR office. In this subsection also, the fund managers appraise the 
comments and directions of the IROs, CFOs and CEOs on the analysts' research 
reports. These top executives constantly send feedback to both sell side and buy side 
analysts, and this communication process is regarded as an important IT tool for the 
listed companies. In this section the interviewees evaluate the quality and quantity of the 
market intermediaries such as the analysts, the brokers. the financial journalists, et al., to 
the communication of their companies. 
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8.1 Communication via Analysts' reports 
a) Top Management: Can you state the approximate number of reports on your 
company that have been produced by sell - side / brokers' analysts in the past 
twelve months? 
On average the annual number of reports done for the large companies is around 35, for 
the medium companies the number is 17 and for the small companies it is 7. In other 
words, the small Greek market justifies "the global trend of diminishing coverage for 
the small companies", especially in recent years, a CFO said. 
Can you state the approximate number of reports that have been passed to your 
company for comment prior to issue in the past twelve months? 
All research before printing and moving to the public domain was checked by the top 
management. 
What action does your company take when it receives a draft analyst's report for 
comment or when an analyst telephones to discuss his \ her draft report? 
All companies, when they receive the draft from the analyst, both correct factual errors 
and comment on the analyst's prediction and forecasted figures. "Con7nients are offered 
on the accurac. v qf the analysts'prediction when the. v are too far ftoni the realitv ", a 
CFO said. 
Who are the Executives that are designated to comment on drafts of the research 
reports? 
The authorized person to comment on the draft report is the IRO primarily and the CFO 
comes second. Indeed, for the large caps, 12% are answered by the Chairman, 38% by 
the CEO, 56% by the CFO and 88% by the IROs. For the medium caps, 28%, 64%, 
80% and 76% are answered by the BoD Chairman. CEO, CFO and IRO respectively, 
while 34%, 49%, 63% and 71 % are the percentages for the small ones. 
Please can you specify your company's policywhen asked to comment on analysts' 
profit forecasts? 
Only the top management is designated to comment on the analysts' profit forecasts. 
Who are the Executives that are designated to comment on the analysts' profit 
forecasts reports? 
Four top executives were identified as those designated to comment on the analysts' 
forecasts: As it is shown in table 8.17. the top management is committed to direct and 
full disclosure of the company's information through the reports. Furthermore. 
"connnews are inade onýv ýf grossýv ow of line ", a Chain-nan stated. 
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Table 8.17: Comments by the management on Analysts' reports. 
FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Chairman of the BoD - 
75% 80% 86% 
ýEO 100% 92% 941/o 
CFO 100% 92% _ 83% 
IRO 1 100% 76% 690/0 1 
If your company does make comments on analysts' forecasts, please can you 
indicate your procedure? 
Specifically, in terms of commenting on the forecasted numbers: no comment is made if 
the forecast is reasonable by 12%, 16% and 17% of big, medium and small firms: 
confirmation of reasonable forecasts by 88%, 84% and 77% respectively; guidance is 
given in case of unreasonable forecasts by 100%, 92% and 94% and guidance is given 
always, even for minor issues, by 56%, 68% and 63%. "The IRO gives guidance 
relating to issues that the analyst has misunderstood about the coinpanýy, and sees that 
the company's prospects, strategy and current position are understood bi, the analyst 
and the market, so as to prevent the market. /rom being faced by surprises. The JR0 
never inteiferes with the analysts' opinions, assumptions, judgments and comment; it, 
just makes sure that they have a clear picture of the company so that their research 1. s 
based on solid information ", a CFO declared. 
How would you rate the quality of analysts' reports, from all sources, that are 
made on your company? 
When listed companies were asked to evaluate the quality of the analysts' reports of the 
companies 12%, 16% and 17% of the big, medium and small fin-ns rated the reports 
with a "very good" mark, 38%, 36% and 29% marked them "good", 38%, 24% and 
29% said that the reports are mediocre and 12%, 16% and 23% assigned them a poor 
and very poor mark. 
Therefore , it is observed that when the companies rate the analysts' reports well above 
average, they indeed put a value on the evaluation of their companies by the sell-side 
and buy-side analysts, and consequently believe that the information that these people 
have is correct, and moreover they can access management, prospects and strategy well. 
Moreover, given the "personal" dimension of the small Greek market, the extreme 
majority of the analysts know both top management and founder major shareholders 
well, where sometimes these roles, as already mentioned, overlap or at least coincide in 
Greece. 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship ivith sell - side / brokers' analysts. 
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By trying to evaluate companies' relationship xvith major and important market players 
such as the sell side and the buy side analysts, the broker and sales people and finally 
the media people, it can be seen that the companies think alike and evaluate similarly. if 
not in the same way. their relationship with these four groups of market players. In more 
detail, with the exception of some different partners on the sell side evaluation for the 
remaining three groups. the pattern is the same. Thus. 88% and 12% of the FTSE 20 
companies. 84% and 16% of the 40 and 89% and 11% of the 80, believe that the 
meetings with the sell side are of high and moderate importance respectively, and also 
the telephone conversations are of the highest importance (100%). In contrast. all big. 
medium and small caps totally (100%) disregard any inactivity in terms of meetings, 
telephone talks and guidance. In addition, 88% of big companies believe that the sell 
side tries hard to evaluate objectively their companies without focusing either on the' 
short term profitability or on the long ten-n prospects. therefore losing sight of the 
current value of the companies. The same applied for the medium and small companies. 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship with buy - side analysts and fund 
managers working for institutional investors. 
100% of the FTSE 20,40 and 80 believe that the meetings with the fund managers and 
the buy side are of high and moderate importance respectively, and also the telephone 
conversations are of the highest importance (100%). In contrast, all big, medium and 
small caps totally (100%) disregard any inactivity in terrns of meetings, telephone talks 
and guidance. In addition, 100% of big, medium and small companies believe that the 
sell side tries hard to evaluate objectively their companies without focusing either on the 
short ten-n profitability or on the long terrn prospects, therefore losing sight of the 
current value of the companies. 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship with traders and sales people. 
100% of the FTSE 20,40 and 80 believe that the meetings with the traders and the sales 
people are of high and moderate importance respectively, and also the telephone 
conversations are of the highest importance (100%). In contrast, all big, medium and 
small caps totally (100%) disregard any inactivity in terms of meetings, telephone talks 
and guidance. In addition, 100% of big, medium and small companies believe that the 
sell side tries hard to evaluate objectively their companies without focusing either on the 
short term profitability or on the long term prospects. therefore losing sight of the 
current value of the companies. 
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If you have an), opinions or ideas concerning how company communications with 
sell - side / brokers' analysts, buy - side analysts and fund managers should be 
conducted in the future please can you state these below? 
No comments. 
b) Analysts: Do you utilize an industrý 
7 
specific analyst? 
47% of the Greek analysts utilize a specialist industry analyst and 100% of the London- 
based analysts do so. 
How many firms you cover each year? 
On average, the local analysts cover 50 listed companies while the global analysts cover 
15 firms each. "10 companies per analyst is our goal but in reallýv each analyst covers 
6 companies well", one local director of research indicated. 
Before you evaluate a stock, do you consult with your trader and/or the corporate 
finance department? 
When the analysts were asked if they consult with traders, sales people or corporate 
finance professionals when they are researching and writing reports for a listed 
company, 59% of the local and 100% of the global analysts answered negatively. 6% 
and 60% repliýd that they talk informally a little for the company, the management, etc., 
and 44% and 20% accept that somehow they collect information and opinions. either 
formally or informally, from other market players on the targeted stock and company. 
Before you evaluate a stock, do you consult with other sell-side analysts' reports? 
When the interviewees were asked if they consult with other analysts' reports and 
coverage on the targeted companies and targeted industry, 26% and 10% respectively 
replied that they never do so, 21% and 80% accepted that they do it on a minor level 
and 53% and 10% do read carefully almost all other reports written on the targeted 
companies and industries. 
Before you issue the analysis report, how many times do you meet with the top 
management of the targeted firms? 
Before printing the analysis report, both local and global analysts declared that they 
meet with the Chairman of the BoD at least once. The local analysts meet the CEO on 
average twice while the global analysts do so just once. Indeed, it is probably "a inatter 
of distance; when we come to Athens we meet with inany top managers of inany 
companies in one dql,, while the local analyst can have the opportuniýv to pql, a visit 
, nore qfien ", a London-based analyst declared. In the same mode, the local analysts 
meet the CFO 3 times and the global analysts just once. Finally. the number of meetings 
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with the IRO increases to 4 times before the report publication, but stays at one time for 
the global analysts. 
Do you visit the premises/headquarters of the targeted company? 
88% and 100% respectively of the analysts visit the premises and headquarters before 
they publish their reporl on the respective targeted company. Only 12% of the local 
analysts "wolk on the groundpremises qfIer the coi, erage ", as one said. 
How many times do you visit the company (site visit - aside from the headquarters) 
before or after the report? 
On average, 24% and 20% of the analysts respectively visit at least once the operations 
(factories, distribution centres, R&D departments. etc. ) of the targeted company, while 
82% and 80% pay a visit more times. 
How would you compare the quality of analysis carried out by sell -side / brokers" 
with that of buy - side analysts working for institutional investors? 
When the interviewees were asked to evaluate in more depth and further compare the 
reports by the sell side and the buy side (when known): 19% of the FTSE 20 companies 
replied that the sell side reports are better than the buy side ones (like to like); 25% find 
the reports of equal value; 37% said they are worse than the respective reports by the 
buy side counter reports; and 19% of the companies could not offer an evaluation. 
Similarly: 20% of the FTSE 40 medium cap companies believe that the sell side reports 
are better than the counter part buy side, 32% find them of equal value; 32% also value 
them to being worse than the buy side one, and 16% avoided evaluating or, better, 
disclosing their evaluation. 
Finally: 20% if the small caps (FTSE 80) find the sell side reports better than the 
counter part buy side reports; 26% assess them with an equal value; 34% find them 
worse; and 20% did not want to reveal their opinion and preferences. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you utilize a buy side analyst? 
On average, 77% and 100% of local and global FMs respectively do utilize sell side 
analysts' reports. This was made clear by the global FNIs who need to utilize all 
possible local sources of information. 
How many firms do you cover/follow each vear? 
On average, the local FMs follow up to 60 listed companies, while the global FMs 
closely watch 40 listed companies of the ASE. A fund manager commented: "It 
depends on the conditions Qf the niarket and the inning and restructuring of our 
Portfolios 
Do you consult with your analyst before you invest in a stock? 
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77% and 100% respectively (local and global FMs) disclosed that they consult xvith 
their buy-side analyst before they take the decision to invest in any particular stock. 
Do you consult with the sell-side analysts' reports, before you invest in a stock? 
Also 62% and 56% of local and global FMs consult and read the (sell side) analysts' 
reports carefully before they invest in a stock, while 38% and 33% respectively consult 
slightly with the sell side. 
Do you find the sell side analyst reports on the listed companies sufficient? 
69% and 100% respectively do find the reports on the listed companies sufficient and of 
value to their decision-making process, while 46% and 56% respectively find the 
reports partially and occasionally satisfactory. 
Do you visit the premises/headquarters of the targeted company before you invest? 
100% of all FMs do visit the headquarters or premises of the targeted companies before 
they decide to invest in them, while 50% and 100% visit the companies when they can. 
How many times do you visit the company before or after the investment? 
88% and 84% of local and global FMs visit the companies before investing but also 
after they bought stock, while 96% and 84% visit them occasionally. 
In summary, most of the interviewed companies value the feedback on the analysts' 
reports as an important communication and IR tool. The big, medium and small firrns 
assign responsibility to the BoD chain-nan, the CEO, the CFO and the IRO to speak and 
comment on the companies' behalf, and giving guidance for major and minor issues has 
become a policy for the Greek listed firms. The executives interviewed declared that 
they value the analysts' reports as an important and effective communication tool. A 
greater number of top managers revealed that they place more value on the buy side 
analysis when compared with the sell side analysis. All Greek companies value highly 
the role of other intermediaries such as the brokers, the media people, et al. in the 
corporate communication process. Most of the interviewed analysts value the 
companies' feedback on their analysis reports as important and very helpful. Before the 
publication of their report they visit the companies' headquarters and other premises in 
order to have a "closer" look. Most of the fund managers interviewed utilize and consult 
the companies' feedback on the analysts' reports and value it as an important 
communication and IR tool. They also visit the targeted companies before they invest in 
them. 
iilint, ) information to FAs and FMs 
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The section describes the use of mail as a too] to convey company's information. The 
use of direct mail, as the preferred means of communication. is accepted by the analysts 
as well. It is surprising that while on-line communication continues to rise in use and 
popularity among the professional investment community, the old and traditional use of 
mail is still a favourite communication tool and the Greek IR offices use it and the 
analysts accept it. This section finally describes the use of mail as a corporate 
communication tool. 
9.1 Disclosure via mail 
a) Top Management: Does your company mail information to analysts? 
The traditional way of mail is still very much in use in Greece, despite the recent global 
crisis and "mail" concerns after the terrorist attacks in the USA. On average, 100% of 
the FTSE 20,80% of the FTSE 40 and 63% of the FTSE 80 send mail to the sell side' 
analysts, and 100%, 72% and 49% respectively send mail to the fund managers. 
Approximately how many organizations employing analysts receive information 
from your company by mail? 
No comment 
What type of information is sent to analysts and / or fund managers? 
The large, medium size and small listed companies replied that they send out: Annual 
Report (100% across the board); Interior Reports (75%, 68% and 54%), respectively; 
Quarterly reports (44%, 44% and 40%), Filing documents to exchanges (25%, 8% and 
6%), Take over documents (19% only by the large caps and no answer by the others); 
Company information and brochures and promotional literature (100%, 60% and 51%); 
Press releases (12%, 8% and 6%): Documents designated specifically for analysts (56%, 
48% and 51%); Annual Report in English (100%, 60% and 40%); Interior report in 
English (75%, 36% and 31 %) and Quarterly reports in English (44%, 16% and 17%). 
b) Analysts: Do you receive mailed information from the listed companies? 
The absolute majority of the analysts frequently receive inforrnation about the 
companies via traditional mail. 
What type of information do you receive? 
All the analysts interviewed receive annual reports, interim and quarterly reports and 
official announcements, and 71% of them also receive additional print material, i. e. 
promotional material. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you receive mail information from the listed companies? 
All FMs receive mailed information from the listed companies. and only 46% and 78% 
replied that they occasionally receive mail. 
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What type of information do you receive? 
Most of the fund managers receive information in Greek and in English. such as Annual 
Reports, Interim, Quarterly results, etc. as well as the official filings to the ASE. LSE 
and NYSE; while 54% and 67% respectively received takeover documents via the mail. 
62% and 89% receive different marketing brochures and promotional literature and 62'//o 
and 67% receive material designed specifically for analysts (Table 8.18). 
Table 8.18: Mailing infonnation to the fund managers 
Local FMs (L/q) London FMs (Lo) 
Annual report 100 100 
Interim report 100 100 
Quarterly reports 100 100 
Copies of announcements sent to the 
company news service of the ASE / LSE 
_NYSE/NASDAQ 
100 100 
jakeover documents 54 67 
Company information brochures and other 
promotional literature 
62 89 
General press releases 100 100 
Documents designed specifically fo r 
analysts 
62 67 
Annual report' in English 100 100 
Interim report in English 100 100 
_ 
_ 
Quarterly reports in English 100 100 
To summarize, the majority of the Greek listed companies use the mail extensively to 
post annual reports, press releases, filling documents and other information. The 
analysts interviewed indicated that they receive companies, material such as annual 
reports, filled documents, press releases and other promotional items via the mail. The 
majority of the Greek and global fund managers also indicated that they receive a large 
amount of corporate infori-nation such as annual reports, filing documents, etc., through 
the mail. 
Question 8.10.0- Roadshows (visitinp- FMs) 
The companies' roadshow communication policy is analysed in this subsection: what 
kind of roadshows the Greek companies are involved in; who is orgams'ng the offering, 
the relationship and the proactive roadshows is important information since roadshows 
help the visibility, the trading and liquidity of the shares and the evaluation of the listed 
firms, especially the smaller ones. As mentioned before, the roadshow is a favourite 
means of communication by the Greek listed companies. since they like to "get on the 
is section, the views of the analysts road" in order to promote their investment case. In thl I 
are presented in order to evaluate roadshows. especialk 7 the proactive ones (initiated by 
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the company) as a communication device. It was also mentioned that roadshows - 
especially proactive roadshows - are a very effective but expensive communication 
policy for the listed company and, as the research indicates, the smaller capitalization 
companies need it most while the bigger capitalization entities can afford it. 
Furthermore, the roadshow programme Is preferred by the fund managers, especally 
those of the smaller companies, since they have the chance to "receive" a group of the 
top management (CEO. CFO and IRO) at their office bases, where the fund manager, 
the buy side analyst and the country analyst can join the presentation. 
10.1 Disclosure via roadshows 
a) Top Management: Do you implement a roadshow communication policy? 
The majority of the big capitalization fin-ns constantly implement a roadshow 
communication policy, but only 52% of medium caps have a roadshow programme and 
40% of the small firms do so. 
Is it tactical, offering related or proactive roadshow? 
The types of roadshows that the Greek (big, medium and small) firms are involved with 
is shown in the table below. 
, 
Table 8.19: Roadshows by the Greek listed companies. 
Roadshows FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Offering 44% 28% 6% 
Relationship 75% 20% 14% 
Proactive 25% 44% 29% 
Combination 56% 44% 1 29% 
It is observed that the major players, (mostly government stocks that become joint-stock 
companies) utilize vastly secondary offerings and offer roadshows in order to decrease 
state ownership, while the medium caps (on average 500 million Euros capitalization) 
use offering roadshows, mostly through private placements, and only 6% of the eighty 
(80) small cap companies use offering roadsbows. "Placements motivate relationship 
roadshows and everi, quarter we from the top management, at least the CFO and IRO, 
have to go around to investors and even prospective investors to explain the results and 
the financials ", a CFO said. A slight decrease of relationship roadshow companies is 
also observed (compared with the other types of roadshowing). One explanation is that 
some medium size companies do not follow the "exact"- typical relationship paradigm, 
(that of infon-ning the investors quarterly). A second explanation is that before this 
research. the activity of roadshow was not identified and measured, and might have a 
distorted effect on the research data. A third explanation is that the small cap firms in 
particular go around and promote their investment cases and stories to prospective 
Investors or to no-current investors. and because thev see/v]sit these investors twice a 
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year or at least once every year, they consider these roadshows to be relationship ones. 
With reference to the proactive roadshows. it is observed that the major players are not 
trying hard enough, and only 25% initiate such roadshows, while almost half (44%) of 
the medium and 29% of the small ones are trying hard to make their story known and to 
be visible to the fund managers. "The "catering " of neii, ini, estors reseinblesfishi*ng in 
the ocean (for sinall and inedium companies) and like catching the salinon on the 
upstream i-iver (for the big caps) where iheJob is inuch easier" another CFO declared. 
b) Analysts: Do you prefer a roadshow communication policy by the listed 
companies? 
All analysts from the sell side prefer the roadshow communication policy. because 
11 roadshows proliferate and create strong demandfor our product, the research reports 
on the conipanies", one local analyst said. Most of the targeted institutional investors 
ask for the analysis reports on the company before the meeting with the management. 
That is because the majority of the Greek companies are generally not known, even to 
the major global investment managers, and the research by the analysts Is a vital 
information too] (along with the company's site information) before the meeting. 
Do you prefer tactical, offering related or proactive roadshows? 
Among the different types of roadshows, all London-based analysts prefer equally any 
type of (offering, relationship, proactive or a combination) roadshows, but the local 
analysts have a different set of prefereDces. that is 41%, 100%, 82% and 88% of 
offering, relationship, proactive or a combination of roadshows implemented by the 
listed companies. 
Do you organize roadshows in Greece for global stocks? 
Only 12% of the local analysts but 90% of the global ones do organize roadshows for 
global (non Greek listed) stocks targeting Greek institutional money (fund managers, 
pension funds, etc. ). 
c) Fund Managers: Do you prefer (as a communication tool) a roadshow 
communication policy by the listed companies? 
The absolute majority (100%) prefer the roadshows communication policy. A fund 
manager explained: "It helps a lot on our overall judgment on the companjý; it boosts 
the attractiveness of the stock, especlalýi' if the roadshow is specifiicalýv targeted ". 
What kind of roadshow (tactical, offering related or proactive) do you prefer by 
the listed companies? 
All global FMs (100%) participate and like all types of roadshows (offering. tactical and 
proactive) because they get the opportunity not only to see the top management face to 
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face but also to have a detailed analysis of the company's strategy. its implementation 
steps and financial objectives by the listed firrns. Of the local FMs. 85% prefer the 
offering roadshows. 69% hke the relationship ones. 73% favour the proactive ones and 
62% participate in all types. 
Are you targeted by non Greek stocks? 
When asked if they are targeted by non-local listed companies, 50% and 100% of the 
Greek and global FMs said they are targeted, for their money, by European listed 
companies, while 12% and 44% respectively said that they are targeted by American 
listed firms and 8% and 100% by neighbouring countries' listed companies. One 
respondent said: "Not direct4i% The inforniation is done through the professional 
rq/erences bY our consultants in thefibreign investinents 
Do you participate in Global Investor Conferences? 
8% and 16% respectively said that they do participate in Global Investor Conferences. 
A local FM said: "Participate selective4v; up to noit, the participation was after the 
inviiation qf the CEO and the Top Fund Manager Qf the fund inanagetnent conipanj, 
(A EDA K) ". 
10.2 Tactical roadshows 
a) Top Management: If you do use tactical roadshows, how many times per year 
and where? 
In respect of the tactical/relationship roadshow, roughly 12% of the big firms go out 
once a year, 50% twice a year and another 12% more often. Similarly, 12% and 8% of 
medium firms implement tactical roadshows once and twice per year respectively. 
Finally, 6%, 6% and 3% of small firms use tactical roadshows, respectively, once, twice 
and more per year. 
Who participates from the company (in the relationship roadshows)? 
With reference to participation in the relationship or tactical roadsbows, it is observed 
that of the big companies, 25%, 63%, 75% and 63% involve the BoD Chairman, CEO, 
CFO and IRO respectively, while for the medium caps involvement is 12%, 20%, 20% 
and 20% and for the small firms it is 6%,, 11%, 14% and 14% respectively (Table 8.20). 
it is worth noting that for the big firms fewer IROs (compared with the CFOs) 
participate in the tactical roadshows, where the involvement of the IR is absolutely 
imperative. The small number of experienced and effective IROs and "the qualification 
ql* the IR prqlýssional that distinguishes hinilher and is able to stand along with the 
CFO in a iough one-on-one ineenng, around the ii, or/d and not sinlpýy pla. 1, the 
carctakcr person - are essential. according to a CEO of a medium size company. L- 
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Another point is "Me equal iveight and importance qfCEO, CFO and IRO, tbi- inedium 
companies as an efjýchve triad", as a BoD chain-nan correctly indicated, this applies 
generally to the small companies as well. 
Table 8.20: Relationship roadshows management participation. 
Executives FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE, 'ASE 80 
_BoD 
Chairman 25% 12% 6% 
_CEO 
63% 20% 11% 
_CFO 
75% 20% 14% 
_IRO 
63% 20% 14'/o 
Who organizes it? (Logistics, selecting the targets, pre-marketing, etc. ) 
The organizer for the large caps is often the global banks [31 %] (such as Credit Suisse, 
Citibank, HSBC, Lehman Brothers, etc. ); the global underwriters [25%] (who are the 
aforementioned global banks); the Greek banks [19%] (especially NBGl. Alpha). the 
Greek brokerage securities finns [19%] (P&K Securities, Beta Sec., etc. ) and the 
company Itself [12%] (Table 8.21). The medium caps report that organizers are the 
global banks (4%), the Greek banks (16%), the Greek brokerage firrns (20%) and the 
company (4%). Similarly, the small caps indicated that organizers are the global banks 
(3%), the Greek banks (I I%), the Greek brokerage firms (14%) and the company (6%). 
Table 8.21: Relationship roadshows initiation and implementation. 
Institution FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Global Bank 31% 4% 3% 
_ Global 
Underwriter 
25% - - 
_ Greek Bank 19% 16% 11% 
_ Greek Broker 19% 20% 14% 
_ Company / IRO 12% 1 4% 1 6% 
Do you organize / implement "Analysts' Presentation" (both domestic in Athens 
and global in London) with the'year-end results or the HI results? 
The large caps declared that they participate fully (100%) in the local analyst 
presentations and 31% in the London ones, once a year (44%) and twice per year (3 1 
8% of medium caps use London and 80% join the Athenian presentations, 80% at least 
once a year and 56% twice. Finally, I I% of the small caps join London and 69% 
Athens, 97% at least once per year, while 34% twice per year. 
Does the IR help or plan or direct the focus of the roadshow in terms of geography 
(London, Frankfurt, Milan, Paris, Boston, etc. ) and in terms of funds specialization 
(hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, etc)? 
The IROs help considerably, in terrns of targeted geographic cities. 50%, 24% and 26% 
for large, rnedium and small companies respectively. probably "due to the insights and 
knowleaýe that ihey havc. fi-on? anall'. zing the shareholder regisn-v ", a CEO explained. 
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"The use of'the opinion leaders is that ifyou have one or two shareholders in Boston, 
then the smart JR0 can use thein as rq/errals to talk to FMs in the same citv " another 
CEO added. Of course. "cities can be identified by research, especially lvhen the JR0 
goes to global IR conferences ", a third CEO said. In terms of targeted funds type 
0-nutual. pension. etc. ) the IRO helps equally: 12%. 12% and 14% for all companies. 
The same behaviour is observed for the industry funds (12%, 12% and 14%) and finally. 
with the market size funds, the IROs help greatly by 38%, 36% and 34%, inducing 
targeting and planning of the roadshow. "inainly in London and toivards the USA cities, 
whilefor other European countries more rareýv ", a CEO declared. 
b) Analysts: How many times per year do listed companies visit you? 
When asked to count the visits by the companies, 77% and 50% of the analysts 
respectively indicated one visit per year. 41% and 40% get visits twice per year, 35%, 
and 10% have more visits annually and 53% and 30% have never received visits by the 
companies. 
Who participates from the listed company? 
Concerning what they see and whom they meet during these roadshows, the analysts, 
both local and global, replied that 24% and 30% of the time they meet with the CEOs, 
53% and 50% see the CFOs and 74% and 70% get together with the IROs. "The JR0s, 
the CFOs and the CEOs in order of iniportance, are the inost proactive executives that 
go aroundproinoting their investn7ent cases ", a London based country analyst asserted. 
Who initiates and organizes the roadshow? 
When the analysts asked if they know who is organizing the roadshow for the 
companies, 62% of the local and 30% of the global answered they perceive that the 
IROs plan and implement the roadshows. 44% and 40% respectively replied that "they 
themselves", that is, the analyst departments from the sell side initiate and organize the 
roadsbows. Finally, 44% of the interviewed local analysts and 20% of the global ones 
assigned the organization of the roadshows to other brokerage firms. 
Does your research department or your brokerage house organize offering 
roadshows, targeting Greek clients? 
When asked if they themselves or the brokerage house they work for organize offering 
roadshows, 35% and 30% respectively replied that the analysis departments do so; 29% 
and 50% believed that the sales people of the brokerage house do so, 29% and 40% 
indicated that it is a joint effort between the brokerage house/bank and the company-, 9% 
and 200, 'o said that it is done by an external consultant/roadshow specialist: and 12% and 
401"o responded that it is organized by a global bank (Table 8.22). 
175 
Table 8.22: Analysts' opinions on the roadshow initiation and implementation 
0 fferi n v- Relationship Proactive 
Roadshows Roadshows Roadshows 
(%) Local Global Local Global Local Global 
FAs FAs FAs FAs FAs FAs 
Analysis 35 30 41 60 18 50 
_department Sales People and 29 50 44 80 24 50 
_Brokers 
_Both 
29 40 29 50 18 50 
In cooperation with 29 40 21 50 24 50 
the IRO of the 
_I 
i sted company 
In cooperation with 9 20 9 30 6 10 
an external IR 
consultant 
In cooperation with 9 20 6 30 12 10 
other market 
players 
_ In cooperation with 12 40 18 50 12 30 
_a 
global Bank 
Does your department or your brokerage house organize relationship roadshows, 
targeting Greek fund managers? 
As the table 8.23 shows,, 41% and 60% of the analysts respectively replied that their 
own analysis departments (out of the local brokerage houses or global banks) organize 
such roadshows, especially every quarter or at least twice per year following the 
announcements of the results. Additionally, 44% and 80% of the local and global 
analysts consider that the salespeople and brokers initiate and execute these relationship 
or tactical roadshows. "It is obvious and eas for us, the analysts and the brokers alike, y 
because we are the people who know in person the end users, the fund managers; we 
know their profile, their investment philosophy and style, how much they know about the 
companies and therefore not only do ive tiý, to keep them happy ivith a continuous and 
constantflow of information on targeted listed companies but also we trv to educate the 
top management of the companies in the profile of the fund managers as well as the 
necessit), of the continuous disclosure andpersonal meetings ", one global analyst said. 
21% and 50% of the analysts believe that the IROs of the companies give sufficient help 
for the success of these relationship roadshows. 9% and 30% said that it is done by an 
external consultant/roadshow specialist. Finally, 18% and 50% responded that it is 
organized by a global bank. 
year do listed companies visit Nou? c) Fund Managers: How manY times per. .7 
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The interviewees declined to give a definite answer. One of them replied that: "Thei-e is 
not a specific fi-equencýv ". 
Who participates from the listed company? 
The interviewees declined to give a definite answer to this question also. 
Do you kno", who is organizing it? 
As table 8.23 shows, 56% of the global FMs of the Greek listed companies participate 
in the roadshows organized by the local big banks, while 38% and 33% of the local and 
global FMs go to roadshow meetings organized by a Greek bank; 58% and 67% go 
when it is organized by a Greek brokerage firm, and 77% and 44% participate when the 
roadshow is organized by the company itself. 
Table 8.23: Fund managers' opinion on who initiates the roadshows. 
Local CFAs London CFAs 
_Globalbank 
56 
Institution 31 33 
Greek bank 38 33 
Greek brokerage fin-n 58 67 
Other - - 
Company itself 77 44 
Do you know if the IR help, plan and direct the focus of the 
roadshow? 
When the fund managers were asked, based on their knowledge of the involvement of 
the IROs, who organizes the roadshows and directs the targets, 62% of the local and 
67% of the global FMs replied positively, while 35% and 33% replied sometimes. 
Do roadshows help you comprehend the listed companies better? 
77% and 89% of local and global FMs respectively declared that the roadshows help 
them exponentially comprehend the listed companies better, while 23% and 11% 
respectively replied that they do help moderately. 
10.3 Proactive roadshows 
a) Top Management: If you organise proactive roadshows, how many times are 
they held per year and where? 
19% of the large caps implement proactive roadshows once per year and 6% twice per 
year. Similarly, 24% of the medium caps use proactive roadshows once per year and 
20% twice per year, and 14% of the small fin-ns participate equally once and twice per 
year. 
NN, 'ho participates from the company? 
it is observed that no BoD Chairrnen of the big firms participate in these opening 
"doors"' roadshows. while 6'o of CEOs, 12% of CFOs and 19% of IROs participate. 
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From the medium size firms. 8% of Chairmen. 24% of CEOs, 28% of CFOs and 40'/'0 of 
the IROs take part in the proactive roadshow. and finally for the small caps I I% of the 
Chain-nen, 9% of the CEOs, 14% of the CFOs and 29% of the IROs do participate in the 
proactive roadshows (Table 8.24). 
Table 8.24: Proactive roadshows management participation. 
Executives FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
BoD Cbairman - 8% 110/0 
_CEO 
6% 24% 9% 
CFO 12% 28% 14% 
IRO 19% 40% 29% 
Who organizes it? (Logistics, selecting the targets, pre-marketing, etc. ) 
Table 8.25: Proactive roadshows initiation and implementation. 
Institution FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Global Bank 6% 4% 
Global 
Underwriter 
6% - - 
Greek Bank 6% 16% 9% 
Greek Broker 6% 24% 20% 
Company / IRO - - - 
As the table 8., 25 indicates, the global banks organize 6%, 4% and 0% of the proactive 
roadshows for big, medium and small firms, and a similar ratio is observed for the 
global underwriters as organizers. The Greek banks organize 6%, 16% and 9% of these 
types of roadshows for the companies, and finally the Greek brokerage firrns do so by 
6%, 24% and 20% respectively. No company official initiates proactive roadshows. 
Is part of the proactive roadshow the increase of analyst coverage? 
It is a difficult relationsbip to identify and measure since none of the executives 
interviewed thought to measure this and no research has been done on this subject. 
Some interviewees, bowever, identified a positive correlation between these two 
parameters. 24% and 14% of medium and small companies indicated an exponential 
correlation, while 12% and 11% respectively pinpointed moderate correlation. 
b) Analysts: Does your department or your brokerage house organize proactive 
roadshows, targeting Greek clients? 
As table 8.22 shows, 18% and 50% of the analysts respectively believe that their own 
departments organize the proactive roadshows for the companies. 24% and 50% of them 
believe that the sales people and brokers do so. Another 24% and 50% of them believe 
that the IROs help in organizing, targeting, and executing proactwe roadshows and only 
6% and 10% accept that external IR consultants organize proactive roadshows. Indeed. 
"we observe that the IROs, in ani, proacti . ve roadshow, plai, the biggest role since 
nobodi, else has the it"gent n7olivat * -1 
lon to search andfind new prospective slock 
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buy, ers", one analyst commented. Finally, 12% and 30% responded that they believe 
that the proactive roadshows are organized by a global bank. 
Does the IR help or plan or direct the focus of the roadshow? 
12% and 10% of the analysts accept that the IRO plays an important role in the 
organization of these roadshows, while 27% and 60% respectively estimate occasional 
value-added involvement of the IRO in this type of roadshow. 
Do roadshows help you comprehend the listed companies better? 
When analysts asked if roadshows, in any form. help the intermediary market players 
and the fund managers to comprehend the listed companies better, 71 % of the local and 
80% of the global analysts indicated the high importance of this communication too], 
which improves greatly the comprehension of the Greek investment stories. 
Additionally, 29% and 20% of the analysts respectively believe that roadshows help the' 
companies moderately. "Compai, ýv comprehension exists before the roadshow, and 
roadshows add the personal dimension on the storl, ", an analyst explained. 
10.4 Effectiveness of the roadshow communication policy 
b) Analysts: Do roadshows help you comprehend the listed companies better? 
When analysts asked if roadshows, in any form, help the intermediary market players 
and the fund managers to comprehend the listed companies better, 71% of the local and 
80% of the global analysts indicated the high importance of this communication tool,, 
which improves greatly the comprehension of the Greek investment stories. 
Additionally, 29% and 20% of the analysts respectively believe that roadshows help the 
companies moderately. "Company comprehension exists before the roadshow, and 
roadshows add the personal dimension on the story", an analyst explained. 
What do you think of the roadshows organized by the Greek companies? 
The majority of the local (94%) and global (100%) analysts were dissatisfied with the 
roadshow policy of the Greek listed companies, referring especially to the frequency of 
the roadshows. "They are useful but a very small number of companies organize well- 
structured roadshows", one said. In contrast, all interviewed global analysts expect 
more roadshow activity by the companies. "There are a few roadshows. Many 
companies don't do am, roadshows ", one observed. "They are becoming more 
prq/essional in terms ofpresentation skills but thel, need to go out more o en ", another 
one added. 
Do you believe that these roadshows are effective, in terms of stock liquidity and 
performance? 
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When asked if the roadshows help the listed companies in terms of trading l, qu, dlt,,,,. 
stock buying and stock increase, all analysts replied that they believe that the roadshoNv 
policy adds a very high value (97% and 100% respectively) to the motIvation of 
institutional and retail investors to look closely at the stock and take a position. 
especially after meeting the managernent. As one responded: "Yes theY are. Both stock 
peiformance and liquidiry are enhanced-ivilh roadshows ". 
c) Fund Managers: What do you think of the roadshows organized by the Greek 
companies? 
The comments below illustrate the opinions of the fund managers about the roadshows 
organized by the Greek listed companies. On the negative side: "They are rare and 
should increase"; "The. i, are quite often poor in information ": "The. i, should be used 
more often inside and outside Greece"; "There is an J. inproveniew over h. ine inolivated 
by compen . tionfrom other non-Greek listed companies looking. for capital as ive/l as ky 
greater deniandsfrom the institutional capital". On the positive side: "Although the 
roadshows done by Greek companies are only afew their quallýv is high enough ". 
To summarize, the Greek IROs are-heavily involved with the roadshows of the listed 
companies. They initiate, organize or co-organize, implement and follow up the 
offering, tactical and proactive roadshows. They also promote and persuade the top 
management for the benefits and for their participation in the roadshows, especially the 
proactive ones. As mentioned earlier, the roadshow communication policy is more 
important for the smaller companies since it helps their visibility, trading patterns and 
evaluation. The local and global analysts believe that the roadshows and specifically the 
proactive roadshows are an important communication too] for the Greek listed 
companies. Their research departments and especially the London based research units, 
mitiate, organize, implement and follow up offering, tactical and proactive roadsbows. 
They were dissatisfied with the frequency of the roadshows and indicated that they 
constantly promote the roadshow communication policy to the top management of the 
listed companies by stressing the benefits of the roadsbows, and write coverage reports 
or flash notes that help the process. Finally, the fund managers interviewed participate 
in all roadshows by the Greek listed companies and they expect more relationship and 
proactive roadshows to be implemented by the IROs and the top management. 
Question 8.11.0- Email database manaoement and distribution of information 
Internet based techniques are examined here, in particular the use of email 
communication. which is efficient. speed full and timely. Online communication has 
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been gaining importance every year and distribution of infori-nation via email has been 
the most effective and efficient medium used to pass company infon-nation to existing 
and prospective investors. market players and shareholders. Moreover, email is 
practically dislocating and fast replacing telephone communication, although they are 
highly complementary. Furthermore, the analysts, as an important hub in the disclosure 
process, view ernail as one of the most important means of communication. Email 
communication policy has been and is of great importance, not only for its speed but 
also for the reliability and even visibility of the companies and the underlying stocks. 
UA Disclosure via email 
a) Top Management: Do you disclose information and news by email? 
All companies use the e-mail too] extensively (100%, 100%. and 94% respectively). 
Do you have an email database? 
Most companies have an adequate database. - 88%, 84% and 94% of the big, medium 
and small companies. - and, as mentioned earlier. they continuously update and expand 
their databases. 
Do you have a database for fax use? 
As a back-up plan, all companies still use the fax system, that is a based database fax 
number,, which is a "toolfiroin the previous "old" days, for "old" guys like us", a CEO 
explained. 
Is it complementary with the fax system in place for distributing information? 
88%, 84% and 94% of the companies declare that the use of e-mail and the fax system 
is highly complementary in order to distribute press releases, announcements and 
generally vital information from the company to all market players and interested 
parties. 
How often you use the email to answer questions from analysts, FMs, bankers, 
etc.? 
Table 8.26: Email use to answer questions. 
FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Email answer only 19% 16% 17% 
Email answer 50% 88% 64% 57% 
_ Never use email - - - 
Do not have email I 
E-mail is often used to answer questions from analysts. FMs, bankers, et al., and indeed 
19% of the big Greek companies indicated that they use e-mail exclusively for that 
purpose, while 88% use e-mail to answer at least 50% of the questions (Table 8.26). The 
percentage for the medium caps is reaching 16% and 64% respectively for e-mail use 
o v. and at ]cast half answer by e-mail- n] I. for the small caps the percentage is rising to as 
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high as 17% for exclusive e-mail use and 57% of half use in replying to demand driven 
requests. 
How often do you send press releases out via email? 
100% of all companies send press releases via email and most of the companies have 
and use a sophisticated email database. 
Do you categorize/divide the email database? 
88%, 80% and 43% of the big. medium and small companies categorize/divide their 
email database for efficient and effective use. 
If so, do you do so by geography, by fund type or by group? 
Their email database is categorized/divided, by geographic targets (75%, 40% and 26% 
for big, medium and small caps, as the table shows), by fund type (mutual, pension, 
hedge funds. etc. ) and by group type targets (bankers, CFAs, FMs, media, SEC' 
exchanges. etc. ). 
Table 8.27: Email database targets. 
FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
By geography 75% 40% 26% 
By fund type 63% 40% 26% 
By target group 63% 40% 26% 
Other - - - 
Do you face email distribution problems? 
With reference to the effectiveness of the use of email as an information tool, and the 
infrastructure of the companies, only 12%, 4% and 9% of the big-medium-small 
companies face some e-mail distribution problems (probably mostly referring to servers, 
etc. ), but the majority (75%, 80% and 80%) face no problems wbatsoever, making this 
too] highly usable. t: ) 
b) Analysts: Do you use the email for collecting and disclosing information? 
All analysts exploit the capabilities of e-mail extensively. They also use fax in the same 
mode. 
Do you use the fax for information? 
No comment. 
Is the email complementary with the fax system for gathering/ sending 
information? 
74% and 70% of the analysts believe that these two tools are complementary in use and 
value. 
Ho, vv often do you receive press releases via email? 
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88% and 100% respectively constantly receive information from and for the companies 
through e-mail or fax, while only 12% of the local Indicate that they receive Infon-nation 
occasionally. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you use email for collecting and disclosing information? 
All the money managers use e-mail and the fax mechanism as information tools. They 
noted, however, the frequency of receiving information via emails; a London based fund 
manager responded: "Quite often butfi-oni a limited nuniber of collipanies 
Do you use the fax for information? 
No comment. 
Is the email system complementary with the Fax system for gathering 
information? 
No comment. 
How often do you receive press releases via email? 
No comment. 
To summarize, the email as a communication tool is used extensively by the Greek 
companies, by which they manage effectively the email database, the email distribution 
and its targeting. Email as a communication tool is used extensively by the analysts, and 
they receive emails from companies but also distribute infori-nation to market players 
and end infori-nation users. Email is used extensively as a communication tool by the 
Greek and global fund managers, and they expect regular and more email 
communication from the Greek companies. 
Question 8.12.0- Conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium 
Conference calls as a communication medium used by the Greek companies are 
described in this section. As the research indicates, this communication too] is being 
used increasingly by the firms, especially the large capitalization fin-ns. Conference 
calls as a communication tool have also increased in use during the last decade, since 
they save time and money. Moreover, the larger companies have conference calls after 
the annual, interim and quarterly results announcements and the conference call is the 
only medium which allows many professionals to present. ask questions about and 
comment on the results concurrently. Many analysts prefer to participate in the 
conference calls since they can create a cross-examination session for the participating 
companies executives. The use and importance of the conference call as a means of 
cornmuni cation has been growing over the years and poses a question concerning choice 
between cost, speed and size for the listed companies as well as for the fund managers. 
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12.1 Disclosure via conference calls 
a) Top Management: Doyou hold conference calls? 
50% of the large caps answered that they use conference calls as a vital too] of 
communication, while 24% of the medium size companies and only I I% of the micro 
stock companies do so. 
Do you have conference calls with the quarterly results announcements (four times 
annually)? 
Only 25% and 4% of the large and medium caps answered positively. It is observed that 
this too] of communication is primitively used by the Greek companies to communicate 
infori-nation, in particular data and results on a consistent basis. 
When else you would you have a conference call and for what purpose? (Change of 
management, a merger or buyout, major breakthrough ... ?) 
Apart from announcing figures and results (38%, 24% and I I%), Greek companies 
declared that they occasionally use conference calls for announcements such as change 
in management (19%. 8% and 3% for big, medium and small caps) information on 
mergers and/or buyouts (12%, 4% and 3%) and major breakthroughs (6%, 4% and 3%). 
"If and when wejudge it is necessai-v. There is not a standardpattern ", one IRO said. 
What is the average number of participants in your conference calls? 
It is observed that when a conference call takes place, global demand to participate is 
there. That is why just over 10 participants were involved in 6%, 8% and 6% of 
conference calls for big, medium and small companies. When the number of people Is 
higher than 20, bigger participation rates such as 19%, 12% and 6% are observed, and 
more than 30 people participate in 25% and 4% of big and medium companies' 
conference calls. 
Do you organize /implement it or do you get help from a major bank? 
All Greek companies outsource the organization and the conference calls to players 
such as British Telecom conferences, Genesy's conferencing, Chorus Call, etc. Indeed, 
50%, 24% and I I% respectively do outsource the organization and management of their 
conference calls, since to organize a global conference call, a company needs to rely 
upon global and experienced organizers in Europe and North America. 
Who from the top management participates in the conference call? 
For the big corporations, 38%, 50%, 50% and 50% of the BoD Chairmen, CEOs, CFOs 
and IROs respectively participate. For the medium companies, percentage participation 
is lower. that is 20'o. 21W, o. 24% and 24% again for the Chairman. CEO, CFO and IRO. 
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For the small firms 11% is the uniform management participation in the conference 
calls. 
Do you invite your bankers, consultants, and other advisers to participate? 
The majority of the listed companies (50%, 24% and 11% respectively) invite most of 
market players such as the bankers, analysts and FMs to participate in the conference 
calls. Some listed firms do invite consultants too. The research indicates that each 
participant increases the cost of the conference calls by 80-100 Euros. These results 
coincide with the results of a previous research study by the author (Demos, 2003b). 
Do you record the call? 
All companies that use conference calls do record, the calls for learning purposes as well 
as for following up questions, requests and demands. 
Do you use a teleconference company from London or from Greece? 
Most of the Greek companies employ a London-based conference call/handier company 
(44%, 20% and 6%) while only (6%, 4% and 6%) of the big medium and small cap 
firrns use an Athens-based call handler. 
Do you receive a list of participants, after the call? 
I 
All companies receive a list of participants on the conference call, but only some fin-ns 
(50%, 24% and 11% respectively) use the list in order to identify shareholders, diagnose 
opinions and write down opinions, questions and even trends. 
b) Analysts: Do you participate in the conference calls by the listed companies? 
56% of the interviewed local analysts and 100% of the interviewed global analysts 
participate in the conference calls conducted by the listed Greek companies. 
Do you participate in conference calls with the quarterly results announcements 
(four times annually)? When else do you participate in conference calls and for 
what purpose? (Change of management, a merger or buyout, major 
breakthrough ... ?) 
The same number of local (56%) and global (100%) analysts participates in the 
conference calls for the quarterly or other announcements by the companies. "Merger 
or buyout, major company change, company developments or whenever the issue is 
I. mportant, we participate ", an analyst declared. Another analyst indicated that "we have 
a major impact on the share price " after most conference cal Is. 
What is the average number of participants in the conference calls? 
In terms of participation numbers, 65% and 100% of the local and global analysts say 
that more than 20 participants is a norm, while 35% of the locals answer that more than 
20 participants is their experience. 
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Who participates in the conference call from your company? 
47% and 20% replied that their director or research participates, 71% and 100% that 
their industry specialist research analyst does so, 50% of the global analysts send the 
country specialist and for 44% and 50% a team of people participates. 
c) Fund Managers: Do you participate in the conference calls made by the listed 
companies? Do you participate in conference calls with the quarterlý7 results 
announcements (four times annually)? 
All FMs participate in the conference calls, especially after the announcements of the 
results. 
When else do you participate in conference calls and for what purpose? (Change of 
management, a merger or buyout, major breakthrough ... ?) 
77% and 67% of local and global FMs participate in the conference calls for reasons 
other than results issues (i. e. change of management. mergers. major breakthroughs. 
etc. ). 
What is the average number of participants in the conference calls? 
In terms of participation numbers: 23% and 61% said that on average more than 10 
people participate in the conference calls; 46% and 56% replied that they have more 
than 20 people; and 62% and 100% replied that more than 30 people participate. 
Who participates in the conference call from your fund management company? 
Who now participates from their office: 54% and 39% of local and global FMs said that 
the top fund manager participates; 88% and 94% said that the industry fund manager 
participates; 100% and 100% said the buy side analyst participates; and 58% and 67% 
indicated that a team of people takes part. 
To summarize, conference calls are used by the Greek listed companies, especially the 
larger ones, for regular and ad hoc communication of company's activities. Conference 
calls are used by the Athens based analysts, but especially the London based analysts, as 
an efficient, speedy and timely information medium. Conference calls are used by the 
Athens based and the London based fund managers in particular, and both groups 
indicated that the Greek companies should have more conference calls during their 
financial year, as well as other company developments. 
Question 8.13.0- Disclosurevia Internet sites 
Internet corporate communication via the websites is examined in this subsection. Web 
site communication. as mentioned earlier. has been regulated in Greece by ASE, CMC 
and EU regulations. The web site has also become a standard in the IR industry. 
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Moreover. owing to the corporate governance principles. rules and regulations. it is a 
mandatory and legal too] for every listed company. Like the annual reports. it is a matter 
of imagination, creativity and appeal of a company's web site to disclose more and 
better infori-nation and to attract investors. It is the first "visIt'" to the targeted company 
by the analysts as well. Communication through the company's site is extensive and in 
Greece all ASE listed companies must have a site in Greek. and the large capitalization 
listed companies (FTSE 20) must also have site in English. The web site is an extremely 
good communication vehicle for the proactive and aggressive IROs. 
13.1 Web site communication 
a) Top Management: Do you have your own web site? 
All Greek companies participating in this research have a corporate website. 95% of the 
sample had bilingual (in Greek and in English) sites and 18% had even a third (German 
language) section. 
How man), requests concerning IR issues do you receive from your site? 
On average, only 6% of the big caps make requests for more than 50 visits on their site,, 
while a frequency of visits of 20-50 per month is observed in 56%, 24% and 23% of the 
big, medium and small companies. Similarly, 10-20 visits per month are seen at 31%, 
56% and 49%. of the companies' sites and 0-10 visits at 6%, 20% and 29% sites 
respectively. 
How many new names are coming from the web site for your data base/mailing 
list? 
As the table 8.28 indicates, 82% of the big caps said that they get new names from their 
website, while 68% of the medium firms and only 26% of the small capitalization 
companies mentioned new name additions from their site. 
Table 8.28: New database names from the website. 
FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
Many 38% 20% 20% 
Some 44% 48% 6% 
None - - 20% 
N/A 19% 32% 54% 
Are you linked with the sites of external consultants? 
Sophisticated website management from the companies is observed by 44%, 48% and 
26% when it is especially measured by the links that the company's site has with site 
promoters (i. e. Win link). industry search engines and other. 
How often you update your site? 
All companies declared that they update their site continuously and at a dynamic pace. 
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V'erv 'a/ results are publ and whenever a change takes place fi-equenill- asfinanci 
then we also add news ", one IRO said. "ASAP with all corporate news and 
announcements bui. forsure ever-v three months ", another IRO added. 
Please evaluate your site in terms of information effectiveness. 
When asked to evaluate their own site in terms of effective communication of 
information, 44%, 60% and 54% of the big. medium and small answered positively. 
while 19%, 20% and 20% find their site ineffective and 38%, 20% and 26% were 
unable to evaluate the effectiveness of their site. "It is veri,, important that the 
I. nformation is up to dale in order for someone to be able to learn on litne and 
accurately what is happening ", a CFO declared. 
b) Analysts: Do you use the targeted listed companies' web site? 
All analysts check their targeted listed companies' web site regularly to extract basic' 
and required information. 
Do you believe their web site is sufficient and user friendly? 
Only 53% and 60% of the local and global analysts respectively believe that the sites 
were user friendly (during the period of the research) and supply sufficient information 
in the public domain. In that respect the sites need a lot of upgrading and modification 
in order to become more information-rel easing tools. 
Please evaluate the web sites in terms of information effectiveness? 
The majority of the local and global analysts interviewed expected improvements on the 
companies' site and many indicated the need for duality of the sites (including 
equivalent information in Greek and in English). Some even mentioned that the Greek 
companies' sites should include more language versions such as German, French, 
Italian, etc. The updating dimension was also raised by some analysts, and, as someone 
suggested: "They need to disclose inore information, renew it often and update it 
continuousýv ". 
Please could you recommend any improvements? 
Some quotes by the analysts stress the aforementioned findings better: "Appearance is 
the last issue but iniproveinent in disclosure and fi-equency of renewal are crucial. " 
"More uffibrinallon is needed, such as sales breakdown, EBITDA breakdown, financing 
ierins, stralegy, inore updates on the industri,, and the sector, etc. " "The web sites need 
I. n7provenient in the proOsion qfproinotional In/67-7776111017 as well". "Updated detailed 
information on all important issues concerning the fin-n. - 
c) Fund Managers: Do you use the targeted listed companies' web site? 
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All fund managers interviewed use the listed companies' site extensively to extract and 
check what they disclose in the public domain. 
Do you believe their Nveb site is adequate and user friendly? 
No comment. 
Please evaluate the %N, eb sites in terms of information effectiveness? Please could 
you recommend any improvements? 
The fund managers are more than satisfied with most sites. The following illustrates this 
satisfaction: "Most sites are updated ivith the latest neývs and data and ivith accurate 
information", "They provide saiisfactoi-y and valuable information but lhqýy cannot 
substitute the other ineans of communication such as the personalized ones ". 
To summarise, the majority of the Greek listed companies interviewed have a bilingual 
site (in Greek and in English) and although mandatory for corporate communication,, 
their website management is considered sophisticated by the top executives. All Greek 
and global analysts interviewed visit and use the companies' web sites regularly but 
they indicated that site improvements are needed in terrns of infon-nation content. style 
and attractiveness. The fund managers prefer the aggressive and proactive Greek listed 
companies, and indicate strongly that they like the smaller capitalization companies to 
make the extra. effort to communicate with them in order to attract their attention,, focus 
and meet with the management, since they have available money for investments and 
they are short of good and solid investment ideas and cases. It is evident from the 
current research that not only the Greek funds, but, most important, the London based 
fund managers who invest in the Greek stocks invite and challenge the small and good 
companies to follow a voluntary corporate communication strategy and accept the cost 
in order to create visibility for themselves and make their story known to the global 
market players. 
Ouestion 8.14.0- Controlled information 
In the following section the restrictions of the companies' communication is 
investigated. Controlled information is beneficial for the company since it allows the 
management to disclose information when it is "ready" as a CFO declared. It is also 
close to corporate governance regulations and enhances simultaneous/equivalent 
information to all market players. 
14.1 Disclosure constraints 
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a) Top Management: Does ý'our company prohibit or restricts communication with 
sell - side analysts, buy - side analysts and / or fund managers at certain times of 
the year? 
75%, 56% and 51 % of the big, medium and small companies do have a policy in place, 
with which it does prohibit or at least restrict communication with sell side and buy side 
analysts, fund managers, et a]. -Onýv i-esiriction: iqfbi-n7allon regarding non-published 
oi- non-onnounced issues ", an IRO said. 
If you have answered "yes" to the above question, please specifv the times during 
the year when the communication is prohibited or restricted. 
Universally, 75%, 56% and 51% of the companies, that is those companies that have 
such a policy, also have universal restrictions and prohibit any communication with the 
market players, prior to the announcements of the annual, semiannual and quarterly' 
results. "Prior to an. 1, financial results announcement or an_v major corporate 
announcement or new development ", one IRO stated. 
Please specify the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the annual results announcement. 
"As soon as we have the inforination - it is released. We don't wait for the official 
publication " an IRO declared. 
Please specify the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the interim results announcement. 
No comments. 
Please specifv the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the quarterly results announcement. 
No comments. 
If your company operates a policy of restriction of communication rather than 
complete prohibition please describe the nature of the restriction. 
"The company will not give out information a week before results are published a 
CFO stated. 
To summarize. most of the executives interviewed indicated that they have a policy in 
place in order to control the company's inforination when needed and when this is 
decided. For instance, prior to the periodical announcements and results, most of the 
Greek companies prohibit any executive from communicating with the market. 
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Chapter 9.0 Research Selective Coding 
9.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in 1.8 and 7.1 this chapter aims to integrate and refine categories. It's 
objective is to organize the plethora of ideas and comments which have emer2ed from 
the analysis of data, docurnents, interviews, previous research and field notes. In the 
previous "analysis of data" (chapter 8), an effori of decoding, open and axial coding of 
the responses and comments of the interviewees was formulated. In this chapter, an 
effort was made to document intricate details of IR phenomena which were expressed 
through the comments, body language. emotions and feelings experienced during the 
interviews,, as Strauss and Corbin mentioned. 
Figure 9.1: The Investor Relations activity framework -Is 
STRATEGIC IR PROGRAMME 
IR OBJECTIVES IR TASKSJ 
IR CONSTRAINTS 
(Requirements) 
IR OPERATIONAL SET 
IR TOOLS / MEANS 
REGULATED DISCLOSURE 
DISCLOSURE via INTERMEDIARIES 
IR EFFECTIVENESS 
F 
The objective of this chapter iII is to contrast and synthesize the opinions and perceptions 
of the three groups interviewed (the companies' executives. the analysts and the fund 
managers) on the corporate communication strategies and investor relations activities. 
This triangulation of the grounded additional data and other research results can be 
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represented in the depicted diagram that simplifies IR relationships and synthesizes the 
major IR concepts and their connections (Figure 9.1 ). This diagram enables us to 
observe the collected data from a distance and present concepts rather than details of 
data. It also shows IR relationships that stimulate implications and even 
recommendations for the Greek listed companies. the market players as well as the 
institutions of the capital markets. 
9.2 Strategic IR Programme 
In this section conclusions and grounded research implications will be described in 
reference to the corporate communication and IR programme that the executives want 
and the analysts as well as the fund managers expect. The findings of previous research. 
as described in chapters 1.1.1 and 5.3.2. on the opinions of the Greek market players' 
and the perceptions of the interviewees in the current research coincide in reference to 
the basic aims of the Investor Relations department. such as: 1) The direct, truthful, 
equivalent, authoritative, correct, valid and timely disclosure of a company's activities, 
strategy, results and perspectives to the market (analysts, institutional investors, brokers, 
bankers, etc. ) is the essence of the IR function and minimizes infori-nation asymmetry. 
2) The creation of a trustworthy relationship with the investors. The executives, analysts 
and institutional investors interviewed indicated that infon-nal one-on-one meetings 
build up trust and establish long ten-n relationships, which for the listed companies are 
imperative. 3) The strategic planning and the IR programme lead to a creative 
communication direction which in turn increases visibility, liquidity and share 
optimization. Since the foreign institutional investors and analysts are "bombarded" on 
a daily basis by many investment stories which are offered by companies from many 
countries, the communication policy of direct and reliable infori-nation to them, along 
with the visits to their offices and the briefing on the history and growth prospects of a 
company, is the best way of selling the stock of any Greek company. IR strategic 
planning, according to the interviewed executives, should aim at "the continuousflow of 
iqforniation, the creation of trust and the maxImLation of the company's share price, " 
as a CEO stated. The creation of an effective action plan and adequate budget of the IR 
activity will help the IR to design a proactive strategic programme "to satisfi, the 
markel's iqfortnaiion needs and notjust to play the role qf afirefighter in time of crisis, 
as itsual4v happens ", one CFO mentioned. The majority of the interviewees asserted 
that the IR programme is vital to the IR activities since it is the strategic blueprint that 
directs. evaluates. inspires, and controls the corporate communication policies of the 
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IROs and the companies (8.1). They also indicated that a solid IR programme defines 
the short-term and long-term targets. measurable tasks. the specific processes and 
timing, and the communication tools to be used (8.5). However. only 14% of the 
company executives interviewed mentioned that they have some forrn of written IR 
prograrnme with objectives and timetable. As the research shows. the remaining 
majority (86%) of the Greek listed firms communicate impulsively and in most cases 
with a tactical, passive or even reactionary mode (8.9). The research also found that 
only a few listed companies have a consistent financial reporting policy such as 
informing the investors quarterly, semi-annually and annually, communicating good and 
bad news, visiting local and global institutional investors regularly, etc (8.14). It is 
implied from the current research that the IR departments should have detailed strategic 
and tactical IR plans with specific objectives and timeframe, and main responsibilities 
which above all: give a sense of urgency and seriousness about the IR profession; set 
long- and short-term targets and objectives, which help evaluate the success or not of 
the proposed and implemented IR strategic plan; set in motion a "proaclive and 
energetic communication and investor relations mode in the company "; as one IRO 
mentioned, and set a success bonus structure for the IRO and his/her team,, which in turn 
is "se4f-motivating to bring about the desired results, " as an IRO suggested. 
9.2.1 Strategic intent 
Strategically, the overriding purpose of an IR communications programme 
is primarily to "build awareness and positivelY shape perceptions of the 
company among its key audiences by, highlighting the company's strengths 
and management vision, " as a fund manager put it. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters (8.5,8.6, and 8J 0) the Greek companies have to deal with the limited 
visibility and minimal awareness, owing to small market size, periphery economy and 
mostly to the passive strategic intent of the companies themselves. The majority of the 
three groups interviewed mentioned the importance and necessity of a mental change 
and paradigm shift of the Greek listed company. The new proactive role and strategic IR 
direction should, above all: 
a "develop a clear and compelling investment thesis articulating the 
company's business proposition, and establish consistency of this message 
throughout all communications inaterials, " according to one CFO, 
- "raise the company's visibility among selected and targeted financial 
n7edia to increase general awareness and it nders ian ding of the company, 
I. ts husiness and its senior management, " one IRO mentioned, 
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0 11 reline the coinpanY's inf6rinaiion distribution inechanisms and 
generate a consisienifloii, of inforination to the investinent communit. v and 
financial inedia across Europe, Asia and the U. S. " according to a global 
fund manager: 
* 1. attract buy-side and sell-side coverage with a proactive outreach 
prograinme, " as a local analyst stated. 
9.2.2 Strategic IR plan objectives 
The following is a short list of specific objectives for an IR programme. 
as indicated by the interviewees: to "increase the company's overall level 
Qfvisibiliti, in Europe, the U. S. andAsia andposition the companv" (i. e. 
as a leader in its industry, as one of the region's fastest growing 
economies, or as one niche international player, etc)-, to "highlight the' 
strengths of the Company's specific advantages- (i. e. successful 
diversification plan, major consolidation and expansion. unique product 
line, etc), to "position the company as an attractive investment with 
substantial and sustainable growth opportunities" (i. e. ROA>20%, 
ROCE>15%, etc); to "establish the credibilli. v of the growth or value 
siorY, or dividend investment and the company's senior management team 
with the investment communi1v to create a soli *d platform for the 
company's long-terin valuation" (i. e. solid management team and strong 
leadership); to "leierage exposure of JPO and secondary offerings to 
disseminate the story, to wider audiences" (i. e. share price performance, 
liquidity, dual listing, American Depositary Receipts, etc. ). 
9.2.3 Strategic target audiences 
According to the interviews and the grounded research findings as 
described previously (i. e. chapters 8.2 and 8.10), the IR communications 
programme for a company is designed to reach several key audiences in 
Europe, Asia, the U. S. and the Rest of the World (RoW), including 
mainly: 
End (Information) Users 
Institutional Investors - The IR office targets a select group of prospective domestic, 
European, American and Rest of World (RoW) investors and reaches out to those 
investors through the multiple IR tools, In particular targeted road shows. In order to do 
so, the creation and maintenance of a database of the institutions is mandatory, from 
secondary sources but primarily from the meetings during the road shows. 
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Retail Investors - The stock's basic stock exchange (horne country) plays an important 
role in supplying a diverse pool of individual investors who create, ma I nta n and 
increase or decrease stock liquidity. Retail investors can be reached via group 
presentations in different targeted cities in Greece and "wher major globalfinancial 
centers with Greek population ". As many analysts and fund manager maintained, the 
population that belongs to the Greek Diaspora should not be neglected as a target for the 
IR office. Even "stock exchanges for a multiple listing should be targeted in cities and 
markets where man_1., Greeks work and live, " one global fund manager suggested. 
Information Intermediaries 
Security Analysis - The IR should be persistent in targeting influential sell-side analysts 
in addition to those that currently cover the stock (Table 8.9). The continuous flow of 
infori-nation towards these infori-nation intermediaries and the update of the analysts' 
database are imperative. 
Industry Analysts - Industry analysts or "gurus" become particularly important when 
there is news about the company, as they are key sources to the media and the 
investment community, and they are often asked to comment on the merits of the 
company's current activities and future prospects (chapter 8.5). By enhancing existing 
relationships and targeting these groups with regular information updates, the IR should 
help to "pre-condition them to reacifavourably to news coming out of the listedfirm 
and, occasionally, mitigate the risk of an analyst publishing a negative report, " one 
global analyst suggested. 
Major Media - Key journalists who work in the local and English media groups are a 
critical audience in building greater awareness,, and they can positively shape 
perceptions of the company on a national and international level (chapter 8.3). Key 
media targets would include: major global newspapers (Financial Times, The Wall 
Street Journal,, The Herald Tribune), local financial press (Kathimerini, to Vima, 
lsotimia, etc. ) 9 influential international regional newspapers 
(NY Times, LA Times, La 
Monde, etc. ), major business magazines such as the Economist, Business Week, Forbes, 
and Fortune, and major news wires such as Reuters, Bloomberg, Dow Jones, and the 
Associated Press. 
MdusfrylTrade Media - Specialized industry and trade media should also be targeted 
since they are "opinion leaders that shape perceptions and influence investors". 
Audifors - The communication of the company's infon-nation to all local (Le. SOL) and 
international (i. e. KPMG, Price Waterhouse, Grant Thomion, etc. ) auditing houses is 
also vcrv important too. as mentioned in chapter 8.3.8. 
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Regulaloiýr bodies 
Throughout the programme it is important to be mindful of local and global regulatory 
constraints regarding securities offerings and the dissemination of information. 
especially after the Enron scandal. Generally the safest approach is to comply with the 
strictest regulations (i. e. by the US SEC) in each market. 
9.2.4 Message 
As indicated by the analyst and the institutional investors in particular (chapters 8.5 and 
8.10) the communication plan should create "a set of clear, direct and short Inessages 
to be woven consistently through all inforination to the inarket " as mentioned by a fund 
manager. In general, these messages should highlight certain key elements, including: 
historic financial performance; market, industry and company presence and potential-, 
clear business objectives and growth strategy. strong management team with proven' 
ability to execute strategy; and stock performance and liquidity. In conclusion. the IR 
programme should clarify its strategic intent, major strategic objectives and targeted 
audiences. and use a clear message to investors and market intermediaries in order to 
motivate managemenVs commitment, increase company-s visibility and attract 
investors' interest. The implementation of the IR programme is based upon these four 
pillarsthrough "thefibrinalpolici, or written description of the detailed objectives and 
responsib ill ties of the IRfunction, " one CFO declared. 
9.3 IR Objectives 
In this section a synthesis of the experience and opinions of the Interviewees Is 
described. As mentioned in chapter 7, their ideas, quotes, comments and sayings 
were taped, translated and grouped as a set of defined IR objectives. 
9.3.1 Types of IR objectives 
The IR objectives, borne out of the current grounded research (chapter 8.6,8.11, 
8.121,8.13), can be separated into four major groups: key market players, 
infori-nation, IR tools and IR activity. 
a) People (market players) related objectives 
"Knoiving the shareholders - not just their nanies, but how they invest 
"Knowing the wider stakeholder audiences ", - "Making sure one is highli, 
in1brined about one's sector "; "Targeiing key buy-side and sell-side anali, sts 
"Enhancing shareholder relations and broker connnunications 
b) Inforinatimi related objectives 
"Knowini, ), the C'07771)al7l' 
'S 
inessage - and inakin, ('), sure evef-ývone else does"; 
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"Having joined-up communications not having artýficially separate I 
communication "; "Developing compelling investment rationales ". 
IR channels related objectives 
"Coordinating ineeli . ngs with investment professionals", - "Conducting 
presentation and inedia training"; "Creating investor presen tat 1 oils ": 
"Design inglenhancing web sites"; "Writinglediting corporate materials- 
(including annual and quarterly reports, earnings and corporate development 
releases, fact sheets, etc. ). 
d) IR activity related objectives 
"Attending disclosure seminars"; "Conducting analvst surveys and writing 
fbIlow-up reports"; "Analyzing institutional ownership and peer group 
shareholder profiles ". 
9.3.2 Measurable IR goals and objectives 
As indicated by the top executives (i. e. chapters 8.4.8.11,8.13) and mentioned in 
chapter 2.6 and 2.7, the IR prime objective is to know exactly where one's institutional 
investors are, and to be more proactive and search for new investors. An example of a 
I measurable IR annual plan, which was mentioned by the interviewees. is described 
below and should include goals such as: "To introduce the company to 10 analysis" 
(sell side and buy side); "To introduce the company to 10 new growthfunds and to add 
these to the investor base "; "To promote the companY to solid Pension Funds across 
the globe " (i. e. Canadian, Chicago, etc. ); "To introduce a 'CEO's letter'to thefinancial 
community "; "To communicate the news releases and the CEO's letter mainly via 
email and. fax "; "To release information and communicate to the financial community 
on time and in most cases within 24 hours"; "To identify the best practices that IR 
departments (globalýi) apply in terms of communicating and building relationships with 
investors " (i. e. best annual reports, best half year results, news releases, editing, etc. ); 
"To complete the "investor profiles " of all the major institutional shareholders "; "To 
target prospects via proactive roadshows in order to expose the company to newfunds 
(Chicago, Florida, NYC, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Toronto, Montreal, etc. ). 
9.3.3 Key IR tasks 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the main tasks of the IR off-ice are: "To communicate to the 
financial community the activities and the results of the company" and "To build 
stronger relationships with long-term investors, mostly institutional investors". 
In order to communicate effectively and efficienfly with the analysts. investors, bankers 
and media, the IR off-ice, as found by the current grounded research (chapter 8 and a lot 
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of interview material). has to: "orgamse an effective IR department"; "monitor the 
shareholder register and trends": "gain access to investor intelligence" (i. e. Thomson 
Financial, etc. ), "continuously update the mailing list": "update a detailed financial 
model of the company's operations". "prepare communication and presentation 
material". for external and internal use as follows: External Use: Detailed results 
announcements. Earnings releases. Press releases; Ad hoc announcements and press 
releases in the local and international press, the investment community and other market 
players; Filing to the SEC and stock exchanges, Updating of the company's websiteý 
regarding key corporate developments, annual and quarterly financial results, etc.; 
Investor presentations addressing key issues (financial perfon-nance, business strategy. 
plans to counter competition, capital expenditures and timeframe for return on 
investments, etc. ); Company literature (e. g. annual report, CEO letter, etc. ). Internal' 
Use: Profile of the Institutional Investor(s) for one-on-one meetings; Analysis, reports, 
grouping of hard data from the shareholders registry; Perception of investors to top 
management; "Coordinate investor and equity research analyst contact"; "Increase the 
level of analyst coverage and the number of analysts' reports"; "Set up meetings with 
analysts and investors"; "Ensure critical analysis of investor perception1l; "Orgamse 
group presentations for retail investors"; "Schedule meetings of management with 
existing and target investors"; "Promote the company/stock proactively via roadsbows". 
In order to build stronger relationships with the investors, the executives, but mostly the 
analysts and the institutional investors interviewed, commented that the IR office ought 
to: "respond to inquiries in a timely matter"; "respond to investor inquiries about 
company data and issues"; "build close and reliable relationships" (i. e. create trust) with 
the investors via good PR, dinners, trips, etc; "develop investor profile data"; "have a 
reliable source for hard and soft data by talking to assigned contacts of divisions and 
subsidiaries within the company". 
9.4 IR prerequisites and constraints 
Most of those interviewed agreed that, in order for a listed company to communicate 
effectively. create visibility, establish good relations and motivate share buying, L- it 
should have an IR office, employ a resourceful and hard working IRO, have the 
commitment of top management and board of directors and commit money to promote 
its investment case (i. e. chapters 8.1 and 8.3). The aforementioned prerequisites are vital 
to the IR programme of the Greek companies and. as the current research indicates, their 
nonexistence leads to illiquid stock and even to delisting status. The majority of fund 
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managers and many of the analysts interviewed suggested that , in order to match 
the 
major IR tasks, the IR department is required to have the fOlIONN'ing: 
IRO's 
-Profile. 
The IRO should: Be knowledgeable: Be a good salesman: Be 
professional; Have good contacts with media. market: Have good presentation skills, Be 
fluent in English and the other languages, Have a proactive mind set; Have a strategic 
intent; Have good organisational skills. 
IR office: The IR office should: Have a meeting room. Utilize a good shareholder 
registry programme, Have an effective contact database: Have a diary management too]. 
Company related: Have solid financial results; Have good, professional management; 
Be concerned about agency conflicts; Have stock option plans. 
Financial issues: Budget; Financial commitment by the top management. 
Other: Encourage feedback from leading brokers; Be proficient at word document and 
presentations processing, Have a user-friendly investor relations web page. Maintain 
and update an email contact directory; Have competent personnel with appropriate 
skills; Have proper IR organization; Have financial modelling capability, Have 
excellent relations with all market players. 
Investor feedback study on: Communication style and content; Management, Strategy: 
Business outlook; Peer group companies. 
All London based fund managers and many global analysts strongly advised that the 
IRO be effective, and, in order to attain the defined communication objectives, the IR 
office ought to: "subscribe to specialized magazines and periodicals in English" (i. e. 
Global Fund Analysis, IR magazine, Research, Buy Side, etc. ); "create a librai-Y of 
specialised IR books and research fi-om the academic community as well as from the 
experienced IR practitioners and associations " such as IIRF, IRS, NIRI etc.; 
participate in IR Conferences organised ky the IR local and international societies, the 
I. nvestinent community and brokerage industry "; "hire and use the services of 
specialised companies " like Thomson Financial, Lipper, etc. "that will help the IR 
office to identify the funds". In retrospect, as the interviewees stated (chapter 8.1), the 
biggest obstacle for the IRO in its efforts to be effective and bring the desired results for 
the company and the shareholders is first the IRO's capabilities and competence and 
second the financial commitment to the IR function by the company. In this following 
subchapter, findings on the IR structure, substitution and complementary issues, as well 
as the qualification of the IR people and the IR budget are documented, and respective 
conclusions are made. 
9.4.1 Organization of the IR function and structure of the IR office 
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As this grounded research has shown. more than half of the larger listed compan I es and 
a quarter of the medium and small firrns have a separate IR department. On the other 
hand, only very few companies have no IR department. 
a) The position of'the investorfiinctions within the companies 
Most of the Greek IROs report to the CFO and therefore belong organizationally to the 
finance department as a separate entity. There are some IROs who report either to the 
CEOs or to the Chairman of the Board of Directors. A tiny minority of IROs from the 
big capitalization joint stock companies operate under the Public Relations department 
in the company organizational structure. From the life cycle angle and tile maturity level 
of the IR profession in Greece, it can be concluded that from its fledging steps the IR 
started as a branch of the Finance Department under the CFO and operated as a passive 
function which distributes only financial results. Since the IR has been recently, 
instituted 
, its position is not efficient and the existing IROs try hard to 
be effective. As 
indicated in chapters 8.1 and 8.2.7 and the comments of many interviewees, the 
situation is attributable to "the views of the top inanageinent, to the inaturity level and 
IR acceptance of'the Greek capital inarket and to the lack of inany experienced local IR 
practilioners, " as one local analyst maintained. The current research shows that most of 
the Greek IR departments operate under the CFO, which is a condition for 'ýpassive" 
IR departments riding at the initial stages of their life cycle. There are also IR 
departments which are under the PR department, something that the international IR 
practitioners and experience rejected a long time ago as not being effective and 
functional (IIRF Conference, 2001; 2000). Most of the fund managers as well as the 
analysts expected, however, that the IR should have the flexibility and independence 
that would act as the company's activity and sophisticated art that adds value to the 
stock and the shareholders. Many of those interviewed suggested that the IR office 
should "be a separate department that operates among the major decision makers of the 
company ". Some even proposed that the IROs should "have a non-voting seat in the 
Board of Directors ". Most of the top executives interviewed (chapter 8.1) accepted that 
the effectiveness and the perfon-nance of the IR department is influenced directly by the 
organizational position it has in the company's structure, as well by the understanding 
and treatment of the IR activities by the top executives (Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, CEO. CFO, etc. ) Some executives agreed with the other two groups 
interviewed that, since the IRO has to have good knowledge of the company's strategy, 
operations and financial results in order to be able to communicate to the investors. the 
organizational and organic position of the IRO and his/her department is between the t7 t7 
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president of the Board of Directors. the CEO and CFO. as depicted In appendix XV. In 
Idly mature markets , it 
has been observed that the IRO accomplishes his goals more rap 
and more economically (i. e. cost. time, man/hours. etc. ) when he/she holds a non-voting 
seat in the company's Board of Directors (IIRF Conference. 2004: 2003). This issue has 
been discussed extensively during the annual IIRF conferences. but so far no 
recommendatory steps have been taken from the IIRF BoD to the regulatory and related 
bodies. 
b) Profile of a designated investor relations officer (IRO) 
As indicated in chapter 8.1, the majority of the interviewees of all three groups accepted 
the existence of an IRO in most listed companies. However. most of those interviewed 
perceived that the Investor Relations Officer title in most cases does not represent a 
61 qualified, trained and experienced IR professional ". In particular. the inten-nediaries 
and the information end users urged the need for "training effective JR0s ". 
Furthermore, since the IROs were recommended, not enforced, by the local authorities 
such as the CMC and the ASE, the need for qualified IROs is a market as well as a 
company driven result. It is implied that in Greece, the operation of the IR function 
depends upon the maturity level and voluntary initiation by the listed firrns, and it was 
not forced upon the companies as it was in neighbouring Bulgaria. where every listed 
company has to have a "titled' IRO (Demos, 2005b, IIRF conference 2004, Rome). In 
Rome, an IIRF round table participant stated: "It is questionable, if this ex communist 
countiýv has produced and trained experienced IR professionals, to name them IROs". 
One CFO stated that "the profile of the IRO affects vastly the success of the IR 
programme and strategy. The position of the IRO and the IR office should be 
established at the beginning if not before the Initial Public Offering of the company". 
"Hiring some analyst or transferring someone from the PR department covers only 
certain needs but creates more disclosure problems for the company, " an IRO of a 
medium size company added. Many interviewees reported that the IRO has to combine 
a mix of theoretical training, experience and predisposition or personality. "Helshe 
should have pei. -formedfundamental anaývses of companies and technical anaývsis of 
shares, managed investment money, traded stocks in a brokerage house, worked as a 
journalist and as salesperson and even have legal expertise and knowledge, " one global 
fund manager declared. The current findings agree with those of other markets: 
Mavrinac (1997, p. 2) argued that "todays IR manager inust be conlinuolli. honing his 
or her skills and capabilities in communication and journalism, public relations, 
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I. qf6rinahon systenis n7anageinent, corporate finance, financial anall'sis, 
financial 
accounting and accounting regulation 
C) Origins ofIROs 
The Greek capital market recovered qui and local market collapse ickly after the global in 
2000. The Athens Stock Exchange turned around in 2002 and kept a growing 
momentum, mainly as a consequence of "the Athens 2004 Olvinpic Ganies, the neady II 
fi f man inonev iqflu. Y qf the cohesive EU junds and the good pei- orinance o _v 
Greek 
enlerprises that operate succesýfully in Greece but inostli- in the Balkan and south 
Easiern Europe, " as a local analyst mentioned. However, the depressing market 
conditions after the 2000 stock market bubble led to a decrease in the number of local 
sell-side analysts and many of them were driven the IR profession and became IROs. A 
previous inquiry on the origins of the Greek IROs, in order to update HIRFs database, ' 
showed that at the end of 2004, almost 65% of the JROs were previously analysts, 25% 
were previously financial journalists and the remaining 10% were brokers and registry 
people (Demos, 2005b). In the current research, many of those interviewed believed that 
most companies have qualified employees and IROs, whatever their origin, to deal and 
comply with the mandatory and voluntary market infori-nation needs. 
d) The number of staff workingfor the investor relations office 
As the current grounded research indicates (i. e. chapter 8.1 ) the bigger Greek companies 
employ more than two people for their IR needs, while the medium and smaller firms 
employ at least one person. 
e) IR staff dedicated to IR relations activities or do they perform other duties 
The interviewees, as shown in chapter 8.1, and taped comments, provided that the 
majority (roughly 70%) of the people working in the IR departments are fully dedicated 
the IR function. The analysts and fund managers interviewed indicated these "numbers 
since the. i, talk to and deal ivith the larger listedfirms" but are aware that the IR people 
"in 1heS7naller companies become involved in non IR activities and even the designated 
IR Os are involved in such activities". Another issue arose during the interviews in 
reference to the IROs' own image. Some IROs were "ashamed' to say that they work as 
IROs exclusively and for image reasons they label themselves with dual titles such as 
IRO and Manager of Strategic Planning, IRO and Treasurer, etc. A possible 
explanation, aside from the psychological reasons, is that they did not understand the 
strategic dimension of the IR function. 
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fi A nnual salatyfbr the ]RO and hislher staff. 
From the interviews with the top management (chapter 8-1) it was found that 
approximately 15% of the IROs across all listed companies are highly paid. The 
majority of the IR practitioners are paid according to the wage level in Greece (i. e. 
11000-2,000 Euros per month). It is inferred from the findings that "the JRjoh is still not 
considered as a high i-anking position and sti-aiegie. function in the coinpan-v'S hiei-ai-ch-v 
and only a few, conipanies conipensate the JROs highly, " as one local analyst 
mentioned. This is consistent with the top management's perceptions of the IR 
function, as the research shows. 
g) Annual budgetfor the IRfunction (excluding. salaries, annual report costs, etc) 
As mentioned in 8.1, most of the big capitalization companies commit comparatively 
bigger IR budgets, while a minority of the small and medium size fin-ns assign 
substantial amounts of money for company and share promotion. Many of those 
interviewed indicated that medium and/or small capitalization companies cannot sustain 
a consistently "expensive or rich IR budgelfior inore ihan 2 years, unless they see 
ci-edible andpositive IR i-esults ", such as increase in share price, increase in the number 
I of institutional . investors, geographic and investment type diversification of the global 
fund managers, decrease in the capital cost of equity, etc. As one fund manager said, 
"the budget plays an important role and affects the IRO'S effectiveness ". For instance, 
many of the IR 'financial and non- financial objectives can not be attained if the Greek 
companies do not implement roadshows " as a communication option, "due to budget 
constraints, " another global fund manager argued. A previous local research study 
found that an average budget estimate for all initiatives of an IR programme, which 
includes local and international promotional campaigns, can reach 200,000 Euro 
annually (Demos 2002d). This amount does not include any discretionary success fee or 
performance bonus based on the IRO's performance and effectiveness, as discussed in 
chapter 12. 
h) Top management involvement with the IR function 
The vast majority of the top executives interviewed are involved with the IR function. 
The top managers of the smaller companies, owing to the simpler organizational 
structures, as mentioned in subchapter 8.13, are involved more with the IR issues. 
Similarly, the analysts as well the fund managers confirmed the top management 
involvement. They also stress "the management qf'the sinaller companies and the 
I. nvolveinew qf the shareholders, who are extreineli, interested in the corporate 
communications process and are personally involved in the disclosure policies of the 
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firm, " as one analyst stated. As the current research found, top executives devote on 
average more than one month per year to the IR function (chapter 8.1 
i Internal reporting kjý, the IRO and internal information flows 
Table 9.1: IRO reporting to the top management 
FTSE/ASE 20 FTSE/ASE 40 FTSE/ASE 80 
_CFOs 
(75%) CEOs (48%) CFOs (43%) 
BoD Chain-nan (25%) BoD Chairman (32%) BoD Chainnan (43%) 
_CEOs 
(-) CFOs (20%) CEOs (14%) 
This research shows that at the big and small capitalization companies the IROs report 
to the CFOs primarily while at the medium size companies the IROs report directly to 
the CEOs, while the Chairman of the Board of Directors is infori-ned in good time and in 
priority across all companies. The table below represents to whom Internally the IROs 
report in order of ranking and priority as indicated in chapter 8.1. It is observed that the 
reporting in the larger companies is similar to the reporting in the smaller ones but 
differs from the reporting in the 
Table 9.2: Internal information flows 
Department / Subsidiary Contact Person 
Finance CFO 
Accounting Chief Accountant 
_Treasury 
Treasurer 
Operations Chief Operating Officer 
Budget CFO 
International Business Business Development Office 
R&D Research Director 
Law Legal Advisor 
Personnel Human Resources Director 
medium size companies. The role of the CFO in the communication process is stated 
and supports the (previously stated) findings that most of the Greek IROs report to the 
CFO and belong organizationally to the finance department as depicted in Appendix 
XVI. The interviewees also indicated that the IROs, in order to communicate on time 
and with authority the right information to analysts and investors, should collect 
company information internally from otber departments sucb as sbown at Table 9.2: 
9.4.2 Substifutimi issues 
Substitution of the official corporate communication process can take place internally 
vla the registry office or the PR department, or externally via the analysts and the media 
people. As the current research shows, both can distort the company9s message and 
create infonnation confusion and noise. 
a) Internal Substitution issues: Cooperation and Replacement of the IR office by the 
Regisny Shareholders Oletochologio) office 
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As mentioned in 3.5 and 3.6, it is compulsory for all Greek listed companies to operate 
a "metochologio" or registry office. which deals mostly with individual-retail 
shareholders and informs them about stock transfers. dividends payouts, stock 
certificates and other similar information. The majority of the companies' top 
executives interviewed believed that the "two deparlinenIs areful4v compleinentai-v in 
terins qf their scope and objeclives, " -as one CEO stated. In contrast, most of the 
analysts believed that the "two departinenis work competitively " and not in a 
complementary way. while the maýjority of the institutional investors feel that "there 
exists a cot? flicting symbiosis of the IR and the regiStiý, office ", and they act only 
partially in a complementary way. In smaller companies. the registry office, owing to 
cost savings and non qualified communication people, "tackles and deals with more 
complex disclosure issues" such as general assemblies, press releases. etc. and, as this 
research shows (8.1), the result is that these companies are mostly introverted and 
passive in reference to their communication. 46% and 69% of the medium and small 
capitalization firms stated that they have only a "registi f -v q. ) a fice" and they are "s iisfied" 
with their communication policies. -On the contrary, the big capitalization listed fin-ns 
operate both IR and registry offices and they indicated that "the two offices' activities 
are cooperative and efficient ". As an IRO mentioned, the IR office serves mostly "the 
institutional and big private investors, while the registry office takes care of the day-lo- 
day, low end and value added activities " (i. e. dividend payout, change of address, share 
ownership transfers, etc. ), mostly of the small shareholders. This arrangement leaves 
enough time and space for the IRO to "deal effectively and efficienth, with the major 
shareholders and simultaneously with the large private investors-shareholders " by 
informing and implementing IR policies. as another IRO stated. It is recommended that 
the registry office should be a subdivision of the IR office and coordinate with the IROs 
in ten-ns of information content and communication tactics. 
b) External Substitution issues: Cooperation and Replacement of the IR office by the 
analysts and media people 
As shown in chapter 8.3, most executives running the bigger corporations believed that 
they do not face substitution problems from analysts and journalists. In contrast, most of 
the executives from the small and medium size companies stated that "the 
intermediaries create coininunication problenis and noise ". Most of the analysts 
interviewed accepted the existence of duplication and even "the replacenient of the 
IRO, y' ýffbris and actiOties, especialli, ii, hen the IR offices are /lot organised and well 
ffinciloned, " as one local analyst said. The majority of the institutional investors 
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interviewed also accepted possible duplication of the corporate communication, more 
from the analysts and less from the journalists and especially for the smaller 
capitalization companies. 
9.5 Corporate communication and IR tools 
In this section, implications of the corporate communication of the Greek companies 
and the execution of their IR programme are described. In other words, the means by 
which the listed companies communicate with the analysts. the fund managers and the 
other market participants, along with the importance of the different means of 
communications, are evaluated. As mentioned previously. the IROs can supply 
company information through the regulated standardized channels and/or through 
intermediary market players and/or through voluntary means. The current research' 
focused mostly on the voluntary IR means that provide a proactive effort and essence to 
the Greek companies and the market (chapter 8.5). It was found that the Greek firms 
which are committed to good communication and try voluntarily to be visible on all 
financial markets do their best in terrns of communication and investor relations, by 
going beyond the regulatory framework. 
9.5.1 Regulated corporate disclosure and -IR communication tools 
As described in chapter 3, the mandatory corporate disclosure for the listed companies 
is initiated, recommended,, enforced and controlled mostly by the Greek SEC (the 
Capital Market Committee). This takes place in return through the corporate governance 
directives and other securities' regulations and laws. As the research indicates, it is 
accepted as given by the analysts, fund managers and other market players. For 
instance, the companies are obliged to "publish a highýv analytical and bulky annual 
report in Greek, bqfoi-e the ordinai-y annual assembly in June", in order to be 
distributed, read, approved and sometimes voted for in the general meetings. But only 
half of the companies interviewed produce annual reports in English, and even fewer 
publish them on a regular basis (i. e. every year). 
a) Corporate Governance and IR 
Most of the listed companies interviewed believed in the strong relationship and 
interdependence between the CG and the IR. The majority of the analysts as well as the 
fund managers suggested the existence of strong or moderate interdependence and 
poslt]N, c relationship between IR policies and Corporate Governance (CG) principles. 
b) Greek and EU Corporate Governance 
The majority of the executives described the necessary. speedy and obligatory 
com-ci-gence of the local and EU Corporate Governance platform (Chapter 8.4). A 
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sound-example is the mandatory application across the EU markets of the Internat, onal 
Financial Reporting System (IFRS) or IAS as well as the focused but still discretionary 
consideration and implementation of Corporate Social ResponsIbIlIty (CSR) issues. All 
analysts and fund managers also confirmed the implementation of EU corporate 
governance regulations across all European markets. the speedy convergence and the,, - 
positive role in the Greek market place. One London based analyst maintained that "the 
convergence of the regulations across inarkets and countries helps the Greek IROs, 
since thev use similar if not the saine mandatory connnunj*cation channels as do IROs in 
other countries ". 
c) Maturity of the IR fiinction and IR Life Cycle stages 
Most of the executives interviewed, as well as the analysts and the fund managers. 
accepted that the Greek IR profession is at its early stages and can learn much from 
experienced IROs, the local IR association as well as other industry societies. An 
implication from the interviews is that the local IR society (HIRI) should educate or 
train professionals in the smaller capitalization firrns on how to implement effective IR 
programmes and policies. Another implication is for the CMC to try to recommend the 
creation of an IR department in addition to the "inandatoi-y " shareholder registry office. 
The interviewees, however, gave no clear answer or indication to the possibility of a 
CMC recommendation, "examining and approving the qualýfications of the JROs and 
prospective IROs ". One local fund manager added. "It is up to the top inanagenient to 
comprehend the necessity of ýhe IR function and the qualiti! of the JR0, and proceed to 
the implementation of their communi . cati . on polic_v ". HIRI, as suggested in 8.4, can help 
the medium and small Greek companies in particular to expose their investment cases 
abroad through industry conferences and Greek days where local companies present in 
major financial centres. 
d) Greek industry structure and IR 
All the executives interviewed pinpointed the different set up which exists in Greece in 
terrns of "industry culture and structure that affects the application of the mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure policies, " one CFO mentioned. For instance, the small size, 
the family dimension, involvement and in most cases control and manipulation the 
strategic orientation and outlook etc., are only some of the factors that affect the 
companies' communication policies. Indeed, 88% of the large capitalization companies, 
32'() and 49% of the medium and small size companies agree on "the particularities of 
the Greek inarket structure ". The small percentages from the smaller companies. as 
mcritioned in 8.4, and emerges from the interviews. are proof that these 'Jainilil, 
structured companies take inore t1ine to iniliaie changes towards better disclosure, 
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coiporaie social responsibiliýv, pi-qPssional management, auditing, and shareholder 
value creation, " as one CEO stated. The majority of analysts and institutional investors 
also pinpointed the particularities of the Greek market. especially the 'fibrination of the 
industi-v structure, the aniiýv-sniall si7e of the listed companies, the profile of inqj'or fi 
shareholders ", even the inexperience of the top management, as a global fund manager 
mentioned, that resembles more closely the -entrepreneurial stý'le " rather than growing 
global companies being run by professional management. 
9.5.2 Corporate disclosure via intermediaries and IR tools 
As mentioned in chapter 4. the IROs can utilize the influence, the knowledge and the 
analytical capabilities of the market intermediaries to convey the company's message to 
the market. This research identifies and focuses on two major intermediary groups: 
mostly the sell side analysts and partly the business journalists. The findings show that' 
both play an important role in the communication process, and sometimes either replace 
or even create so much information noise that it is detrimental to the IR departments and 
consequently to the listed companies, as described previously in this chapter. 
1) Analysis as communication channels and IR means 
Analyst communication, especially through the analysts' reports or coverage, is 
considered by the listed firms to be of high importance, as chapter 8.8 shows. Most of 
the company executives interviewed stated that one of the first questions both local and 
global fund managers ask them is "who covers thein? " The value of these reports 
increases if they are written in both Greek and English. For their part, the analysts 
interviewed valued their "product " moderately as a communicator of company's 
information. However, the fund managers believed in the "high value of the analysts' 
reports, especial4l- if they are continuous and analyze senii-annual and quarterly 
financial results, - as one said. They also indicated that analysts' reports "help them in 
their investment decisions and consult with these reports before they invest in a stock" 
(chapter 8.8). 
a) Conipany'sftedback on sell side analysts' reports 
The feedback to the analysts' reports is considered to be of high value by the executives, 
but mostly by the analysts and the fund managers. In particular, as reported in chapter 8 
(i. e. 8.5,8.8), the company's executives, in particular the IROs, confirm reasonable 
forecasts by the analysts, comment on their profit estimations and also give guidance on 
other financial. strategic and operational issues. t7 
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b) Compaiqs relationship with sell side analysis 
In the current grounded research. acceptance, trust and close relationship are 
demonstrated amongst the top management. the analysts and the fund managers. The 
majority of the executives interviewed believed that analyst meetings and presentations 
as well as telephone conversations with them are very important in the corporate 
communication. Most of the executives mentioned (chapter 8.6) the objectivity and non- 
biased effort by the analysts to evaluate the listed companies, "withouifiocusing either 
on the short-terni profitability or on the long-terni prospects, therqfore without losing 
sight of the current value of the conipanies, as one IRO said. The analysts interviewed 
provided that communication through email, the telephone, and mail. as well as the 
personal contact with the IROs, builds and continuously strengthens relationships with 
them in order to avoid surprises and information noise. 
c) Analysts' substitution effects of the ]Rfunction 
The majority of the executives interviewed, as mentioned previously in this chapter, 
suggested that the sell side analysts operate in a complementary mode with the IR 
people. However, a minority of the executives interviewed, especially those from the 
small capitalization stocks,, argued that the deficiency of nonqualified IROs and well 
organized and, structured IR offices invite analysts to replace the official company 
voice. This substitution creates unnecessary noise and misinfori-nation, which in turn 
distorts the communication of company's information and widens the information 
asymmetry. In contrast, the analysts interviewed observed "no substitution but 
nioderate duplication" and the fund managers accepted moderate overlapping (chapter 
8.3). 
d) The communication role of the analysts' dailies 
Most of the Chairmen, CEOs and CFOs interviewed argued that the dailies by the sell 
side do not create any disclosure problems for their companies. They are confident that 
the dailies promote their investment cases, and stated that is up to the IROs to evaluate 
the communication weight of the dailies. The IROs interviewed mentioned that the 
"exposure through the dailies, ineasured bY the calls and site visits their conipanies 
accept qfier the publication and distribution of these dailies, can be considered as ftee 
n7arketing and advertising to the market players ", and especially those who "invest in 
Greek stocks ". The majority of the local and global analysts interviewed believe that the 
"dailies especially the local analysts' dailies, 1. are adding value to the h7forination 
process They also suggest "the inipartialiti, and objectiviýy qf the dailies ", since the 
analysts' i-cputation, the following and reading by the fund managers, the checking by 
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the SEC watch dogs among others are excellent motivators for unbiased dailies. The 
local analysts also stressed their tendency to "avoid niedia sourcesfor their dailies and 
the *r fficial companys 'qformation ". Along the . 
ýbrt to depend on reliable, d )-ecl and o 
same lines. most of the fund managers interviewed indicated that these dailies by the 
sel I side "do not create disclosure problems or corporaie governance complications to 
the listedfirins ", and are useful to the communication of company's information owing 
to the frequency, objectivity and global reach of the dailies. 
11) Financialjournalists as communication channels and IR ineans 
Corporate communication via the other important inten-nediary group, the financial 
journalists, especially through their reports in the newspapers, magazines and TV, is 
lightly investigated in the current research. As chapter 8.3 shows, many negative 
quotes " on the media role were taped during the interviews with the companies" 
executives especially from the smaller companies. Some executives stated that "there is 
IR substitution - but they accepted the "indirect communication process and possible 
inishiforinalion and coqfusion created by the inedia people ". It is a challenge for future 
research since "in this sinall market, it plays a vital role in the corporate 
communication and affects the companies as ivel/ as the other marketforces " as a CEO 
stated. "The journalists affect our communication and many times misinform the 
fioreign institutional inoney managers " another CEO mentioned. "We try to avoid them 
bqfore the publication of our results but they always write something in advance" a 
CFO reported. "It takes us a lot of energy, time andpersuasion to disappear the noise 
that thev create, a BoD chain-nan mentioned. Possible communication 
misinformation, even IR substitution by the local journalists was suggested by the 
analysts interviewed, but not so much by the fund managers interviewed (chapters 9.3, 
10.3). "We take the published information as reliable since it is appears in the 
ne-",, spapers, but sometimes it is not, "a London based analyst said. "Yes, we have 
learnt the Greek inedia workings very well and we always cross check with the 
companies, "a global fund manager stated. The majority of the interviewees, especially 
the executives of the listed companies, indicated that this area should be researched 
more. 
a) Jouriialists'substitution effects of the IRfunction 
a Most of the executives interviewed accepted that the medi articles create disclosure 
problems or frequently substitute official announcements by the company. Only a 
minority Irom the large capitalization companies. which have the means and the power 
to diffuse any premature writings and newspaper articles, pinpointed no media 
1. ý 
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substitution or replacement issues. Therefore. the majority of the listed firms are at least 
suspicious, if not afraid. of the media substitution of the communication process, and for 
them an "indirect communication process " exists which distorts truthful. correct and 
reliable company information and creates information noise. which in tum affects share 
price, trading behaviour and shareholders' appetite. As mentioned in chapter 8.3. 
"incorrect or misinjbi-ined articles by journalists create thne-consU777ing disclosure 
problems and information side e cts" (i. e. wasted time, confusion. misleading ffie III 
information, wrong interpretation, etc. ). The infon-nation conveyed through these 
newspapers wastes time for the company's management, confuses the investors and 
affects negatively the credibility of the company's management and disclosure policies. 
Therefore , it is 
highly recommended that the companies, in order to avoid information 
noise, should assign specialized persons to talk to the media. On the contrary, the local 
analysts interviewed view the media articles as important company disclosure and 
sometimes as a source of "primary company datafor their own dailies". As noted 
before, frequently the analysts' dailies have become the users of the indirect primary 
data and company information, since the journalists generate them in the Greek 
language and the analysts translate them into English in order to inform their clients. 
The global analysts accept that substitution might take place, but they stressed that 
11 usually these kinds of phenomena exist when the IR office is weak or non-exisieni ". 
The majority of the fund managers doubt if the journalists' articles create any 
substitution effects for the IR and they declared that "the. v even capitaliZe on the value 
that these articles contribute". Some of them even believe that the articles are 
complementary and to the benefit of the IR function. It probably shows that the fund 
managers are "Ihirst)ý, " for more and regular company information. 
111) IR consultants as communication channels and IR ineans 
As mentioned in chapters 2.4.4 and 5.3.3, the development and proliferation of the IR 
profession in Greece and the consequent expansion of the IR idea in the Greek market 
place were partly motivated, initiated and promoted by the London based IR consulting 
fin-ns during the multiple listings of the Greek companies. This research found that only 
few foreign (and local) IR consultants operate in the market place owing to the cost 
element as well as disbelief and misunderstanding by the top executives such as the 
CEO, the CFO and the BoD Chairman. "Theýv chai-ge a lot of nioney and thev do not 
con7pi-chend the Gi-eek business conduct, "a CFO mentioned. "These people believe 
that ihevcan qppýy the London policies hei-e, " another CFO added. 
a) E. vteriial IR com-, vultants in the conipaiývs communication 
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As indicated in chapter 8.2. on average more than 2/3 of the listed companies do not use 
the services of the IR consultants. As mentioned In previous chapters, the IR consultants 
based in London charge high fees for their services. This. when coupled with the lack 
of clarity, misunderstanding and misperception of the IR operation line, and, more 
important, the vagueness of the IR results and effectiveness, cause the top managers to 
shy away from hiring external IR consultants. It is recommended that the London based 
consultants should educate and put in place a "C0110-ete IR plan with specific tasks and 
results oriented iiineiable, " as a CEO stated, to the senior management, and then "we 
are ready to accept the17- IRPI-OgM7711ne into OU7- integMtea`Mporate cominunication 
policY, " he added. It is also indicated in 8.2. only few of the analysts and fund managers 
interviewed identified sorne companies that outsource IR activities to external 
consultants, but they suggested these services since they themselves and their end' 
clients demand high valued IR services through direct, timely, exact and reliable 
company information and the IR specialists are experienced in advising and delivering 
such services. 
b) Related IR consultants in the company's communication 
The majority of executives interviewed (8.2) declared that they do not use services from 
IR professionals, such as Annual Report Specialists, editors, targeting specialists, et al., 
but they do employ services like annual report printers, editors etc.; this is especially the 
case among the firms that publish Annual Reports in English. Nevertheless, most senior 
executives from smaller capitalization firms indicated the need to employ the services of 
global IR related consultants, owing to the non existence of internal and local IR 
expertise and tools. The analysts and the fund managers emphasized that the listed 
companies "should seek outside help in order to iniprove their conimunication tools, 
process, thning and inessage in English ". 
IV) AuditorslLawjlers and other intermediaries as communication channels and IR 
ineans 
The current grounded research has not focused on other inten-nediary groups and their 
role in the corporate communication; these are a subject for future research. The 
auditors' work has become more standardised as a result of the EU IFRS accounting 
rules and they could not affect the communication process and product (i. e. financial 
statements). 
a) A 11difors' role on the coinpanýy 7s corporate disclosure policies 
As indicated in 8.3.8. the majority of company executives interviewed consider that the 
auditors do not play any role on the company's disclosure Policies. 
9.5.3 1101unlaiý), coiporate disclosure and IR ineans 
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rom As this research indicates, the Greek companies. in order to distinguish themselves f 
the other firms, should Initiate and apply creative communication strategies and 
voluntarily employ means sucb as conference calls. one-to-one meetings and 
roadshows, multi language web sites. etc. The research also shows the preference of 
market players interviewed in terms of IR tools and identifies as the most effective 
infon-nation channels the one-to-one meetings, the use of e-majil and telephone among 
others. 
1. Group presentations 
These presentations can take the form either of one company presenting to analysts. 
fund managers, bankers, etc., or of a group of four or five listed companies presenting to 
a diverse audience of market players. Most of the top managers interviewed stated that 
the group conferences are very important because "the. l,, expose the investment stoi-y to 
many people as well as updating on financial results, strategy and company's 
operations, " as one CEO mentioned. Also, "they split the cost aniong the participating 
companies "; "they learn ftom the other presenters "; and "they attract more people due 
to conipany and industry diversity, " as some executives mentioned. 
Table 9.3: Who represents the company in group meetings? 
Executive FTSE/ASE 20 (%) FTSE/ASE 40 (%) FTSE/ASE 80 (%) 
Chain-nan of BoD 13 52 60 
_ CEO 38 60 48 
CFO loo 76 57 
IRO loo 76 _ 69 
Marketing Director 6 8 _ - 
Cbief Accountant 6 8 9 
Extemal IR Consultant 12 4 - 
Participation in group conferences is indeed beneficial for companies from an emerging 
market like the Greek one, because it enables companies to learn about IR techniques 
(learn from other presenters' methods of presenting, styles, tactics, annual reports, etc. ) 
and it can be more promotional as industry group conferences. HIRI (the local IR 
society) and the author (as president of HIRI) have organized the group presentations of 
many Greek companies to targeted financial centers such as Frankfurt, Geneva, Zurich, 
Milan, Paris, etc., during the last five years and these presentations have proved to be an 
effective form of communication, especially to those financial markets that hardly know 
the Greek market. The analysts and the fund managers interviewed also evaluated 
highly and provided that they prefer group roadshows as an efficient means of company 
inforniation. The participation rate in these group conferences is sat] sfactory and the 
213 
highest ranking officials are involved, as the research indicates which proves the 
importance of this communication channel. 
2. Private or one-to-one meetings 
Private meetings are recorded as the highest preference for the majority of the company 
executives and these meetings are the "high-end iools for the IRO and the most 
challenging. fbi- the company, " as one CEO stated. "Our senior management commits a 
lot qf iin7e to the privale ineetMgS and conS7ders them to be of high added value to the 
corporate conin7unican'on P7-Ocess, "a BoD chairman also stated. As the current 
research shows, the smaller the company, the bigger the propensity to employ one-to- 
one meetings as an effective form of corporate disclosure (chapter 8.5). The same 
applies to the intermediaries and especially the end users, since they like to create direct 
communication with the companies which they own. Because of the high importance of 
the private meetings, the IR office should initiate more one-to-one meetings and focus 
on targeting the "proper inarket pai-ticipants, " as one IRO suggested. In terms of 
information distributed, the analysts indicated that the explanation of financial results, 
the breakdown of figures by line of business and geography, the future projections and 
cash flows all need to be given more attention by the companies (Table 8.14). The fund 
managers indicated their need to receive more and detailed information on the 
company's specific activities (such as profitability and sales forecasts, cash flow 
situation, dividend policy, etc. ) rather than macroeconomic trends (table 8.15). That 
ýIreflects on the qualification qf the IRO since helshe should be able to collect, distribute 
and explain the nunibers intelligentýv and in depth, " as one local fund manager 
mentioned. 
Table 9.4: Who represents the company in the private meetings? 
Executive FTSE/ASE 20 (%) FTSE/ASE 40 (%) FTSE/ASE 80 (%) 
Chain-nan of BoD 38 80 75 
CEO 40 85 80 
CFO 100 100 100 
IRO 100 100 100 
Marketing Director I - - Chief Accountant 1 5 
External IR Consultant - - As implied trom this grounded research, the most effective way Of communication for 
the IR practitioners and consequently for attracting foreign funds into the Greek money 
market is the direct contact with the foreign institutional investors, rather than via the 
different intermediary market players. The infonnal or individual or one-to-one meeting 
is an imperative IR too] for the Greek listed companies for not only the foreign 
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institutional investors but also the analysts and other agents of the stock market. who 
have formed a good or bad idea and perception of Greece and the Greek stock market. 
II Ity. poor Their bias is entrenched in the uncertainty. lack of confidence and reliabili 
information and inconsistency concerning corporate governance issues. The concept of 
direct and proper infori-nation to the global fund management community. especially by 
visiting their offices and briefing them on the history and perspective of a company. is 
the best way of selling that company's share. As the research indicates. the majority of 
the IROs believe that the one-to-one meetings where the target is the institutional 
investors are the most effective communication too]. "Since thel, are not confing lo us, 
we have to pay them (thefýnd managers) a visit, " one IRO declared, and "revisit (thein) 
fi-equently through a consistent roadshow targeted plan, " another IRO stated. Some 
academic research in the IR area leads to similar if not the same conclusions. As 
mentioned in chapter 6, the study by Marston (1996b) on 547 listed companies in the 
London Stock Exchange, the study by Holland (1997) on 33 CFOs listed companies in 
the LSE and the research by Eccles and Marvinac (1995) on 200 CFAs and 200 FMs in 
the USA, to name a few, also concluded that the individual meetings are the most 
effective means of communication. Annual surveys, conducted by the internationally 
recognized specialized magazine, (i. e. IR Magazine-Yearbook 2002, page. 6) on the 200 
largest European companies, for the European Institutional Investors provide that the 
most effective communication means is the one-to-one meeting (79%, as shown by the 
table below). 
Table 9.5: Effective IR communication tools 
European 
Companies 
European 
Companies 
Greek 
Companies 
Greek 
Companies 
Greek 
Companies 
Greek 
Companies 
Greek 
Com anies 
Greek 
Companies 
Greek 
Companies 
Institutional 
Investors 
Private 
Investors 
FTSE/ASE, 
20 
FTSE/ASE 
40 
FTSE/ASE 
80 
Local 
CFAs 
Global 
CFAs 
Local 
FMs 
Global 
FMs 
Group Meetings 14 12 44 32 40 24 10 77 100 
Private Meetings 79 8 88 92 94 100 100 100 100 
Telephone - - 94 76 91 88 100 85 89 
Reports feedback - - 88 100 91 - 23 100 
Direct Mail 0 14 94 92 86 3 - 54 84 
Site Visits - - 100 96 80 29 70 100 100 
Analyst coverage 100 88 77 12 - 69 100 
Ernall 100 100 94 94 100 100 100 
Conference Calls 1 44 20 6 32 100 T4- 14 
Internet 50 94 92 94 24 8 62 84 
Web casting 3 19 12 9 - - - - 
S11ON\ 
Public Relations 7 
3(-)Ulct:. lix ý. Vw- """ 
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Table 9.5 shows clearly that private meetings get the highest ranking among European 
and Greek companies compared with other communication tools. Private meetings can 
take place either on the company premises (i. e. meetings in the company's headquarters 
during site visits) or on the other market players' offices (i. e. meetings in the fund 
managers' headquarters during roadshows). The process in a private meeting on the 
company's premises, as identified by the interviewees in the current and previous 
research (Demos, 2002c). can be as follows. The IRO meets with the analyst and the 
investors first, for an adequate length of time, in order to communicate to them the basic 
updated information such as financial and operational results, trends, competition, etc. 
Then the CFO steps into the meeting room ilio explain the financials and value the 
company's invesiments ". The CEO later enters the meeting "to provide the strategic 
orientation of* the coinpan. i, " and finally the Chain-nan of the Board of Directors 
concludes the meeting "to comment on the business environment, corporate governance 
issues, government relationships " and other macroeconomic phenomena. A major task 
for the IRO during the meeting is to make notes, highlight unanswered questions, 
observe body language and possibly direct and correct the management. The IRO also 
either at the beginning or at the end supplies the visitors with a package of company 
information or a disc. Implications for the process in a private meeting on the fund 
managers' headquarters, during a tactical or proactive roadshow, have been drawn from 
the interviewees in the current and previous research (Demos, 2002d), in reference to: 
the participation of senior executives, (i. e. most of the fund managers want "to meet 
with the CEO and CFO'), - time punctuality issues (i. e. "being latefor an appointment 
diffuses the roadshow effort, "a London based fund manager stated); conduct issues 
(i. e. "many Greek executives light a cigarette without even asking, " another global FM 
mentioned), telephone issues (i. e. "using the cell phone is unacceptable during a 
ineeling, - another FM advised); body language issues (i. e. "talking in Greek or with 
body language among themselves during the meeting is observed with Greeks, "a FM 
from London documented). 
3. Telephone use 
All companies use the telephone extensively. especially the mobile telephone, since 
is of high infon-nation communication over the phone II value, as those interviewed 
declared. The research (chapter 8.7) showed that the IROs of the smaller companies use 
the phone less than the CFOs and the BoD Chairman, that is because "our JR0 is not 
able and qualýficd to coni, c. i- the proper coinpanv in ortnation and answer difficult ý 
fi 
questions, one CFO mentioned. and consequently this job beconies injý 
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responsibilit), ". One implementation made clear from the research is that the smaller 
capitalization companies should try to train their IROs to accept the calls by the market 
players and "protect us b_v, creating a buffer zone betiveen us and the analysts and 
especialIv the Journalists, " one CEO suggested. The Greek IROs should also try to 
make notes from the telephone conversations in order to follow up with the requests. 
and, most important, "to accordingýv inforin the top inanageinent (? f i4, hat it ivas said 
over the telephone conversation at the specific iiine, " as another CEO recommended. 
4. Direct Mail 
Since internet penetration in Greece is very low, and given the cultural dimension of the 
local market, companies communicate a great deal through direct mail by sending and 
receiving annual reports, marketing tools, press and quarterly releases, CEOs' letters, 
etc., as shown in chapter 8.9. The IROs should, however, -ti-v to communicate the same 
iqforniation bY other means, such as email, since sometimes the postal. /unction is 
neither reliable nor quick, " one analyst suggested. 
5. On-site visits to companies 
As noted in chapter 8.5, visits to the company headquarters and other operation facilities 
are used extensively in Greece. The Association of the Greek Fund Managers 
implements the "site visits " regularly in their annual programme and these represent a 
major part of their company information activity. 
6. E-mail 
As reported by those interviewed (and shown in table 9.5), the use of email (as also 
named internet financial reporting) is one of the leading means of communication, 
owing to its speed, cost effectiveness, directness and easiness. E-mail is used 
extensively to deal with questions from analysts, FMs, bankers, et aL, and to send press 
releases, to file official announcements, and obtain feedback from the market (8.11). 
7. Disclosure via Internet sites 
Website communication is also extensively used and highly appreciated by all market 
players as well as the Greek companies. As the research indicates (8.13), the majority of 
the firms use their web site as an authoritative, complete and official information source 
for shareholders and stakeholders alike. The website is an information tool that covers 
the "equivalent in rination " principle and belongs to the public domain Infori-nati ýfo III ion set 
which satisfies many Corporate Governance guiding principles. Some of the analysts 
and fund managers interviewed indicated that the sites "need a lot of upgrading and 
lnodýflcaiion in order to becoine inore infortnation-releasing tools ". As a London based 
CFA mentioned. "the creation of an liffibrination eqnIvalent EngliSh section " as well as 
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multi-language sections on the sites is strongly recommended. In order for the Greek 
companies to promote themselves effectively into specific markets, they should 
1. translate inajor sections of the lqforinatlon into Gernion, French, Russian, even 
Arabic, "a global fund manager suggested. These customized language sections could 
"becoine an efficieni connnunication tool fbi- increasing the nuinber of a targeied 
counlrv's shareholders, " another global analyst suggested. In addition, the companies 
collect and register the names of those who visit the website seeking information about 
the company. Sophisticated website management from the companies is also observed 
and it is measured by the links that the company's site has with site promoters, industry 
search engines and others. 
8. Conference calls 
Conference calls have not been established in Greece as an effective and efficient, 
communication channel and only some of the big capitalization companies employ it 
(8.12). The infori-nation intermediaries as well as the information end users, especially 
the global ones, value this too] of communication highly. The benefit of this 
communication too] is to "interaciiveli, present and explain the financial results on a 
consistent base every quarter, "a London fund manager stated. The challenge and the 
recommendation for most Greek companies are to utilize the conference calls. 
9. Web casting 
Web casting is at a "Prinfilive" stage in Greece, as indicated by all those interviewed, 
despite the beneficial dimension of this communication too]. As table 9.5 shows, video 
and audio web casting is rarely used, even in Europe. 
10. Roadshows communication 
The roadshow communication policy is much appreciated and implemented by most 
Greek companies, and, as mentioned by the executives interviewed, it is an effective 
channel "to increase the company's visibility, share liquidity and capital attraction and 
consequently investment, YY as a CEO mentioned. According to the current research, the 
bigger companies offer mostly relationship roadshows, while the smaller capitalization 
companies prefer proactive roadshows (chapter 8.10). All the analysts and fund 
managers interviewed prefer the roadshow communication policy since it improves 
understanding of the investment case as well as making it possible "to meet with the 
inanag, enient personalli"'. However, they believe that the Greek companies should 
"plan more roadshows and the . 
/ull spectrion of the lop management should 
pariicipaie". "We expect to rneet the company's insiders at least once per year, " one 
global ftind manager said. It falls within the responsibility of the IROs to plan and 
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execute the roadshows to keep the relationship "close and alh, e '', as another fund 
manager stated. The research also shows that the responsibility of the IROS to organize 
proactive roadshows is a difficult task. since he/she has to initiate. target and match the 
company and its investment story with the appropriate financial market, fund managers 
and prospective investors. As preparatory work for these roadshoNA's. the task of the 
IROs is "to Prepare the logistics as well as the IR secondari, tools such as presentation, 
ftiendly user si . le, illustrative annual report, analysts' coverage reports by the sell 
side, - as one IRO mentioned. 
I]. Multiple Listings and corporate disclosure 
The grounded research shows (8.2) that the benefits of the multiple listings are 
comprehended by the top executives. Their perceptions are divided mainly between the 
believers in moderate benefits for the dual listing and those who perceive major 
influences and gains, especially to the IR function. the disclosure process, the liquidity 
and perfon-nance of the stocks, and the company's capital cost. The importance of dual 
listing is also accepted by the sell side analysts because of the "ease andprýferencefior 
the disclosure policies that dual listed conipanies have and follolv ". The same was 
answered by the institutional investors interviewed, although the local fund managers 
mentioned that. a company can "disclose adequate h? forniaiion voluntariýv andproinote 
its stock with or without a dual listing". In conclusion, it is recommended that the IR 
department should "promote the underlying stock to the inarket-countiý, fi-oin which 
investors are coining andlor in which the conipan_-v has operations ". An effective 
promotion and creation of solid confidence level with these country's funds is "to list in 
the domestic exchange for communication in the local language, as well as for trading, 
liquidity, coverage and even attraction of retail investors, " as a global fund manager 
suggested. As the financial analysts also mentioned, some differences between ASE 
only listed and dual listed companies can be identified, not so much in the content and 
substance (since lately the compulsory rules have become uniform and standardised 
across the European Union, North American and Asian markets) but in the 'functioning, 
inentalitv, proactive action, perception, and even behaviour of the top inanagenient ", 
especially since the lROs have to deal with multi-filings, strict corporate governance 
and mandatory disclosure policies that make them more alert, quicker to act and 
respond, more flexible and efficient. The opening of an IR office in the NYC to cater for 
the US and Canadian institutional investors and analysts. and another one in London, is 
highly recommended for most companies and is less costly than outsourcing the job. 
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9.6 IR Effectiveness 
The next step in the aforementioned IR act, %,, ty framework (Figure 9-1) is to evaluate 
the effectiveness of IR, based on the research results. 
a) Communicating with the top management of the listed companies 
As the grounded research indicates. the majority of analysts and fund managers 
interviewed have a direct line of communication with the top management of the listed 
companies, especiallv those on which they write reports and in which they invest. In 
particular, the analysts. as well as the London-based fund managers, prefer to talk to 
IROs. CFOs, CEOs, and the BoD Chairman, in order of importance, while the local 
institutional investors prefer to speak to IROs. CEOs. CFOs, and the BoD Chairman 
(Table 8.4, Table 8.5). It may be concluded that both local and global analysts and fund 
managers recognize the IROs as "a reliable source of information and pi-incipal, 
conununicalion partner in the conipan-1 , ". 
b IROs participation hi the communication process 
The majority of the analysts and fund managers interviewed know the IROs in person 
communicate and meet with them frequently (8.1). 
c) IROs'providing quafifj7 of information 
The majority of the local analysts reported satisfaction with the explanations by the 
Greek IROs on almost every subject, such as strategy, competition, financials, 
marketing, operations, personnel and forecasts. The CFAs interviewed also emphasized 
that "the IROs are veri, strong in conimunicatin a financial figures ", since most of them 
were trained and worked as financial analysts and/or have a finance and accounting 
background. The London-based analysts were also satisfied with the strategic as well as 
the financial analysis by the IROs (chapter 8.1). The local and global fund managers 
reported that they frequently and satisfactorily discuss and analyze equally the strategy, 
implementation and financial situation of the companies. The fund managers also added 
that their buy-side analysts, as the people who analyse and advise them, communicate 
constantly with the IROs, since "although the JR people represent either the biggest 
shareholder andlor the senior managers (the conipanv's insiders), they reveal what 
realli, is happening in this company, " as one global FM mentioned, and because "as 
professionals, lheýv liýý to conve. v the real company situation, " as another global FM 
stated, in order to avoid any illegal conduct. to uphold their reputation in the market 
place, etc. 
d) Time coiiceriis 
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In terms of time spent with the companies. or better. the IROs. the local analysts 
interviewed indicated that they devote on average one month annually to doing so. 
while the global analysts indicated that they spend on average half a month per year 
(chapter 8.0. The local fund managers reported that they talk to the IR office of the 
targeted listed companies on average 40 days per year, while the global ones talk to the 
companies 20 days per year on average. -The conclusion is that both the analysts and the 
fund managers are interested in their investments and therefore keep communications 
open and are on line with the IROs. Issues for further research are: who initiates the 
talk; is it the IRO who seeks communication; is it the analyst or the fund manager who 
asks first? Referring to the speed of the IROs, the research found that the local analysts 
and fund managers receive answers promptly and efficiently. but they observed that 
"delays are caused h. y the inefficiency of other departments in the conlpal'ýv ", such as 
accounting, marketing, supplies, R&D. etc. (chapter 8.1). In addition, the interviewees 
reported that the IROs try to convey and disclose quality information to the market, but 
sometimes the top management and other insiders have "different objectives, in terins of 
the thning, quality, reliabiliýv and symmetry of information, " as one local FM stated. On 
the other band,, the research indicated that the information speed to the global analysts is 
faster from the IR offices, infori-nation reaches there within a day in most cases and 
within a couple of days in the worst case scenario. This implies that the companies are 
more sensitive to the requests of the global analysts, since both the IR departments and 
the top executives release information (in English) more easily and with more speed to 
London based analysts and fund managers. 
e) IROs overall effectiveness 
As the grounded research shows, the top executives (CEOs, CFOs and BoD Chain-nan) 
of many listed companies accept and expect that the IRO, as an educated and 
experienced professional, "can analyze, understand, give feedback, evaluate the 
company's business model, advise the board" as a CEO stated. However, the research 
indicates that most of the executives "do not leave enough space to the JR0s tojunction 
proactivelv, imaginatively, and creatively, " as one IRO stated. Overall, while 2/3 of the 
local and global analysts are satisfied with the service of the IROs, the remaining 1/3 
expect better, faster and more reliable infori-nation from them (8.1). Although it is 
concluded that overall the Greek IR departments serve these infori-nation inten-nediaries 
well, more is expected by them. In addition. the interviews indicate that the IR 
departments without IROs "do not serve the inarket pla. vers satisfactorilv, nor do they 
correct and thnell, fieedback to in. 1, analisis'reports, "a director of research stated. 
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Findings from the interviews with the local and global fund managers show that the end 
pped o infon-nation users accepted that the majority of "the Greek JR0s are well equi I 
respond and help thein to understand and decide u on their current and future p 
invesiments on the li . sted company, " as one fund manager mentioned. As evidenced in 
previous chapters, the global fund managers interviewed in particular deal with and 
invest in only big and some medium capitalization companies, which overcome the 
liquidity and free float concerns, that the smaller listed fin-ns confront in almost every 
trading day. As also reported by many analysts and fund managers during the 
interviews, "the personalli. 1, dimension of the JR0s plays a veiý,, important role in the 
disclosure business ". In addition, the company information requirements by the end 
users, such as the institutional investors, existing and prospective shareholders, directly 
to the IROs or indirectly through the information inten-nediaries such as the financial' 
analysts, constantly guide and motivate the IROs to be better and faster in 
communicating reliable. faster and critical infon-nation. 
fi 141hat constitutes a good and effective IR office? 
As mentioned in 8.1, an effective IR department should "provide accurate, credible, 
s_vsteinatic and in-depth company information ", and the IRO should have a detailed 
"knowledge of the conipany, knowledge of the market and the sector, good knowledge 
of strategic matters andfinancialfigures 
g) Intra-conimunication 
The analysts and fund managers interviewed indicated that they prefer to communicate 
mainly with the IR office but many times they are directed to other company officials 
(such as those in the registry department, accounting, marketing, R&D, etc. ) when "they 
do not obtain the required infon-nation" or the IRO is not capable of answering their 
questions or there is no IR department, etc. When they do not talk to an official assigned 
spokesperson, the global analysts and fund managers reported that they "become 
confused and are discouraged from investing in this company". Some even described 
this process as a "Byzantine labyrinth" and declared that they "cannot cope with this 
communication process due to language barriers, time and reliability concems". Only 
some interviewees accepted that they talk to other company departments, by necessity 
and on a small scale, but they do prefer to talk to an IRO. The Greek fund managers 
interviewed also indicated their preference for the same line of communication and 
recommend the establishment and upgrading of the intra-company communication. 
Despite that. they can communicate in Greek with all company departments. 
h) De,, -vignaled officialspokesperson 
1) 1) 1) 
The majority of the analysts and fund managers Interviewed prefer that the IRO is the 
company's spokesperson designated to all market parlicipants. including the media, and 
that he/she should function as the main "processOr "of information to the market as 
well as feedback to the company management. 
i) IROs' fools 
The analysts interviewed read the official IR press releases carefully. The majority 1f not 
all fund managers interviewed also read the official and fori-nal investor releases,, the 
press releases ", the newsletters by the IR departments, after the semi-annual and 
quarter results or any other important material or management change in the company 
activities. They consider these investor releases to be the most authoritative and reliable 
source of information on the activities and performance of the company. 
9.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the preceding material is integrated, relationships are recognized and 
stated and implications are synthesized. During the interviews, many executives raised 
questions such as: Why are the foreign institutional investors not investing in Greece? 
What would encourage them to come? One policy is for the Greek companies to wait to 
be discovered. But it is so difficult to be found and identified by the fund managers "by 
way of searching on Bloomberg and Reuters, among hundreds of companies from each 
industi-y and countrv, " as a CEO mentioned. One has to "get their attention, increase 
their interest andprovoke them to come and visit us " in order for them to be persuaded 
that they can make money and have a positive return on their managed funds. Another 
policy is to get help from the analysts. As previous and the current research indicates, 
the Greek companies believe in the analytical, evaluation and even promotional skills of 
the analysts who cover their stocks (Demos 2002c). Many executives agreed with the 
following statement by a CEO, that a major step for a listed Greek company "is the 
analysts' report coverage which disseminates the company's investment case to 
investors and to the market ". Another major policy is the implementation of a proactive 
corporate communication channel, especially through roadshows. The IR office should 
"identify and target cities and managers of mutualfunds in order to organize visits and 
appointments, - an IRO suggested. As evaluated by the interviewees, the visits to the 
various cities of Europe, America and Asia, and the follow up by the listed company, as 
well as by the broker or by the bank, constitute important steps in the private meetings 
procedure. According to one CFO, "it is the responsibility Qf our IR department to 
organi: c and implement the logistics and the appointments' procedure" in order to 
conduct an aggressivc prornotional campaign. The conclusions and implications of this 
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grounded research could also be useful to capital markets with characteristics similar to 
those of the Greek market. Small and periphery markets (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, 
etc. ). emerging and developing (Turkey. Russia, Ukraine, etc. ), EU fledgling markets 
(Portugal, Poland, Hungary. etc. ). EU mature markets (Austria, Holland, Denmark, 
etc. ). as well as regional markets where Greek multinational companies operate (Egypt. 
Lebanon, Dubai. etc. ) could all benefit from the underlying research findings and 
implications. 
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Chapter 10.0 Recommendations: Creatinp, an Effective IR Model 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an IR model as a synthesis of the underlying grounded research 
findings, implications and recommendations. As mentioned in the previous chapter 
(Figure 9.1), the IR activity flow starts with the IR programme and objectives. is 
constrained by endogenous and exogenous factors, and employs communication means, 
IR tools and relationship channels through mandatory and voluntary disclosure in order 
to attain predetermined goals (Table 10.1). This structure is followed in this chapter 
with a short description about the Greek IR practice. 
Table 10.1: The IR activity flow 
IR Programme 
IR Objectives: Goals and Tasks 
IR Prerequisites : Constraints and operational 
IR Tools and channels: Regulated - Via Inten-nediaries - Voluntary Disclosure 
IR Effectiveness 
10.2 Greek IR practice 
As mentioned in chapters 2.2 and 3.5, the Greek IR practising model focuses mostly on 
corporate public mandatory disclosure (i. e. filing and distributing quarterly, semi- 
annually and annually financial res-ults, annual reports, etc. ) and on "passive and 
inipulsive action" by the top management. An effort by the Athens bourse to motivate 
the listed companies to become more active by recommending and five annual 
roadshows or group presentations brought mediocre results. Most of the company 
executives interviewed mentioned that "these group presentations, in Greek cities, were 
somehow ineffective, but we learnt to present, to discuss with a large investor audience 
and promote our stock, " one CFO said. Some London based consulting IR firms have 
also tried to fill the communication inexperience by the Greek companies and tried to 
win over some corporate accounts but were partially ineffective owing to the corporate 
family structure, language barriers, etc. The London IR consultants have been 
persuading an increasing number of local listed firms to realize the need to market 
thernselves to the foreign investor community and to set up investor relations 
departments, usually headed by an investor relations officer (IRO). However, it emerged 
frorn the research that most Greek companies. especially the small ones, ignore the 
requirements of the particular IRO position and rush to fill them with unqualified 
individuals. Instead of hiring an "Individual ivith a strong personalitv, extensive 
knowlec4ge ofihe compan. 1, and the industi-1, and with experience in relaledprofessions 
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such as porýfoho management, analysis, public relations, inarket, 'ng " these compan ies 
fill the IRO position with a person whose "most important asset is her relationship to 
the owners or the top executives of the coinpanýy, " as one local fund manager said. As a 
consequence, "the IRO falls to impress foreign institutional investors", according to one 
analyst. Greek corporate communication via the analysts was implemented only by 
some large listed companies. The less frequent and, after especially year 2002. non- 
existent coverage for the medium and small capitalization firrns was another motivator 
for them to act on their own. The smaller companies tried also to avoid the substitution 
of their communication process by the media people. As found (8.3), the financial 
fe i journalists usually replace the small companies' officials and largely af ct the r 
message to the market, either directly or via the sell side analysts' dailies. The 
conclusion is that the implementation of a standardised strategic IR programme might 
be good for one Greek company but marginal and detrimental for other companies. For 
instance, the main target for a small capitalization fin-n is usually the hedge and venture 
capital fund manager, while for a large company it is the institutional investor who is 
seeking dividends. 
10.3 The IR programme 
As drawn from the current grounded research, an effective IR programme can be 
separated into five primary activities and sections which define the fundamental 
corporate communication strategic planning. 
a) Strategic corporate conimunication programme and IR planning 
The planning process should involve creating a local (in Greek) but, most important, a 
global communications framework (in English) and logistics infrastructure as well as a 
proactive and offensive strategy. This strategy will then be adjusted and refined 
geographically as local market conditions dictate. For instance, many Greek top 
executives mentioned that they prefer to promote and "present their investment cases to 
Italian fund managers rather than to Scottish ones, since the Italians comprehend us 
better, '" as a CEO suggested. Central to this strategy will be clear objectives and specific 
benchmarks for each particular capital market, geographic area and fund type. Specific 
tactics and policies should be made, for instance, for prospecting "pension funds in 
Canada. mutual funds in Amsterdam, hedge funds in New York City, private equity 
funds in Zurich state funds in Dubai, " as a IRO suggested. On the global scene, it i is 
Imperative that the communication strategy complies with local legal, banking and 
accounting rules and regulations. 
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b) IR global strategy at a local level 
The IR programme should be responsible for executing global strategy at a local level. 
Every market has its own idiosyncrasies. For example, in Greece. the top big 
capitalization companies are divided into joint-stock (government) companies. family 
controlled conglomerates and subsidiaries of multinationals. In Europe companies and 
industries are structured differently and, "political administration is required". In Asia, 
as in Japan and Korea, companies ernploy different management techniques and form 
clusters of related firms i. e. kereitsu. In the USA, companies are characterised by "free 
enterprise and lobbying principles" and publicity restrictions are particularly stringent. 
For 144A public companies in the USA, no publicity of any kind is allowed. The local 
market characteristics and the use of global communication tools can have different 
implications in terms of conduct, activity and use of information channels for each 
market. For example, a CNN interview conducted in London may well be transmitted in 
the USA, and legal advice is necessary and recommended. 
c) Positioning and messaging 
The IR programme should include the creation of the company's overall positioning and 
messaging. Specifically, this will entail "analysing our business model, crafting 
compelling business definitions and presenting central marketing themes, " as one CEO 
mentioned, to be used across all communication channels and materials Given the 
intense competition for news as well as "the limited space in the global financial 
market", the ability for the top management to define the company precisely, succinctly 
and creatively, from a small country like Greece, in a variety of market situations, is 
crucial. A well-planned corporate positioning programme. based on an integrated long- 
terrn approach to the analysts, -the institutional and retail investors as well as the 
financial media and other inten-nediaries, is important for creating a "clear 
understanding of the distinct business proposition, compelling investment opportunity 
and long-ten-n potential performance, " as explained by a fund manager. 
d) Crisis management 
The IR programme should provide fixed and flexible options for dealing with ongoing 
issues and also with crisis situations, where corporate communication requires "artistic 
manipulation". Given the very "liquid nature of information; of international 
transactions and of internal and external factors which can impact upon the listed 
company". it will be important to keep continual vigilance over the company's 
commum cation front. 
e) Proactive approach 
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The proactive approach is fundamental to a solid IR programme and the style of the 
corporate communication. and ensures the avoidance of being placed in a defensive and 
impulsive reaction and position. All communications should come from a position of 
strength and work to an agreed strategy and timetable. In summary, the IR programme 
plays an important role on a day-to-day basis. identifying opportunities, managing the 
local and global communications and providing sound advice to the board of directors 
and the top management of the company. Creating a global IR strategy provides an 
invaluable base to all communications activity and ensures that, both globally and 
locally; corporate infori-nation is "tailored and delivered to precisely the targeted and 
right audience". The company's core message themes will also be embedded in the 
overall strategy and are a vital part of keeping all communications on track. 
10.4 IR Objectives 
The current grounded research identified IR objectives in terms of shareholders, share 
price and IR budget, as the following table 10.2 shows. As the executives interviewed 
Indicated,, the prime focus and target for the IR office is the infori-nation end user, which 
is the "institutional investor as well as any other investor and shareholder". It was 
argued that the IROs' main target and job is to "know thoroughly and extensively the 
company's shareholders, ultimately to know them in person, by visiting them regularly 
and to target fund managers and locate prospective shareholders". The use of telephone 
and electronic (direct) communication "sets the first stage for establishing a reliable and 
trustworthy relationship". Interviewees provided specific "shareholder" goals (table 
10.2) such as to Increase the number of large institutional investors, enlarge geographic 
allocation of money managers, increase employee shareholdings, etc. which can be 
"attainable and measurable", as one CFO mentioned. "Searching, identifying, locating, 
infori-ning, attracting and holding" investors and shareholders in turn help "the stock 
trading, its liquidity and above all the increase of the share price, " as mentioned by a 
CEO. The majority of the Greek executives interviewed asserted that a share price 
increase is the ultimate goal and the end result for an IR programme and action plan. It 
is also, as many interviewees argued, "the ultimate benchmark for evaluating the 
effectiveness of the IR office and the IRO". Most of the interviewees also stressed the 
cost structure of the IR activities as the set of goals for the IR function. "The IR 
expenses can blow up the annual budget if not controlled. " the CFO of a dually listed 
company declared. "The roadshows cost a lot of money and sometimes we do not have 
the approval by the Board, which is why they are carefully budgeted, " another CFO 
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III the custod* stated. On the other hand, "the annual listing fees and especially jan expenses 
should be not on the IR budget since they blow up my budget. " one IRO argued. In any 
case, the implication and recommendation are that the IRO should function with the 
"least cost" in mind by trying to minimize the IR expenses. In summary. as Indicated in 
the current research. some Greek listed companies have already received good exposure 
important and in the global market place, but the setting of specific IR objectives is an 
necessary step for the Greek listed companies in order to establish a more prominent 
intemational profile. 
Table 10.2: IR objectives and goals 
Shareholders Share Price Budget and Expenses 
Increase number of new 
Institutional Investors Increase share liquidity Mimmise IR costs 
Increase number of large 
Institutional Investors 
(>300,000 shares) Increase share free float Minirmse PR expenses 
Decrease/Eliminate selling 
by existing Institutional 
Investors (within specified 
time) Increase share price Control roadshow expenses 
_ Decrease partial selling by 
existing Institutional 
Investors (>I 0% of Increase effect on cost of Minimise stock exchange 
holdings, as of Dec 3 1) capital costs 
Enlarge geographic 
allocation of Institutional 
Investors (Germany, USA, 
Japan, etc. ) Minimise custodian costs 
Enlarge type allocation of 
Institutional Investors 
(Growth, Income, Minirmse depositary bank 
Dividend, Pension, etc. ) costs 
Increase number of Retail 
Investors 
Enlarge geographic 
allocation of Retail 
Investors (across Greece, 
other countries, etc. ) 
Create good mix of 
Institutional and Retail 
investors 
increase employee 
shareholdings 
Increase cross shareholding 
with other listed fin-ns 
10.5 IR Prerequisites 
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The current grounded research found three main categories of prerequisites and 
requirements that are perceived in and possibly ensure an effective IR policy: a) 
company's performance (financial and non-financial) prerequisites. b) people related or 
psychological prerequisites and c) organizational related constraints (Table 10-3). The 
interviewees indicated that it is very important for everv listed firm to cater for the 
different financial and non-financial infori-nation requirements from different audiences. 
For example, Institutional investors require "Information on strategy and prospects", 
while equity research analysts demand "Information on accounting and forecasting". 
The Greek companies would benefit significantly from "communicating clearly to 
market their policies on corporate governance. management compensation, capital 
structure efficiency, possible share buyback, service and product strategy and possible 
hidden value in the subsidiaries which add extra value to our calculations, " a global' 
fund manager suggested. Many equity research analysts mentioned that they appreciate 
continuous transparency in financial reporting. In particular, in companies with multi- 
market operations, expansion creates the need for appropriate "business by business 
disclosure, cash flow generation by businesses., and reporting, in a consolidated form, 
according to IFRS and to US GAAP". In terms of the required psychological 
requirements, the IRO's personality, ability, imagination, creative, resourcefulness, 
efficiency and effectiveness "can make the difference for any listed company" and 
every targeted market. In addition, the perceptions of the senior management of the IR 
function, the "IRO's capability and their willingness to disclose company infonnation in 
good time" affects the communication and effectiveness of the IR office. Lastly, the 
acceptance by the fund managers and analysts of the IRO as a "value added infori-nation 
processor" is of great importance. The IRO should "work closely with the company's 
senior management to assist the development and implementation of an integrated 
financial communications programme" in Europe, the United States, Canada, the Far 
East and the rest of the world. His/her principal areas of focus would be the financial 
media, the analysts and, most important, the investor community. However, he/she can 
also assist the company in "developing a communications plan designed to reach out to 
the same or similar industry companies for strategic partnerships, commercial 
agreements and strategic investors" as mentioned by a BoD Chairman. The IR 
organizational constraints were described in ten-ns of the IR office set up in the 
organizational company chart. the IR operations and the process. Almost all executives 
interviewed believe that above all "IR effectiveness is a linear function of the IR budget 
and its organizational soting'". As mentioned in the previous chapter, i it is recommended 
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that the IR office is strategically located among the Board of Directors. especially its 
Chairman and the CEO as well as the CFO. 
Table 10.3: IR constraints and prerequisites 
Company Performance 
Prerequisites 
Companv Performance 
Prerequisites 
Financial PreEtýquisites Non-Financial Prereguisites 
_ 
Clear Strategy and 
- 
Vision 
Working on the good relations with senior 
management 
_ 
Sound Business Model Updating regularly the Board of Directors 
Industry position 
Informing regularly the top management 
on IR and communication issues 
Solid growth 
Informing regularly the middle 
management on IR and communication 
issues 
_ 
Good financial quarterly results 
Informing regularly the top management 
on market's opinion and perception 
Profitability ratios 
Informing regularly the middle 
management on market's opinion and 
perception 
_ 
Solvency ratios 
Infori-ning all executives of roadshow 
results 
_ _ Capital ratios Informing the audit committee 
_ 
Management compensation 
Following regulations and Corporate 
overnance rules 
Share buyback policies 
Applying FTSE4GOOD and EIRIS 
recommendations 
Applying Corporate Social Responsibility 
issues 
Use of integrated communications 
Quality of IR programme 
Quality of company's objectives and goals 
People Related Prerequisites Orp-anizational Related 
Prerequisites 
Psycholopjcal Prerequisites IR set up and procedures 
IRO's personality IR Budget 
IR perception of senior management izational position of the IR office 
IR perception of institutional investors IR operational procedures 
IR perception of retail investors 
IR perception of analysts 
IR perception of financial journalists 
IR perception of other market 
participants 
The current Greek practice of putting the IR office under the CFO or under the PR 
Director does not signal "the importance and appreciation by the top management of the 
function", nor does it give the appropriate "flexibility and freedom to the IRO to 
communicate effectively in every direction and create reliable and strong relations with 
the market plavers". as one IRO mentioned. The company should also have an "in- 
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house graphics department or outsourcing artistic team that can produce computer- 
generated slide presentations that correlate with the content of the presentatIon and 
attract the eye and other senses of the targeted audience, " a local fund manager 
suggested. From a procedural viewpoint. as the research indicated, principal IR policies 
for the institutional investors and equity research analysts would be to meet "with the 
CEO at least once per year, the CFO and IRO more and maintain a prograrnme of 
operational site visits" as an analyst urged. "We would like to receive continuous 
information, clear guidance on earnings and comments on stock, industry and regulatory 
developments, " another analyst suggested. We "sustain a programme of frequent 
contact between the sell side as well the buy side and the senior management and keep 
the two lines of communication open. " an IRO stated. Given the aforementioned 
constraints. the IR office should develop a compelling investment rationale which will' 
define the answer to why an investor should buy the particular company stock. This 
rationale should be communicated consistently to investors, the analysts, the financial 
press and other market participants, and the messages must be consistently repeated 
through all IR channels. 
10.6 IR Tools and Channels 
The company's investment rationale needs to be communicated throughout all 
mandatory (public and private), inten-nediary and voluntary communication channels, as 
Table 10.4 shows. For instance , it could be the theme in the annual report, the core 
message in an analyst presentation, the focus in a company media profile, etc. 
a)IR toolsfor iiiaiidatory corporate disclosure 
The current grounded research indicates that corporate governance rules and stock 
exchange regulations monitor the communication of information but "by creating a 
regulated and standardized disclosure environment tends to eliminate or minimize the 
need of the IR function, as one IRO argued. Disclosure tools, such as the Annual 
Report (in Greek), the interim reports (in Greek), the AGM vote participation, 
execution and decisions leave "limited space to us and do not address agency issues, 
information asymmetries and possible use of information by insiders, " another IRO 
reported. 
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Table 10.4: IR tools and channels 
IR tools for IR tools for Disclosure IR tools for Voluntarv 
Mandatorv Disclosure via Intermediaries Disclosure 
Annual Report (in Greek) 
A) Financial 
Intermediaries Group Presentations 
_ Interim Reports (in Greek) Investment Banks Conferences participation 
_Annual 
General Assembly Corpo ate *Banks 
Private (one on ones) 
_meetings Extraordinary General 
Assembly Venture Capital Funds On site visits 
_Financial 
Statements Insurance Companies Analysts Presentations 
Footnotes on Financials 
B) Information 
Intermediaries Management Forecasts 
Management discussion 
and analysis Financial Analysts 
Feedback on Analysts 
Reports & Coverage 
Fillings Independent Research Press Releases 
Industry Experts Other Corporate Reports 
Financial Press Mailing Information 
Other Media people 
Telephone Answering 
queries 
Auditors Emailing Information 
Custodians Web Sites 
Specialists Web Casting 
Brokers Conference Calls 
Rating Agencies Dual Listing 
Lobbyists Roadshows 
Targeting Institutional 
Investors 
Annual Report (in English) 
Annual Reports (In other 
languages) 
Interim Reports (in 
English) 
b) IR foolsfor disclosure via intermediaries 
Most interviewees indicated that major IR tasks are to inform the "market's middle 
men", especially the sell-side analysts, and to work along with all inten-nediaries, such 
as the analysts, the brokers, the underwriters, the media, et al. However, the effective 
IRO "should not leave the corporate communication to these intennediaries", but rather 
should reap the benefits of their support, as one IRO said. To do that, the IR office 
should begin with the "identification of a targeted group of analysts and use extensively 
databases of analysts who follow companies with profiles similar" to that of the 
underlying company. (Table 10.5). Another task is to "increase analyst coverage if 
possible every quarter and control analysts' earnings consensus. that we monitor every 
quarter. " a CFO mentioned. The IRO should "advise the management about which 
intermediary market players the company should cooperate with. " a CEO suggested. 
233 
The IR office should "strengthen the company's media relations and build trustworthy 
and solid relationships with the major national and international business media, " one 
IRO maintained. For instance. 44press briefings and magazine interviews" in local and 
English newspapers should be increasing every year. Working with "the editors of the 
local newspapers and magazines as well as the editors of the Wall Street Journal. the 
New York Times. Business Week, Forbes, Barron's and Fortune is a key focus of our 
investor relations plan and increases awareness among the global investment 
community, " the IRO of a dual listed firm declared. 
Table 10.5: IR tools for intermediary corporate communication 
Analvsts Analysts Media 
Analysts' report Analvsts' Financial Journalists 
coverage recommendations 
Control analysts' earnings Increase press briefings (in 
Increase analyst coverage consensus Greek and in English) 
Information on analysts' Upgrade recommendation Increase magazine 
universe (from hold to buy) interviews 
Minimise/Eliminate 
Expand analysts' recommendation Target major global 
geographic coverage downgrades icals 
Increase reports per Control media information 
quarter results abuse 
Standardise earnings 
forecasts Eliminate noise 
Mimmise executive 
retaliation on journalists 
Increase analysts guidance with negative opinion 
Minimise executive 
retaliation on journalists 
Increase analyst feedback with ne ative artjclpr, les 
Minimise executive Minimise journalists 
retaliation on analysts retaliation on executives 
with negative opinion actions 
Mimmise executive 
retaliation on analysts 
with sell recommendation 
_ Minimise analyst 
retaliation on executives 
actions 
c) IR foolsfor voluwary disclosure 
It is implied from the current grounded research that "the most effective 
communication tools are the discretionary ones that create extensive company 
visibility. capital attraction and share buying. " as one IRO mentioned. Most of the 
interviewees stressed the need for reliable and motivating communi I tools as 
shown in Table 10.6. The Greek IROs should "effect'vely use group and Industry 
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presentations. targeted roadshows. private meetings, illustrated annual reports in 
und manager English to promote the company's investment case. one London based f 
suggested. "Organising and participating in group but mostly in one-to-one meetings is 
imperative for us. " an IRO stated. 
Table 10.6: IR tools for voluntary corporate communication 
IRO effectiveness 
measures 
IR activity measures Other 
Selling ability A) Presentations 
Financial 
publications 
Analytical ability _ Increase analyst presentations Speeches 
Financial skills Increase group presentations 
Reliable 
Increase private (one on ones) 
'presentations 
_Management 
skills 
Increase conference 
participations 
Avoid selective disclosure B) Roadshows 
_Proactive 
vs. passive attributes 
Increase visits to fund 
managers 
Increase site visits 
Enlarge targeting financial 
centres by geography 
Enlarge targeting financial 
centres by type of investment 
Roadshow disclosure tactics 
Roadshow disclosure when 
numbers are not good 
Targeting disperse geographic 
funds 
Targeting different types of 
funds (pension, hedge, mutual, 
etc) 
Q Web site 
Visits on the company's site per 
month 
_ _Geographic 
origination of visits 
Site design 
Site content 
Site friendly use 
Site easy access 
New contact persons and 
addresses through site 
Bv establishinp- a "vroactive 'Droiaramme of meetinp-s, we motivate the management tn 
provide a strategic overview of the market, the industry and mostly the company and 
we manage to increase interest in the company by the global investment community, " 
another IRO said. The IRO should "coordinate the meetings, provide counsel on the 
presentation, and follow up with targeted fund managers to encourage investment, " one 
analyst recommended. The IRO should "target the buy-side analysts, who advise 
internally the fund mangers on investing. " another sell-side analyst maintained. Many 
of the executives interviewed also mentioned that "the preparation of interesting and 
motivating corporate materials is a vital job for the IR office". As part of the feedback 
intelligence gathering. the conduct of periodic surveys of buy and sell side analysts to 
1.4 obtain opinions and impressions about the top management and the company can 
improve and upgrade the company's communication. " one fund manager 
recommended. The grounded research indicated that the most of the Greek senior 
executives participate in annual road shows at the same financial centres and cities, 
such as London, Boston, New York city, Frankfurt. Nevertheless, the IR challenge is 
"to proactively search, identify prospective financial and strategic shareholders in other 
cities such as Amsterdam, Munich. Milan and Toronto, " as the IRO of a medium size 
firm suggested. 
10.7 An effective IR model 
The synthesis of the (described and prescribed) characteristics of an effective IR 
programme according to the interviewees is shown in Figure 10.1 below, following the 
framework of Figure 9.1. The study suggests that basic seven criteria, that define an 
effective IR path/model, especially for the IR and corporate communication 
practitioners, are: the internal IR set up and organization, the bevavioural attributes of 
the interactive market players (i. e. IROs, insiders, buyers, etc); the effective and 
efficient use of voluntary and via intermediaries IR tools; the investor confidence 
building process; the company visibility, the stock liquidity; and the increase of the 
share price. This figure could be used as a benchmark for measuring the IR 
effectiveness that could bring about the expected results for the investors and the senior 
management. This "model" can also be used as a best practice IR paradigm for small, 
medium and large capitalization listed companies as well as local and global corporate 
communication professionals. It can also add to the research, from a practitioner's 
viewpoint, on the investor relations area and the effectiveness of the corporate 
cornmum cation activity in emerging capital markets. An effort has been made to rank 
the variables mentioned below or identify them in terrns of importance and suitability. 
The research though indicated that the management of each company applies and uses 
the IR tools based on the particular needs and according to each company's life cycle 
stage. For instance a small capitalization firm needs above all to increase stock liquidity 
and company visibility and therefore corporate communication via intermediaries could 
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be the best policy for a specific period of time. In contrast, a large capitalization 
company needs to implement roadshow communication policy in order to increase its 
share price. Therefore, Figure 10.1 represents a basic universal and standardized 
paradigm which can be used according to its company needs. goals. life cycle level. 
country and industry characteristics. management commitment. personalit,,, issues and 
chemistry, stock market rules. corporate governance regulations. elements. the equity. 
bond and commodity long and short term trends and political decisions by local and 
regional governments. The ranking in terms of importance to the five groups of the 
interviewees (small, medium and large capitalization companies, analysts and fund 
managers) were identified as A= very important; B= medium important, and C= least 
important. 
Fip-ure 10.1: An effective IR model 
1) IR OBJECTIVES AND Small Medium Large Financial Fund 
Caps Caps Caps Analysts Managers 
GOALS Companies Companies Companies 
Shareholders 
Increase number of new A A A A A 
Institutional Investors 
Increase number of large C B A B B 
Institutional Investors 
(>300,000 shares) 
Decrease/Eliminate selling C B A B B 
by existing Institutional 
Investors 
Decrease partial selling by B A A C C 
existing Institutional 
Investors 
Enlarge geographic C B A B C 
allocation of Institutional 
Investors 
Enlarge type allocation of B A A B C 
Institutional Investors 
Increase number of Retail A A A B B 
Investors 
Enlarge geographic C B B B B 
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allocation of Retail 
Investors 
Create good mix of BAABA 
Institutional and Retail 
investors 
Increase employee CCBBA 
shareholdings 
Increase cross shareholding CBCC 
with other listed firms 
Share price 
Increase share liquidity AAAAA 
Increase share free float ABCBB 
Increase share price AAAAA 
Increase effect on cost of AAAAA 
capital 
Budp, et and Expenses 
Minimise IR costs B C B C C 
Minimise PR expenses C C B C C 
Control roadshow expenses C C C C C 
Minimise stock exchange 
costs 
A A A B C 
Minimise custodian costs C C C B A 
Minimise depositary bank 
costs 
C B A C C 
11) IR CONSTRAINTS 
AND PREREQUISITES 
Small Caps 
Companies 
Medium 
Caps 
Companies 
Large Financial Fund 
Caps Analysts Managers 
Companies 
Company Performance 
Prerequisites (Financial 
Prerequisites) 
Clear Strategy and Vision AAAAA 
Sound Business Model AAAAA 
Industry position BBBBB 
Solid growth AAAAA 
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Good financial quarterly 
results 
A A A A A 
Profitability ratios A A A A A 
Solvency ratios A A A A A 
Capital ratios A A A A A 
Management compensation B B A B B 
Share buyback policies B B A B B 
Company Performance 
Prerequisites (Non- 
Financial Prerequisites) 
Working on the good A A A A A 
relations with senior 
management 
Updating regularly the B A A B B 
Board of Directors 
Informing regularly the top B B A A A 
management on IR and 
communication' issues 
Informing regularly the C B B B B 
middle management on IR 
and communication issues 
Informing regularly the top B A A B B 
management on market's 
opinion and perception 
Infori-ning regularly the C B B B B 
middle management on 
market's opinion and 
perception 
Infori-ning all executives of C B A B B 
roadshow results 
Informing the audit C C B C C 
committee 
Following regulations and A A A A A 
Corporate Governance 
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Applying FTSE4GOOD BBAAA 
and EIRIS 
recommendations 
Applying Corporate Social BAAAA 
Responsibility issues 
Use of integrated BBABB 
communications 
Quality of IR programme BBBBB 
Quality of company's BBAAA 
objectives and goals 
People Related 
PrereQuisites 
(Psvcholop_ical 
Prerequisi es) 
IRO's personality A A A A A 
IR perception of senior A A A A A 
management 
IR perception of A A A A A 
institutional investors 
IR perception of retail A A A A A 
investors 
IR perception of analysts A A A A A 
IR perception of financial A A A A A 
journalists 
IR perception of other A A A A A 
market participants 
Orf! anizational Related 
Prerequisites (IR set up 
and procedures) 
IR Budget CBBCC 
Organizational position of CBBBB 
the IR office 
IR operational procedures BBBCC 
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111) IR TOOLS AND 
CHANNELS 
IR tools for Mandatorv 
Disclosure 
Small Caps Medium Large Financial 
Companies Caps Caps Analysts 
Companies Companies 
Fund 
Managers 
Annual Report (in Greek) A A A A A 
Interim Reports (in Greek) A A A A A 
Annual General Assembly A A A B B 
Extraordinary General 
Assembly 
A A A B B 
Financial Statements A A A A A 
Footnotes on Financials A A A A A 
Management discussion 
and analysis 
B B B A A 
Fillings B B B B B 
IR tools for Disclosure 
Nia Intermediaries 
A) Financial 
Intermediaries 
Investment Banks BAAAA 
Corporate Banks BBBBB 
Venture Capital Funds ABBBB 
Insurance Companies BAABB 
B) Information 
Intermediaries 
Financial Analysts A A A A A 
Independent Research A A A A A 
Industry Experts B A A B B 
Financial Press A A A B B 
Other Media people A A A A A 
Auditors A A A A A 
Custodians C C C C C 
Specialists C B B B B 
Brokers A A A B B 
Ratino Agencies L- 
B A A A A 7 
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Lobbyists ccBc 
IR tools for Voluntarv 
Disclosure 
Group Presentations A B B A A 
Conferences participation A A A A A 
Private meetings A A A A A 
On site visits 
Analysts Presentations 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
A 
Management Forecasts B B B A A 
Feedback on Analysts 
Reports & Coverage 
B A A A A 
Press Releases A A A A A 
Other Corporate Reports B B B A A 
Mailing Information B B B A A 
Telephone Answering 
queries 
A A A A A 
Emailing Infori-nation A A A A A 
Web Sites A A A A A 
Web Casting C B A A A 
Conference Calls B A A A A 
Dual Listing C B A A A 
Roadshows A A A A A 
Targeting Institutional 
Investors 
A A A A A 
Annual Report (in English) A A A A A 
Annual Reports (in other 
languages) 
B A A B B 
Interim Reports (in 
English) 
A A A A A 
IV) IR TOOLS FOR 
INTERMEDIARY 
Small Medium Large Financial 
Caps Caps Caps Analysts 
Companies Companies Companies 
Fund 
Managers 
CORPORATE 
COMMUNICATION 
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Analysts 
A) Analysts' Report 
Coverage 
Increase analyst coverage A A A A A 
Information on analysts' B A A A A 
universe 
Expand analysts' B A A A A 
geographic coverage 
Increase reports per quarter B A A A A 
results 
Standardise earnings B A A A A 
forecasts 
Increase analysts guidance A A A A A 
Increase analyst feedback A A A A A 
Minimise executive B B B A A 
retaliation on analysts with 
negative opinion 
Minimise executive B B B A A 
retaliation on analysts with 
sell recommendation 
Mimmise analyst retaliation B B B A A 
on executives actions 
Analysts' 
Recommendations 
Control analysts' earnings BAAAA 
consensus 
Upgrade recommendation AAABA 
Minimise/Eliminate AAABA 
recommendation 
downgrades 
Media 
Financial Journalists 
Increase press briefings (in AAABB 
Greek and in English) 
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Increase magazine A A A A 
interviews 
Target major global B B A C C 
periodicals 
Control media information A A A A A 
abuse 
Eliminate noise A A A A A 
Minimise executive B B B C C 
retaliation on journalists 
with negative opinion 
Mimmise executive B B B C C 
retaliation on journalists 
with negative articles 
Mimmise journalists B B B C C 
retaliation on executives 
actions 
V) IR TOOLS FOR Small 
VOLUNTARY Caps 
CORPORATE 
Companies 
COMMUNICATION 
IRO effectiveness 
Medium Large Financial 
Caps Caps Analysts 
Companies Companies 
Fund 
Managers 
measures 
Selling ability A A A A A 
Analytical ability A A A A A 
Financial skills A A A A A 
Reliable A A A A A 
Management skills B B A B B 
Avoid selective disclosure A A A A A 
Proactive vs. passive 
attributes 
A A A A A 
IR activity measures 
A) Presentations 
Increasc analyst AAAA 
244 
presentations 
Increase group AAAAA 
presentations 
Increase private (one on AAAAA 
ones) presentations 
Increase conference AAAAA 
participations 
B) Roadshows 
Increase visits to fund A A A A A 
managers 
Increase site visits A A A A A 
Enlarge targeting financial A A A A A 
centres by geography 
Enlarge targeting financial A A A A A 
centres by type of 
investment 
Roadshow disclosure A A A A A 
tactics 
Roadshow disclosure when A A A A A 
numbers are not good 
Targeting disperse A A A A A 
geographic funds 
Targeting different types of A A A A A 
funds (pension, hedge, 
mutual, etc) 
Web site 
Visits on the company's site 
per month 
A A A A A 
Geographic origination of 
Visits 
A A A A A 
Site design A A A A A 
Site content A A A A A 
Site friendly use A A A A A 
Site easy access A A A A A 
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New contact persons and BBABB 
addresses tbrougb site 
Other 
Financial publications BBABB 
Speeches BBABB 
1ei-1, important; B =, Mediuin important; C= Least important 
10.8 Contribution of the stud), 
The current grounded research suggests that the most effective communication tool is a 
custom-made mix of primarily voluntary IR tools and secondarily inten-nediary 
communication ways that increase company visibility, capital attraction and share 
I 
buying. This mix includes the effective use of group presentations, targeted proactive 
roadshows, private meetings, annual reports in English, German and French, web sites 
in many languages, arriong others in order to promote the company Is investment case to 
the global investment community and to motivate the company's management for better 
operational results and more communication effort and commitment towards the 
company and the market. For instance. if the company Is objective is to increase stock 
liquidity, then the retail investors are as important as the institutional ones and therefore 
the IRO should primarily use and capitalize the media path. If the company's objective 
is to target sophisticated investors (i . e. pension. mutual,, hedge 
funds), then the IRO 
should primarily use infon-nation intermediaries. such as sell-side analysts. The study 
finds that for especially the small and medium size listed companies, from a small, 
peripheral and non English speaking market, the share price increase is the ultimate goal 
and benchmark for evaluating the effectiveness of the IR office, the IR programme as 
well as the IRO. The small capitalization companies from a small country like Greece 
should conceive and implement a proactive communication plan. This is mostly the 
responsibility and the job of an effective and qualified investor relations officer (IRO). 
The hiring of an experienced and highly paid IRO should correspond with the 
maintenance of an efficient IR office/department. The company's top management and 
the owners expect that the IRO will initiate and implement targeted corporate 
communication strategy and tactics and use a combination of IR tools in order to 
effectively place the share on the investors I screen. shape their views and influence 
investment decisions. Similar countries in terms of size. capital markets. maturity, 
visibility and growth level can benefit from the findings. The medium and small size 
listed companies fi-om the neighbouring emerging economies such as Bulgariaý 
Romania. Turkcy. c1c. face similar challenges as the Greek small firms. such as lack of I 
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visibility and confidence at the major global financial centers. As the current research 
finds, decreased visibility justifies the fliquidity of the stocks and visibility Is a major 
concern for IR practitioners. This research study focuses only on listed companies and a 
future challenge is to investigate pre-IPO firms as well as non-] sted compan es. Future 
research should also examine and pro,, 'Ide evidence on the IR practices and promotional 
activities by the private companies. state-owned and government corporations. A 
challenge for future research efforts is the lack of research on the role of an important 
intermediary infori-nation player, the media people, and how they affect the disclosure 
process. 
10.9 Conclusion 
As the current grounded research implies, the basic attributes for an effective IR activity 
is the appropriate diagnosis of the specific firm's needs as well as the creative strategic 
planning by the IR department, combined with the IRO's personal attributes and 
characteristics. The IRO should always continuously ask when to disclose; why 
disclose, who should disclose; and how to disclose. He/she should constantly review the 
communications implications of a company's disclosure requirements from both a legal 
as well as an effective communication perspective. The IR office should disclose in 
timely fashion the company's infonnation to the market. The majority of the 
interviewees suggested that by adjusting the content of the company's communications, 
the IR is able to "empower the long term relationships with the current shareholders, 
target, match and attract potential investors, differentiate itself from its peer group, 
demonstrate its future growth potential, focus on the implicit under valuation at which 
its shares trade, create positive news flow", and, as a consequence, motivate buying and 
have an immediate impact on the company's share price. The significant value that the 
IR function could add to the senior management and the company is based primarily on 
the voluntary disclosure policies. In small capital markets, like the Greek one, which are 
characterized by investor bias, investment uncertainty, lack of general market 
confidence, low market and fin-n visibility, poor company infori-nation, corporate 
disclosure inconsistency and passive attitude, the IR function can diffuse negative 
emotions and opinions, attract attention, provoke and invite investment action by 
applying voluntary disclosure policies and implementing a proactive communication 
plan. In summary. every Greek listed company should create its own corporate 
communication and IR strategy by targeting investors, analysts, bankers, brokers, and 
others. Accordingly it integrates and organizes the IR function within the scope of its 
own needs. 
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LIST OF APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interviews with Top Management 
SECTION 1: ORGANISATION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS FUNCTION 
Question 1.1 Please state the number of directors (including the chairman) in your company. 
Executive directors 
Non-executive directors 
Question 1.2 Please speciýy how many of the directors are involved to some extent in managing and 
/ or executing the investor relations I. unction. 
Question 1.3 To what extent are the members ofyour company's directorate involved in managing 
and/or executing the investor relations function. 
01234 
Not Not at Minor Moderate Large 
Applicable all extent extent extent 
i) Chairman 
ii) CEO 
111) CFO 
Jv) Marketing 
Director 
Other directors (Please specify) 
V) ............. 
vi) ............. 
V11) ............. 
V111) ............. 
ix) ............. Question 1.4 Can you provide an estimate of the number of working days in a year 
that the directors devote to investor relations? 
Infori-nation not ayailable 
Not applicable 
Question 1.5 Does your company have a designated investor relations / financial 
public relations officer? 
Yes (with investor relations as the main responsibility) 
Yes (with investor relations as part of responsibilities) 
No 
Question 1.6 Please state the job title if the answer to the above question was ' Yes 
To whom the does the designated investor relations officer report? 
Question 1.7 Please indicate the position of the investor function within your organization. 
i) It is carried out by a separate department 
n) It is carried out by a section of the 
public relations department 
in) It is carried out by the CEO's 
Office 
iv) It is carried out by the Chain-nan's office 
v) It is carried out by the CFO's office 
vi) It is carried out by company executives, 
with no central unit or department 
vii) It is carried out by the off ce for shareholders 
vill) There is no investor relations function 
Other (please specify) 
Question 1.8 Please indicate if your company has a separate IR department that is not the same as 
the Off-ice for Shareholders (Metoxologio) and how they cooperate? 
Yes L-1 
No 
Not applicable 
Question 1.9 Does the office for the retail shareholders (]%Ietoxologio) compliment the IR function? 
Question 1.10 Please indicate the number of staff working for the investor relations / financial 
public relations officer (including clerical and secretarial assistants) 
Question L] I Are these staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do 
the), perform other duties? 
Yes - work is mainly investor relations 
No - work nwolves other duties 
Not applicable 
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Question 1.12 Please can Nou provide an estimate of the annual gross salary bill for the investor 
relations officer and his her staff. 
For IRO more than 50 million Drs 
For other staff. regular paý 
Information not available 
Not applicable 
Question 1.13 Please can you give an approximate indication of the annual budget allocation for the 
investor relations function (excluding the salary bill and also excluding the cost of production and 
distribution of annual report). 
Budget exceeds 100 milliom Drs 
Budget exceeds 200 million-i Drs 
Budget exceeds 300 i-nilllom Drs 
Infon-nation not available 
Not applicable 
Question 1.14 Does your company has a formal policy or, %vritten description stating the objectives 
and responsibilities of the investor relations function? 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Note: If your company does have such a document (whether general or detailed) can we have one? 
SECTION 2: INTERNATIONAL IR ASPECTS AND CONSULTATION 
Question 2. ] Does your company currently employ the services of an external investor relations or 
financial public relations consultant? 
Yes 
No 
Question 2.2 Doesvour companý 7 currently employ the services of other related to the IR 
professionals (such as Financial Information Services ICarson group, Technimetrics, etc], Web sites 
specialists, Annual report distribution agencies, etc) 
Question 2.3Can you provide an approximate indication of the cost incurred by your company in 
the past twelve months in retaining the services of an external investor relations or financial public 
relations consultant? 
Total cost exceeds 10 million Drs 
Total cost exceeds 30 million Drs 
Total cost exceeds 50 million Drs 
Not applicable 
Question 2.4 If you were able to answer the above question please can you provide an estimate of 
the percentage of the consultant's charges that relate to communications with analysts (both sell - 
side and buy- side) and fund managers as opposed to communications with other groups? 
Infon-nation not available 
Not applicable 
(Dual listin2 cases) 
Question 2.5 Is your company dual listed? 
Question 2.6 And on what exchanges? 
NYSE 
NASDAQ 
LSE 
FRANKFURT 
OTHER 
Question 2.7 How the dual listing of your stock has influenced the IR function and its activities? 
Question 2.8 Does the IR have direct connection with the following depositary banks: 
BONY 
Citibank 
JP Morgan 
Other 
Question 2.9 Is the IRO or an external consultant (IR company or Law office) that riles the 
information such as 6K and 20F? 
IRO 
Extemal consultant 
Law office F9 
Other (please specify) 
SEQ-ION 3: SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS FOR THE IR FUNCTION 
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Question 3.1 How the anaIN'sts and the traders or sales people of the domestic securities firms have 
replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of your company? 
Question 3.2 Do the big domestic brokers' "daily market watch" or "daily market news", which is 
distributed to their global database every morning, create disclosure problems for your company? 
Question 3.3 Similarly, do the reports in the Greek newspapers (daily or weekly) substitute the 
official announcements for your company? 
Question 3.4Have you designated an Official Spokesperson to the newspapers. media. etc? 
Yes 
No 
To whom 
Not applicable 
Question 3.5 If yes. Is this person the IRO? 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Question 3.6 How the sell-side analysts out of London of the big international investment banks and 
their sales people fill-in or duplicate the IR job for your company? 
Question 3.7 Is there any cost and benefit for it, if that happens? 
Question 3.8 Do your auditors play an important role and most often influence your company's 
corporate disclosure policies? 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
SECTION 4: MACRO ASPECTS OF THE IR FUNCTION 
Question 4.1 Is there any interdependence and relationship between the IR policies and the 
Corporate Governance in Greece? 
Question 4.2 Can you see any influence or mandatory coni, ergence to the European Corporate 
Governance? 
Question 4.3 Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or forecasting policies? 
Question 4.4 Is there any learning IR experience (curve) in Greece? 
Question 4.51s there a need for a National Investor Relations Association that will shorten the 
learning path and time for other Greek companies? 
SECTION 5: EXECUTING OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS PROGRAMME 
Question 5.1 Please can you indicate the means by which your company communicates with 
analysts (sell - side and buy - side) and fund managers and the importance of the different means 
of communications? 1234 
Not at all Minor Moderate High 
-not done importance importance importance 
i) By holding meetings 
which are attended by 
a number of delegates 
from differed organizations 
n) By holding meetings 
with individuals or 
small groups from the 
same organization 
in) By answering 
telephone queries 
iv) By providing 
feedback on analysts' 
reports 
v) By mailing 
infori-nation to 
analysts and fund 
managers 
vi) By visiting the Fund 
Managers (Proactive 
Roadshows) 
vil) By increasing 
Analysts Coverage 
viii) Bv Ernall 
ix) By holding Conference 
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Calls 
x) Via the Internet 
Other (please specify) 
SECTION 6: COMPANYMEETINGS WITH ANALYSTS AND FUND MANAGERS 
Question 6.1 Does your company hold meetings with any of the following? Sell - side analysts, buy- 
side analysts and fund managers. 
Yes 
No 
Question 6.2 Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these meetings? 
(Where officials perform a dual role please link with a bracket. ) 
Yes No Not applicable 
i) Chairman 
n) CEO 
in) CFO 
iv) Marketing Director 
v) Company Secretary 
vi) Chief Accountant 
vil) IRO 
vill) Head of Public Relations F9 1=1 F9 
ix) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant 
Question 6.3 Does the company keep a record of the proceedings of these meetings? (General 
meetings are defined here as meetings for a group of delegates from a number of different 
employing organisations. Special meetings are defined as meetings for individuals or small groups 
from one organisation. ) Yes No Not Applicable 
General (or group ) meetings 
One to one (or individual meetings) 
Question 6.4 How many of these meetings did your company hold in the past twelve months? 
(Please complete the box with a number or with a '? ' If the infori-nation is not available) 
General meetings 
One to one meetings 
Question 6.5 Approximately how many analysts are there on your company's circulation list of 
people who may be invited to these meetings? 
(Please complete the boxes with a number or with a 'T if the infori-nation is not available) 
Sell - side analysts 
Buy - side analysts & fund managers 
Question 6.6 Can you provide an estimate of the number of individual analysts who have attended 
at last one of your meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
(Please complete the boxes with a number or with a 'T if the information is not available) 
Sell - side analysts 
Buy - side analysts & fund managers 
Question 6.8 Can you provide an estimate of the number of stock-broking firms and institutions, 
which sent representatives to your meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
Sell - side analysts 
Other analysts 
Question 6.9 Can you provide an estimate of the number of institutional investor organization, 
which sent representatives to your meetings (one to one or general) in the past 12 months? 
Buy - side analysts & fund managers 
Other analysts 
Question 6.10 Please indicate thee types of information that your company provides to delegates 
(sell- side analysts and / or buy - side analysts and / or fund managers) at these meetings (special or 
general). In respect of those types of information that there are provided please can you indicate 
their relative importance. 01234 
Not Not at Minor Moderate High 
Applicable all importance importance importance 
past performance (110TOIRK6 OT01Y60) 
i) Explanation of 
recent results in 
the context of the 
general economic 
cnvironment 
ii) Explanation of 
accounting policies 
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iii) Additional 
breakdown of 
published figures 
by line of business 
iv) Additional breakdown 
of published figures 
by geographical area 
v) Performance of recent 
acquisitions 
v0 Outcome of completed 
research and 
development projects 
vii) Explanation of 
structure of balance 
sheet and gearing 
Future prospects 
(Subject, if necessary, to prior announcement to the A SE. LSE. NYSE. etc) 
0 1 2 3 4 
Not Not at Minor Moderate High 
Applicable all importance importance i mportance 
Past performance (110TOPIK6 (TTOI'/EiU) 
xi) First announcement of 
major new projects and 
developments 
x1l) Further explanation 
of major new projects 
and developments that 
have already been 
announced 
xiii) First announcement 
of new products 
x1v) Further explanation 
of new products that 
have already been 
announced 
xv) First announcement 
of new contracts 
xv]) Further explanation of 
new contracts that have 
already been announced 
xvil) Current state of 
order book 
xvill) Prospects of current 
research and development 
projects 
xix) First announcement of 
new research and 
development projects 
xx) Further explanation 
of new research and 
development projects that 
have already been announced 
xxii) First announcement 
of profits forecast 
xxII) Further explanation 
of profits forecast that 
has already been made 
xxill) Company strategy 
in the short term 
x, \I\, ) Company strategy 
in the lone term 
x. \\, ) Company strategy 
for particular segments 
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of the business 
xxv]) Company strategy on 
future acquisitions 
xxvil) Company strategy on 
future disposals of 
segments of the 
business 
xxvill) Long term 
investment plans 
xxix) Cash flow situation 
xxx) Dividend policy 
Other (please specify) 
SECTION 7: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH ANALYSTS AND FUND 
MANAGERS 
Question 7. ] Does your company engage in telephone conversation with analysts? 
Yes No 
Sell - side analysis 
Buy - side analysis and fund managers 
Question 7.2 Please indicate the company personnel who answer telephone enquiries from analysts 
(sell - side and / or fund managers) and / or fund managers. 
Yes No Not applicable 
I) Chain-nan - Non-executive 
n) CEO 
Ili) CFO 
IV Marketing Director 
v Company Secretary F Fý] F9 
vi) Chief Accountant 
vil) Investor Relations Officer F9 F-9 F9 
Vill) Head of Public Relations 
ix) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant 
Question 7.3 Does the company keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
" tape recording is made 
" written record is made 
No record is made 
SECTION 8: COMPANY FEEDBACK ON SELL - SIDE ANALYSTS' REPORTS 
Question 8. ] Can ou state the approximate number of reports on your company that have been 
produced by sell side / brokers' analysts in the past twelve months? 
Question 8.2Can you state the approximate number of reports that have been passed to your 
company for comment prior to issue in the past twelve months? 
Question 8.3 What action does your company take when it receives a draft analysts' report for 
comment or when an analysts telephones to discuss his \ her draft report? 
1) Analysts' reports are never received 
Feedback is never provided 
Factual errors relating to published infon-nation are corrected 
IV) Comments are offered on the accuracy of analysts' prediction 
Question 8.4 Executives that are designated to comment on drafts of the research reports? 
J) The CEO 
ii) The CFO 
in) The IRO 
Question 8.5 Please can you specify your company's policy when asked to comment on analysts' 
profit forecasts. 
I) Company is never asked for comments 
ii) Comments are never made 
ill) Comments are made 
Question 8.6 Executives that are designated to comment on the analysts' profit forecasts reports. 
I) The CEO 
n) The CFO 
Ill) The IRO 
Question 8.7 If your company does make comments on analysts' forecasts please can vou indicate 
your procedure. 
1) 11'a I, orecast is reasonable no comment is made 
3 14 
n) If a forecast is reasonable the company 
confin-ris this 
iii) If a forecast is not reasonable no comment is made 
iv) If a forecast is not reasonable the company informs 
the analysts 
v) An analyst will be given guidance regarding 
the size and direction of the error in his forecast 
SECTION 9: MAILING INFOR'MATION TO ANALYSTS AND FUNDMANAGERS 
Question 9.1 Does your company mail information to analysts? 
Yes No 
Sell - side analysts 
Buy - side analysts and fund managers 
Question 9.2 Approximately ho", many organizations employing analysts receive information from 
your company by mail? 
Stockbrokers 
Institutional investors 
Other 
Question 9.3 What type of information is sent to analysts and or fund manag ers? 
i) Annual report 
ii) Interim report 
ill) Quarterly reports 
iv) Copies of announcements sent to 
the company news service of the 
ASE / LSE / NYSE / NASDAQ 
v) Takeover documents 
vi) Company information brochures 
and other promotional literature 
vil) General press releases 
vill) Documents designed specifically 
for analysts 
Other, please specify 
x) Information not available 
SECTION 10: PROACTIVE ROADSHONAIS (VISITING THE FUND MANAGERS) AND 
INCREASING ANALYST COVERAGE 
Question 10.1 Do you implement a roadshow communication policy? 
Question 10.2 Is it tactical, offering related or proactive? 
Offering Roadshows 
Tactical Roadshows 
Proactive Roadshows 
Combination 
Other 
Question 10.3 If tactical roadshow? How man), times per year and where? 
Once per year 
Twice per year F: 9 
More 
Never 
Question 10.4 Who participates from the your company? 
Chairman 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 10.5 Who is organizing it? (Logistics, selecting the targets, pre-mark eting, etc) 
Global bank (Morgan, Lehman,.. ) 
Your global underwriter 
Greek bank 
Greek brokerage firrn 
Company itself 
i " 'P i /i " ze on resentat mplement Analysts (both do Question 10.6 Doyou organ mestic in Athens and 
global in London) with the year-end results or the HI results? 
London Analyst Presentation 
Athens Analyst Presentation 
Once per \r! ear 
Twice perycar 
, 15 
Question 10.7 Does the IR helps or plans or directs the focus of the roadshow in te= Of 
Geography (London, Frankfurt. Milan, Paris. Boston, etc) and in terms of funds specialization 
(hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, etc)? 
Geography 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 10.8 If proactive roadshow? How manv times per year and where? 
Once per year 
Twice per year 
More 
N ever 
Question 10.9 Who participates from the your company? 
Chain-nan 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 10.10 Who is organizing it? (Logistics, selecting the targets, pre-marketing, etc) 
Global bank (Morgan. Lehman... ) 
Your global underwriter 
Greek bank 
Greek brokerage firm 
Company itself 
Question 10.11 Is part of the proactive roadshow the increase of analyst coveragJ= 
Exponentially 
Moderately 
No 
Never valued 
SECTION U: EMAIL DATA BASE MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
INFORMATION 
Question 11.1 Doyou disclose info and news by email? 
Question 11.2 Do you have an email database? 
Question 11.3 Do you have a database for fax use? 
Question 11.4 Is it complementary with the Fax system in place for distributing info? 
Question 11.5 How often you use the email to answer questions from analysts, FMs, bankers, etc? 
Answer by email only 
Answer the 50% of the questions 
Never use email to answer 
We do not have email 
Question 11.6 How often you send press releases out via email? 
Question 11.7 Do you divide the email database? 
Question 11.8 How? By geography? By Fund type? By group? 
By Geography 
By fund type 
By group 
Question 11.9 Do you face email distribution problems? 
SECTION 12: CONFERENCE CALLS AS A VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE MEDIUM 
Question 12.1 Do you hold conference calls? 
Question 12.2 Do you have conference calls with the quarterly results announcements (four times 
annually)? 
Question 12.3 When else you have a conference call and for what purpose? (Change of 
management, a merger or buyout, major breakthrough ... ?) 
Question 12.4 What is the average number of participants in your conference calls? 
More than 10 
More than 20 
More than 30 
Question 12.5 Do you organize /implement it or you get the help from a major bank? 
Question 12.6 Who participates at the conference call from the top management? 
Chairman 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 12.7 Do you invite your bankers. consultants, and other advisers to participate? 
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Banker 
IR consultant 
Question 12.8 Do you tape the call? 
Question 12.9 Do you use a teleconference company from London or from Greece? 
Question 12.10 Do you receive a list of participants, after the call? 
SECTION 13: DISCLOSURE VIA INTERNET SITES 
Question 13.1 Do you have your own -, -,, eb site? 
Question 13.2 Ho, *N manv requests you get from your site, concerning IR issues? 
Question 13.3 How manv new names are coming from the Nved site for your data base/mailing list? 
Question 13.4 Are you linked Nvith the sites of -external consultants? 
Question 13.5 How often you update your site? 
Question 13.6 Please evaluate your site in terms of information effectiveness? 
SECTION 14: CONTROLLED INFORMATION 
Question 14.1 Does your company prohibit or restrict communication with sell - side analysts. buy 
- side analysts and / or fund managers at certain times of the year? 
Yes -a prohibition operates 
at certain times 
No 
Other 
Question 14.2 If you have answered ' yes ' to the above question please specilýv the times during the 
year when the communication is prohibited or restricted. 
Yes No Not applicable 
i) Prior to the annual results 
announcement 
Jj) Prior to the interim results 
announcernent 
in) Prior to the quarterly 
results announcement 
Other (Please specify) 
Question 14.3 Please specify the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the annual results announcement. 
If you have not answered the above please lick the relevant box 
Information not available 
Not applicable 
Question 14.4 Please specify the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the interim results announcement. 
If you have not answered the above-please tick the relevant box 
Information not available 
Not applicable 
Question 14.5 Please specifýy the number of days for which communication is prohibited or 
restricted prior to the quartely results announcement. 
If you have not answered the above please tick the relevant box 
Information not available 
Not applicable 
Question 14.6 If your company operates a policy of restriction of communication rather than 
complete prohibition please describe the nature of the restriction. 
If you have not answered the above please tick the relevant box 
Infon-nation not available 
Not applicable 
SECTION 15: OPINIONS ON YOUR COMPANY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ANALYSTS 
Some companies have expressed dissatisfaction regarding the quality of sell - side / brokers' analysts' 
reports. Others have expressed concern regarding the amount of time and energy devoted to 
responding to sell -side analysts' requests for information and meetings. This section seeks to elicit 
your opinions on your company Is relationship with both sell- side and buy analysts. 
Question 15. ] How would you rate the general quality of analysts' reports, from all sources, that are 
made onyour company? 
1345 
Ver-N, Poor Acceptable Good Verv 
poor good 
If you ha\ c not ans\N ered the above please tick the relevant box 
No opinion 
17 
Not applicable 
Question 15.2 How would you compare the quality of analysts carried out by sell -side brokers' 
with buy - side analysts working for institutional investors? 
1 2345 
Verv Poor Acceptable Good Verv 
poor good 
Sell - side 
Analvsts 
Buy - side FAs 
If you have not answered the above please tick the relevant box 
No opinion 
Not applicable 
Question 15.3 Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship with sell - side brokers' analysts. . 1234 5 
Strongly Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree 
1) Company meetings 
with sell - side analysts 
are a valuable rneans of 
communication 
11) Company telephone 
conversations with 
sell - side analysts are 
a valuable means of 
communication 
iii) My company would 
prefer not to hold 
sell - side analysts' 
meetings 
IV) My company would 
prefer not to talk 
sell - side analysts' 
on the telephone 
V) My company should 
not provide sell - side 
analysts with guidance 
as to the accuracy of 
their profits forecasts 
VO Sell - side analysts 
pressurize my company 
for information 
V11) Sell - side analysts 
are too concerned 
with short term 
profit opportunities 
viii) Sell - side analysts 
are not sufficiently 
interested in the 
long term prospects 
of my company 
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Question 15.4 Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship N%ith buy - side analysts and fund managers working 
for institutional investors. 
Question 15.5 Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship Nvith traders and sales people. 
Question 15.6 Please indicate the extent of your agreement with the following statements as they 
apply to your company and its relationship with media people. 
Question 15.7 If you have any opinions or ideas as to how company communications with sell - side 
brokers' analysts, buy - side analysts and fund managers should be conducted in the future 
please can you State these below. 
................................................................. . ........................................................ 
Ap endix H: Interviews with Financial Analysts 
SECTION 1: ORGANIZATION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS FUNCTION 
Question 1.1 Please state the number of analyst in your compan). 
Analysts 
Bo, 90TITIK&/Support staff 
Question 1.2 Please specify if you communicate with the top management of the listed companies? 
Question 1.3 With whom of the top management you have rapport frequently? 
01 1) 34 
Not Not at Minor Moderate Large 
A 1* able all extent extent extent 
i) Chain-nan 
PE 
J) CEO 
ill) CFO 
iv) IRO El El 
Question 1.4 Please specify if you know the JR0 in person? 
Question 1.5 Please specify for what issues you talk to the IRO? 
Strategic issues 
Financial issbes 
Question 1.6 How many days per year you or your assocf;; 
l 
talk with the IR 
office, of the targeted listed firms. 
50 days per year 
30 days per year 
10 days per year 
Question 1.7 Does the IR office service you well? 
Yes (with investor relations as the main responsibility-there is an IRO) 
Yes (with investor relations as part of responsibilities-no IRO) 
No 
Question 1.8 How quickly the IR respond to your inquires? 
Within 24 hours 
Within 3 days 
Within a week 
Later 
Never 
Question 1.9 What kind of relationship exists? 
Personal 
Telephone 
Email 
Mail 
Nothing 
Question 1.10 Do you communicate with other com pany departments (i. e. the shareholder registry, 
accounting, etc) 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Question 1.11 Does the office for the retail shareholders (Nletoxologio) compliment the IR function? 
Question 1.12 Please indicate the number of staff w orking for the investor relations 
One F-I 
Two 
Three 
More than 3 
Not Known 
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Question 1.13 Is this staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do they 
perform other duties? 
Yes - work is mainly investor relations 
No - work involves other duties 
Not applicable 
Question 1.14 What constitutes a good and effective IR office? 
SECTION 2: INTERNATIONAL IR ASPECTS AND CONSULTATION 
Question 2.1 Do vou knov*, ifyour targeted companies currently employ the services of an external 
investor relations or financial public relations consultant? 
Yes 
No 
How many 
Percentage 
Question 2.2 Any company currently employ the services of other related to the IR professionals 
(such as Financial Information Services ICarson group, Technimetrics, etc], Web sites specialists, 
Annual report distribution agencies, etc) 
Yes 
No 
How many 
Percentage 
(Dual listinp, cases) 
Question 2.3 Are your targeted dual listed companies? 
Question 2.4 And on what exchanges? 
NYSE 
NASDAQ 
LSE 
FRANKFURT 
OTHER 
Question 2.5 How the dual listing of the stock has influenced the IR function and its activities? 
Question 2.6 Do you observe any difference between listed at the ASE and dual listed companies? 
SECTION 3: SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS FOR THE IR FUNCTION 
Question 3.1 How the analysts and the traders or sales people of the domestic securities firms have 
replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of targeted companies? 
Question 3.2 Do you read / follow regularly the daily's by the brokerage houses? 
Question 3.3 Do the big domestic brokers' "daily market watch" or "daily market news", which is 
distributed to their global database every morning, create disclosure problems for the listed 
companies? 
Question 3.4 Similarly, Do the reports in the Greek newspapers (daily or weekly) substitute the 
official announcements for the listed companies? 
Question 3.5 Do you read the formal "investor releases" released by the IR offices? 
Yes 
No 
Often 
Question 3.6 Do you prefer to talk directly and/or officially with the listed firms? 
25% 
50% 
Not applicable 
Question 3.7 Do you prefer that the firm to have designated 
investors, analysts, newspapers, media, etc? 
Yes 
No 
To whom 
Not applicable 
Question 3.8 If yes. 
Yes 
No 
an Official Spokesperson to the 
ETJ 
Not appilcable II 
Question 3.9 How the sell-side analysts out of London of the big international investment banks and 
their sales people fill-in or duplicate the IR ob for the listed company? 
Question 3.10 Is there any cost and benefit for it, if that happens? 
SECTION 4: MACRO ASPECTS OF THE IR FUNCTION 
Question 4.1 Is there any interdependence and relationship between the IR policies and the 
Corporate Governance in Greece? 
Is this person the IRO? 
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Question 4.2 Can you see any influence or mandatory convergence to the European Corporate 
Governance? 
Question 4.3 Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or forecasting policies? 
Question 4.4 Is there an), learning IR experience (curve) in Greece? 
Question 4.5 Dovou believe that the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute will shorten the learning 
path and time for the listed Greek companies? 
SECTION 5: EXECUTING OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS PROGRANTME 
Question 5.1 Please can vou indicate the means bv which you communicate with the listed targeted 
firms and the importance of the different means of communications? 
SECTION 6: GROUP and ONE-on-ONE COMPANY MEETINGS WITH ANALYSTS 
Question 6.1 Do you participate to group presentations? 
Yes 
No 
Question 6.2 Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these meetings? 
Yes No Not applicable no such official 
i) Director of Research 
ii) Industry Research Analyst 
in) Country Research analyst 
Jv) Team of people 
Question 6.3 Do you participate to one-on-one meetings-presentations? 
Yes 
No 
Question 6.4 Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these private 
meetings? 
Yes No Not applicable 
i) Director of research 
n) Industry research Analyst 
ill) Country research Analyst 
Jv) Team of people 
Question 6.5Does the company keep a record of the proceedings of these meetings? 
Yes No Not Applicable 
General (or group) meetings 
One to one (or individual meetings) 
Question 6.6 How many of these meetings did your company hold in the past twelve months? 
General meetings 
One to one meetings 
Question 6.7Approximately how many officials are invited to these meetings? 
Individuals 
Team 
Question 6.8 Do you set up the meetings or the listed company? 
Fund (Client) 
Your Research department 
Top management 
IRO 
Question 6.9 Can you pro0de an estimate of the number of individuals who have attended at last 
one of group meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
Individuals 
Team 
Question 6.10 Do you go to group presentations, organized by other brokerage firms or banks? 
Always 
Often 
Never 
Question 6.11 Do you go to group presentations, organized by the listed companies themselves? 
Always 
Often 
Never 
Other 
Question 6.12 Please indicate the types of information that the listed companies pro0de to delegates 
at these meetings (special or general). In respect of those types of information that there are 
provided please can you indicate their relative importance. 
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SECTION 7: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 
Question 7.1 Does your company engage in telephone conversation with targeted listed companies? 
Yes No 
Often 
Never 
Question 7.2 Please indicate the company personnel who answer telephone enquiries 
Yes No Not applicable (no such official) 
0 Chain-nan - Non-executive 
ii) CEO 
in) CFO 
iv IRO 
v Company Secretary F9 FF 
vi) Chief Accountant 
vil) Marketing Director F9 F9 F9 
vill) Head of Public Relations 
ix) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant 
Other (Please specify) 
Question 7.3Do you keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
A tape recording is made 
A written record is made 
No record is made 
Question 7ADo you believe that the info provided useful and value added to your evaluation of the 
listed firms? 
Useful 
Partially useful 
Useless 
Other 
SECTION 8: CONI PANY FEEDBACK ON SELL - SIDE ANALYSTS' REPORTS 
Question 8.1 Do you utilize a industry sp ecific analyst? 
Question 8.2 How man), firms you cover each year? 
Question 8.3 Before you ei, aluate a stock, do you consult with your trader and/or the corporate 
finance departmenti 
No whatsoever 
Lightly F1 Very much 
Question 8.4 Before you evaluate a stock, do you consult with other sell-side analysts' reports? 
No whatsoever 
Lightly 
Very much 
Question 8.5 Before you issue the analysis report, how man), times you meet with the top 
management of the targeted firms? 
Chairman of the BoD 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Accounting 
coo 
Question 8.6 Do you visit the premises/headquarters of the targeted company? 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
Question 8.7 How many times you visit the company before or after the report? 
Once 
More x 
Never F1 
SECTION 9: MAILING INFORMATION 
Question 9. ] Do you receive mail information from the listed companies? 
Yes No 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
QtIestion 9.2 What type of information do vou receive? 
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i) Annual report 
ji) Interim report 
in) Quarterly reports 
iv) Copies of announcements sent to 
the company news service of the 
ASE / LSE / NYSE / NASDAQ 
v) Takeover documents 
v0 Company infori-nation brochures 
and other promotional literature 
vil) General press releases 
vill) Documents designed specifically for analysts 
x) Infori-nation not available 
SECTION 10: PROACTIVE ROADSHONAIS (VISITING THE FUND N1ANAGEjjSj 
Question 10.1 Do you use /prefer a roadshovv, communication policy? 
Question 10.2 Is it tactical, offering related or proactive? 
Question 10.3 How many times per year listed companies visit you? 
Once per year 
Twice per year F: 9 
More 
Never 
Other 
Question 10.4 Who participates from the listed company? 
Chain-nan 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 10.5 Who is initiating and organizing it? 
IRO of the listed company 
Other top manager of the listed company 
Your department (Analysis) 
Other Greek brokerage fin-n A = l 
Question 10.6 Does your department or your brokerage ho use organize Offer ing o a hows, 
targeting Greek clients? Greek FMs Global FMs 
Analysis department 
Sales People and Brokers 
Both 
In cooperation with the IRO of the listed company 
In cooperation with an external (le IR) consultant 
In cooperation with other market players 
In cooperation with a global Bank 
Question 10.7 Does your department or your brokerage house organize Relat ioship roadshows, 
targeting Greek clients? Greek FMs Global FMs 
Analysis department 
Sales People and Brokers 
Both 
In cooperation with the IRO of the listed company 
In cooperation with an external (ie IR) consultant M 
In cooperation with other market players 
In cooperation with a global Bank M 6ýa 
Question 10.8 Does your department or your brokerage ho use nize Proac tive roadshows, 
targeting Greek clients? Greek FMs Global FMs 
Analysis department 
Sales People and Brokers 
Both 
In cooperation with the IRO of the listed company 
In cooperation with an external (ie IR) consultant 
In cooperation with other market players 
In cooperation with a global Bank 
Question 10.9 Does the IR helps or plans or directs the focus of the roadshow 
Always 
Sometimes 
Never 
Do not know 
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Question 10.10 Do roadshows help you com ehend better the listed companies? 
Exponentially 
n 
Moderately 
No 
Never valued 
Question 10.11 What do you think of the roadshows done by the Greek companies? 
Question 10.12 Do Nou believe that these roadshows are effective, in terms of liquidity and 
performance? 
Question 10.13 Do you organize roadshows in Greece for global stocks? 
SECTION I]: EMAIL DATA BASE MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
INFORMATION 
Question 11.1 Do vou use the email for info? 
Question 11.2 Do you use the fax for info? 
Question 11.3 Is the email complementary with the Fax system for gathering info? 
Question 11.4 How often you receive press releases via email? 
SECTION 12: CONFERENCE CALLS AS A VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE MEDIUM 
Question 12.1 Do you participate in the conference calls by the listed companies? 
Question 12.2 Do you participate in conference calls with the quarterly results announcements 
(four times annually)? 
Question 12.3 When else you participate in conference call and for what purpose? (Change of 
management, a merger or buyout, major breakthrough ... ?) Question 12.4 What is the average number of participants in the conference calls? 
More than 10 
More than 20 
More than 30 
Question 12.5 Who participates in the conference call from your company? 
Director of Research 
Industry Research Analyst 
Country Research analyst 
Team 
SECTION 13: DISCLOSURE VIA INTER-NET SITES 
Question 13.1 Do you use the targeted listed companies' web site? 
Question 13.2 Do you believe their web site is sufficient and user friendly? 
Question 13.3 Please, evaluate the web sites in terms of information effectiveness? 
Question 13.4 Please, could you recommend any improvements? 
............................................................................................................................... 
endix III: Interviews with Fund Managers 
SECTION 1: ORGANISATION OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS FUNCTION 
Question 1.1 Please state the number of executives in your company. 
Executive directors 
Support staff 
Question 1.2 Please specify if you communicate with the top management of the listed companies? 
Question 1.3 With whom of the top management you have rapport frequently? 
034 
Not Not at Minor Moderate Large 
Applicable all extent extent extent 
i) Chain-nan EJ 
n) CEO 
in) CFO 
F9 E E E iv) IRO 
Other directors (Please specify) 
Question 1.4 Please specify if you know the IRO, in person? 
Question 1.5 Please speciiv for what issues vou talk to the IRO? 
Strategic issues 
Financial issues 
Question 1.6 How many days per year you or your associates talk with the IR 
office. of the targeted listed firms. 
50 days per year 
30 days per year 
10 days per year 
Question I. 7 Does the IR office service you lveil? 
Yes (with investor relations as the main responsibility-there is an IRO) 
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Yes (with investor relations as part of responsibilities-no IRO) 
No 
Question 1.8 How quickly the IR respond to your inquires? 
Within 24 hours 
Within 3 days 
Within a week 
Later 
Never 
Question 1.9 What kind ofrelationship exists? 
Personal 
Telephone 
Email 
Mail 
Nothing 
Other 
Question 1.10 Do you communicate with other company departments (ie the shareholder registry, 
accounting, etc) 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Question ]JI Does the office for the retail shareholders (Metoxologio) compliment the IR function? 
Question 1.12 Please indicate the number of staff working for the investor relations 
One 
Two 
Three 
More than 3 
Not Known 
Question 1.13 Is this staff dedicated to investor relations / finance public relations work or do they 
perform other duties? 
Yes - work is mainly investor relations 
No - work involves other duties 
Not applicable 
Question 1.14 What constitutes a good and effective IR office? 
SECTION 2: INTERNATIONAL IR ASPECTS AND CONSULTATION 
Question 2. ] Do you know if your targeted companies currently employ the services of an external 
investor relations or financial public relations consultant? 
Yes 
No 
How many 
Percentage 
Question 2.2 Any company currently employ the services of other related to the IR professionals 
(such as Financial Information Services ICarson group, Technimetrics, etc], Web sites specialists, 
Annual report distribution agencies, 6tc) 
Yes 
No 
How many 
Percentage 
(Dual listi p- cases) 
Question 2.3 Are your targeted dual listed companies? 
Question 2.4 And on what exchanges? 
NYSE 
NASDAQ 
LSE 
FRANKFURT 
OTHER 
Question 2.5 How the dual listing of the stock has influenced the IR function and its activities? 
Question 2.6 Do you observe an), difference between listed at the ASE and dual listed companies? 
SECTION 3: SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS FOR THE IR FUNCTION 
Question 3.1 How the analysts and the traders or sales people of the domestic securities firms have 
replaced and/or duplicated the IR function of targeted companies? 
Question 3.2 Do you read / follow regularly the daily's by the brokerage houses? 
Question 3.3 Do the big domestic brokers' "daily market watch" or "daily market news", which is 
distributed to their global database every morning, create disclosure problems for the listed 
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companies? Question 3.4 Similarly. DO the reports in the Greek newspapers (daily or weekly) 
substitute the official announcements for the listed comanies? 
Question 3.5 Do you read the formal "investor releases': released by the IR offices? 
Yes 
No 
Often 
Question 3.6 Do you prefer to talk directly and/or officially N%ith the listed firms? 
2 5'ý'O 
50% 
Not applicable 
Question 3.7 Do you prefer that the firm to have designated an Official Spokesperson to the 
investors, analysts, newspapers, media, etc) 
Yes 
No 
To whom 
Not applicable 
Question 3.8 If yes. Is this person the IRO? 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 
Question 3.9 How the sell-side analysts out of London of the big international investment banks and 
their sales people fill-in or duplicate the IR job for the listed company? 
Question 3.10 Is there any cost and benefit for it, if that happens? 
SECTION 4: INIACRO ASPECTS OF THE IR FUNCTION 
Question 4.1 Is there any interdependence and relationship between the IR policies and the 
Corporate Governance in Greece? 
Question 4.2Can you see any influence or mandatory convergence to the European Corporate 
Governance? 
Question 4.3 Do you believe that the industry structure and the competitive dynamics in Greece 
influence the setting and the application of specific voluntary disclosure or forecasting policies? 
Question 4.4 Is there any learning IR experience (curve) in Greece? 
Question 4.5 Do you believe that the Hellenic Investor Relations Institute will shorten the learning 
path and time for the listed Greek companies? 
SECTION 5: EXECUTING OF THE INVESTOR RELATIONS PROGRAMME 
Question 5.1 Please can you indicate the means by which you communicate with the listed targeted 
firms and the importance of the different means of communications? 
SECTION 6: COMPANY MEETINGS WITH ANALYSTS AND FUND MANAGERS 
Question 6.1 Do you participate to group presentations? 
Yes 
No 
Question 6.2 Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these meetings? 
Yes No Not ficable 
J) Top Fund Manager 
ii) Industry Fund Manager 
ill) Analyst 
Jv) Team of people 
Question 6.3 Doyou participate to one-on-one meetings-presentations? 
Question 6.4 Which company officials represent the company at some or all of these private 
meetings? 
i) Top Fund Manager 
n) Industry Fund Manager 
in) Analyst 
iv) Team of people 
Question 6.5Does the companý 
Yes No Not applicable 
keep a record of the proceedings of these meeting 
Yes No Not Applicable 
General (or group) meetings 
One to one (or individual meetings) 
Question 6.6 How man. N, t y of these meetings did your company hold in the past twel e mon hs? 
General meetings 
One to one meetings 
Question 6.7Appro\imatelY hoNv many officials are invited to these meetings? 
Individuals 
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Team 
Question 6.8 Do vou set up the meetings or the listed company? 
Fund 
IRO 
Top management 
Brokerage House (XP1jPaT1C5TTjP1CtKý) 
Other 
Question 6.9 Can you provide an estimate of the number of individuals who have attended at last 
one of group meetings (special or general) in the past 12 months? 
Individuals 
Team 
Question 6.10 Do you go to group presentations. organized by the brokerage firms? 
Always 
Often 
Never 
Question 6.1 ]Do you go to group presentations, organized by the listed companies themselves? 
Always 
Very often 
Often 
Never 
Question 6.12 Please indicate the types of information that the listed companies provide to delegates 
at these meetings (special or general). In respect of those types of information that there are 
provided please can you indicate their relative importance. 
SECTION 7: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 
Question 7. ] Does your company engage in telephone conversation with targeted listed companies? 
Yes No 
Often 
Never 
Question 7.2 Please indicate the company personnel who answer telephone enquiries 
Yes No Not applicable 
i) Chairman - Non-executive 
n) CEO 
in) CFO 
iv IRO 
v Company Secretary El EE 
v0 Chief Accountant 
vil) Marketing Director FFF 
vill) Head of Public Relations 
ix) External Financial Public 
Relations Consultant 
Question 7.3 Do you keep a record of these telephone conversations? 
A tape recording is made 
A written record is made 
No record is made 
Question 7.4 Do you believe that the info provided useful and value added to your evaluation of the 
listed firms? 
Useful 
Partially useful 
Useless 
SECTION 8: COMPANY FEEDBACK ON SELL - SIDE ANALYSTS' REPORTS 
Question 8.1 Do you utilize a buy side analyst? 
Question 8.2 How man), firms you cover each year? 
Question 8.3 Before you invest in a stock, do you consult with your analyst? 
No whatsoever 
Slightly 
Very much R 
Question 8.4 Before you invest in a stock, do you consult with the sell-side analysts' reports? 
No whatsoever 
Slighfly 
Verv much R 
Question 8.5 Is the company analysis sufficient? 
Often 
Sometimes 
, 27 
Never 
Question 8.6 Beforeyou invest. do you visit the premises/headquarlers of the targeted company? 
Often 
Sometimes F Never 
Question 8.7 How many times you visit the company before or after the investment? 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
SECTION 9: MAILING INFORMATION 
Question 9. ] Do you receive mail information from the listed companies? 
Yes No 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
Question 9.2 What type of information do you receive? 
j) Annual report 
n) Interim report 
in) Quarterly reports 
iv) Copies of announcements sent to 
the company news service of the 
ASE / LSE / NYSE / NASDAQ 
v) Takeover docurnents 
vi) Company information brochures 
and other promotional literature 
vii) General press releases 
vill) Documents designed specifically 
for analysts 
Other, please specify 
x) Information not available 
SECTION 10: PROACTIVE ROADSHONNIS (VISITING THE FUND MANAGERS) 
Question 10.1 Do you use /prefer a roadshow communication policy? 
Question 10.2 Is it tactical, offering related or proactive? 
Offering Roadshows 
Relationship Roadshows 
Proactive Roadshows 
Combination 
Other 
Question 10.3 How many times per year listed companies visit you? 
Once per year 
Twice per year F9 
More 
Never 
Other 
Question 10.4 Who participates from the listed company? 
Chairman 
CEO 
CFO 
IRO 
Question 10.5 Who is organizing it? 
Global bank (Morgan, Lehman-) 
Institution 
Greek bank 
Greek brokerage firm 
Company itself 
Question 10.6 Does the IR helps or plans or directs the focus of the roadshow 
Always 
Sometimes 
Never 
Do not know 
Question 10.7 Do roadshows help you com hend better the listed companies? 
Exponentially 
Nloderately 
328 
No 
Never valued 
Question 10.8 What do you think of the roadshows done by the Greek companies? 
Question 10.9 Are you a target for global stocks? 
European listed companies 
American listed companies 
Neighboring (Balkan. Middle East, -) 
listed companies 
Other Emerging Markets 
Question 10.10 Do you participate in Global Investor Conferences? 
SECTION H: EMAIL DATA BASE MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
INFORI%IATION 
Question IL] Do you use the email for info? 
Question 11.2 Do you use the fax for info? 
Question 11.3 Is the email complementary with the Fax system for gathering info? 
Question 11.4 Ho", often you receive press releases via email? 
SECTION 12: CONFERENCE CALLS AS A VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE MEDIUM 
Question 12.1 Do you participate in the conference calls by the listed companies? 
Question 12.2 Do you participate in conference calls with the quarterly results announcements 
(four times annually)? 
Question 12.3 When else you participate in conference call and for what purpose? (Change of 
management, a merger or buyout, major breakthrough ... ?) Question 12.4 What is the average number of participants in the conference calls? 
More than 10 
More than 20 
More than 30 
Question 12.5 Who participates in the conference call from your company? 
Top Fund Manager 
Industry Fund Manager 
Buy side analyst 
Team 
SECTION 13: DISCLOSURE VIA INTERNET SITES 
Question 13.1 Do you use the targeted listed companies' web site? 
Question 13.2 Do you believe their web site is sufficient and user friendly? 
Question 13.3 Please, evaluate the web sites in ten-ns of infori-nation effectiveness? 
Question 13.4 Please, could you recommend any improvements? 
......................................... 
4.................................................................................... 
Appendix IV: Response Rate to the Semi-Structured Interviews 
Response Rate to Interviews 
RESPONSE RATES TO THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS and QUESTIONNAIRES 
Response Initial mailing In terviews Success Rate FTSE/ASE index Listed 
% of 0. of % of % of % of Index No of % 
No. total NO. total Initial No. tota I Initial Listed Firms Firms ofFTSE 
Top Management I 
Chairman of the BoD 14 8.5% FTSEASE 20 16 80% 
CEO 11 6.8% FTSEASE 40 25 63% 
CFO 15 9.2% FTSEASE 80 35 44% 
IRO 36 21.9% Other 0 0 
tal Subto 250 70.5% 76 46.4% 30.4% 76 46.4% 30.4% Subtotal 76 - ý4.30/6 
. Analysts 
Locals 35 9.8% 34 20.7% 97.1% 1 
London based 10 2.8% 10 6.1% 100% 
Subtotal 45 12.6% 44 1 26.8% 97.8% 44 26.8% 97.8% 
Locals 40 11.3% 26 15.9% 65% 
London based 20 5.6% 18 10.9% 90% 
Subtotal 60 16.9% 44 26.8% 73.3% 44 26.8% 73.3% 
-Fesearch Total 355 100% 1 164 1 100% 164 100% 46.2% 
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